

**CLASS BASED CONFLICTS: The Case of Agriculture and Livestock Production in
Kenya.**

By

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I. CONFLICT: A STATEMENT

I.1: This paper discusses economic and class-based conflicts with special emphasis on agriculture and livestock production in Kenya. The main case study is drawn from the ethnic clashes experienced in Narok District in 1993 and 1994. In this conflict there were two principal protagonists: the indigenous Maasai who are mainly pastoralist, and migrant farmers relying mainly on crop production. The basis for the conflict was competition for access to the limited land and other natural resources, especially water.

The Maasai are indigenous to the area. Traditionally they keep cattle as their main source of livelihood.

I.2: Before the colonial era, the Maasai were living in harmony with nature: they herded their livestock among the wildlife (Maasai don't eat meat from wildlife). In the dry season they move to the wetter higher grounds, thereby reducing pressure on the dry plains, while during the wet seasons they move their livestock to the plains, thus allowing vegetation to regenerate in higher grounds. Therefore through transhumance the Maasai were able to avoid over-exploitation of their commons. Land among the Maasai was owned by the group or clan (i.e., it was a common property resource). Its use was regulated by the community. However with the coming of white settlers and migrant communities from other parts of Kenya large tracts of land were alienated from the Maasai, leaving them with inadequate land whose carrying capacity was substantially less than was needed given the sizes of their livestock herds. Thus the desire of the Maasai has been to regain their land, a goal which they believe can only be achieved by expelling those who usurped it.

I.3: With the advent of independence in 1963 most white settlers left the country and their farms were taken over by native Kenyans. This left migrant communities as the main targets of the indigenous Maasai in their desire to get back their land. However, the migrant communities consider that they acquired their land in Narok legitimately either by being allocated state land for settlement by the Government or by buying or renting it from the Maasai. They have been making a decent living from farming the land and would rather that they stay in Narok than go back to their districts of origin. This is the basis for the conflict between these two parties: while the Maasai want to get back their land, the migrants would have none of this. In theory, such a situation of conflict could be resolved through negotiation, whereby mechanisms would be put in place to compensate the migrants so that they vacate their land holdings voluntarily. However, such mechanisms are difficult to put in place due to lack of appropriate institutions to facilitate the necessary transactions. As a result it became increasingly clear to the Maasai that these conflicting interests could only be resolved through resort to violence, with the pastoralist pitted against arable farmers (mainly the migrant communities). This conflict situation has paralysed the society in Narok District and split it into two hostile camps: the indigenous Maasai versus the migrant communities.

II: CLASHES BETWEEN THE MAASAI AND MIGRANT COMMUNITIES

II.1: Violent clashes between the indigenous Maasai and migrant communities in Narok District exploded in the early 1990s after simmering for a long time. The main reasons for the clashes were disputes over access to natural resources and the degradation of these resources. Similar conflicts have arisen in other parts of the country such as between the Nandi and the Luhya communities in the Eldoret-Kitale area, between the Kisii and the Kipsigis in the Kericho area, and recently between the Mijikenda clans and people from up-country in the Coast Province. While the principal root cause for all these conflicts has been the stiff competition for dwindling resources especially land, pressure from deteriorating economic conditions and poverty has proved a potent spark for the clashes. By aggravating the economic plight of the poor in Kenya Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) have brought tremendous pressure to bear on marginalised communities especially in rural areas such as pastoralists and subsistence farmers. Unwittingly, the poor tend to blame their economic plight on migrant communities in their midst (i.e., those who are not like them) instead of the real causes, which are gross economic mismanagement of the country's resources and the resulting SAPs.

II.2: This paper argues that although SAPs are not the ones responsible for inter-ethnic rivalry and hatred in Kenya, by aggravating the poverty situation in the country they have acted as the triggers for ethnic clashes in which many people have been killed, maimed, or have had their property destroyed. Kenya is now experiencing a strange problem: that of having refugees in their own country!

III: SOCIO-POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND ITS CAUSES

The Maasai and their Land Resources

III.1: The study area is Enoosopukia in Narok District which has been historically occupied by the Maasai. In Kenya, the Maasai are generally perceived as a proud, conservative, warlike nomadic pastoralists with strong cultural and socio-economic attachment to their livestock, especially cattle. They are thought to have originated from northern Kenya and by the end of the nineteenth century (at the advent of colonialism) they were still raiding neighbouring communities and expanding their territory southward into present-day central Tanzania, eastward towards Mombasa and westward towards Lake Victoria.

III.2: Since Kenya was declared a British colony the Maasai have lost more territory than any other ethnic group in the country. At the turn of this century Maasai territory extended from the southern tip of Lake Turkana in the North to the Serengeti/Ngorongoro/Arusha area in the South; and from near Lake Victoria (Awendo) in the West to near Kwale District at the Coast in the East. Through deceit and coercion the Maasai were displaced from the present Taita Taveta, Laikipia and Nakuru districts and pushed to present-day Kajiado and Narok districts. Their close relatives, the Samburu, the Njemps (the Ilchamus) and the Dorobos were also confined to their present territories in order to give room for the establishment of the White Highlands and African Reserves. Their raids, transhumance movements and quest for conquest were curtailed by the creation of international and internal administrative boundaries. This had the effect of concentrating the Maasai and their livestock in the present Narok and Kajiado districts.

III.3: After 1930 the Maasai lost more land as a result of measures taken to conserve natural resources through the creation of forest reserves and wildlife sanctuaries. These include the Mau forest, Masai Mara Game Reserve, Amboseli Game Reserve, and Nairobi National Park, among others. The community was later denied use of these areas and this led to their losing more of their land. As late as the 1970s the Maasai of Narok District were resisting the loss of Nguruman Forest to conservationists. In the 1980s they managed to recover about 10 per cent of the land occupied by the Masai Mara Game Reserve.

III.4: However, the most serious and nettlesome loss of Maasai land occurred immediately after Kenya became independent in 1963. This was caused by migrants from outside Maasailand, with the newcomers comprising mainly of the Kikuyu of Central Province, the Kisii of Nyanza Province and the Kipsigis of the Rift Valley Province. These were mainly arable farmers escaping from their densely populated and land-scarce home districts to the seemingly unsettled and empty spaces of Narok. These were followed by a stream of the politically powerful and well-connected individuals who set out on a land-grabbing binge, and later by hordes of rich entrepreneurs and speculators who acquired large tracts of land for speculation purposes and for commercial farming, particularly the growing of wheat, barley and other cereals.

III. 5: The migrant arable farmers settled mainly in the wet and very fertile highland and forested areas which constitute the main catchments of the area. They acquired the land mainly through purchase from the Maasai at throw away prices. They did this by taking advantage of the fact that at that time the Maasai were generally ignorant of the monetary value of land. These migrants were mainly small-scale farmers, acquiring holdings of about 10 hectares each. The rich entrepreneurs acquired large scale farms some of them through outright land purchase but most through renting. The majority of these rich entrepreneurs paid ridiculously low prices and rents for the land, just as was the case for the arable farmers.

III.6: The result of all this was that the Maasai were squeezed and displaced out of their land. As they became increasingly aware of what was happening to them, they became resentful of and hostile to these migrant communities. The Maasai began to complain about the destruction of the water catchments by the migrants, which resulted in the drying up of rivers. As the rivers dwindled to mere trickles the Maasai pastoralist found it increasingly difficult to get water for their livestock. Another difficulty the Maasai faced was the conversion of their grazing lands to crop lands by the migrants. This left little land unused, which was not capable of supporting their livestock herds. The Maasai also found that they could no longer engage in transhumance: traditionally they would graze their cattle in the plains during the wet seasons and move them to the wetter highlands and forests in the dry seasons. This enabled their livestock to survive severe droughts. However, with the loss of the wetter highlands to migrant farmers the Maasai found themselves confined to the drier plains throughout the year so that during severe droughts most of their livestock were decimated. As a result, livestock herds in Narok District have diminished in size and the Maasai have been forced to change from large stock such as cattle which they traditionally prefer, to small stock such as goats and sheep, due to the sharp declines in the carrying capacity of the land.

Table 1.1 Changes in Human Populations and Per Capita Land Availability in Narok District

Year of Census	1948	1962	1969	1979	1989	1997*
Total Population	37,000	101,000	125,000	210,300	398,300	576,000
% Maasai	99	95	85	56	47.3	n.a.
% Non-Maasai	1	5	15	44	52.7	n.a.
Density (No./Km ²)	n.a.	6.9	8.6	14.5	27.4	44
Per capita land in Narok	n.a.	0.145	0.116	0.068	0.036	-

Note: 1) * estimates.
 2) n.a. means data not available.

3) Area of Narok District - Total trust land is 18,530 Km². Masai Mara Game Reserve occupies 1,680 Km². Area under forest is 2,280 Km². This effectively leaves 14,550 Km² which is used to derive the data in the Table.

III.7: Table 1.1 shows changes in per capita land availability in Narok since 1948. The figures in Table 1.1 show that increasingly more people have settled within Narok in the last half a century. The amount of land available per person has declined, implying that pressure on the available land has increased. This has constrained the movement of the Maasai since in the dry season they can no longer move to the pastures on higher and wetter grounds. It has resulted in high concentrations of livestock in Osupuko Division, which is mainly occupied by the Maasai.

III.8: Land used to be a common property resource and is to a large extent perceived as such among the pastoralists. In a bid to force the Maasai to sedentarize in order to ease administration and conserve land, land demarcation and registration was started in the district after 1970. This exercise led to the creation of group ranches and later to privately-owned parcels of land in some areas. This has inculcated a sense of private land ownership which is alien to traditional Maasai values and is leading to the conversion of many group ranches into privately-owned land holdings. This may be the last straw to nomadic pastoralism in the area. It means that all resources needed for livestock must be provided within an individual's land holding, including water, grazing and forage.

III.9: The ethnic mix of the population in Narok District has also changed with the inflow of the Kipsigis, Kisii, Kikuyu and other ethnic groups into the area. Furthermore, most of these immigrants are mixed farmers, in that alongside livestock keeping they grow crops. This has led to the destruction of large forest areas to allow for farming activities in the highlands. Consequently, this has reduced the grazing lands available to the Maasai, pushing them further to the drier areas. The result has been intensified land-use conflicts as witnessed in the 1991-92¹ ethnic clashes between the predominantly Maasai pastoralists and the immigrants.

III.10: Thus the link between environmental decline and social and political instability seems clear and distinct. Such conflicts are likely to increase as resources become more scarce and

¹ The clashes were seen as a means of applying pressure on non-Maasai suspected to have supported politicians from opposition parties during the 1992 general elections. The question of non-Maasais acquiring land in Narok was made an election issue in the multi-party elections of 1992, with pro-KANU forces agitating for the expulsion of the migrant communities. This is despite the fact that the constitution of Kenya allows every citizen to own property in any part of the country!

competition for them intensifies. There is need to understand the complexities of these links and relationships in order to design appropriate measures to reduce conflicts, conserve the environment more effectively, and keep political instability at bay.

IV: SOCIO-CULTURAL CONFLICTS

IV.1: The process leading to environmental degradation has socio-cultural implications. The immigrant communities have brought about new cultures in Maasailand, involving new value systems. For instance, the privatization of land that was once communally owned is likely to affect the way of life of the Maasai fundamentally. The permanent settlement of nomadic people as a result of both implicit and explicit policies could also lead to considerable damage on the environment. The resulting concentration of people in a restricted area is accelerating the rate of land degradation.

IV.2: Over the years the Maasai have been forced to adapt to harsh environments and have seen their traditional way of life coming under threat from the cultures of immigrants. Their grazing lands have diminished in size with the expansion of the area under crop production. Thus their natural resource base is rapidly deteriorating, and their economic and environmental plight is emerging as an issue that cannot be ignored.

IV.3: Two factors explain the alienation of the Maasai from the mainstream of economic progress: (1) the marked differences in resource management and survival strategies between them and the new settlers; (2) real or perceived discrimination against the Maasai which partly explains the ethnic tensions and clashes of 1991/93. The clashes were widely seen as a means for the Maasai to re-assert their rights over the area's resources. The increasing poverty among the Maasai is to some extent related to the drastic reduction of the resources available to them or to their forced displacement to regions of inferior ecological conditions. They have further lost a valuable asset: social cohesion and indigenous knowledge of their ecology.

V: MIGRANTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION IN NAROK

V.1: Ecological stability in Narok District and in particular Osupuko and Mau Divisions is under threat and may be difficult to reverse. Until about a century ago the indigenous Maasai pastoralist, their livestock and the wildlife had evolved a system of mutual tolerance and coexistence, utilizing the environment optimally. Appropriate levels of utilization of different parts of the ecosystem ensured the survival of both humans and livestock as well as a balanced use of resources in all parts of the ecosystem with minimum degradation.

V.2: Large scale farmers in the area have also expressed concern about the continued wanton destruction of forests in the Mau Hills. This destruction of forests and other vegetative cover has affected the water catchments in the area thereby reducing water flows downstream. The rapid increase in population in the district after independence and the fragmentation of land due to the ongoing sub-division of the group ranches are bringing more pressure to bear on the land. As a result regeneration periods are no longer observed as land owners cultivate their land more intensively and continuously, contributing to the general deterioration of the ecosystem.

V.3: In addition the opening up of hilly areas in the marginal lands for ranching has made soil susceptible to water and wind erosion. During the dry seasons competition between wildlife and livestock for water and grazing is particularly intense around wildlife sanctuaries and game reserves. These sanctuaries are mostly found in the same plains that the Maasai have been confined to after losing the higher grounds to the migrant farmers. The effect has been increased overstocking and pressure on the soil and vegetation cover.

VI: POVERTY PROFILE OF THE CONFLICT AREA

VI.1: Data on poverty profiles in Narok district is scanty. However, there is considerable evidence of both relative and absolute poverty among the people. Recent studies on poverty show that the situation has worsened in virtually all parts of the country in the last two decades. The latest comprehensive poverty survey shows that by 1994 about 47 per cent of the Kenyan rural population were below the poverty line of US \$170 per person per annum. This compares unfavourably with the situation in 1994 when about 29 per cent of the people were below the poverty line. In Narok about 27 per cent were below the poverty line, 36 per cent suffered Food Poverty and 9 per cent Hard Core Poverty. Those who suffered food poverty in the whole country in general were 47 per cent of the total population, and for hard core poverty they were 29 per cent, implying that the incidence of poverty in Narok District is below the national average.

VI.2: The sale of land is reported to be a contributory factor to the rising poverty in Narok District. Some Maasai have sold their land and squandered all the proceeds, leaving their families destitute. These individuals later migrate to the drier plains or seek employment as casual labourers on large commercial farms in the area. Institutional and issues associated with the cultural practices have also contributed to the poverty problem. To a large extent the Maasai keep livestock for purposes other than purely economic considerations.

VI.3: The Maasai generally enjoy a lower standard of living compared to the immigrants. Most of the Maasai do not have access to such services as water, sanitation and electricity.

VI.4: Based on land use and occupational patterns, it is possible to delineate four distinct income categories in the district. In terms of increasing incidence of poverty the categories are as follows:

1. large scale commercial farmers growing wheat, barley and maize;
2. modern sector employees including those in parastatals, commercial farms and the tourism industry;
3. small and medium scale mixed farmers growing potatoes, pyrethrum, maize, beans and keeping some dairy cattle;
4. pastoralist who also engage in subsistence agriculture.

VI.5: Large scale farmers are the leading group in terms of earnings. The large scale farms are mainly leased by individual immigrants and corporations for crop production and ranching activities. Less than 10 per cent of the income from farm leases reaches the families of lessors, with the bulk being squandered by household heads who handle the cash payments. The

commercial farmers leasing land generally use it very intensively, often with little regard for conservation.

VI.6: Small and medium scale farmers are found in the high and medium potential areas. They earn their income from growing food and cash crops and keeping dairy cattle.

VI.7: Pastoralist derive most of their income from livestock production. Also in this group are some who have sold their land holdings in the high potential areas of the district but do not have enough livestock to live on. In the process they have been forced to engage in crop production in the marginal areas. Therefore this is a particularly vulnerable group in which most of the poor people in the area are to be found.

VI.8: Historically, development efforts have been concentrated in high potential areas of Narok District. This has often led to the escalation of land prices and rents, thereby pushing out the poorer members of the community who are tempted to sell their land holdings. They then move to areas of lower potential where access to markets, infrastructure and other social services like health, water and education is often limited.

VI.9: Poverty in Narok District is also attributed to the sub-division of land as parents bequeath their wealth and assets to their children, cultural and institutional practices and public policy. Sub-division of land and its subsequent conversion to crop production has reduced the land available for pastoral activities.

VI.10: This process has led to the marginalization of the Maasai in their own country. It has impoverished them so that the once proud warrior tribe is becoming destitute and desperate with an increasing sense of hopelessness and helplessness. Their resentment was fueled further by what is perceived as arrogance and condescending attitude of the migrants towards the Maasai. The migrants have tended to consider the Maasai as backward, uncultured, and an unenlightened tribe which requires civilizing by the migrant communities. Therefore Narok has evolved into a society of two bi-polar communities: on one hand are the migrant communities looking down on the indigenous Maasai, on the other are the indigenous Maasai resenting the patronizing and disrespectful attitude of the migrants, the way they had grabbed their land for a mere pittance and were now destroying their natural resources especially catchment areas, streams and rivers. This is a recipe for violent conflict and the opportunity has not lost to bellicose politicians like Ntimama, the MP for Narok Town.

VI.11: Ntimama has been acutely aware of the fact that the migrants were becoming a sizable population in the district. In the age of multi-party politics most of the migrant communities supported opposition parties (the Kikuyus are mostly in the Democratic Party and Ford Asili party), while Ntimama and his community have been mainly KANU supporters. The migrants have tended to be more politically astute and have voted in large numbers compared to the conservative Maasai. It was clear that for KANU to avoid being beaten at the polls by the opposition parties the migrant communities had to be kicked out of Narok District. Ntimama

and other KANU operatives capitalized on the seething anger of the Maasai towards the migrants in order to achieve their political objectives. For example, when the Maasai were instigated to chase the migrant communities particularly the Kikuyu from such areas as Enoosupukia, they did this by attacking the Kikuyus, torching their houses, stealing their cattle and destroying their property. Many Kikuyus and other non-Maasai were killed. The rest were displaced and became internal refugees in their own country, setting camp on church compounds for safety. Some have not returned to their original property to this day. Ntimama, who was then the Minister for Local Government, justified this action through a bellicose speech he made in Parliament on 21st October 1993 in which he said he had no regrets about the violence in Enoosupukia, Narok. He told Parliament that the Kikuyu " had suppressed the Maasai, taken their land, and degraded their environment".

VI.12: According to Ntimama, Enoosupukia and Mau Narok is a water catchment area where the rivers flow serving several locations: Nairage, Enkare, Ntulele, Suswa and Mosiro. These four locations have dams to capture water flowing from Enoosupukia catchment areas. The dams had made life bearable for the Maasai and their livestock downstream. However about 1988 a small group of people started penetrating Enoosupukia Forest from Maela and Naivasha. Initially the population was small and the destruction of the forest was insignificant. However around 1990 large swarms of people entered and settled in the area illegally and slashed and burned charcoal looking for quick money. Massive destruction of this important catchment took place. 1992 witnessed the biggest influx into the area immediately after the general elections. Now streams and other water sources have dried up so that dams like the one constructed by the Government with financial aid from the Germans has no water. That is why according to the Maasai the migrants have to go. The area occupied by the migrants is trust land and any title deeds they have are bogus ones.

VI.13: The belligerence of Ntimama and others fanned the flames of ethnic clashes in Enoosupukia and Mau Narok. The clashes spread throughout much of Narok as far north as Molo and other parts of the Rift Valley. They caused untold human suffering. The ripple effects of these clashes continue to this day, manifested in similar clashes taking place at the Coast especially at Likoni, Mtwapa, Malindi and other parts of Kwale District.

VII. THE NAROK CASE

VII.1: Ten people were killed on Friday of 15th of October 1993 and many more were injured following ethnic fighting in Enoosopukia Location of Narok District. This was confirmed by the then police spokesman Jeremiah Matagaro, who assured the residents of security reinforcement in the area. This violence brought up to 15 the number of people killed in the area from the ethnic feuds. In June 1992, another five people died in the same area when Masai Morans raided homes inhabited by Kikuyus.

The Size of the Conflict Area

VII.2: The affected area stretches about 44 square kilometres in Narok North constituency. These conflicts came after the area MP, William Ole Ntimama, demanded that Enoosupukia be declared 'trust land' to safeguard the environment for the benefit of the indigenous communities, particularly the Maasai.

VIII: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT.

VIII.1: Economic and class conflicts in Kenya have been numerous in the recent past. Apart from the ethnic clashes in Enoosupukia and Mau Narok there were similar ones at Olenguruone, Nakuru, Molo, Eldoret, Kitale, and recently at the coast. In all these cases social differentiation is usually along ethnic lines with the indigenous people constituting the aggrieved group or class and the migrant communities the perpetrators of oppression and injustice especially with regard to access to natural resources, particularly land. In Narok it was mainly the indigenous Maasai against the Kikuyu, Kisii, and Kipsigis. In the Eldoret-Kitale areas it was the indigenous Kalenjin clans especially the Nandi against the Luhya migrants, while at the coast it is the indigenous Mijikenda clans against migrants from up-country, especially the Luo, Kikuyu, and the Kamba. In almost all the cases the migrant communities are perceived as being economic colonizers who are domineering and culturally arrogant. For example, in Narok District the Maasai perceive the migrant communities as having usurped their land, colonised it and settled, in the same way that Kenyans perceived colonial settlers from Britain. The migrant communities not only took Maasai land but engaged in wanton destruction of forests and other natural resources, leaving the indigenous people poorer. The migrant communities also control the commanding heights of trade, commerce and tourism in Narok and have marginalised the indigenous people in these activities. As the Maasai see it, to add insult to injury, the migrants have become haughty and arrogant, despising the Maasai as being culturally inferior to them. In many cases it is alleged that the migrants have had the audacity to say as much to the Maasai in their face, thereby humiliating them further.

VIII.2: Thus there has been an insidious process of class formation in Narok, with the indigenous people constituting a distinct economic class of the underdogs ... poor and increasingly hopeless people, and the migrant community another of the relatively well to do and the elites. The class of the underdogs is comprised mainly of the pastoralists while that of the privileged is dominated by arable farmers.

VIII.3: At the coast the Mijikenda consider up-country people as being no different from colonial settlers who grabbed their best land and settled there leaving the indigenous people in the marginal areas. Examples are the Kamba who settled in the once Crown Lands of Shimba Hills, Kikoneni and the surrounding areas as far as Kwale and Lunga Lunga. Up-country people also took over much of the wage employment. For example, the Luo are said to work in sisal estates such as Vipingo and in quarries. The Kikuyu are alleged to have taken the plum jobs in the civil service and in general trade and commerce. It is also alleged that they own and dominate small and micro-enterprises in the area. Therefore taken together up-country people are perceived by the indigenous coastal people as having gained a stranglehold on the local economy especially in Mombasa, Kilifi, and Kwale Districts. Thus in their opinion, the indigenous people have been marginalised in their own land, and this perception has intensified their hatred towards the up-country people. The indigenous people of the coast can therefore be considered as comprising a distinct economic class, that of the underdogs ... poor and marginalised, while up-country people constitute a class of the more

privileged Kenyans at the coast, dominating commercial farming, trade, commerce and wage employment.

IX: THE CHRONOLOGY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION ACTIVITIES

IX.1: It is noteworthy that the ethnic conflicts experienced in Narok have not been resolved. What the Government merely did was to send its security forces especially the regular and administrative police to pacify the area. The Government has shown no inclination or intention to resolve the conflict. Although many people from the migrant communities were killed, maimed or displaced and had their property destroyed and land seized by the Maasai, hardly any of the perpetrators of these atrocities were arrested or prosecuted. The few who were had their charges dropped surreptitiously and then released. They now live as free people among the people they had terrorized. This is the case even where victims have identified their attackers. Hence no methodology either evolved or was developed to resolve the conflicts. The victims and other parties sympathetic to them have every reason to believe that the Government had a hand in the instigation and execution of these hostilities. Indeed, war-like utterances by political leaders in other areas within or around the Rift Valley Province encourage the spread of such clashes to diverse places like Molo, Kitale, Eldoret, Nakuru and Maela.

IX.2: There have been a number of institutions and individuals interested in resolving these conflicts. These were led by religious organizations such as the National Christian Council of Kenya (NCCCK), the Catholic Church, and international bodies such as the UNDP. In addition, politicians particularly from the opposition parties made serious attempts to assist the victims and find amicable solutions to the problem. These include Paul Muite and Ngegi Muigai, among others. Some foreign embassies also tried to assist. Much of this assistance from individuals and institutions was in the form of food, basic shelter, and basic domestic needs for the people displaced by the clashes. Their efforts to help the victims were severely constrained by the Government. In many cases administrators such as Chiefs, District Officers, District Commissioners, Provincial Commissioners and even the regular police blocked the flow of assistance to the victims. All attempts by those who wanted to assist the victims and initiate dialogue among the protagonists were blocked by the Government. This explains why it is generally perceived that the KANU government had a hand in the instigation and execution of the ethnic conflicts in these areas.

IX.3: It is interesting that similar sentiments are being expressed on the clashes that started in August 13th in Likoni, Mombasa. In this recent case the Government was slow in responding to the crisis and apprehend the culprits. Even when some suspects were arrested prosecution has been slow and has been carried out with so much reluctance that it will not be surprising if they also went scot free. Indeed at one time the Government ordered the Catholic Church which had offered refuge to the victims to throw them out of the church compound. When the KANU Government stated this it became very clear which side it stood in this conflict. Since then government efforts at quelling the clashes have been at best awkward and half-hearted. For example, immediately after the clashes started the Government sent army and General Service Unit (GSU) troops to assist the regular police in apprehending the perpetrators of this heinous act. Yet in no time the troops were withdrawn even before any arrests had been made. Since then the police force which is obviously ill-equipped to deal with the situation has continued to

bungle the operation. This has emboldened the perpetrators who have increased the frequency and intensity of their terrorist acts within and beyond Mombasa, in a number of cases even daring to attack police stations with impunity. Furthermore, a few prominent people have been arrested in connection with the crisis at the coast. Most of them are big names in KANU in the area. Thus far, no serious action has been taken against them except what appear to be meaningless motions to hoodwink members of the public into believing that the Government is taking appropriate action to arrest the situation.

IX.4: As already noted, the clashes at the coast are inspired by similar sentiments as those that took place in Narok and neighboring districts: it is a case of indigenous coastal people who consider themselves as an oppressed and exploited people in their own region, rising against the so-called up-country people who they see as a distinct class of oppressors and colonizers. Since the KANU government has effectively prevented other institutions from participating effectively in the resolutions of such conflicts it is not meaningful to attempt to assess the capacity of such institutions to handle such conflicts. Suffice it to say that some of these institutions would have brought a lot of experience in the handling of such situations to bear on the problem. This is because such institutions as the Catholic church and the NCCK have considerable experience in handling the problem of refugees, internally-displaced people and victims of ethnic clashes and wars.

IX.5: The KANU Government has been an impediment to the solution of the ethnic clashes experienced in the country since the early 1990s. For this reason, this problem remains unsolved and continues to simmer under the surface, ready to explode or recur any moment. Indeed, it appears that this is the state of affairs the Government would like to persist so that it can dangle the threat of renewed ethnic clashes as the sword of Damocles on those who would not support it.

X: HOW THE CONFLICTS CAN BE MITIGATED

X.1: In order to mitigate such conflicts it is necessary to undertake several steps:

1. investigate the causes of the conflict; its origin, history and the present state of affairs;
2. identify the main protagonists and other stakeholders in the conflict;
3. establish the costs of the conflict to various stakeholders and the benefits of resolving the conflict to the same;
4. identify the leaders and opinion makers in each group of stakeholders;
5. initiate mechanisms for dialogue among the groups;
6. facilitate dialogue to find solutions which are amicable to all the parties involved;

X.2: It is necessary to involve the Government and other parties in the mitigation process. This is because they may be needed to avail resources which are necessary to facilitate any compensation that may be required in the solution of the conflict. For example, if there is need to relocate some households the Government is the one best placed to avail land for such purposes. The Government is also best placed to mobilize financial and other resources from NGOs and other donors as well as from its own resources in order to facilitate any resettlement activities that may be called for. In some cases the Government could appease the indigenous communities by giving them opportunities for wage employment in the civil service, parastatal organizations and other areas of gainful employment where it has direct or indirect influence.

X.3: SAPs have aggravated economic hardships in Kenya. This has intensified the hardships the poor face, particularly those who live in marginal areas such as the Maasai of Narok and the Mijikenda of the Coast. Adjustment measures have reduced the real incomes of these communities since they mainly produce non-tradables, while increasing the income of migrant communities in these areas since the latter tend to produce tradables. This has increased the resentment that indigenous people have towards the migrant communities: although SAPs are the ones responsible for their increasing economic immiserization, indigenous people are not aware of this fact and have made migrant communities the scape goats (i.e., those to blame for the problems), hence the hostility and resentment.