Public Policy Making: A Review of the Literature

Milu MUYANGA

Acknowledgements

Table of contents

1.   Background

1.1   Introduction

Policy making process has also become equally as important as the content of the final policy document for the legitimacy of a new policy. The question of how values are weighted into decisions or resultant states of affairs is central to the study of public decision making. In mature and advanced democracies, policy-making cannot be entrusted on one omniscient entity. In order to grasp the complexity of policy problems, to set policy objectives, to consider solutions and instruments and to ensure the democratic legitimacy of policy-making, an elaborate consultation is imperative. Inviting the participation of a plurality of actors ensures that key aspects, interests and values are not completely overlooked. In general, there is a mix of actors who pursue different and sometimes conflicting interests. It is furthermore the idea that ultimately interests are balanced and prioritized in the final decisions taken stakeholders that carry the responsibility and can be held accountable by the greater populace. Participatory processes give an assurance that the relevant positions and underlying values are at least recognized if not actually reconciled. Participants might not be happy with the outcome but at if least process is considered credible then they can be satisfied.

In this paper, we undertake to review relevant literature to public policy making processes. We review literature on the evolution of different theories that have been used to explain public policy making; triggers of public policy change; evolution into participatory policy making processes and participatory processes building blocks.

1.2   Definitions of key concepts

Politics: Members of a group rarely agree, at least initially, on what course of action to follow and even if they agree over goal, there may be conflict over means (Hague et al., 1998). Yet a decision has to be arrived at, one way or another, and once made it is

binding to the entire group. Political action may be interpreted as a way to work out rationally the best and reasonable common solution to a common problem. Politics is the business of reconciling special interests in the pursuit of the common good. Miller (1991) defines politics as 'a process whereby a group of people, whose opinions or interests are initially divergent, reach collective decisions which are generally accepted as binding on the group, and enforced as common policy'. This process involves elements of persuasion and bargaining, together with a mechanism for reaching a final decision.

Government and governance: Large groups develop special institutions for making and enforcing collective decisions. These institutions are the government. Government exists because they provide individuals with solutions to the twin problems of trust and protection from aggression (by individuals of the same society and ones of different societies) (Mantzavinos et al., 2003). A government becomes necessary once a society grows bigger and relationships among the members become increasingly impersonal. In cases of larger groups or societies, trust becomes scarce. Government consists of institutions responsible for making collective decisions for society (Finer, 1974). Governance by contrast, refers to the process of making collective decisions. So in essence, one cannot in the contemporary world choose a life without government. However, governance can exist without government- for example, in the case of globalization[1]. The in manner in which governments conduct their business (rule) varies across countries. In one country, government actions may be the prime cause of human pain and misery while in another, government actions may help to create the environment under which citizens fulfil their dreams and aspirations.

Democracy: Democracy means self rule: the word itself comes from the Greek *demokratia*, meaning rule by the people (Hague et al., 1998). It represents a system whereby citizens participate in shaping collective decisions, in a context of equality and open deliberation. Decisions reached by wide deliberation are likely to be more informed,

---

[1] Globalisation lacks precise definition, it generally refers to the interconnectedness of the world (economic, cultural, social and technological dimensions), through compression of time and space (Robertson, 1992).

more careful, and more rational. This is because discussions allow the group to reconcile different interests, inform members about the issues and draw on group's expertise. Debate enables people both to influence and to be influenced and therefore democratic decisions are not necessarily or even best reached by voting (Hague et al., 1998). Democracy is a bargain reached by conflicting groups which come to recognize the impossibility of monopolizing power and the inevitability of power sharing (Rustow, 1970). Democracy is compromise. It forces negotiating parties to settle on the second choice: optimal for no-one, acceptable to everyone. A democracy 'consolidates' when under given political and economic conditions no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions-- all major actors become accustomed to democracy, accepting it as the only 'game in town' (Przeworski, 1991). At that stage democracy becomes habitual- democratic rules must be not so much believed in as in applied (Rustow, 1970).

Does democracy become a thing of the past when countries become more and more integrated? If crucial economic decisions are made outside the state, what is the role of citizens in decision making then? Pannu (1996) argues that globalisation along with the market ideology has challenged the supremacy of the government. According to Guehenno (1995), this 'dominion of inevitability' signifies the death of active citizen's forum and thus democracy by implication. But as Hague et al (1998) argues, writing off democracy this fast is surely a terrible mistake. He argues that this line of thought emanates from equating democracy with absolute 'self determination'. He candidly asserts that if democracy could only exist in societies with absolute sovereignty, then we may safely put it that it is merely a psychological construct that never existed anywhere! All states have always and will continue to be strongly influenced from outside. Democracy involves reconciling and aligning domestic affairs to international pressures.

Public policy and policy analysis: Different authors have defined public policy differently. But they concur that public policies result from decisions by the governments and decisions by governments to do nothing are just as much policy as are decisions to do something (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995). Public policies are the mechanisms through

which values are authoritatively allocated for the society (Schneider and Ingram, 1997). Policies are revealed through texts, practices, symbols, and discourses that define and deliver values. Policy analysis is the application of the tools and methodologies of the policy science approach (deLeon, 1988). It is an applied social science discipline which uses multiple methods of inquiry and argument to produce and transform policy-relevant information that may be utilized in political settings to resolve policy problems. The policy analysis and its consequent advice have been practiced in one form or another, virtually since the serpent hissed in Eve's receptive ear (deLeon, 1988). Public policies vary according to the nature of the political system and its links with the society. Public policies have underlying patterns and logic, and the ideas included in policies have real consequences. Policy evolves for example through amendments. Policies fit into contexts. What may be an excellent design in one context, may well serve poorly in another. Below we discuss the major theories that have evolved over time to explain public policy processes.

2.   Theories of public policy

2.1   *Pluralist/corporatism theories*

The pluralism theory is based on the assumption of the primacy of interest groups in the political process (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995). Society is nothing other than the complex of groups that compose it. There are different interests in society which find their concrete manifestation in different groups consisting of individuals with similar interests. Groups are also characterized by overlapping membership and lack of representational monopoly- an individual may belong to more than one organization in pursuit of his/her interests. The overlapping membership is seen to be the key mechanism for reconciling conflicts and promoting cooperation among groups. Groups vary in terms of the financial or organizational resources they possess and the access to government they enjoy. The corporatist perspective posits that public policy in a declining industry will take form of a bargaining between and among the state and relevant industry associations and trade unions as to how best to rationalize the industry and make it competitive.

The pluralist model of democracy is based on the principles of political equality, open participatory political processes, and a society in which power of the state is checked and balanced by the private market economy and by a strong civic culture (Schneider and Ingram, 1997). The power of government is limited to arena of life that are considered 'public' leaving to other non-governmental institutions such as family and economy control over the 'private' world of individuals and group relations. Among the fundamental tenets of pluralism is the belief that people and groups should be able to pursue their self-interests through government, just as they do through the market economy. In addition to protecting fundamental rights, the role of the government is to be responsive and accountable to the public, reconcile divergent interests, resolve conflicts, and facilitate compromises. Pluralist models of democracy do not expect government to pursue public interest, because there is no agreement on what actually constitutes the

interest of the public. There are only competing interests of diverse set of 'publics'. Decisions are made through a process of bargaining and negotiation among persons advocating various points of view. Pluralist doctrine do not have a normative standard that permits some interests to be considers more legitimate than others, and they have not developed adequate standards for judging the merits of public policy designs.

The role of the government is to produce public policies that represent interests of the electorate, resolve conflicts, reflect reasonable compromises among competing perspectives, and to ensure the continued stability of the collectivity along with its preferred economic and cultural characteristics. The government is simply acts as a transmission belt registering and implementing demands placed upon it by interest groups. The government was actually an entity so much as a place, an 'arena' where competing groups met and bargained. The government is considered a neutral official (referee or umpire) setting out rules of group conflict and ensuring that groups did not violate them with impunity. Power should be fragmented because it is more likely to be used for mischief than for a good cause. The state is viewed just like any other powerful group that competes with others such as business, religion, or media for control of resources, status and influence.

The pluralist theory is grounded on the logic that institutions limit the power of the government; institutions ensure governments are responsive to public preferences, are not dominated by simplistic notions of majority rule or by any single interest group, and are held accountable for their actions; incremental 'self-correcting' process of policy change; multiple sources of identity and overlapping social memberships that reduce conflict and provide a context within which compromises are made; and a 'civic culture', a 'realistic' view of citizenship, and a rejection of the concept of 'public interest' that legitimize governments to make policy and allow such system to be called democratic.

These theories have been criticized on their simplicity by assuming that the government officials don't have interests and ambitions which they also seek to satisfy through the

control of the government machinery (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995). It also neglects the fact that state often develops some ties with some groups and may even sponsor formation of groups if the existing ones are difficult to work with. Even within the government itself, there are conflicting interests that can affect the policy process and have influence in the final policy decision. The groups are not free-forming. There exist institutions, both formal and informal providing incentives and disincentives to group formation.

2.2   *Policy science/rational decision making theories*

The policy science focus on the role of policy analysis, expertise, professionalism, evaluation research, and scientific studies in the policy process, and argue that greater reliance on scientific analysis is needed to improve public policy. As Schneider and Ingram (1997) observes, it performance has produced mixed results- both in terms of making headway in the face of political power and in its ability to actually produce better policy designs. The purpose of policy analysis is to provide scientifically reliable, useful information that will enable decision makers to make better decisions. Better decisions are those that result in rational, efficient, effective public policy that solve important problems and improve societal conditions.

These theories are founded on the logic that policy science help decision maker determine what is wanted; find possible ways of achieving those goals; work out the consequences that follow a decision to adopt each of the alternatives; rank the alternatives according to a criteria specified by the decision makers; assist implementing agencies in developing the technologies for proper implementation and rational decision making; and provide reliable and valid information about the impacts of policies on society. This is more or less rational decision process- determine goals and objectives, create or identify policy alternatives, assess the probable effects of each alternative on each goal, adopt the most efficient or effective policy, implement the policy, and evaluate results. Increased reliance on policy analysis, science and technological approaches have

been criticized for discouraging citizens' discussion of issues, thereby producing alienation and low levels of citizen participation.

2.3   Rational/public choice theory

The rational choice paradigm assumes that people know what is in their self interest and act accordingly, or at the very least that competition will weed out those who make incorrect choices and reward those who make correct choices (Grindle, 1999). Political actors are assumed to act rationally to maximize their utility and the only political actor that counts is the individual (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995). Individual political actors are guided by self-interest in choosing course of action which is to their best advantage. Also, voters are deemed to vote for parties and candidates that will serve their interests. Politicians and political parties are also seen as interested in supporting programmes that will win them a longer stay in the office.   So as a result, institutions that support maximization of various actors' utilities emerge.

Thus, in seeking to explain the behavior of politicians, rational choice theorists generally assert that politicians naturally prefer more power to less; survival in office to defeat; re-election to loss; influence to irrelevance (Grindle, 1999). Voters naturally prefer politicians who provide benefits that improve their individual welfare to those who do not. Bureaucrats naturally prefer higher budgets to lower ones, more discretion to less, more opportunities to promote their own welfare to fewer, career promotion to demotion. These individuals are distinct from economic actors only in that they are conceptualized to be interacting in a political market in which competition is about power to provide or receive benefits from public policy, public investments, and resources controlled by government.

If politicians prefer power, survival in office, influence, and electoral support to not having these things, then in democratic systems politicians must be particularly sensitive to the interests of voters or particular constituencies that help them achieve their

objectives. The interests of voters are particularly important in rational choice political economy because they constrain the choices available to politicians and compel them to make decisions that are characteristically geared toward electoral gains. Moreover, because of periodic elections, politicians must discount the future heavily. Thus, it is rational for politicians to sacrifice policy choices that will pay off in the longer term to those that produce short-term advantages, like staying in office. In some cases, so powerful is the need of politicians to trade policy benefits for votes that policy making can be captured by particular interests extorting preferential treatment in return for votes or resources for electoral campaigns.

Public choice theory contends that markets always outperform government and that the public sector should be strictly limited to the few tasks that public choice theory believes it can perform effectively (Schneider and Ingram, 1997). Markets are privileged because they encompass voluntary exchanges among all parties, and each is assumed to be better off as a result. Markets are free whereas public policy is coercive. The only just role for public policy is to provide public goods that can not be delivered by the markets. The move towards deregulation, downsizing of government, and privatization reflect the influence of public choice on the practical world of politics.

The theory has been described by its critics as being too simplistic. Unless institutions are created to alter incentive structure, rational action by individuals (self-interested utility maximizers) will lead to collective irrational outcomes. Critics of public choice theory base their arguments on the adequacy of its normative stance (pareto optimality) and the self-interest utility maximizing individuals. Pareto assumes just distribution of value within community. The argument that actions that render at least one person better off without making another person worse off, renders as 'unjust' all distributions in society no matter how unequal the initial distributions are. The compensation (pareto improvement) in case a member is made worse of as a result of redistribution never takes place in the real world. Self interest has also been found not to be the main motivation for human decisions. Values and ideas are important. Individuals sometimes act as good

Samaritans under a variety of conditions for which they do not expect any return. From the political point of view, the complexity of politics that surround public policy making and institutional influence is underrated. It has little to offer to undemocratic societies and assumes that only two parties are competing. In real world parties and coalition of parties are complex for voters to understand what they stand for and consequently for the voters to know what they vote for.

Modern day rational choice theorists try to bring ideas and beliefs on board by arguing that under conditions of uncertainty, ideas serve as guides to behaviour, helping individuals or groups choose a reasonable rational plan of action (Fischer, 2003). Ideas and beliefs are relegated to a secondary role as responses to uncertainty. Rational choice theorists fail to account for the fact that ideas often shape the interests themselves. They not only do they neglect the fact that ideas affect how actors come to see- and change- their interests, they ignore the possibility of seeing things in altogether new ways, what others have referred to as 'reality shifts'. As Fischer (2003) explains, leaving the argument at the point that ideas and beliefs help in dealing with uncertainty is to miss the juicy story, especially when it comes to explaining major social and political changes. How do we deal with the influence of principled beliefs that have changed the course of history, for example, the opposition to slavery or the spread of democratic ideals? Self interest has hard time explain the actions of terrorists willing to sacrifice their lives for specific political or religious *beliefs*.

2.4   Critical theory

Critical theorist contend that public policy has disempowered citizens, permitted or encouraged widespread withdrawal of citizens from political discourse and participation, and systematically created more inequalities in power, wealth, and status than should be not tolerated in a democracy Schneider and Ingram (1997). Equal opportunity is mirth, according to these perspectives, and the system is far more elitist than commonly acknowledged. Critical theory posits a different understanding of what is meant by

'rationality' and challenges many of the taken-for-granted tenets of modern society. Critical perspectives challenge the contention that scientific knowledge is superior to other forms and raise serious questions about whether scientific and technological discoveries will lead to a better society. The struggle to create a society without oppression and domination where all people can be free to realize their potential has been a central concern of critical theorists (Schneider and Ingram, 1997). Unlike public choice and pluralist theories whose goal is to produce new knowledge, and unlike policy science whose goal is to improve public policy, the goal of critical theory is produce social change that will empower, enlighten and emancipate all people.

This theory argues for *depolitisation* of policy making because policy-makers and technocrats harbour interests and thus can conceal important findings and exaggerate the significance of their findings (Fischer, 2003). They work for the interest of their master-political systems. The theory further argues for scientisation of policy making by state through methodologies such as policy analysis and planning (Habermas, 1987). Also *repolitisation* of public sphere is important to include full range of interests and to develop an authentic consensus through a renewal of the discursive processes. In this theory no one would impose restrictions on who participates; what kind of arguments to be advanced; or the duration of the deliberations. The only resource actors would have at their disposal is their arguments, and the only authority would be that of the better argument. All actors would have equal chances to participate (including the chances to learn to participate) in the discursive process of consensus formation.

Notwithstanding much criticism, as Fischer (2003) observes, this theory introduces the concept of participation and inspired 'non-technocratic' and 'postempiricist' models of policy analysis. There is considerable common ground between critical theory and theories of participatory democracy. A discursive democracy rests on a discourse that is oriented towards reciprocal understanding, trust, and an undistorted consensus about what should be done. In a discursive design no individual has authority on the basis of anything other than a good instrument. Rules are made by the group itself and can only

be amended by the group whenever it is important to do so. Disagreements should revolve around alternative conceptions of public interest rather that strategic manipulation on behalf of private interests. The decision rule should be consensus on what is to be done, eve if consensus cannot be reached on why. Finally, the participants should be free to establish the principles and rules that they believe are needed and to change these through the same discursive process.

2.5 Class theory

These are group theories and more focused to collective action. Class is defined to mean groups differentiated in various ways within a more inclusive category, such common interests groups, and groups with members sharing some characteristics such as economic conditions. Karl Marx grouping was based on production systems which produced two conflicting classes based on interests- slaves vis-à-vis slaves owners in slave trader societies; serfs vis-à-vis landlords in feudal societies; and workers vis-à-vis factors of production owners (capitalists) in capitalist societies. According to class theorists, in capitalist societies public policies reflect interests of the capitalist class. Indeed according to Marx, state is nothing but a tool in the capitalists hand to uphold the capitalist system and generate more profits at the expense of labour. Structure of capitalism requires that certain functions be performed by the state if capitalism is to survive.

Critics of public choice theory base their arguments on the definition of class. The provided dichotomous structure is too simple to obtain in reality. Also, the economic determinism of theory remain is a big problem- non economic factors are apparently ignored in this theory.

2.6 Welfare economics

Policy analysis is applied welfare economics (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995). It is based on the notion that individuals, through market mechanisms, should be relied upon to make

most social decisions. The theory recognizes the limitation of the markets in aggregating individual utility-maximizing behaviour so as to optimize overall social welfare (market failure). So, political institutions can act to supplement or replace markets. They argue, the government has to correct market failures, because optimal social outcomes will not result from purely uncoordinated individual decision-making. Market fails in the presence of natural monopolies, imperfect information, externalities, common access resources, and destructive competition.

Certain industries have large capital requirements and disappropriate returns to scale that tend to promote a single firm over its competitors, e.g. telecommunication and railways-the first company to establish the necessary infrastructure enjoys, if unregulated, cost advantages which make it difficult for other firms to compete. The lack of competition leads to society's economic welfare loss. In certain circumstances, consumers and investors lack adequate information to make rational decisions. For example, consumers lack expertise to evaluate pharmaceutical products and producing companies may lack the incentives to reveal adverse effects of their products. Externalities arise in situations where production costs are not borne by producers (internalized) but passed on to others outside the production process. The cost of pollution is passed over to the entire society (negative). There are positive externalities- education, research and development, art and culture, social peace and stability, etc- costs not externalized. In the 'common access resources' case, use of common access property without regulation (pastures, fisheries, forests, and minerals) results in over extraction. Individual users benefit from increasing their extraction rates in the short term, but all users suffer in the long term as a result of depletion 'resource mining' in the event that the extraction rate is above the resource self replenishing rate ('the tragedy of the commons'). Destructive competition is controversial. It appears in instances in which aggressive competition between firms cause negative side effects on workers and society. Excessive competition can drive down profit margins and lead to the unnecessary reduction of wages and deterioration of working conditions, adversely affecting overall social welfare.

The first step involves establishing whether market failure takes place, then next you search for the most appropriate intervention. In this perspective the most efficient way is either the least cost option (using cost-benefit analysis) - but how to measure costs and benefits of some services such as security is problematic. In most cases pareto optimality approach is also employed. But critics have argued that if markets can fail, then the government can fail miserably. They quote situations in which an administrative agency charged with producing a particular good or service displaces public goals with its own 'private' or 'organizational' ones- may be leading to large budgets, power, or whatever else the organization values (interests). Thus, in pursuit of correcting market failure, the government fails by increasing inefficiencies. Also, because of the separation between revenues and costs (lack of quid-pro-quo), the government often fails to control expenses. In some other cases, government actions have a broad impact on the society and economy, as a result of which they have the effect of excluding viable market-produced goods and services or otherwise negatively affect overall levels of social welfare. This generally implies that the government should carefully evaluate its capacity to correct a failure before attempting to do so.

To improve on this theory, welfare economists have come up with taxonomy of goods and services based on *exclusivity* and *exhaustiveness*. There are the *private good:* bulk good produced by the market- can be divided to up for sale and are no longer available to others after their consumption by consumers; *toll good:* semi-public goods such as bridges and highways which do not decrease in stock after use but for whose use it is possible to charge; c*ommon pool good:* common access resources such as fish pools, the stock decline after use but it is hard to charge; and *public good:* cannot be parceled out for sale and are available to others after their consumption- street lights and defence. The argument here is the government should not provide private goods; should only provide public goods; should not confuse toll goods with public goods and a user charges must be applied (the cost of building and repairing bridges and roads should not be charged on all taxpayers, but users); and for common access resources the government should introduce licenses (property rights regime) to prevent depletion- may be through auctions.

2.7   Statism

This approach recognizes social structures or political institutions as its basic unit of analysis (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995). State is seen as the leading institution in society and key agent in political process. States create, organize and regulate societies. States dominate other organizations within a particular territory, they mould the culture and shape economy. The state is seen as autonomous actor with the capacity to devise and implement its own objectives, not necessarily responding to pressure from any quarter (interest groups). It has the capacity and the experts. However, this approach can not explain the existence of social liberties- why the government cannot often enforce its will. Even the most autocratic regimes attempt to respond to citizens' preferences.

2.8   Neo- Institutionalism

The reconsideration of ideas and beliefs in mainstreaming political and policy research owes much the 'new institutionalists' or 'neo-institutionalists', especially those in comparative politics and policy (Fischer, 2003). Proponents have argued that analysis of variations in public policy outcomes should be broadly examine the interplay of political elites, interest groups demands, institutional processes, and ideas in political and policy analysis. The hypothesis is not that institutions cause an action; rather, they supplier actors with regularized behavioral rules, standards of assessment- institutions influence actors by structuring or shaping the political and social interpretations of problems they have to deal with and by limiting the choice of policy solutions that might be implemented. Institutions shape the interpretation of problems and possible solutions and by constraining the choice of solutions and the way and extent to which they can be implemented (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995). The interests of actors are still there, but influenced by the institutional structures, norms, and rules through which they are pursued. It is the opportunities and barriers created by institutions that determine people's preferences.

While the pluralists understood institutions as 'arenas where interest groups politics play itself out' and that institutions do not exercise special role in shaping policy outcomes, the neo-institutionalists, in contrast, seek to show how institutions actually structure the play of the game, often in ways hidden from view. Not only can they facilitate the ability of some groups to achieve their goals, they can block or hinder the attempts of others. Neo-institutionalists see political and policymaking practices as grounded in institutions dominated by ideas, rules, procedural routines, roles, organizational structures and strategies which constitute an 'institutional construction of meaning that shapes actors preferences, expectations, experiences, and interpretations of actions. As a dominant force determining meanings, they shape the ways people communicate and argue with one another.

3.   Public policy change

3.1   Institutions and path dependency

How do we make sense out of the diverse performance of economies both historically and contemporaneously if individuals really knew their self interest and acted accordingly as some theories would want us to believe? What accounts for societies experiencing long-run stagnation, absolute decline in economic well-being and social decay? Wouldn't the political entrepreneurs in stagnant economies quickly emulate the policies of more successful ones (Denzau and North, 1994)? Why as per the Alchian (1950) hypothesis wouldn't the ubiquitous competition weed out inferior institutions and reward by survival those that better solve human problems? Comparative institutionalists led by North (1990) have attempted to explore this issue to some considerable depth. Comparative institutionalists place institutions much more at the centre of explanations of policy change. They insist that to understand political actors as generic individuals pursuing generic preferences is to miss the role of institutions and history in shaping the preferences, values and strategies (Grindle, 1999). While the fundamental neo-classical

assumption of scarcity and hence competition has been robust, the assumption of a frictionless exchange process has led economic theory astray. Neo-classical theory is concerned with allocation of resources at a moment in time; allocation which is assumed to occur in a frictionless world, that is, one in which institutions either did not exist or did not matter.

Institutions are the rules of the game in a society. They humanly devised constraints or frameworks that shape human interaction. They reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life. Institutions include what people are prohibited from doing, or under what conditions are people supposed to undertake some activities. Institutions are both formal and informal. Formal institutions consist are the formal rules. The hierarchy of such rules range from constitutions, to statute and common laws, to specific bylaws, and finally to individual contracts. The costliness to alter is also direct; constitutions are more costly to alter than contracts. Rules facilitate both political and economic exchanges. Political rules lead to economic rules. The informal constraints include norms of behaviour, taboos, customs, traditions and conventions. In the societies from the most primitive to the most advanced, people impose informal constraints upon themselves to give a structure to their relations with others. Informal constraints come from socially transmitted information and are a part of the heritage that we call culture. Culture is defined as the 'transmission from one generation to the next, via teaching and imitation, of knowledge, values, and other factors that influence behaviour. Individuals respecting conventions, following moral rules, and adopting social norms cause (as an unintended outcome of their action) the emergence of social order. Sometimes formal and informal rules are both violated- consequently punishment must be enacted.

If institutions are the rules of the game, organizations are the players. Organization provides a structure to human interaction. Organizations are groups of people bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives. For example, firms are economic organizations, political parties are political organizations, and universities are educational organizations. The purpose of the rules is to define how the game is played while the

objective of the team within the set rules is to win the game- by a combination of skills, strategy, and coordination; by fair means and sometimes by foul means. The constraints imposed by the institutional framework together with the standard constraints of economic theory define the opportunity and incentive matrix and therefore the kind of organizations that will emerge. How organizations emerge and how they evolve is a function of existing intuitional framework. Organisations also influence how the institutional framework evolves. Organisations engage in acquiring skills and knowledge that will enhance their survival possibilities. If the highest rates of return in a society are to be made from corrupt activities, organizations will invest in knowledge and skills that will perfect their corruption competencies; if organizations realize the highest payoffs by increasing productivity then they will invest in relevant skills and knowledge. Organizations not only directly invest in acquiring skills and knowledge but indirectly (via the political process) induce public investment in those kinds of knowledge that they believe will enhance their survival prospects.

Although formal rules can change overnight as a result of a political or judicial decision, informal rules are strongly embodied in customs, traditions and codes of conduct are much more impervious to deliberate policies. The difference between institutions and organizations and the interaction between them shape the direction of institutional change. Change comes from the perceptions of the entrepreneurs in political and economic organizations that their interests can be better achieved through altering the existing institutional framework at some margin (Grindle, 1999). The sources of change are the opportunities perceived by entrepreneurs. The agent of change is the entrepreneur, the decision maker(s) in organizations. The subjective perceptions of entrepreneurs determine the choices they make. They stem from either external changes in the environment or the acquisition of learning and skills and their incorporation in the mental constructs of the actors.

As Denzau and North (1994) and Mantzavinos et al. (2003) explain, the starting point of change is human learning. Learning is the complex modification of the 'mental models'

according to the feedback received from the environment. A mental model is the final prediction that the mind makes or expectation that it has regarding the environment before getting feedback from it (environment). Depending on whether the expectation formed is validated by the environmental feedback, the mental model can be revised, refined, or rejected. Learning is an evolutionary process of trial and error, and failure of a solution leads to the trial of another solution. When environmental feedback confirms the same mental model many times, it becomes stabilized. The relatively crystallized mental model is referred to as a 'belief' and the interconnection of beliefs (either consistent or inconsistent) is referred to as a 'belief system'. As shared mental models evolve within organizations, collective learning takes place with respect to their goals. This phenomenon is similar to what Schneider and Ingram (1997) call social construction of issues. The social construction of knowledge refers to the way facts, experiences, beliefs, and events are constructed and certified as 'true'. Therefore, institutional change comes about as a result of the demands of entrepreneurs in the context of the perceived costs of altering the institutional framework at various margins as confirmed by their shared mental models. Changes in informal constraints have the same origins as do changes in formal rules; but they occur gradually and sometimes subconsciously as individuals evolve alternative patterns of behaviour consistent with their newly perceived mental models (Grindle, 1999).

The process of change is overwhelmingly incremental. The complementarities, economies of scope and network externalities bias change in favour of the interests of the existing organizations and institutional frameworks. Extensive evidence exists about how powerful economic interests develop around policies and the ways in which they fiercely resist any move to reduce or to take the benefits away (Dixit, 1996 and Grindle 1999). As Grindle points out, potential losers from altered policy tend to be well organized and conscious of the losses they face while winners tend to be dispersed and generally unaware of the benefits of reform. Also, the larger the number of rules to change implies the greater the number of losers and hence the severe the opposition. This battle results in sustained policy despite enormous costs implications on the economy. Further, Dixit

(1996) acknowledges a normative concept that defends continuance of long standing policies even when they are inefficient. This is called 'reliance doctrine'. It says that when people have made commitments (sunk investments) in the expenditure of continuation of a given policy, those expectations should not be disappointed, and the resources costs they incurred in making these investments should not be rendered worthless, save for some really important offsetting reason. So as people make sunk investments, changing a policy act becomes ever harder with the passage of time.

Therefore, institutional change will only occur at those margins considered most pliable in the context of the bargaining power of interested parties and making new policies fails to make the complete break with the past. As North (1990) summarises the discussion, the resultant path of institutional change is shaped by 1) the lock-in that comes from the symbiotic relationship between institutions and the organizations that have evolved as a consequence of the incentive structure provided by those institutions and 2) the feedback process by which human beings perceive and react to change in the opportunity set. The direction of change is determined by 'path dependence', such that 'history matters'. Denzau and North (1994) argue that a concept discovered by an individual that is useful in explaining the world is more likely to persist in one's mental model, and this implies 'path-dependence'. The political and economic organizations that have come into existence courtesy of certain institutional matrix rationally have a duty in protecting and perpetuating the parent framework. Both the interests of the existing organizations that produce path dependence and the mental models of the actors that produce ideologies 'rationalize' the existing institutional matrix and therefore bias the perception of the actors in favour of policies conceived to be in the interests of existing organizations.

Long-run economic change is the cumulative consequence of innumerable short-term decisions by political and economic entrepreneurs and the resulting path dependence can lock-in the economy into inefficient suboptimal performance for substantial period of time. This perspective explains how similar policy problems have generated distinct solutions in different contexts (Grindle, 1999). The histories of different countries or

different regions of the world are likely to differ as each pursues a unique path that evolves from institutional adjustment and adaptation, producing an economic theory that explains why 'history matters'.

As comparative institutionalists concur, not even a revolution, a conquest nor a crisis can make a complete break from the past. Revolutionary change occurs as a result of gridlock arising from a lack of mediating institutions that enable conflicting parties to reach compromises. The intersection of the choice sets of the conflicting parties may be a null set (no overlaps) and in the absence of facilitating institutions reaching a compromise may be difficult. However, revolutionary change is never as revolutionary as its supporter's may desire. When formal institutions are suddenly altered by revolution, invasion or crisis; the deep-seated beliefs and norms may not change automatically- status quo will be eventually overturned when the revolution ends, the invaders leave or the crisis subsides. Inconsistency between the formal rules and the informal constraints (which may be the result of deep-seated cultural inheritance) results in tensions which typically get resolved by some restructuring of the overall constraints--in both directions- -to produce a new equilibrium that is far less revolutionary contrary to what the initiators of the change thought.

Comparative institutionalism has generally shown itself to be more adaptive to the realities of developing and transitional country policy making (Grindle, 1999). Public policy is always produced within one or more institutional settings and the characteristics of these institutions remain imprinted in the policy itself. Although institutions produce policy designs, they also are created, limited or influenced in other ways by public policy. Those who make policy and design have a stake in the framework they created and resist changes that may rob them power or property. Institutions have values, norms, and ways of operating that define an institutional culture. Policy making institutions often have distinctive cultures that direct the people within the institution towards various styles of decision making and towards particular ideas about what kind of behaviours (and what kind of policy) are appropriate (Schneider and Ingram 1997). As North (1990) observes,

the developing world countries are poor because the institutional constraints define a set of payoffs to political/economic activities that do not encourage productive activity. The institutional path dependence structure the economic game in a standardized way through time and lead societies to play a game that results in undesirable consequences (Mantzavinos et al., 2003). The organizations that flourish within such institutional framework are efficient- but more efficient in making the societies even more unproductive and the basic institutional structure even less conducive to productive activity. Unproductive paths persist- the increasing returns characteristic of an initial set of institutions that provide disincentives to productive activity create organizations and interests groups with a stake in the existing constraints. They shape polity in their interests. The subjective mental constructs of the participants evolve an ideology that not only rationalizes the society's structure but accounts for its poor performance. As a result the economy evolves policies that reinforce the existing incentives and organizations.

While exploring the question of underdeveloped institutions in the developing world, Shirley (2003) explains that such countries inherited poor institutions from their colonial masters. The colonist created institutions that mirrored their own institutional endowment. The colonists transplanted their institutional setups with all their weaknesses to their colonies. She further basis her argument on colonial institutional incentives heritage. If countries had valuable resources (including human) that could be enslaved, the colonizers were enticing to design institutions to exploit these riches. Where the colonist could not settle in large numbers, they introduced 'extractive institutions' - oppressive production methods, adapted tax and tribute systems designed to 'concentrate political power in the hands of a few who used their power to extract resources from the rest of the population' (Acemoglu et al., 2001). Elites used their positions of power to restrict access of non elites to opportunities, reducing competition and discouraging innovations. However, in safe places where they could settle in large numbers, the colonist brought with them 'beneficial institutions'. The countries that inherited beneficial institutions prospered (Canada). Those that inherited extractive institutions are languishing in poverty (Africa). However, there is need for further research to establish

which are these 'colonial extractive institutions' that so cripple societies that they stay poor for centuries.

So how are the underdeveloped and inefficient institutions changed? Path dependency and stickiness of beliefs and norms explain why underdevelopment cannot be overcome by simply importing institutions that were successful in other countries. The foreign aid community generally assumes that institutions are malleable and can be changed through aid within the three to five years life span of development assistance project. Another school of thought imagines that well-intentioned outsiders can discover needed institutional changes and persuade governments to implement reforms and sustain them. Shirley (2003) observes that all these assumption are wrong: (i) most institutional change is well beyond the time frame of even a series of aid projects; (ii) institutional change requires alterations in beliefs that, cannot usually be pushed or purchased by outsiders; (iii) successful institutional adaptations have been engineered by insiders and sometimes work quite contrary to the conventional wisdom or best practice touted by the aid community; and (iv) in the absence of a supportive institutional framework, aid can create perverse incentives and prop up rulers who are opponents, not catalyst, of reform or lock-in bad institutions that will never allow a country to develop. Since improvements in formal institutions hinge on changes in long held beliefs a result of *mental models* that usually require a period of gradual learning to change, the noble role for outsiders is to support learning process by helping build local knowledge and educational institutions while avoiding actions that fortify the custodians and defenders of the old order.

As Rose (2005) recounts from his vast practical experience as a development expert in many developing countries, many governments believe as long as the system is working, there is no stimulus to learn. 'If it isn't broken, don't fix'. As long as almost everyone concerned with a programme is satisfied, the diagnosis is simple: no problem. A suggestion to change to even better policies invites blank stares. There is always the 'fear of the unknown' and risk in disrupting the status quo. Many a times, politicians have rejected reform proposals, even when these were clearly superior to a broken or deeply

inefficient status quo (Grindle, 1999). Governments have inherited many policies from their predecessors and programmes run by routine- they are carried forward by the *force of political inertia*. The laws that govern most public programmes were enacted by the colonialists or politicians who left office along time ago, some are even dead. When there are complaints, politician ignore in the hope that the discontented voices will just go away. Worse still- if a prospective difficulty will become serious once they leave office; the incentives of doing nothing are very high. When voters are dissatisfied with a 'doing nothing government' there is frantic efforts by the government to get the same old faces to deliver remedies that worked some years ago or in other countries.

3.2   Beliefs, values and ideas

If economic interests shaped by long-term economic forces and institutions, are the main determinant of policies (North, 1990), what then is the role of beliefs and values in the policy making process? The starting point of this examination of polices is the assertion that beliefs and values count in the process of building and maintaining functional policies. A belief is defined as how persons think things are and a value is defined as how persons think things ought to be (Hathaway and Hathaway, 1997). A belief is a perception of current reality and a value is a perception of how one would prefer current reality to be. As Fischer (2003) argues, people don't act simply on the basis of their perceived self-interest, without regard to aggregative consequences of their actions. They are motivated by values, ideas and commitments that transcend self-interest. One cannot understand the civil rights movements or social welfare transfer policies without a clear appreciation of their underlying normative preferences: namely, that all persons should have equal opportunities regardless of their race, creed, sex or religion (deLeon, 1988).Besides acting to maximize personal self-interest, people strive to achieve or affirm social and ideological goals. Ideas and ideologies shape the mental constructs that individuals use to interpret the world around them and make choices. Also, as Fischer (2003) explains, political leaders frequently do not reflect the narrow self-interested orientations as some political theories posit. Because politics is about good life, policy

27

politics revolve around controversial ideas and beliefs about the best course of action. Particular policies have come into existence courtesy of actors who had beliefs about what they take to be the right course of action and thus struggled to influence and shape decisions in the light of them.

Belief system is the underlying determinant of path dependence, one of the most striking regularities of history. Beliefs are not static; it is the learning process by which beliefs evolve that matters. For example, Christian beliefs evolved to views that were hospitable to economic and political development, such as the view that legitimate government must be based on the consent of the governed, the protestants virtue of 'a new man- rational, ordered, diligent, productive' promoted literacy, an appreciation of time, and tolerance and openness to new ideas (Landes, 1998). Cooperative beliefs and norms encourage people to cooperate even with those with whom they have no family, business or other relational ties have economic payoffs.

Beliefs and values shape the groups which become policy actors. Individuals do not have enough weight in the policy making process (Hathaway and Hathaway, 1997). Also, the poor are short of resources that most often underwrite political influence (Leonard, 2006). So to be influential, collective action is needed, but collective action requires the existence of collective actors. Citizens' preferences are articulated and aggregated by intermediate groups such as interest groups, professional associations, and political parties. Through their activities, citizens are more likely to have their preferences reflected in public policy (Schneider and Ingram, 1997). Individual actors will tend to join groups or to form groups with other individuals having the same interests. People sharing broadly common interests tend to have similar beliefs and values (shared mental models), and they form collective actors. One would be right to assume that these common beliefs and values are the glue that holds groups together. As Schneider and Ingram (1997) points out, groups are the bedrock for democracy. Consequently, groups should not be feared and restrained, but encouraged- citizens should be free to join or create new groups any time. Interests groups provide information to policy makers that

enable them create more responsible policies. Interests groups are watchdogs that hold officials accountable and alert the public when their interests are threatened.

Ideas are acknowledged to have a role in group consciousness and both inter- and intra-group conflict (Grindle, 1999). Just as values and beliefs, ideas help groups understand their own situation or define their identity and interests in distinction to those of others. The influence of ideas is inferred from the statements and policy preferences of actors. However, as Grindle (1999) explains, ideas are difficult to identify, track and measure. It is not easy to distinguish from interests. It is almost always a puzzle to know how much individuals or groups are acting out of conviction or out of some more self-interested motivation. Only in cases in which actors assert and act on ideas that are in direct conflict with their immediate and longer term self-interest can a good case be made for the independent influence of ideas. Most commonly, ideas are understood as political resources, a form of capital that is used to promote particular positions or to influence the outcome of decisions. As Grindle (1999) cautions, given the frequency with which ideas emerge in experiences of reform, the concept deserves more attention in research.

Focusing particularly on the agricultural policy, there is a range of non-economic values that are important in the agricultural policy process. Possibly the most pervasive of which is agrarianism and its influence can be seen in some common assertions about agriculture which have clear implications for agricultural policy. These assertions are fundamentally that agriculture is different from other forms of economic activity. Farmers have special interests and needs because of the dependence of farmers on the weather and imperfect markets, and that agriculture contributes to the national interest through food security (Skogstad, 1998). Further, farming is the basic occupation on which all other economic pursuits depend for raw materials and food; agricultural life is the natural life for man; being natural it is good, while city life is artificial and evil; and farming delivers complete economic independence for the farmer (Flinn and Johnson, 1974). When economic arguments about the special conditions facing farming are combined with non-economic sentiments about the inherent virtues of farming as a lifestyle, the resulting mix of values

is potent and can have a significant impact on policy. In some economies, agriculture carries a cultural and social significance far in excess of its economic importance (Ockenden and Franklin, 1995). An important feature of all these agrarian images is the promotion of small-scale nature of the farm systems.

In recent years, the scope of non-economic considerations in agricultural policy has expanded beyond agrarianism to cover other aspects like the environmental impact of farming. In the European Union, sustainability and food safety are considered important issues for the agricultural policy-maker to consider. As Linder (1986) observes, there is also the tendency of 'hard values' to squeeze out 'soft values' in the policymaking process. Linder defines 'hard values' as those which are tangible and whose realization can be measured with some precision; they tend to be economic and technological and thus translatable into physical units. 'Soft values', on the other hand, are predominantly intangible and non-instrumental. Advocates of economic values (empiricist) can therefore have an edge in debate which attempts to compare and weight different perspectives. However, as Etzioni (1988) argues, in order to understand policy outcomes in terms of the values they represent, it is important to explicitly recognize economic efficiency as a value like any other in that it is no more or less valid than any other value competing for policy attention. Economist can be very effective partisan advocate for efficiency; but unfortunately, in a pluralist society there is seldom an ethical consensus sufficient to justify the primacy of economic efficiency as an allocative norm independent of the political process (Linder, 1986). This argument does not however downplay the role of economic analysis in the policy process in terms of identifying the costs and benefits of different policy options. But the bottom line is; the goals of the policy need to be clear-efficiency may only be one of them and in some cases not the most important.

Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa indicates that effective, collective, proactive peasant initiatives in the policy game are hard to find (Leonard, 2006). Peasant farmers can be aggressive when their interests are challenged, but their actions are reactive and defensive rather than proactive. As Leonard (2006) explains, the rural poor are able to derive

Milu MUYANGA- Public Policy Making: A Review of the Literature

benefits from more advantaged members of their social systems by becoming their clients, exchanging subservience, service and political loyalty for material benefits. In patron-client networks, horizontal ties between relative equals and peers are replaced with vertical ties of dependence by the client on the patron. Reflecting on earlier work by Bates (1983), peasant politics is naturally based on patronage-client relations or ascriptive units (identities acquired by birth, which include religion). In such a scenario, clients frequently support policies that are detrimental to their long term collective interests in order to gain immediate, personal advantage.

On the other hand, the non-poor are found less likely to be organized internally along ascriptive or patron-client lines. They are more likely to be mobilized along class or common interests, which permits them to pursue their collective interests more effectively and thus enjoy comparative advantage in policy making (Bates, 1983). For example, urban workers in defence of their own class interests often demand for lower food prices, which hurt the interests of agriculture even when these workers continue to have close ties to rural homes. The elites in society often use their resources to buy the clientage of peasant groups. Therefore, even in democratic political system in which peasant are the majority, their interests vanish by selling their support to the interests of the elite groups in return for modest personal benefits.

How then are policies that promote interests of poor producers in developing countries to be advanced? Leonard (2006) has a brief answer- 'not easily, but with sophisticated analysis, patience and the right allies'. With client-patron ties, collective interests move is unlikely. However, there are times when other major political actors find smallholder farmers useful allies and will mobilize them by addressing their interests. There are times also when decentralization- well crafted to the unique political economy of the country- will give poor smallholder producers control over policies in their areas. We are also seeing international and local NGOs emerging as organizers and advocates on behalf of small holder producers and lobbying effectively on their behalf in local, national and global fora. None of them can claim to be far from client-patron arrangement though, but

they are benevolent form of patrons and are critical steps on the road to peasants becoming effective advocates in their own interests based on their beliefs and values.

3.3   Policy context, anchors and discourses

Context is the most important predictor of what type of design will result. Designs are always crafted within a context and tailored to fit some conceptions of the situation. Thus, designs created for one context cannot be easily transplanted to another. Designs emerge from a context and have consequence for that context, sometimes over a long period of time.   Contexts contain long historical memories that influence beliefs and shape how people will interpret various design choices (recall path dependence and mental models).

Policymakers are restricted in the areas of the policy space in which they can operate due to the existence in any particular political context of the *policy anchor* which 'pulls' policy options in its direction (Botterill, 2003). The policy anchor could be seen to represent the ideal policy settings within a particular policy environment, constraining the development of extreme policy positions and bounding the field area within which policy manoeuvres can occur. The model suggest that while policy approaches may be flexible in the short term they remain anchored in a set of core values which are more unchallengeable and which prevent policy shifts from producing radical realignments. By mapping policy settings in terms of the balance of values they represent, the map can identify the location of a policy anchor or 'centre of ideological gravity' which limits policy options as they shift. Policy anchors move as shifts occur in the prevailing ideology or frameworks which underpin policy choices over the longer term. She gives example of the transition in developed economies from policy approaches based on Keynesian economics to positions influenced by neoliberal values as an example of the movement of the policy anchor. During the time when Keynesian economics held sway, it provided the context for policy developments, resulting in parameters for policy that are different from those that prevailed under a neoliberal framework.

Discourses function epistemically to regularize the thinking of a particular period, including the basic organizing principles of social action. Functioning as deep socio-linguistic structures, discourses organize the actors' understandings of reality without them necessarily being aware. As large encompassing systems of meaning embedded in and transmitted by culture, macro discourses constitute the 'residua' of society's or groups' collective memory. They do so primarily in stories that can be taken as the *engrams* basic to our modes of thinking and action. Example is the Jews and the holocaust, the story is told and retold to remind Jews of whom they are and why they must defend themselves. In Germany, of course, the same story conveys a very different message of shame and guilt. So is the story of apartheid in South Africa.

3.4   Policy communities and issue networks

Heclo (1978), Habermas (1987) and Fischer (2003) discuss the role of policy communities and networks in public policy making. Unlike agenda-setting, where interest groups leaders and select members of the public are more readily involved, in policy formulation participation is much more restricted to actors who have a working professional knowledge in the substantive issues. Actors actively participate in advancing solutions to policy problems and discussing the feasibility of various options. Some serve as 'policy entrepreneurs' actively developing and pushing particular policy solutions, sometimes their own. Unlike groups that unite to ensure dominance over a policy, for these policy actors, a clear material self-interest is frequently subordinate to either an emotional commitment or an intellectual conviction. It appears what keeps policy networks moving is the common ideas about solutions to public problems. However, some authors have observed that networks are a function of shared values. Without a common understanding on what policy issues are and how to solve them; policy networks cannot stand. Hence, there are conflicts and considerable bargaining and consensus inside the network.

Policy communities and networks resemble what Peter Haas (1992) calls 'epistemic communities'- profusion of government agencies, policy analysis institutes, and policy experts. An epistemic community is a network of knowledge-based experts or groups with an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within the domain of their expertise. Members hold a common set of causal beliefs and share notions of validity based on internally defined criteria for evaluation, common policy projects, and shared normative commitments. Increasing complexity of public issues has compelled decision-makers to more and more turn to epistemic communities to resolve policy dilemmas. Policy beliefs and the politics of 'expertise' assume central role in development and construction of policy. However, it is important to acknowledge that expert consensus can influence politics of policy making, but politics does not influence science.

3.5   Leadership and agents of change

Leadership matters. Change agents can make a difference to the destinies of countries. Change agents are individual who sees change as an opportunity rather than a threat, individuals who are instrumental in managing change and taking it forward (Sutton, 1999 and Ambrose, A. 1989). As Grindle (1999) explains, studies of policy reform initiatives indicate that for successful change, reform leaders must emerge, commit themselves to the content of a reform, empower and protect technocrats who provide substantive input into reform planning, mobilize reformist coalitions, provide a vision of a more hopeful future to help citizens tolerate the disequilibrium of change, and deal effectively with those whose opposition threatens to derail reform. The empirical literature is almost unanimous: reform leadership is essential to successful policy and institutional change.

Empirical studies also demonstrate consistently those politicians who are forced unwillingly into reform by powerful international actors renege on their agreements. In many cases, leaders appear to act autonomously from the stated preferences of powerful groups and even against their own immediate political self-interest. In comparative institutionalism leadership is usually treated as a function of group interests and resources

for engaging in conflict over policy and institutional preferences. Thus, leaders are those who represent and advance group interests in conflicts. At the same time, leaders can be counted as resources that groups have (or don't have) in their quest for policy results. This would be the case in demonstrating, for example, that some groups or interests have leadership skilled in negotiation and some don't, some have leaders in powerful official positions and others don't, and so forth. The notion that leaders act more autonomously in the sense that they initiate proposals and mobilize group support around particular policy issues is elusive in the theory, although it appears to be a normal case in practice.

4. Participatory public policy making

4.1 The principle

In this section, we rely heavily on the works by Peter deLeon. Before the evolution to participatory policy making, policies are made by an elite corps of technocrats and bureaucrats, obliged principally to a state and largely insulated from the ultimate recipients of their designed policies. And if the experts are too bend upon 'waiting until all the data is in' the decisions are made anyway without the experts 'by the practical man- the hard-headed' politician. As Schneider and Ingram (1997) observe, in such a situation the ordinary people find it difficult to press their construction of issue onto the political agenda. Citizens become spectators- disconnected from government and public policy initiatives- leaving such issues to experts who rely on scientific studies to determine both the means and ends of policy. These designs contribute to a political system of widespread apathy in which citizens vent their frustration through empty and divisive complaints. Government comes to be a conversation among the few that is irrelevant to the many. This system is characterised by two major flaws. First, the elites consistently misread what is wanted (as opposed to what they think is needed) and, therefore, even less surprising if their recommended policies are adopted, frequently go awry. Second, primarily for methodological reasons, the values inherent in policy-making are neglected- they fail to capture the norms and values which motivate the body politic.

The reason is not hard to understand: values are, by their very nature, are enormously fluid and controversial and thus rarely amenable to reconciliation, let alone thinking of incorporating them into policy making.

The emergence of participatory policy making process tenet is reaction in part to the threats posed by narrow interest groups in a pluralist setting (Bachrach, 1976) and the unsustainable monopoly of power (Rustow, 1970). Reduced to its starkest form, participatory policy process is an approach which expands the range of contributors to the policy-making process. Succinctly, it calls for the inclusion of a greater representation of actors (or, in the policy circles 'stakeholders'), who are affected by a given policy through a series of discursive processes. Forthrightly, it represents a conscious effort to translate and aggregate faithfully *individual* preferences into public policy. Citizens are expected to make significant contributions concerning their values, preferences, facts and policy alternatives to policy-making process. It is a more horizontal than hierarchical policy-making process, one more democratic than administrative. The rationale underlying the proposed approach is straightforward: public programmes should encompass as much understanding of the stakeholders' and recipients' needs as possible in order that the ensuing policies might fulfil as many of their deficiencies.

4.2   The process

Process has also become equally as important as the content of the final policy document for the legitimacy of a new policy: how the policy is made, as well as what it says, matters (Grindle, 1999). This would require establishment of credible *fora* and agreed-upon operating procedures so that the various participants will view the system as genuine and respondent to their interests (Schneider and Ingram, 1988). If credibility condition does not obtain, those groups whose contributions 'vanish' in the information aggregation may perceive the process as a mockery; at best a smokescreen to legitimize predetermined positions. As deLeon (1990) puts it, participants might not be happy with the outcome, but if at the least process allowed 'all contending parties their day in court',

then they can be contented. Credible process gives a promise that the relevant positions and underlying values are at least appreciated if not actually reconciled. Participation include open forum where actors are involved in the making and execution of public policy in a deliberative mode- actors share in agenda-setting, content, and ratification of a policy. There is thus a moral claim to participation, according to the norms of democracy. A claim of necessity for participation is based on the belief that without the general sense of 'ownership' that comes from sharing authorship, modern day democratic societies will not understand, respect, support, and or even live with imposed policies (Hart, 2003). Therefore, public participation should not be construed to mean voting.

Will ordinary citizens be able to comprehend the structure of complicated policy problems? deLeon (1990) does not perceive increased citizen participation in decision making as a means of educating the public or creating a broader body of expertise, although he appreciates that this could be an inevitable and laudable by-product. The intention is to gather information in a credible manner to come up with informed recommendations and decisions. The issue at hand is not one empowerment; it is one of greater access to and visibility of citizens in the public policy making processes. Stakeholders need not necessarily be experts in the technical sense of the term in order to present their particular preferences based upon their idiosyncratic rationale. To substantiate his point, deLeon (1990) refers to Berger Commission case. Berger, a Canadian jurist, was asked to assess the 'social, environmental and economic impact regionally' of a trans-Canadian natural gas pipeline. To carry out his mandate, Berger scheduled hearings among the affected communities which would have been directly affected but otherwise effectively disenfranchised. The public hearings were held in the local townships and in the native languages. To underscore the significance of individual testimonies, the Berger Commission Report comments:

> '… no academic treatise or discussion, formal presentation of the claims of native people by the native organizations and then leaders, could offer as compelling and vivid a picture of the goals and aspirations of native people as their own testimony. In no other way could we have discovered the depth of feeling regarding past wrongs and

future hopes, and the determination of native people to assert their collective identity today and in the years to come'.

At what stage should participation be invited? Some authors argue, if it should happen prior to the problem setting or definition stage, then the expanded participation and their respective requirements might explode the analysis well beyond manageable bounds (Weiss, 1989). If it were to occur at later stages of policy implementation, its effects would be doubtful because many of the major decisions would have already been made and the credibility of the process would be gravely compromised. It would therefore seem more sensible to embed participatory mechanisms in that stage during which policies are being defined, formulated, and their respective effects estimated (deLeon, 1990).

Next we turn to the most fundamental question of representation. The idea of participatory policy process is noble; it aims at gathering greater amounts of information. The testimony of every single affected individual like in the Berger Commission case is useful, but the number of participants and amount of information garnered can easily overwhelm the system, thereby defeating its very basic tenet. The selection process - which groups to participate and who nominates them to present their interests - could quickly stain the alleged neutral and objective process. Some credible representation rules must be devised and enforced. While admitting that every single citizenry might be affected by policy change in one way or another, deLeon (1990) argues that it is imperative to group them into 'intimately', the 'kind of', and the 'casually' affected. Then based on time and financial constraints, an indication on how wider to cast the net of representation can be determined.

4.3   Conceptual and analytical framework

In this section, we focus on conceptual perspectives to understand public policy processes in a theoretically informed style. Having looked at literature on public policy theories, the 'messiness' and the essentials of policy change, we now move further to derive some practical framework in the quest to understand SRA making process. As noted in the

literature review, each theory was conceived during historical era when it seemed to offer an antidote to one or more political or social maladies. Each theory operates from a narrow value perspective and posits only one or two important roles for public policy in a democracy. None is adequate alone. Policy designs that pursue only one value almost always work to the disadvantage of other values. So as Schneider and Ingram (1997) suggest, an integrated framework that posit multiple values for policy to serve in a democracy is essential. Most of the theories treat individual and groups as actors while neo-institutionalism and satism treat the state itself as an actor. It is apparent that some institutions are policy making and implementation friendly, while others are not. The more empirical bent of policy science requires analysts to include both actors and institutions in their analysis, and that is precisely the orientation we propose to pursue here. The set of ideas, values and beliefs or the 'discourse' surrounding a policy problem serves to constrain policy actors. While their activity is conditioned by the nature of the problem under consideration and the larger political, economic, institutional, and ideological context in which they operate, the lessons that policy makers draw from past experiences with addressing problems can shape what views they hold and the actions they take in the present.

To interrogate the policy process that led to realisation of the SRA it is imperative to mobilise different and complementary approaches (Scott and Leblang, 2006; Thatcher, 1998; and Muller and Surel, 1998). The approach taken here is to synthesize a framework for policy analysis which draws from many perspectives (Figure 1). It is grounded on the increasing appreciation that combining theoretical perspectives offers complementary analytic tools, thereby yielding a more complete picture than any one theory alone. We adopt the framework suggested by Bowe et al. 1992, Ball (1993) and Howlett and Ramesh (1995). This approach is an improvement to the traditional policy cycle approach. We are fascinated by its contexts innovation. The approach lays emphasis on micro-political processes and the agency of individual practitioners in constructing policy at the local level. The framework has three primary policy contexts: *context of influence* (where interest groups struggle over construction of policy discourses); *context of policy*

text production (where texts represent policy); and the *context of practice* (where policy is subject to interpretation). Each of these three contexts has multiple arenas of action and each involves struggles. The framework brings into play the role of policy actors; the interests they pursue, impacts of the beliefs, values and ideas they hold on their actions; strategies employed including interests leadership; the impact of past experiences on the present (history matters) and the prevailing environment (policy anchors).

Different groups in society have different beliefs and values. This challenge facing agricultural policy makers in a pluralist democracy is to develop policies that are acceptable to groups within the community which hold competing and sometimes conflicting values. The model of political behaviour used in our study assumes that the primary function of the political process is the compromising of these conflicting or competing values in a fashion that maximizes the satisfaction of the relevant groups in society. To understand negotiation process, Muller and Surel (1998) and Howlett and Ramesh (1995) argue that it is imperative to open the *negotiation arena* (black box) to atomistically comprehend what happens inside there: who are the players, what are their interests, what is their game plan, their leaders and negotiation competence, their positions and strategies- in order to understand how conflicts and compromises are handled and the resulting consensus.

Figure 1: Analytical Framework

Milu MUYANGA- Public Policy Making: A Review of the Literature

Policy arena is the battle field where actors discuss policy issues and persuade and bargain in pursuit of their interests. Actors interact with each other in a countless number of ways in pursuit of their self-interests, and the result of their interaction is what public policy is about. The important issues in the agricultural policy making is the process which resolves the debate between competing values as well as the mix of values that become the policy. During the course of their interaction with the other actors, they often give up or modify their objectives in return for concessions from other members of the subsystem. These interactions, however, occur in the context of various institutional arrangements surrounding the policy process and affecting how actors pursue their interests and ideas and the extent to which their efforts succeed. The compromise could be defined as a 'political-social armistice' between actors with divergent interests, leading to an organisation characterised by rules, rights and obligations (Leborgne and Lipietz, 1992; and André, 1995). Linkages between different levels and contexts of the policy process should be explicitly appreciated by examining how these contexts continually relate to each other. For example, possible avenues and mechanisms for feedback from micro level influences, texts, practices, outcomes and political strategies which contribute to the reconstruction of policy text at the macro level need to be explored.

Beyond the individual policy where the influence, policy text production and practice (smaller picture) processes occur, the system is exposed to other external forces. Decision to or not make a decision in a certain area might be influenced by other variables such as regime changes, science (e.g. global warming), technology (e.g. encourage new technology), the media (e.g. media-induced moral panics) and globalisation. Such factors can anchor policy by setting the radius within which policy makers operate. Thus, a consideration of such factors needs to be incorporated into policy analysis.

4.4   The actors

Our discussion on actors in participatory policy making process is informed by Dixit (1996) and Howlett and Ramesh (1995). Actors in policy process may be either individuals or groups. Actors in policy making process include elected officials, appointed officials, interest groups, research organizations, and mass media. In most cases policies are made by 'policy subsystems' consisting of experts in specific sectoral issues rather than the elected legislative generalists. Policy subsystems are forums where actors discuss policy issues and persuade and bargain in pursuit of their interests. Political parties are not represented in the policy making arena. However, we may not rule out their influence- actors in the subsystem may harbour some party ideologies. In developing countries representatives of voters, who once elected are not required to heed the preferences of their voters, are not actively involved in policy making process.

a)   The executive

The executive (cabinet) in many countries is one of the key players in the policy subsystem. Its central role derives from the constitutional mandate to govern the country. After all the authority to make and implement policy, even without consultations, rests squarely with the executive. In addition, the executive possesses a range of other resources that strengthen its position. Control of information is one of them. The executive has unmatched information which it withholds, releases, and manipulates in a manner that bolsters its preferences and weaken the case of the opponents. The executive also controls the budget and has access to media to publicise its positions and to undermine those of the opponents. It has also the bureaucracy at its disposal to provide advice and to carry out its preferences. The executive is known to use these tools to directly control and influence societal actors such interest groups, mass media and think tanks. It can also exert its influence indirectly through means such as determining the policy agenda or shaping the rules and norms of institutions; and power to influence the perceptions, wants, and needs of others.

The executive is more than just another actor in policy making process, it is able to employ legitimate coercion; shape other institutional features; and fuse the collective will. In democratic societies, the policy making process should be seen as *state-centred,* to emphasise the lead role often taken by governments in policy, but not *state controlled,* which implies a top-down model (Ball, 1993). In many developing countries like Kenya, the executive has power to control the timing of the introduction and passage of laws in the legislature. The size and complexity of the executive overwhelms generalist politicians- can't control executive. As Schneider and Ingram (1997) observes, power relationships are central to policy design because power determines which actions constitute political opportunities and which actions are political risks. Opportunities and risks in turn influence policy makers' perceptions of what is feasible in terms of policy action. Power can be used for good or ill.

b)   The legislature

In parliamentary systems the task of the legislature is to hold government accountable to the public rather that make and implement policies. But through the performance of these roles, the legislature can influence policy making. In legislature social problems are highlighted and policies to address them are demanded. Legislature also gets to have their say during the process of approving government bills enacting policies and government budgets funding their implementations. They can also demand for revision of policies in question and can also raise issues with implementation and demand changes. Parliamentary committees are also established along functional lines and are mandated to review proposed legislations. Committees often build considerable expertise in their respective areas enabling the legislature to exercise influence over making and implementing policies. Some individual legislators may, on the basis of their expertise and experience or special interest, be included in the policy subsystem. It is also important to note that various policies draw varying degree of interest in parliament. For example, policies dealing with redistribution of resources may arouse considerable debate.

However, it is only in minority governments where the legislature is can shape executive bills. In cases where the government is based on majority party or political parties are lack disciplure and are not cohesive, policies are passed easily at the legislature. The executive also influences the internal organization of the parliamentary committees. Legislators may lack expertise or may see little political benefit pursuing a policy.

c)   The bureaucrats

The bureaucrats (appointment officials) assist the executive in the performance of its tasks. They are civil servants. As Howlett and Ramesh (1995) note, in modern governments their role goes beyond that of a servant. Indeed, bureaucrats are very often the central figure in policy subsystems. The bureaucracy power and influence is based on a range of resources. First, the law provides for certain crucial functions to be performed by the bureaucracy and confer wide discretion on individual bureaucrats to make decisions on behalf of the state. Second, bureaucracies have unmatched access to material resources for pursuing their own organizational, or even individual goals if they so wish. Thirds, the bureaucracy is a repository of a wide range of skills and expertise, a resource which make it a premier organization in society. It hires experts specialized in certain areas, and by concentrating on the same area through out acquire dexterity and great insights to policy problems. Fourth, modern bureaucracies have access to information on different aspects of society. At times, information is deliberately gathered, in other times information comes into bureaucrats hand by the virtue of his daily schedule of duties. Fifth, and very important, the permanence of the bureaucracy and the long tenure of its members often give it an edge over its masters, the elected executive. Finally, the fact that policy agenda setting and deliberation for most part occur in secrecy within the bureaucracy cocoons denying other policy actors the opportunity to mount opposition to its plans.

However, the executive is ultimately responsible for all policies, an authority it does assert at times. High level political issues are more likely to involve higher levels of executive control. Executive is also extremely alert especially if bureaucracy consistently opposes a policy option preferred by politician or after a change in political regime. It is also important to note that bureaucracy is not homogenous organisation. It constitutes entities with varying interests (personal, political, functional and technical), perspectives, and standard operating procedures which makes consensus hard to reach at times. Also, bureaucrats may require support of elected officials if they are to exercise their influence.

d)   Interest groups

While policy making is a preserve of the government, and particularly of the executive and bureaucracy, the realities of modern politics enable interest groups to play a significant role in the process. One of the most important resources of interest groups is knowledge. The members of such groups often know the most about their area of concern. Since policy making is highly information-intensive process, those with abundant information have a potential role to play. Other players find information embedded in interest groups indispensable. Politicians require this information for policy making or as arsenal to attack opponents. Interest groups also campaign for and deliver votes to sympathetic candidates who they think would support their cause. While their participation is not a guarantee that their interests will be considered, they are unlikely to be entirely ignored, except in rare circumstances when executives make a high level and deliberate decision to go ahead with policy despite opposition from the concerned groups.

However, their impacts greatly vary according to their varying organizational resources. First, they differ in size and membership. All other things being, relatively large groups are taken more seriously by the government. Second, some groups may form apex (peak) association consisting of groups with similar interests. An umbrella (peak) association is expected to be more influential than those operating individually. Third, some groups are well funded which enables them to hire experts (leaders) to argue their case.

e)   Research organizations

A think tank is defined as 'an independent organization engaged in multi-disciplinary research intended to influence policy' (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995). Such organizations maintain an interest in a broad range of policy problems and employ a variety of expertise enabling them to develop a more comprehensive perspective. Their research tends to be directed at proposing practical solutions to public problems or, in the case of some think tanks, finding evidence to support the ideology-driven positions they advocate. This differentiates them from academic research (university) that does not necessarily aim at solving public problem.

Think tanks are expected to maintain an image of intellectual autonomy from the government or political party if policy-makers are to take them seriously. In certain cases, some 'think tanks' are perceived to be 'hired guns' paid by certain interest groups (government, internal or external) precisely to come up with selective facts, statistics and arguments to support the client's case- money can easily buy a plausible case (deLeon, 1990). To influence policy processes, some think tanks target their research and recommendations on those politicians who may be expected to be favourably disposed to the ideas being espoused. They also spend efforts on publicizing their positions on topical policy issues.

f)   Mass media

Opinions on the role of the mass media in the policy process range from those who regard them as pivotal to those who describe it as marginal. There is no denying that the mass media are crucial links between the state and society, a position that permits them to strongly influence the preferences of the government and the society on public problems and solutions to them. Yet at the same time, their role in the policy process is often sporadic and most often quite marginal. Mass media matters because in their passive

reporting of problems, they add some analysis and suggest possible solutions. Thus, media role in agenda setting is really significant. Their problem analysis and proposals they make condition how issues are understood by the public and the government, thereby shutting out some alternatives and making the choice of another more likely. Questions raised in parliament reflect stories read in daily papers headlines. News reporters and editors are news-makers, in the sense that they define what is worthy of reporting and the aspects of the case that need highlighting. Thus, less important issues may attract attention of public if succinctly articulated by the press. Bureaucrats and executive counter the press by selectively releasing information that furthers their cause.

5.   Policy implementation

Traditional political science stopped at the point where the government took a decision. The responsibility of putting the policy into practice rested squarely with administrators. There are so many factors that can derail implementation of a well conceived policy. First, after the policy is put into text it is subject to interpretation and reaction by the policy implementing agents (Ball, 1993). The implementing agents can either unintentionally or deliberately misinterpret the policy. 'Bad policies', those not based on valid assumptions about how to achieve its goals may have difficulties in being translated into practice.

Secondly, lack of enough time and resources for the policy to be delivered can affect policy implementation (Hague et al., 1998). Often, the old style was to mandate the goals but not the resources to achieve them hoping that the problem goes away once a policy has been formulated. Bureaucracy, the number of 'stations' where the policy has to sit awaiting clearance from a variety of unenthusiastic groups (e.g. parliament) or individuals (presidential accent) before it can be put into effect can cause delay in policy implementation- sometimes rendering a policy irrelevant when policy environment in which the policy was conceived change. Some other times even well-thought-out (good policies) can fail to be implemented as a result of changes in circumstances (bad luck).

For example, the Kenya Rural Development Strategy (KRDS) policy could have meant well for the Kenyans, but its implementation failed partly because of change in political regime from Kenya African National Union (KANU) to National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government in December 2002.

Thirdly, it is important to note that, just as in the policy development, policy implementation also requires leadership. This calls for individuals who see change as an opportunity and not as a threat and who will give direction and momentum to the implementation of new policies and methods.

6.   Conclusion

As Schneider and Ingram (1997) observes, if you ask ordinary citizens about their expectation of public policy, they almost certainly would agree with all the theories: policy should solve problems in an efficient and effective manner; it should be responsive to public preferences, represent interests, and resolve conflicts when interests clash; and it should promote justice and democracy in all spheres of life by providing equal opportunity, aiding the disadvantaged, reducing oppression, and empowering people to gain greater control of their own lives and environments. They would also agree that public policy has fallen short in all these aspects. One must accept that markets and governments are both imperfect systems; that both are unavoidable features of reality; that the operation of each is powerfully influenced by the existence of the other; and that both are processes unfolding in real time, whose evolution is dependent on history and buffeted by surprises (Dixit, 1996). All these theories were constructed during historical period when it seemed to offer an antidote to one or more ailments of the polity.

All in all, the sad story is that public policy reform is not easy. It is a dynamic evolutionary process and the robust institutions that supported modern markets economies emerged through a process of adaptation that apparently cannot easily be

short-circuited or mimicked (Shirley, 2003). According to Dixit (1996), economic policy making should be seen as an on going, imperfect, and incomplete process with powerful but slow dynamics. Clear appreciation of history, politics and institutions- economic policy making practitioners are likely to complain – but they is need to accept some imperfection and 'tolerance' of the slow process. Even when they cause human misery and pain, Shirley (2003) concurs, institutions usually change slowly, if at all. All this takes patience. Policy reform can be blocked for long time but move with lightening speed when the constellation of interests, opportunities and structures is right (Leonard, 2006). In other works, researchers have shown that opportunities to introduce new changes at the margin tend to cluster in so called *honeymoon periods* immediately after elections (Grindle 1999).

References

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: Empirical Investigation. *American Economic Review*, 91:5 pp.1369-401.

Alchian, Armen A. 1950. Uncertainty, Evolution, Economic Theory. *Journal of Political Economy*, 58 pp211-21.

André , C. 1995. Etat P.rovidence et compromis institutionnalisés: des origines à la crise contemporaine. In: Boyer, R. et Saillard, Y. Théorie de la Régulation: L'état des Savoirs. Paris, La Découverte, pp.144-153.

Ambrose, A. 1989. 'Key Concepts of the Transitional Approach to Managing Change' in Klein, L. (ed.) *Working With Organisations, Papers to Celebrate the 80th Birthday of Harold Bridger*. Loxwood: Kestrel Print.

Bachrach, Peter. 1976. The Theory of Democratic Elitism. Boston: Little, Brown.

Ball, S. J. 1993. What is policy? Texts, trajectories and toolboxes. *Discourse*, 13(2), pp.10-17.

Barret, C.B., P. Marenya, J. McPeak, B. Minten, F. Murithi, W. Oluoch-Kosura, F. Place, J.C. Randrianarisoa, J. Rasambainarivo and J. Wangila. 2006. Welfare Dynamics in Rural Kenya and Madagascar. *Journal of Development Studies* 42 (2), 248-277

Bates, Robert H. 1983. Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bigsten, Arne and Paul Collier. 1995. Linkages from agricultural growth in Kenya. In: John Mellor (eds.), Agriculture on the Road to Industrialization, IFPRI, Washington DC.

Botterill, Linda Courtenay. 2003. Government responses to drought in Australia. In: L.C. Botterill and M. Fisher (Eds.), Beyond Drought - People, Policy and Perspectives Melbourne, CSIRO Publishing.

Bowe, R.; Ball, S.; Gold, A. Reforming Education and Changing Schools*:* Case Studies in Policy Sociology. London: Routledge, 1992.

deLeon, Peter. 1990. Participatory policy analysis: prescriptions and precautions. *ASIAN Journal of Public Administration*. 12, pp.29-54.

deLeon, Peter. 1988. Advice and Consent: The Development of the Policy Sciences. Russel Sage Foundation, New York.

Denzau, A. and Douglas C. North. 1994. Shared mental models: ideologies and instituions. *Kyklos* 47, pp3-30.

Dixit, A. 1996. The Making of Economic Policy. A Transaction Cost Politics Perspective. Cambridge, MIT Press.

Easterly, William. 2001. The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics. The MIT Press.

Etzioni, Amitai. 1988. The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics. New York, The Free Press.

Finer, S. 1974. Comparative Government. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Fischer, Frank. 2003. Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices. Oxford University Press.

Flinn, William L. and Donald E. Johnson. 1974. Agrarianism among Wisconsin farmers. *Rural Sociology,* 39(2), pp.187-204.

Grindle, M. 2001. In quest of political: the political economy of development policy making. In: Meier and Stiglitz (Eds.), Frontiers of Development Economics: the Future in Perspective. Washington, New York, World Bank, Oxford University Press: pp.345-389.

Guehenno, J.M. 1995. The End of the Nation-State. Minneapolis, Mn. and London: University of Minnesota Press.

Haas, Peter M. 1992. Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination. IO, 46:1, Winter 1992.

Habermas, J. 1987. The Theory of Communicative Action 2 Cambridge, Mass: Polity

Hague, R., Martin Harrop and Shaun Breslin. 1998. Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction. 4th Ed. Macmillan Press Limited, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London.

Hart, Vivien. 2003. Democratic Constitution Making. United States Institute of Peace. Special Report No. 107, July 2003.

Hathaway, Kate and Dale Hathaway. 1997. Searching for Common Ground. European Union Enlargement and Agricultural Policy. FAO Agricultural Policy and Economic Development Series – 1.

Heclo, H. 1978. Issue networks and the executive establishment. In: A. King (eds.), American Political System. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

Howlett, Michael and M. Ramesh. 1995. Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Subsystems. Oxford University Press.

Kabubo-Mariara, J., and Ndeng'e G.K. 2004. Measuring and monitoring poverty: the case of Kenya. Paper presented at the Poverty Analysis and Data Initiative (PADI) Workshop on Measuring and Monitoring Poverty. Mombasa, Kenya, May 7th-8th 2004.

Kimenyi, Mwangi, S. 2002. Agriculture, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction. KIPPRA Occasional Paper No. 3. June 2002.

Kydd, J. and Andrew Doward. 2004. Implications of Market and Coordination Failures for Rural Development in Least Developed Countries. *Journal of International Development,* 16, pp. 951-970.

Landes, David. 1998. The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Countries are So Rich and Others are So Poor. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

Leborgne, D. and Lipietz, A. 1992. Conceptual fallacies and open questions on post-fordism. In: Storper and Scott (eds), Pathways to Industrialization and Regional Development, Routledge, London - New York.

Leonard, David K. 2006. The Political Economy of International Development and Pro-Poor Livestock Policies: A Comparative Assessment. Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative. Working Paper No. 35.

Linder, Stephen H. 1986. Efficiency, Multiple Claims, and Moral Values. In: W. N. Dunn (Eds.), Policy Analysis: Perspectives, Concepts, and Methods. Greenwich, JAI Press Inc: pp. 281-300.

Mantzavinos, C., Douglass C. North, Syed Shariq. 2003. Learning, Institutions and Economic Performance. *Perspectives on Politics*, 2(1).

Maxon, Robert M. 1992. Establishment of the colonial economy. In: R.W. Ochieng' and R.M. Maxon (eds.), An Economic History of Kenya. East African Educational Publishers Limited.

Miller, D. 1991. Politics. In: Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought, 5th ed. Bogdanor (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell) pp. 390-1.

Muller, P. and Surel Y. 1998. L'analyse des Politiques Publiques. Paris, Editions Montchrestien, 146 p.

North, D.C. 2004. The historical evolution of polities. *International Review of Law and Economics,* 14, pp. 381-91.

North, D.C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Nyoro, J. 2002. Agriculture and Rural Growth in Kenya. Tegemeo Institute Working Paper. June 2002.

Ochieng' William R. 1992. European mercantilism and imperialism. In: R.W. Ochieng' and R.M. Maxon (eds.), An Economic History of Kenya. East African Educational Publishers Limited.

Ockenden, Jonathon and Michael Franklin 1995. European Agriculture: Making the CAP Fit the Future. Chatham House Papers London, Pinter.

Pannu, R. S. 1996. Neoliberal project of globalization: Prospects for democratization of education. *The Alberta Journal of Educational Research, XLII (2),* pp. 87-101.

Przeworski, A. 1991. Democracy and Market: Political and Economic in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge and N.Y.: Cambidge University Press. P. 26.

Republic of Kenya. 2004a. Public Expenditure Review. Ministry of Planning and National Development. Government Printer, Nairobi.

Republic of Kenya. 2004b. Strategy for Revitalizing Agriculture, 2004-2014. Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development (2004). Government Printer, Nairobi, 116p.

Republic of Kenya. 2003. Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation, 2003-2007. Ministry of Planning and National Development. Government Printer, Nairobi, 50p.

Republic of Kenya. 2002. Kenya Rural Development Strategy. Published by Ministry of Agriculture, Government Printer, Nairobi.

Republic of Kenya. 2001. Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Published by Ministry of Finance and Planning, Government Printer, Nairobi.

Republic of Kenya. 1965. The Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 on African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya, Government Printer, Nairobi.

Republic of Kenya. Economic Survey (various). Ministry of Planning and National Development (CBS), Government Printer, Nairobi.

Robertson, R. (1992). Globalization. London: Sage.

Rose, Richrad. 2005. Learning from Comparative Public Policy: A Practical Guide. Routledge, 2005.

Rustow, D. 1970. Transition to Democracy. *Comparative Politics,* 2, pp.337-63.

Schneider, Anne L. and Helen Ingram. 1997. Policy Design for Democracy. University of Kansas, University Press of Kansas, US.

Schneider, Anne and Helen Ingram. 1988. Systematically pinching ideas: a comparative approach to policy design. *Journal of Public Policy,* 8 (1,1988), pp.61-80.

Scott, A. E. and Leblang, D. 2006. Legislative bargaining and the macroeconomy. In: Scott Adler, E. and Lapinski (eds.), The Macropolitics of Congress. Princeton, Princteon University Press, pp. 195-211.

Shirley, Mary. 2003. What does Institutional Economics Tell Us about Development? A paper presented at ISNIE, Budapest, Hungary.

Skogstad, Grace. 1998. Ideas, paradigms and institutions: agricultural exceptionalism in the european union and the United States. *Governance,* 11(4) pp. 463-490.

Swynnerton, R.M. 1955. A Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya. Government Printer, Nairobi.

Talbott, I.D. 1992. African agriculture. In: R.W. Ochieng' and R.M. Maxon (eds.), An Economic History of Kenya. East African Educational Publishers Limited.

Thatcher, M. 1998. The development of policy network analysis. from modest origins to overarching frameworks. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 10(4).

Timmer, C.P. and Block, S. 1994. Agriculture and Economic Growth: Conceptual Issues and the Kenyan Experience. A report submitted to the US Agency for International Development (USAID).

Weiss, Janet A. 1989. The powers of problem definition: the problems of government paperwork. *Policy Sciences,* 22 (2, May 1989), pp. 97-122.