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MEDIA AND MONEY ARE NOT FOR GRASSROOTS:
THE UTOONI EXPERIENCE

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MEDIA PREDATORS PREY ON GRASSROOTS

Utooni is a media event. Utooni was the lead story on CBS News report on the UN's 40th anniversary. The UN earned the coverage out of an old beat-up pickup given to Utooni by UNICEF! Utooni has attracted stars -Harry Belafonte's daughter among others, who come as agents for those in the development business be they NGOs, bilaterals or multilaterals. Utooni has been filmed, videod published, stripped and photographed endlessly. Utooni is attractive to development and media predators for they can cruise on tarmac to within thirty kilometers and then rough it! It is very much within the reach of touring dignitaries therefore.

The dignitaries pay media to sing their praises on Utooni. Yet for those who participate in its development, Utooni is not just medium and message. It is life. It is living. For those who want to dig into possible real development - defined as life itself - in this corner of Kalama Location of Machakos District, Eastern Province, Kenya, a journey into the interior of Utooni may give some apt lessons. The balance of this paper gives an outline of Utooni project. It is an outline for a development process more complex than can be adequately covered in the space and time allowed.

ALTHOUGH IN THE BEGINNING WAS A MAN

Utooni started organizing the community in 1978. More precisely, a Mr. J. Mukusya returned to the community after a short and varied work experience and started DIALOGUE ABOUT DEVELOPMENT with the community. Mr. Mukusya is a young man. It is therefore not surprising that the community looked at his activities and ideas with a dose of skepticism. How could this young man articulate development! After all there were more educated, experienced and knowledgeable people in the community.

Mukusya's initial message was beguiling by its simplicity. It was only that the COMMUNITY HAD TO WORK OUT ITS PRIORITIES and how they were to be implemented WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF COMMUNITY RESOURCES. Development is by communities for communities, he preached.

THEN A COMMUNITY

Utooni started in 1978 as a simple six family work group based on the traditional mwethya (work group). Then it was only interested in growing vegetables, significantly not for nutritional purposes but to earn cash. By the end of the year the group had attracted other members so it formed a committee to run its affairs.

Utooni was lucky to have leadership in the original group which had some experience outside the community. Through this leadership, the group sought commercially better tomato seeds. Within a year they had thought the way to grow was to form a horticultural society. In Kalama Location, there was a coffee cooperative already. The Horticultural Cooperative was formed in 1979. In spite of getting a very good crop of tomatoes in the year, the expected help in marketing, by the District Cooperative Union, did not materialize and the coop had vast losses. This led to turning away from the cooperative track as a vehicle for development. Utooni has operated as a community development project since.

Between 1978 and 1980 no formal development work took place. The community discussed, argued and planned. Since the community and the leadership (in the person of Mukusya) were jealous of being hijacked into other people's development priorities, they were very cautious about entanglements. The first outside support they solicited was from the Ministry of Agriculture for soil conservation tools. Since the "locally-based" technical assistant was not interested, the community in 1980, sent its own for training in laying out contour terraces. This was appropriate for they were convinced that the first development priority was to conserve the land resource. This enabled the group to actually construct terraces which were within the capability of the community for the major input was labor. It was extremely

important that the first collective activity succeed. IT DID.

In 1980, the leadership turned to World Neighbors for assistance in conducting a community development needs survey. This was done the same year. In descending order of priority development needs were identified by the community as: 1. Water 2. Social problems 3. Family health 4. Income generation 5. Food production 6. Livestock improvement 7. Tree planting/soil conservation 8. Food storage and 9. Training. Those who currently harp on training as the true way to development should note that at least in this community, it ranks last.

Having prioritized development needs, Utooni began the first subsurface dam. It was to be used to expand the vegetable nursery for the expanding group. It was also to provide water for livestock so that labor would be released for development activities. Small scale funding was provided by the National Council of Churches of Kenya and Machakos Catholic Diocese Development Office.

From 1980 the community decided that all funds got from a donor for some activity would be matched in the community. This is over and above the organizational costs and direct labor contributed by the community. This however does not mean that project benefits only go to members who can come up with the matching funds. The members decide who is to get the benefit. If they cannot pay, the project loans them money from a community fund. It also does not mean that the leadership has priority on donor derived benefits. If anything they tend to be last.

By the end of the first serious implementation year, 40 water jars were built. Of these, 20 were financed by donor funds and 20 by the community fund. Each member contributed K.Shs. 300 (US\$20). This was over and above the project membership fee of K.Shs. 5 (US\$ 0.35) and project share payment of K.Shs. 20 (US\$ 1.35).

WITHOUT BUREAUCRATS

No outsiders were ever involved in the initial development work of Utooni. The Ministry of Agriculture technical assistants did not aid in the activities. In fact it was not till July 1985 that the technical assistant showed up at a site when the Utooni people were working. He was there only to guide the District Agricultural Officer who was visiting the area for the FIRST time.

The support which was given to Utooni by the Ministry in 1980 was in materials - shovels, mattocks and jembes - used in the construction of terraces. The leaders had to travel to Machakos to beg for the materials. No officials followed it to check on their use or even whether they got to the people they were

intended. This is sad commentary on the Ministry's staff and its donor driven tools program effectiveness.

The local administration personnel were never involved until 1986 for they saw the organization as a threat to their hold on the population. Things got so out of hand that the local administrators, assistant chiefs and chief, were complaining to the local MP that they did not know what Utooni was all about. The implication was that there was some kind of subversive activity going on. It had to take the intervention of some consultants with the District Commissioner to slow what was building up as an administrative and political attack on the Utooni community project.

BUT WITH ALLIES

By 1986 Utooni had funding experience with as varied donors as National Council of Churches of Kenya, Catholic Diocese of Machakos, UNICEF, British Embassy Small Grants, American Embassy Small Grants, World Neighbors, British Boy Scouts, Oxfam, and development conscious individuals.

The leadership at Utooni initially sought out National Council of Churches of Kenya, who had a program in the District for subsurface dams. The Diocese of Machakos, which had a Dutch Volunteers water engineer, assisted with design and location. NCKK gave cement for these in 1981. Mukusya for a time was taken as the NCKK field staff.

Several points are worth noting. First it was Utooni leadership which went looking for help from an NGO which was around but which did not know Utooni. Second, Utooni had dim memories in the collective mind about the importance of subsurface dams both as sources of water and also as a conservation technique. The community had agreed to work on them for the two reasons. Third, the NGO, NCKK saw a resource person for maximizing its field operation and grabbed him.

The net result of all the above points is that the community and the NGO were flexible enough to identify mutually beneficial actions. Why did not the Ministry of Agriculture think of this?

When the history of development of Kenya is done, UNICEF's role in publicizing appropriate technology out of Karen - one of the richest suburbs of the capital city Nairobi! - will feature. Mukusya and Utooni got to visit this site in 1981. Within the UNICEF system of appropriate technologies nothing was then being pushed as hard as the galla water jars. UNICEF pushed them in conjunction with water filters. The argument was that once households built the galla water jar to collect roof water, they would need the filter for roof water had filth or their management of the collected water would introduce filth.

Utooni, in its characteristic fashion challenged this UNICEF system. They accepted building the water jars but rejected building the filters. Filters would have cost K.Shs. 400 (US\$ 27). The community felt that this was too expensive for the benefits which were supposed to come from filtering contaminated rain water. The community accepted that building water jars would be a major qualitative jump as far as the contamination of water in the community was concerned. Rain water was a great improvement over the contaminated ponds, springs, dams etc. Filtering it would not be cost effective. They thus rejected filters.

If one can argue that the first activities i.e. subsurface dams and water jars were predictable, the next project at Utooni was dramatic and extremely radical in terms of the parameters within which Kenya thinks of rural development.

LENDING EACH TO EACH

Having begun to deal with soil and water conservation which made a platform for better food production, Utooni decided that to improve nutrition of the community they needed more milk in the community and more fertilizer to improve crop production. Thus a credit scheme.

Credit was targeted. It was to help the community to buy grade animals and fertilizer. The logic of this choice is flawless. Milk would improve nutrition. Fertilizers would improve nutrition as well as assure a surplus food for the market. In the short term, artificial fertilizers were needed to kick food production to a higher plane. However, the milk cows would also produce organic manure which in the long term would replace artificial fertilizer.

Who was to capitalise the credit scheme? Mukusya had been talking to World Neighbors about the nature of community based development from 1979 to 1982. World Neighbors brings to its projects a fundamental commitment that it is communities who design and implement their own development. To World Neighbors, any NGO interested in development work, should be no more but a supplier of grease to assure smooth running of the development so designed. They thus agreed to capitalize the loan scheme with Shs. 40,000 (US\$ 2667) in 1982. This loan scheme had a default rate of ONLY 2% from 1982 to 1985. It is therefore the complete antithesis of the region's rural credit experience where default rates are between sixty and ninety per cent whether the funding source is NGO, government, bilateral or multilateral not to mention the vehicles, accounting staff, plush offices, and field extension workers costs associated with such failures. All decisions on its operation and collection and reallocation (from 1986 it became a revolving fund) are handled by the community.

ENERGIZING AND CREATING

By 1982 Utooni decided to create formal structure to handle their activities. One has to remember that during the first year - 1978 - only 200 families (or about 1,600 people) were involved. After two years about 10,000 people were involved. By 1985 Utooni activities covered the sublocations of Katanga, Iiuni and Mukuyuni. No formal census has been done yet to establish current coverage but it is not unrealistic to estimate it as close to 20,000 people.

To handle these numbers of people, the following sector specific departments were created in 1982, Livestock Development: Food Production: Water Conservation: Social Problems: Family Health: Food Storage Technology: Soil Conservation and Tree Planting: and finally Training. Each department is run by a committee. The nine identified areas of development needs give the project its management structure of committees which oversee the various sectors. All the committees are coordinated in a supra committee made up of the chairpersons and the two facilitators (Mukusya and Muia each with respective responsibilities for fund-raising and accounts). This is the planning body.

In terms of management style, no major decision is made for the project without open discussion in a members forum. The individual committees hold these meetings and coordinate with the related or supra committee as necessary. Facilitators or committees cannot make any decisions without authority of the public meetings. All project benefits e.g. where to build a subsurface dams or who to give a cow, are made in a public meeting usually held during a working day after completion of a job.

Decisions on what is to be done are therefore discussed at the community level. If a problem is identified it is assigned the specific sector department to discuss, solicit further views and or send it for further discussion and resolution at community level. Once a department has specific recommendation it moves the issue up to the central coordinating committee whereby activities, funds and work schedules are harmonized.

Such a rigid description of how decisions are made does not do justice to the leadership style which allows and solicits community prioritization and involvement in execution.

What has Utooni achieved? In our opinion the BASIC ACHIEVEMENT has been in ORGANIZING AND ENERGIZING THE COMMUNITY. This is unquantifiable.

This basic achievement should not be used to mask the obvious development outputs which are there on the ground for all the ^{and} sundry to see. By the end of 1985, 58 water tanks worth Ksh.

185,600 (US\$ 12,375); 171 water jars worth Ksh. 136,800 (US\$ 9,120); 54 improved toilets worth Ksh. 75,600 (US\$ 5,040); 40 Jersey cows worth Ksh. 2,000,000 (US\$ 133,334); a subsurface dam worth Ksh. 100,000 (US\$ 6,667); five river barrages worth Ksh. 800,000 (US\$ 53,334); a gravity piped water scheme worth Ksh. 3,000,000 (US\$ 200,000) were completed. The costings are only for materials. Community labor is not costed. Utooni argues that the labor cost is about one and a half times the materials cost. This is backed by experience in similar projects.

These activities costing close to US\$ 1,000,000, undertaken by the community over a five year period, WITHOUT FOOD FOR WORK - which many now see as the only avenue for getting community action - are impressive by any quantitative measure.

There of course are facts indicative of basic development impact in the community. Consider the fact that it was estimated that on average families were using 60 liters of water in 1982. It was estimated that they were using 120 liters of better quality water by end of 1986 from as varied sources as roof catchments, subsurface dams and gravity fed systems. Consider also that diarrhoea which used to be the most endemic disease at health facilities is not reported now. When it occurs, it is handled at the family level. Consider further that basic new cropping patterns involving traditional crops, hybrids, vegetables, fodder, fertilizers and manure are now the norm rather than the exception. Consider also that the project organized famine relief before the cooperatives and government and there was no need for other outsiders to come into the area during the 1984 drought. As a result there was not speculation on grains as was found in less development-oriented areas. Consider the savings to the community simply because Utooni buys what must be sold and holds it in the community. They are self-sufficient in crop and tree seed. No multinational need apply to supply these.

Finally consider that crop storage and pest protection is now widely spread and that the members are required and supervised by the community to ensure that each family reverts to the traditional practice of holding sufficient quantities of grain in store for at least two seasons so as to beat the cyclical local patterns. All these are basic contributions to development which do not lend themselves to easy quantification.

BY PARTICIPATION

To ensure that members participate in all group labor activities, and on time, a fine of K.Shs. 4 (US 0.25) is charged for lateness. This goes into the community fund used to match donor funding. Community members who work outside the community are charged K.Shs. 150 (US\$ 10) per work day. Minimum daily labor pay is Ksh. 15 (US\$ 1) in the environs. Thus the high charge is deliberate. It seeks to ensure that the project does not become

a place where the local rich take advantage of the community labor input. At the same time premium is put on using the laboring days for learning about development.

ADAPTED TECHNIQS

Within four years of inception, four of the priorities had programs on the ground. These are water, with galla water jars and subsurface dams, income generating with vegetables, improved food production with better seeds and practices and livestock with improved cockerels and grade milk animals. The project had learned and evaluated the various technics from the menus offered by various development agencies.

For example it had looked at the limitations of the galla water jar and had moved on to building bigger (750 gallon) ones. By 1984 it had moved to 1700 and 3,000 gallon tanks developed within the project after evaluating all available designs.

As early as 1983, it had found the synergistic nature of development. For example, when the department of Social Problems was formally started in 1983, it was primarily to handle issues related to the sexual division of labor. An explanation is apropos.

Kamba culture locks some tasks to specific sexes. For example, drawing water is seen as a female activity. In 1983, the community decided that it was to work five days every week to construct a gravity water system to a primary school where later it was to build a community technology center. To ensure availability of labor in concentrated form, the community had to solve the old problem of some homestead jobs being locked to the man or the woman. The community knew there would be serious family conflicts if there was no dialogue to establish that those who were left home all day would take care of all home activity. Community dialogue got all the members to agree to end the traditional sexist division of labor. This not only released labor for the construction of the gravity water system but also led to more equal distribution of labor ^{between} among the sexes within other activities.

FOR THE DEVELOPMENT SYNERGISM

By 1980/81 the second priority of social problems was extensively discussed in the community. It was concluded that social problems were related to low incomes basically. This could be tackled immediately with community resources through improving agricultural production by learning from the better farmers. A coherent community extension system was started outside the formal Ministry of Agriculture system within the community. Traditional food crops like sorghums, millets, sweet potatoes, cassava, and some new ones like amaranths, soya beans, improved

pigeon peas, improved cow peas etc. were introduced. But perhaps the most important better farming innovation were the reclamation projects of farm and grazing land by terracing and planting of fodder grass and traditional and introduced nitrogen fixing trees which also happen to be important in honey production.

As the community went down the list of its priorities, it increasingly found that they were interrelated. For example, as it sought to handle family health, the problems of access to balanced diets within the resources of the community intruded. The shortage of reliable sources of protein was seen as a major problem. The project decided to activate priority six, livestock, so as to generate milk in the community. The decision was also made to improve local chickens. In 1981 it was able to link up with the Diocese of Machakos cockerel exchange project. On cattle, community individuals were trained by the Ministry of Agriculture so as to locate the experience in the community and outside the formal extension system.

TO FIGHT FAMINE

1984 was one of the worst famine years in Kenya. Anticipating the problem in the community, the Utooni conducted a community food needs survey and procured the needed food ~~from the~~ directly from the District Commissioner who was supervisor of the Government of Kenya famine relief supplies. This was sold to those in need at cost. This marginalized local speculators who were selling at very high prices. Little of the relief food was utilized as food for work in some creative ways. The majority of the project members worked on the subsurface dams to get it. Farmers with poor farms - no conservation structures, low yields, little crop diversification, etc. - were asked to work on their land under the supervision of the community extension system, to qualify for food for work.

The Social Problems and Health Committees surveyed the community during the drought to evaluate the health status, family planning status, seed distribution, and to identify urgent forward planning needs. Their conclusions led to a program of VIP toilets, the need to build a community health facility next to the technology center to handle technical family planning among others, and provision of apparel to poor families whose children did not have appropriate clothes. Between then and 1986, 56 VIP toilets are completed, the health facility is complete and so is the technology center.

This year of drought matured the project for it was handling all the priorities in ways which will take too long to describe. It was intervening not only in the production system of the society, but was introducing technics in health, agriculture, agroforestry and reforestation, education, and most basic mediating to the values held by the members about what is

possible. It was handling many donors. Perhaps it is more accurate to say it was seeking technics and finances in a style which assured that no donor or institution, external to the community, was setting the development agenda for the community. It was making sure that community derived contributions MATCHED/SURPASSED donor contributions. Thus there was to be no dependency. Significantly no external personnel were hired.

By the end of 1986, the project had established its own food mill, completed subsurface dams storing about 15 million gallons, built a health center and a technology center, and introduced indigenous and exotic trees, new vegetables, improved chickens and grade cattle to the farming systems. But perhaps most basic, it had energized the community to be arrogantly sure about what was to be done. There are no yoyos in Utooni.

AGAINST PREDATOR PUBLICITY

Yet by 1989 all is not well with Utooni. Publicity led to many donors wanting a slice of the VERY SUCCESSFUL Utooni action. The slice would be their program. Many who wanted to be associated did try and to shape the development agenda. They wanted to fund THOSE ACTIVITIES WHICH FITTED THEIR AGENDA. In so doing they began to create conflict within what was a peaceful and participatory community development process. Some sought to mobilize women for, it was argued, they were oppressed. This led to quarrels within the group about the representation at different levels. At times some women were put up front although they had not been legitimized by a community process. One donor with a very strong western feminist bias sought to get the committee structures changed to fit her sexist notions on sexual proportional representation. This was against the reality in the community which shows that women are truly and systematically represented in all activities and leadership of the community development structures.

Other donors sought to use those who built Utooni to mount district wide activities similar to Utooni. The core leadership was therefore hijacked. Since it was now mobile and salaried, it was contaminated and therefore open to attack by the community. Since there were many donors and their media praise singers staying with the leadership on their tourist development safaris, some in the community kept asking for the cargo which they believed was distributed to the leadership at night. After all why would so many come so often without cargo, they asked. Ironically this was supported by the cultural tradition. You never visited without gifts. The leadership had to spend valuable time explaining that the praise singers and the tourist developers were only showing solidarity with the community success. This did not set. Many further resented the fact that leaders were called to be facilitators in far places. The leaders in their view became of the other.

Some community members started queries on leaders lifestyle and possible corruption. In short the community turned on itself like the proverbial spider who eats the progeny. In all this, those in the development business have contributed to the rot by their demands on the community and the leadership. It is in this spirit that one shares Harold Miller's view that money married to and by media corrupts sustainable grassroots development.

The Utooni experience in relevant community driven development and its current problems graphically illustrates that at all times such development must be protected from the media which is usually brought into the scene by donors. Donors crave the publicity mainly for Northern fund raising purposes and for internal performance indexing reasons. The upshot usually is that the publicity attracts others to be identified with the success. They come with funding needs and activity development processes which, not only stretch the leadership but also put management needs on community structures. The demands fracture the social fabric. This breeds conflicts within the communities which ultimately kill the spirit of community based development. This is not a new finding. However, it has been ignored by many donors.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

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There is a basic sense in which institutional development is an innovative insider affair and thus beyond the reach (in J.P. Nettls sense) of technical assistance for institutions are creatures of their particular social-political specificity. They are created and nurtured by the societies to undertake specific roles. When they do not fulfil those roles, they are cast aside by the society. Often, developmentalists, in their over concern with minutiae, do not accept that society marginalises institutions by denying them resources or status. Furthermore, society at times nurtures and funds competing and contradictory institutions in its quest for long term survival. The tension over continual innovation and redefinition of roles and agenda for society then becomes the basis for institutional development.

In this perspective then, the primary problem of technical assistance for institutional development is the externality of the giver, and the giving to the socio-political dictates. For example an external source, say a multilateral donor, defines management of say, public institutions as an area requiring institutional support. In that definition, the external source may even show evidence that those managers responsible for public institutions have actually identified the need. In that process the external entity forgets that the managers of insider institutions may be only defending their personal/professional interests and not necessarily those of the institution by their receiving.

Indigents are the subjects of giving and receiving. Equals share. Institutions by their very nature are equals and thus they always share. However, those who run institutions are always less than the institution and thus can become indigents who give and receive. In short then the problematique of institutional development is fundamentally the problem of defining socio-political priorities and the institutions and resources needed to achieve them at a specific time and space in specific social systems.

We can then understand the circular logic of both the receivers and the givers when they complain that some already defined tasks are not been done. Soyinka's expat. expert is frustrated because his knowledge system is ignored by those who matter. The only takers are Achebe's efulefu - empty worthless people - who have no chance of making a difference in the margin at that particular point in time. However we should not ignore them for the taking gives them a resource to trade in the socio-cultural system and in the future. Depending on the cargo, they can become socio-

political actors who develop institutions. We should always remember how colonial Africa transformed the role of traditional nobodies by christianisation to educated spivs initially and later to African Nationalists, some of whom became fathers (mothers, aunts uncles and chiefs) of nations. In christian Ethiopia, Oromo, Eritrean and Tigrinya outsiders seem to be on the same dialectic. So are Liberia's interior (how accurate sociologically) people, in spite of current headlines.

Technical Assistance and Cooperation can only be useful in institution building and thus development, first in the long term. This is so because a particular set, with access to the interior of a particular society, must pick up the cargo and embed it in the socio-political system. Long term in this case means at least a generation. Remember that since 1956 and or 1957 and now there is not a complete generation which has had a chance to stamp its seal on society. Power is still held by those socialised under colonialism. It was in this sense that Africa 2057 clearly argued that the first Africa driven innovations will not become central in public affairs until after 2015.

The second point is that TA@C can increase the possibility of rooting in the African soil if the structure and process of administering TA@C for institution building begins to assume equals. It is time external powers, intellectuals, and assorted development practitioners begun to accept that there are societies who know what they want and make the requisite decisions about how to get there. It will mean that those sent out will have to be more mature than in the past when it tended to be the place to get experience. Further it means that the TA personnel will have to be treated less than royalty. Their activities must become part and parcel of the existing institutions, as local area networks, and not the stand alones, the general pattern of the past. It also will mean most of the training will have to be done on the continent and by at best a mixture of the continent's people and external resource persons. Such training will have to be on the job and not based on some theoretical settings and alien documentation as in the past.

Equally important African societies have to intensify looking for innovations from within themselves. They rely on cargo too much without understanding that such reliance is a sure path towards the death of particular socio-political systems. If a nation can not feed itself, it will surely be recolonised. If a nation cannot innovate and generate wealth, including food, it will surely die. That is the challenge. Only institutional development oriented towards these fundamentals is worth supporting. Systems of reward of innovators will have to be put into place. Knowledge will have to be pooled in the fashion of how Ethiopia built its airline by conceptualising everything from high school training to pilot training and drawing many local institutions together to benefit from an external source. Also innovating institutions will have to be liberated to ride the thermals like the eagle.

Third, individuals can make a difference in the margin. If you are a foreigner to this continent, your role is marginal. Joseph

Conrad knew this. You can only learn to share what knowledge you have and assume that those you share with will permutate it and find some use for it in the socio-political arena. You have no business trying to determine what Africa does. You can only be a preacher who creates catechists! In short, this is a different role from the past role of external developmentalists. It calls for a problem solver and not a change agent. It calls for a team player rather than a power holder. It calls for a participant rather than a boss. It calls for a person willing to accept the logic of other cultures and systems. The cliché - a secure innovator.

If you are an African, you can become a catechist. This though will not be as simple as reading and writing of yester years. You will have to decide on how the new informatics can be used for spreading agricultural knowledge as opposed to bloating ministries with extensionists who never talk to farmers. You will have to worry about tissue culture and genetic engineering to reclaim farmland and rangelands. You will have to worry about spans of control in the context of tribalistic management systems. You will have to worry about bypassing the motor car industry and getting into electronics the basis of future industries. Above all you will have to become an economic pan africanist as opposed to political pan africanists who froze borders in the OAU charter. Above all you will have to make controlling aids a national priority for it will actually wipe out some political systems. In short, a manager of innovations addressing pressing societal issues. This role is the antithesis of the placid manager of inherited structures doing what they have always done with the same outdated techniques. It is a role of a manager seeking and using globally available knowledge, mediated by socio-political specificity and thus not depended on imaged magic.

The catechists of yester years were extremely arrogant about knowing what was of the foreigner. You have to imitate them, know, act and pass on knowledge. Like the catechist of past, you will not be honoured. You are not likely to get rich. You are not likely to be powerful in spite of many stating that your base, the bureaucracy, is the real power on the continent! Yet society in the long term will get to appreciate your marginality and contribution and thus clone you as an ancestor, a prophet, a mugwe, an okoriot. In this way the theoretical and practical basis of institutional development will be rooted in the traditions of the specific socio-political system.

USING AND BUILDING AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT
AND MANAGEMENT CONSULTANCY CAPACITY

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WHO IS AN AFRICAN CONSULTANT

TYPE 1: Okike, came from a third generation Christian family. He was studious and therefore the American fundamentalist missionaries urged the father to keep him on the narrow path. After completing O levels he started training in accounts. However in the late fifties, during the fever of independence he got a scholarship to go to the midwest of the USA to study economics. Within three years he was accepted in Harvard for graduate studies. On coming back to his country, he was one of the first locals to get into the planning ministry which was foreign dominated. For twenty five years he moved up the ladder and retired with a reputation as the most clean public servant. He also had a reputation of being depended on foreign advisers. In a way his dependency was what some in the political arena used against him. He defends his use of foreign advisers on the basis of objectivity and lack of involvement in local political tradeoffs. Ironically after retiring Okike was only offered a sinecure for many saw him as knowing too many secrets. He created a consulting company, but before he would hang shingle, two multilateral donors bought all his time for a very good rate. He facilitates their projects on continental basis.

TYPE 2: Musa came from a very rich traditional family. His father was one of the first traders to make so much money that it was visible. Musa was sent to United States by his family about the same time Okike went on a scholarship. There the trading skills he had learned presumably from his father came in handy. He ran an export import company selling African art to the beach combers of California. He had a Jaguar and a Mercedes Benz in the sixties as a graduate student. He went into education and got his thesis written for him for a fee. He came home to teach at the local university and simultaneously went into a joint venture making shoes with foreigners, who he swindled to finance a consulting company in the early seventies. The company grew very fast because the top bureaucrats in the country were silent partners. Musa only markets. The work now is done by refugee Africans since many locals have been swindled out of their fees and refuse to work for the company. The company has branches in Europe and America and in is one of the largest African consulting ventures. It works for World Bank, FAO and all the right bilateral, increasingly outside the continent for there are many who want to promote African initiative! Its involvement on the continent is increasingly seeking financing for any African country with economic problems.

TYPE 3: Mwamba is much younger than either Okike or Musa for he was an undergraduate in late sixties and only finished his PhD in Princeton in the middle seventies. On returning with appropriate radicalism, the local university could not employ him to teach. He did research on accumulation, ran for parliament and lost. He went to work for an American NGO. Quit and concentrated on building a consulting company based on the Scandinavian bilateral agencies. They went native before all others. In 15 years he has dominated that market concentrating on research and training. He has also accumulated a lot of money and delivers good work. The price he has paid has been a series of strokes. Lately he has diversified by creating joint ventures with ex-senior bureaucrats to get a general management company off the ground basically to diversify for politically he is vulnerable as he is accused of pocketing some ministries who only give work to him. By getting others to front for him, he is able to marginalise those he has not paid in the past for like Musa, a lot of local consultants were not paid their dues.

TYPE 4: The crowd is made of academics and ex-academics, bureaucrats, ex-multinational employees and traders with closet companies which use specialised political access to get specific jobs.

The lesson from these four extreme types is that there yet is no profession called consulting. It is even doubtful that there is a sector called such. The reasons are simply that those who end up there have been doing other things for a long time. They have not been journey men in the profession for as independence came, consulting was the fall back for the ex-colonials, Kenya cowboys and retired employees of the donors and multinationals who set up local shops. So what we have dominating African consultancy is a mixture of retired bureaucrats selling reputations or access, academics and ex-academics selling skills based on access and ultimately traders trading on bodies with some skills. THERE HAVE NOT BEEN JOURNEY MEN TO BE INITIATED IN THE TRADE BY LEARNING WHILE DOING. THERE ARE NO PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS TO DETERMINE WHO IS QUALIFIED AND WHO IS TO BE LEFT OUT.

WHO USES THEM?

The consultants are used mainly by foreign assistance bodies. Politicians see them as pests to be tolerated only if they can produce some kickback for foreign consultants are preferred for reasons well covered by Fanon to detain us. Besides kickbacks are in foreign lands, either as study tours (masquerades for shopping) or hard currency deposits.

This mad dialectic of being dependent almost totally on foreign funds, is the main agent in restructuring African development and management consultancy. Donors are under pressure to reduce the costs of their consultancies. Since it is extremely expensive to

bring them in from their countries, there is pressure to use local ones. Donors also deliberately try and resist consultants being imposed on them by the local political processes. This nexus is thus allowing some creative and non-hustling (in the American ghetto sense) consulting capacity to be built. There are problems though.

BUILDING DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT CONSULTING CAPACITY

The first problem is the focus of development and management consultancy. What donors want is not head hunters but development planners mainly. Management has had a secondary role for it is not central in developmentalism for reasons covered in the institutional development paper. Thus what is needed first is to bring management to the centre of the sector. Since African governments do not fund this aspect, the support will be externally driven until the African private sector grows big enough to buy the service.

The second problem has to do with skills in the sector. Some of the masqueraders have very few skills. The skill in greatest shortage is familiarity with computing and the uses of informatics. Clearly something about this can be done particularly through African Management Training Institutes. I would even go further and argue that when the professional bodies are organised on national basis initially, all management and development consultants should be required as a certification condition to be familiar with computer based data analysis.

The other skill in great shortage among the consultants is strategic and long range planning. These should be a bedrock for all, for they would help both public and private sectors to systematically think of the future which given the rapidity of change is increasingly oppressive.

The third problem is the financing of the companies. Whereas the donors are interested in using local consultants, they are delinquent on paying overheads to the same. There is some basic contradiction when experienced African consultants are paid what is called local rates even when they can compete on a global level. Rates for locals have to take into account companies which are of necessity taking young professionals and training them in house. They cannot be billed and must come out of overhead. So must office space computers etc. It is true that African governments can assist in creating lines of credit or soft loans for equipment or training and not seeing consulting as "very profitable" to quote the Kenya Minister of Finance during a budget speech. The Nairobi based donors and UNDP have proposed a local rate which will not enable a local firm to keep an office if tightly enforced. If the WB is serious about using local consultants, it has to do much more than in the past about its DACON system. In short the local consultants are not getting enough work to finance expansion. To break this bottleneck, much more work has to be given to them rather than multinationals locally based and overheads (multipliers) have to be accepted for the local companies.

Fourthly, the various political arenas have to break the Fannonesque fascination with external consultants and follow the lead of Nigeria and Egypt which demand that on all donor financed consultancies significant proportions must be staffed by their nationals. The logic is simply that building local capacity is useful and one can always call on it.

Fifthly, it is extremely hard to sell management consultancies to the private sector. This has to do with the ethnic basis of the private sector. The multinationals depend on the international accounting multinationals who have moved into management consulting. The Asian private sector relies on its ethnic professionals or the international accounting multinationals. The African private sector is minuscule. It is not exactly cash awash to begin with. It also has not been spared looking at white foreigners as the source of all knowledge. Nairobi based expatriate consultants have more access to African businessmen and women than locals.

Sixth and perhaps the most problematic is the issue of working in other countries. North based consultants are able to gain experience cross culturally since their governments send them out as volunteers. Their consulting companies work on global level. The few large African consulting companies are really local mainly. However there are glimpses in the horizon of things to come. A significant number of East Africans are now consulting in the South. Some are exiles and others, have left crowded markets. Yet the problem of drawing such experience under a few large houses is real. The issue is again how one finances operations.

Finally, there is no shortcut to organising professionally. If the sector is to grow, and defend its interests, national organisations have to be formed to self police and to seek redress from the governments and donors. Personally I believe it will be extremely important to include those working in the private sector and those in the public sector in any national organisation.

INNOVATIONS

Forces impinging on consulting on a global level are beginning to force international companies, particularly European ones, to look for joint ventures with local companies. The logic is flawless. European firms are forced to combine to face 1992. The more creative ones have diagnosed that in the long term they will not be allowed to act alone in Africa. Thus they want to create joint ventures they can rely on for the low tech activities and sell their high tech to. The other side of the coin is the need of the local firms to get intermediaries in the various bilateral donor capitals, and with the multilateral donors, for locally contracted work and to get sophisticated back up. This I believe is the way of the future. Ironically it will lead to more diversified working in Africa for joint ventures will only be set up in strategic countries.

The other major innovation is the deliberate promotion of local consultancies by government. African Governments are beginning to object to the export of data. A colleague of mine found out that of all data of all major East African rivers' morphology is owned by a few consulting companies outside the continent. Any time a government wants to get that data, it has to buy it from the company by finding a donor to finance the consultancy. This now is not one of the acceptable relationships. Such concern creates a niche for joint ventures and local companies.

The last innovation has to do with proliferation of very small companies being built up by fresh college graduates who cannot be absorbed into employment. This is too new in Kenya for data to be collected systematically. What is interesting is their focus on small businesses outside the mainline and outside the capital. When these firms mature and their clients grow, they will form a significant locally driven consulting sector, familiar with accounting, management and strategic planning learned on the job.



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In short the GoK has made the national policy on District Focus. The major sub-policies on staffing, financial procedures etc. have also been made and are being implemented. Where problems have arisen, they are being tackled.

It therefore seems to me that the MAJOR FOCUS of this consultancy ought to be to INVENTORY RESOURCES at the district level and to come up with OPERATIONAL alternatives within the District Focus strategy. The consultancy should generate the operational alternatives from two clear sources :-

1. Field research data to be collected in selected districts.
2. Innovations already being implemented by field officers.

Terms of Reference.

The terms of reference, if the above argument is acceptable, should be as follows :-

1. To inventory District transport resources, transportation maintenance costs and to suggest alternative ways of handling transport.
2. To inventory the District Team manpower and their tenure at the Districts and to evaluate the training needs related to planning, budgeting and management of the District Focus strategy.
3. To inventory available office and accommodation space and to evaluate alternatives for increasing space at the district level, both for short-term and long-term including building recycling proposals to be derived out of several district headquarters' space.
4. To investigate the planning and implementation data bank requirements for more effective planning and management by District Teams.
5. To investigate the managerial role of the DC's office with respect to District Focus by studying the operations of the expanded staff (DOs, DDO's, DA's and DSOs).
6. To investigate methods in use by the DDC on the management of harambee, local authority, donor and non-governmental organisations' projects.



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Time Frame of the Consultancy.

Start up Date: Mr. Nyachae was of the opinion that the main work could be started in July, 1984. This has not been possible because of schedule problems with the DCs of the 12 pilot districts.

Given that the terms of reference will have to be written and agreed by the client (OP) it seems as if effective field work will not start until mid-August.

The availability of cars needs to be sorted out prior to imposing a start up date. We are geared up to go if funds, transport and terms of reference are issued to US by OP.

Progress Report(s): Half-way between the yet to be agreed Interim Final Report dates. If strategy 1 (one) for implementation is authorised this will be two months after start up date. If strategy 11 (two) is authorised it will be after four months.

Interim Final Report: Either four months or eight months depending on method of implementation adopted. Districts have expressed interest in seeing the interim final reports and the final reports.

Final Report. Two months after submission of Interim Final Report. The client (OP) would suggest changes within this period.



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2. CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF DISTRICTS.

The districts to be covered by the consultancy have been selected to reflect the following :-

1. To represent both varied DC's management styles.
2. To represent identified political problems in the setting of development priorities.
3. To represent different socio-economic levels.
4. To represent problems of managing local authorities.
5. To represent districts with extensive donor involvement in implementing development projects.
6. To represent different development/ecological patterns.
7. To represent different DDO planning competencies.
8. To minimise travel costs.

It is not desirable or necessary to cover all the 40 districts in the detailed studies since a sample would trap most of the problems. Unless the client wishes more or all districts to be covered I would suggest that the following list be adopted since it represents 45% of all districts.

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3. LIST OF DISTRICTS TO BE COVERED.

Provinces	No. of Districts	Sample Districts	Sample % rounded	Commissioners
Nyanza	4	Kisumu Kisii	50%	Mungala Makhanu
Western	3	Kakamega	33%	Mberia
Rift Valley	13	Elgeyo Marakwet Baringo Nakuru Kericho Uasin Gishu Kajiado	46%	Wa Mbora/Kihiu Tetu Wamumbui Rotich Muruatetu
Central	5	Muranga Kirinyaga	40%	Wanganagwa Oyier
Eastern	6	Embu Isiolo Machakos	50%	Kibera Nyabwa Saisi
Coast	6	Mombasa Kilifi Hala	50%	Lukhalo Komu Maina
North -eastern	3	Garissa	33%	
	<u>40</u>		<u>45%</u>	<i>Langat</i>



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4. METHODS OF IMPLEMENTATION.

Alternative I. If OP wants the contract implemented fast (say 4 months) the method of implementing would be to field 6 senior consultants and 6 junior consultants simultaneously.

This alternative would lead to prohibitive travel costs since it would be undesirable for six senior consultants and their staff to be in a district simultaneously. That would disrupt normal district operations greatly and the disturbed officers would not be agreeable to giving maximum cooperation in execution of the work. There would be a minimum of 4 vehicles required for this method.

Alternative II. An alternative would be to field consultants to initially handle transport, space and manpower if final reports on all aspects of the contract are not desired in 4 months. These could be implemented by three senior consultants. Other bits can be completed in sequence over 8 months from initiation.

This will greatly reduce transport costs since at most two vehicles would be sufficient.

I prefer this method since it will not crowd any district with consultants at any one time. It will also mean that the consultancy administrator/senior consultant will do many more aspects thereby facilitating greater integration of the final report. This method of sequential implementation leads to better quality since related matters are handled by fewer consultants. It also allows reflection on purely managerial matters derived from quantitative data.

Burning issues can be contained and interim reports produced to aid in the policy-making processes which cannot await the final report.



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5. SUMMARY BUDGET.

Alternative 1.

A. Reimbursable Costs. Shs. 265,650.
B. Consultants' Fees. Shs. 1,892,000.
Totals Shs. 2,157,650.

Alternative 11.

Reimbursable Costs. Shs. 265,650.
Consultants' Fees. Shs. 1,848,000.
2,113,650.



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6. BUDGET DETAILS.

A. DIRECTLY REIMBURSABLE COSTS.

	Shs.		Shs.
Office - 1. Rent 6 months	@ 4,000.	=	24,000.
2. Secretarial 6 man-months	@ 5,000.	=	30,000.
3. Phones 6 months	@ 2,000.	=	12,000.
4. Messengerial 6 man-months	@ 1,000.	=	6,000.
5. Research Xerox/Stencils Questionnaires 6 months	@ 2,000.	=	12,000.
6. Secretarial Aids and Papers 6 months	@ 1,250.	=	7,500.
7. Interim and Final Report Printing & Binding (50 copies)	@ 2,000.	=	100,000.
8. Data Processing			<u>50,000.</u>
			241,500.
9. 10% Contingency			<u>24,150.</u>
			265,650.

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.B. CONSULTANTS' FEES.

(Inclusive of boarding, meals and overnight allowances but not transport)

Alternative I.

Consultancy Administrator/Senior Consultant =

6 man - months	@ 100,000.	=	600,000.
5 Senior Consultants = 10 man - months	@ 80,000.	=	800,000.
6 Junior Consultants = 8 man - months	@ 40,000.	=	<u>320,000.</u>
			1,720,000.
10% Contingency			<u>172,000.</u>
	Total		1,892,000.

Alternative II.

Consultancy Administrator/Senior Consultant =

12 man-months	@ 100,000.	=	1,200,000.
2 Senior Consultants = 4 man - months	@ 80,000.	=	320,000.
6 Junior Consultants = 4 man - months	@ 40,000.	=	<u>160,000.</u>
			1,680,000.
10% Contingency			<u>168,000.</u>
	Total		1,848,000.



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C. TRANSPORT.

1. To be supplied by GoK or,
2. Commercial Hire which is totally reimbursable by GoK.

It is important though that the vehicles and drivers and travel arrangements for the project be TOTALLY under the control of the consultancy administrator to facilitate flexibility of use and time saving.

If travel arrangements are kept within OP there arises conflict of interests.

All drivers and other personnel involved in the consultancy will have to report to the consultancy office and must work the hours demanded by that office.



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7. DECISIONS REQUIRED.

A. DECISIONS REQUIRED FROM OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT.

1. Agreement on terms of reference (subjects and districts) to be covered by the consultancy.
2. Decision on timing and organisation of consultancy.
3. Decisions on costings (a. Reimbursable b. Fees) and manner of payment.
4. Decision on personnel and vehicles and their supervision.
5. Formal communication on supervising officer to Mutiso Consultants.
6. Formal contract letter.

B. DECISIONS REQUIRED FROM MUTISO CONSULTANTS LTD.

1. Submission of consultants curricula vitae
2. Submission of start up claims.
3. Proposal on claim schedules after contract and budget authorisation by OP.