

Royal Netherlands Embassy

Ministry of Land Reclamation,
Regional and Water Development

REVIEW OF THE ASAL PROGRAMMES

PART ONE

**WEST POKOT
DISTRICT REPORT**

ETC East Africa, November, 1997

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

(one list is used for all the reports; for that matter, not all abbreviations will show in the separate reports)

AEZ	Agro Ecological Zone
AIC	African Inland Church
ALRMP	Arid Lands Resources Management Project
AMREF	African Medical and Research Foundation
ARU	Applied Research Unit
ASAL	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands
ASC	ASAL Steering Committee
ATC	Assistant Transect Area Co-ordinator
CAP	Community Action Plan
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CBS	Central Bureau for Statistics
CCF	Christian Children's Fund
CMIP	Co-operative Management Improvement Programme
CMPP	Community Member Participation Programme
COPP	Community Oriented Project Planning
CSRP	Civil Service Reform programme
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDC	District Development Committee
DDO	District Development Officer
DDP	District Development Plan
DEC	District Executive Committee
DEC	Drought Escaping Crops
DFRD(S)	District Focus for Rural Development (Strategy)
DGIS	Directorate General for International Co-operation
DIDC	District Information and Documentation Centre
DO	District Officer
DPU	District Planning Unit
E	East
ECF	East Coast Fever
EMI	Embu, Meru, Isiolo
FES	Field Extension Staff
FLS	Front Line Staff
GA	Gender Adviser
GACP	Gender and Co-operative Programme
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
CMC	Credit Management Committee
CMG	Credit Management Group
GoK	Government of Kenya
GoN	Government of the Netherlands
GSIME	Gender Sensitive Impact Monitoring and Evaluation
HoD	Head of Department
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO	International Labour Organisation (UN)
IS	Implementation Scheme
ITDG	Intermediate Technology Development Group
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KCPE	Kenyan Certificate for Primary Education
KNFC	Kenya National Federation of Co-operatives
KVDA	Kerio Valley Development Authority
KWS	Kenya Wildlife Services
LDF	Laikipia Development Fund
LFA	Logical Framework Approach
LMC	Livestock Marketing Centre

LRP	Laikipia Research programme
LRDP	Laikipia Rural Development programme
LUP	Land Use Planning
LUPA	Land Use Planning Adviser
MDP	Marsabit Development programme
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MIDP	Machakos Integrated Development Project
MIS	Management Information System
MLRRWD	Ministry of Land Reclamation, Regional and Water Development
MRDASAW	Ministry of Reclamation and Development of Arid and Semi-Arid Areas and Wastelands
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoALD	Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development
N	North
NEP	National Extension programme
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NLG	Dutch Guilder
NPO	National programme Officer
NRM	Natural Resources Management
O&M	Operation and Maintenance
OPS	Office of Project Services (UNDP)
PA	programme Advisor
PAM	Project Administration Management
PlanOps	Plan of Operations
PMC	Project Management Committee
PMU	Project Management Unit
PO	programme Officer
PPM	Project Planning Matrix
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
RCA	Reformed Church of Africa
RNE	Royal Netherlands Embassy
RRA	Rapid Rural Appraisal
S	South
SDC	Swiss Development Co-operation
SLO	Sector Liaison Officer
SMS	Subject Matter Specialist
SNV	Netherlands Development Organisation
STD	Sexually Transmitted Disease
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
TA	Transect Area / Technical Assistance
TAA	Transect Area Approach
TAAP	Transect Area Action Plan
TAC	Transect Area Committee
TAM	Transect Area Meeting
TBA	Traditional Birth Attendant
TC	Transect Area Co-ordinator
TOR	Terms Of Reference
TOT	Trainer of Trainers
TPM	Transect Planning Meetings
TPS	Transect Planning Sheets
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development programme
UNSO	UNDP Office to Combat Desertification and Drought
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VI	NGO
W	West
WB	World Bank

WID
YP

Women in Development
Youth Polytechnic

A. BACKGROUND

1. BACKGROUND OF THE PROGRAMME

1.1 Overview of the District

West Pokot District is situated in the Rift Valley Province in the north-western part of Kenya, and it borders Uganda. The district has an area of 9,100 sq. km. and stretches between latitude 2 degrees and four minutes N, to 1 degree and 7 minutes S; longitude is between 34 degrees and 37 minutes and 35 degrees and 49 minutes East. Its main inhabitants are Pokot, who form part of the Kalenjin ethnic group. In 1970 an area that was administered by Uganda since 1932 (the 'Karapokot' area) was incorporated in the district.

West Pokot consists of humid highlands, escarpment zones and dry lowlands. The lowlands have always been the home of the pastoral Pokot. Besides having zebu cattle, goats and hair sheep (and some camels and donkeys), the pastoral Pokot have a fluctuating involvement in marginal agriculture (sorghum and millet, recently maize as well), gold panning, trading of arms, miraa and precious stones and there is a long history of raiding and counter-raiding with their neighbours, the Turkana in the Northeast, the Karamojong in the Northwest, the Sebei in the Southwest and the Marakwet in the Southeast. The pastoral Pokot of West Pokot are closely connected with the pastoral Pokot of northern Baringo District and with those in Upe, Uganda. There are also many links with the agricultural Pokot.

The humid highlands consist of various areas, the Cherangani, Mnagei, Sekerr and Karapokot highland areas. The Cherangani 'uplands' are originally the home of a different Kalenjin sub-group, the hunter-gatherer Sengwer. Nowadays they and Pokot immigrants have started sheep farming in the highest zones and maize, potato and pyrethrum agriculture in the (former) forest zone. Since the 1960s the Pokot (and other Kalenjin) elites have acquired large properties there, and non-Pokot (often Kikuyu) squatters and land labourers became pioneer cultivators. In the Mnagei highlands, around the district headquarters Kapenguria-Makutano, small-scale farmers (many of them non-Pokot coming from outside the district) gradually occupied the area from the 1930s onwards. Ethnic turmoil in late 1993 resulted in a massive exodus from the area. The Sekerr and Karapokot hills are the refuge areas for the Pokot during disaster periods. Part of this Pokot refuge area was opened up recently by a major hydro-electricity project, the Turkwell Gorge Dam.

The humid highlands generate many streams that plunge down from the escarpment and flow towards the lowlands. Most of those join the Suam-Turkwell river, which originates from Mount Elgon and flows towards Lake Turkana. Part of the streams are tapped for traditional irrigation, that already existed in the 19th century. It is an ingenious system that enables a food-secure system of mainly sorghum and millet production by the agricultural Pokot. These agricultural Pokot have always been part of an exchange alliance with their pastoral colleagues.

West Pokot had approximately 225,000 inhabitants according to the 1989 census (more recent census data are not available, only projections made for 1994 at 275,000), of whom 190,000 were Kalenjin. It is estimated that there are 170,000 Pokot in the district, and 80,000 in the neighbouring districts¹. There are very few Pokot in the rest of Kenya, and hence migrant remittances are minimal. About 70% of the population in the district live in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) areas. Half of them would claim to be 'pastoralists' even if livestock no longer forms the backbone of their livelihood; the others are agriculturists. The district headquarters, twin city Kapenguria-Makutano, had 14,000 inhabitants in 1989, but that was before the

¹ Probably another 40,000 in Baringo, maybe 20,000 in Upe, Uganda and maybe 20,000 elsewhere in Kenya, most of them in northern Trans Nzoia, an area the Pokot claim as theirs.

clashes that made considerable numbers of non-Pokot in 1993/94 to leave the district. All other centres had less than 1,000 inhabitants.

In terms of employment most labour in the lowlands is nowadays devoted to arable farming, and to mining of gold and precious stones and no longer to livestock herding. However, in terms of income (cash and non cash combined) livestock income still dominates. Much livestock wealth is being exchanged for grains. Grains now provide a dominant part of the food needs, and no longer milk, let alone meat. With a persistent, although fluctuating, downward trend of livestock per capita, the perception among many Pokot is that poverty is on the increase. During periods of disaster (1979-81, 1984-86, 1992-93) many barely survived. The fact that most children now attend school, that the service situation improved considerably and that in monetary terms far more money is circulating than before 1980, does not undermine a feeling of despair.

Although poverty is currently rather widespread, the area's potential for the productive sector is better than in many other Kenyan drylands. Near the escarpment, where traditional irrigation is important, further improvements in irrigation and further improvements of crop yields are generally thought to be possible. In other areas, adapted forms of water harvesting technologies could be developed. The livestock economy could be much improved, and if there would be a reliable commercial outlet for cattle, livestock income could be higher. Finally, the fallback possibilities of mining are, and will remain, an important survival insurance during bad times. Cattle-theft related violence, though, undermines the economy.

1.2 History of the Programme

In 1979 the Government of Kenya declared its intention to start integrated development programmes in all dryland districts, the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands Programme (ASAL). Among donor organisations, USAID took the lead and supported the general strengthening of the national administrative capacity to deal with ASAL areas. In the Ministry of Agriculture an 'ASAL branch' was established. In the (then) Ministry of Economic Planning and Development a specific senior officer was made responsible for inter-ministerial co-ordination. The ASAL branch in the Ministry of Agriculture concentrated on research, an approach that was later strongly criticised in an official evaluation as very expensive, too much time consuming and not enough planning oriented. As a result, the ASAL branch in the Ministry of Agriculture was resolved in 1984. From then onwards, the ASAL activities were almost completely under the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development². In 1989, a separate Ministry for ASAL was established, which became a Department under a new Ministry for Land Reclamation, Regional and Water Development in 1993.

It was the intention to have an ASAL programme for each district with ASAL areas, and to get separate donors for all these ASAL districts. With the Machakos Integrated Development Programme (MIDP) continuing as a pseudo-ASAL programme, sponsored by the European Development Fund, and the Baringo Pilot Semi-Arid and Arid Programme directly under the President, the regular ASAL programme started in 1980, with the United Kingdom willing to fund the Embu-Meru-Isiolo (EMI) Programme and the Norwegian development organisation NORAD sponsoring the Turkana ASAL programme. USAID followed with an ASAL programme full of expensive research consultants in the northern part of Kitui District in 1981, while the

² Which became the Ministry of Finance and Planning, and later the Ministry of Planning and National Development.

Danish started a pseudo-ASAL project in the southern part in the same year³. The Netherlands accepted involvement in West Pokot and Elgeyo Marakwet Districts in 1982 and in a tiny dryland part of Kiambu District⁴. Switzerland committed itself to Laikipia District in 1984 (to be taken over by the Netherlands later). IFAD accepted the Coastal Districts (mainly Kwale and Kilifi) in 1984 and part of Siaya District (near Lake Victoria) in 1986. Denmark's Danida extended its ASAL involvement to Taita Taveta first (1985) and to the southern part of Machakos later. The Dutch organisation SNV (with funding from the Dutch government) was asked to start an ASAL Programme in Kajiado District, among the eastern Maasai, which started in 1987. Later the same organisation was asked to take over the Elgeyo Marakwet programme (from 1991 until 1994) and the West Pokot Programme (in 1997) and to start a new ASAL programme in Narok District, among the western Maasai⁵. It can be concluded that the Netherlands provided the most continuous and after 1993 the most important support for the ASAL programmes at the district level. In 1987 the stage was set. Of all the districts with arid and semi-arid lands most had a donor for an ASAL Programme⁶.

After a promising start in the early 1980s under the (then) Ministry of Finance and Planning, in the second half of the 1980s all donors more or less got a free hand to develop their own district-specific approach, together with district-based civil servants. The idea of a multi-sector programme was adhered to everywhere, with the District Development Committees responsible for 'integration'. In some cases with a specific role for civil servants from various ministries, who formed an ASAL programme liaison group. Supported by the Royal Netherlands Embassy, and by others involved from the Dutch side, in Dutch-sponsored ASAL programmes the basic philosophy was: 'low profile / input', 'process approach'⁷, 'support the decentralisation to the district level', 'support district civil servants to do their work better', 'try to get the local people's participation as much as possible', and 'try to support the local economy with the ASAL funds available'.

During the late 1970s the Royal Netherlands government and its Embassy in Nairobi had developed a preference for working in the western part of Kenya and to work in really poor, marginal areas. When the ASAL programme started as a Kenya-wide attempt to uplift conditions in all dryland areas of the country, it was evident that the Netherlands would participate, and in any of the north-western districts. Turkana District in the far Northwest could have been selected but it was already 'claimed' by the Norwegian aid agency. West Pokot became an obvious choice. It was among the poorest and most marginal of all Kenyan districts at that time, and it was located in the western part of the country. On top of that, the Netherlands already had some experience in West Pokot, before the ASAL Programme started⁸, and an influential and widely respected Dutch officer who had worked in West Pokot happened to work at the Netherlands Embassy when the request came to adopt one or more district ASAL programmes. Elgeyo Marakwet was added because it was close by⁹ and the Kerio Valley was also referred to as one of the poorest areas of the country.

³ The 'Mutomo Soil & Water Conservation Project'.

⁴ The Ndeiya Karai area, constituency. It functioned from 1982-84 and it never was a success.

⁵ That was aborted because of political reasons.

⁶ But the north and Northeast of the country did not get a donor, the security problem was probably the major issue; Marsabit District had some research-related activities funded by the German GTZ and GTZ also funded a Livestock Development programme in Samburu district.

⁷ In Dutch development parlance also called 'programmatic approach'.

⁸ During the period 1971-1975 the Special Rural Development Programme had Kapenguria division as one of its pilot areas, with a Dutch 'development volunteer' (of the organisation SNV), stationed in Kapenguria and with a considerable amount of money at his disposal.

⁹ It probably played a role that a Dutch religious organisation, based in Eldoret, worked in West Pokot and in Elgeyo Marakwet as well.

In 1981, a Dutch sociologist was recruited to become programme co-ordinator for the two districts combined. He had a long experience with SNV, a.o. in Kenya, and had just finished further studies in development theory, graduating on a thesis about the 'programmatic approach'. The Kenyan government promised a counterpart and office personnel, but it took a long time before staff was posted. This resulted in the situation that the Dutch advisor became the core person of the programme. It soon became clear that the Kapenguria-based advisor could never manage to work in Elgeyo Marakwet District as well. A separate Dutch ASAL co-ordinator was appointed for Elgeyo Marakwet later during 1982, who settled in Iten. He had to cope with a weak Kenyan facilitating structure as well.

With the 'process approach' as the guideline, it was decided to begin with a few starter activities and to spend time to get to know the problems and history of the ASAL areas in the two districts. The Netherlands DGIS engaged a team of geographers from the University of Amsterdam (associated with the Institute for Development Studies of Nairobi University) to do four types of studies: archival research to find out about all development initiatives in the past, mapping the district's current government and NGO facilities (and its history), judging the population supporting capacity of the area and assessing people's livelihood strategies. During the 1982-1988 period it resulted in a District Atlas for each of the two districts, in a large number of 'Locational Development Profiles', in the start of District Information and Documentation Centres and in academic publications (a.o. a Ph.D. thesis).

In 1986 the second Dutch programme advisor was appointed in West Pokot, who had a background of agricultural studies and development sociology, and he had worked in Kenya before, for SNV and for his studies. He would become the personification of 'ASAL' in the district for the next seven years, partly because during long periods he worked without a Kenyan counterpart. Gradually the project activities in many fields expanded and began to cover the whole district, including the very remote corners. Carefully avoiding political pitfalls, the programme became the 'oil in the district machinery', enabling government officers to direct their attention also to the ASAL areas, which would have been virtually impossible otherwise. ASAL West Pokot indeed succeeded to work as a catalyst for much more government attention for the remote ASAL areas.

When in the second half of 1993 a new Dutch programme advisor (economist-cum-geographer) started in West Pokot, his start was unlucky. He came when ethnic-political tensions had reached a boiling point. When non-Kalenjin were threatened and fled from the district, the new ASAL Programme Advisor decided to assist the displaced persons, using ASAL facilities. This humanitarian action was regarded by some Pokot as coming close to treason. Although relations normalised later, there remained an atmosphere of careful distance. In 1996 a new Dutch Programme Advisor was appointed, the fourth one, with a background in agriculture.

1.3 The 1993 Review and Recommendations

The joint Kenyan Netherlands 1993 Review built on the 1985 evaluation in which it was recommended that the programme should pay more attention to the development of long-term strategies and to put more emphasis on the development of the productive sector and environment (according to the review report).

The overall conclusions and recommendations of the 1993 Review were:

- To make the broad ASAL objectives operational in the individual districts by being more explicit on the objectives; enough experience had been gained to

this purpose.

- To prepare better ASAL plan documents based upon a proper problem analysis.
- To complement the 'bottom-up' approach with a 'top-down' element since a number of broader issues need analysis and initiatives from national and / or district level.
- A more gender specific strategy and approach had to be elaborated with special reference to community participation in all phases of the planning cycle.
- Institutional strengthening should be considered as one of the priority objectives. Training needs should be assessed and PMUs enlarged to increase their capacity.
- Regarding the productive sector and environment, a thorough analysis of development constraints and potentials should be conducted and long-term development strategies developed. This priority should be translated in financial as well as personnel means to be made available.
- To further consider the financing of the removal of bottlenecks in the rural road network (under certain conditions).

For West Pokot District, the joint review concluded that since its inception in 1982, the ASAL programme had evolved into a well-balanced programme where activities, in general, are based on a proper problem analysis and with a planning and implementation strategy where community participation is coming of the ground. The programme appeared to be well-established in the district structures with, in general, good relationships with the planning and implementing agencies.

Achievements

Assessing the achievements made, general support from the 1993 review to the programme resulted. The catchment rehabilitation was characterised as 'promising', the on-farm experiments to be intensified and the education sector was lauded (and was given seven detail recommendations). A clear strategy needed to be developed on the issue of pasture improvement (range rehabilitation).

Collaboration with the line ministries

The collaboration between the PMU and the line ministries appeared to be good in 1993, with an effective system of line officers and a functional ASAL Steering Committee. A proper training needs assessment was recommended that should result in training policy framework. The capacity of the programme management was considered insufficient leading to insufficient monitoring and policy development.

Strategy

The programme had contributed significantly to the improvement of the district planning capacity by the 1993 judgement, resulting in improved quality of project proposals from locational and divisional levels and in an improvement of the District Five Year Plans. The lack of a long-term strategy to handle growing resource conflicts and resource degradation was identified as a strategic shortcoming. Such a strategy should integrate the sectors of water, livestock and agriculture.

Most importantly, the 1993 mission had the impression that the scale of the activities could be increased by using district resources more efficiently and by strengthening the management and monitoring capacity of the PMU. It recommended to investigate the possibilities to come to a substantial growth of the programme.

2. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING

2.1 ASAL West Pokot

Implementation of ASALs is based on the principle of shared responsibility between the Government of Kenya (GoK) and the Government of the Netherlands (GoN). The Kenyan Ministry of Land Reclamation, Regional and Water Development (MLRRWD) is the Kenyan parent ministry at present. All ASAL programmes are co-ordinated by the ASAL department of this ministry.

From the donor side is the programme funded by the Minister for Development Co-operation through the Directorate General for International Co-operation (DGIS). Until July 1996 was the programme directly implemented by DGIS through the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Nairobi. After this, the responsibility for the implementation was handed-over to SNV (Netherlands Development Organisation). SNV has a Kenyan office and country director, and keeps in contact with Kenyan authorities in consultation with the Embassy.

At the district level is the programme answerable to the District Development Committee (DDC), in line with the District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) strategy that has been the guiding policy for ASAL implementation. The membership of the DDC comprises Heads of Departments, Parastatals and NGO's working in the district and elected leaders. The programme is a member of the District Planning Unit (DPU).

Responsibility for the programme's operations is with the Programme Management Unit (PMU). This PMU consists of the Kenyan Programme Officer (PO) and the Dutch Programme Advisor (PA). The functioning of the PMU can be expanded through regular extended PMU meetings in which participate the Community Liaison Officer, the Gender Officer, the District Officer (DO) Environment and recently, the Land Use Planning Officer. On accounting, the Programme is assisted by a GoK accountant and four clerical officers, but since February 1997, SNV assigned an SNV administrator to the programme. Departments have also identified liaison officers, generally not the Heads of Department, to work with the PMU in planning specific activities that are initiated or implemented by the departments. Twenty people, partly GoK staff, are employed as support staff.

Over the years, the programme made substantial investments in the DFRD management structure, supporting Provincial Administration in the formation and training of the DDC, the Divisional Development Committees and Sub-locational Development Committees.

Policy issues are the subject of deliberations in the ASAL Steering Committee (ASC) that in generally assists the ASAL programme. The ASC is a sub-committee of the DDC and its membership comprises the Heads of major government departments with which the programme is collaborating.

The programme has financial procedures that are based on slightly modified GoK procedures. The PAM (Project Administration Management) accounting system is developed under auspices of the GoN. It is a bookkeeping system in place to facilitate both external and internal audits. The 'control system', however, is located within the GoK financial procedures. Both the Programme Officer and the Programme Advisor are co-signatories of the donor funds. The Programme Advisor is not a co-signatory of the GoK funds which are solely managed by the Programme officer.

External monitoring is carried out by the Royal Netherlands Embassy and SNV while the internal monitoring is done by the PMU. The reporting and monitoring system is

since 1997 based on the logical framework approach; before this, it was materialised in the quarterly reports of the different collaborating departments. These resulted in ASAL's quarterly progress reports. Expenditure reports are produced monthly.

2.2 GoK / NGO / Private Sector Partners

Since its start, the ASAL programme has predominantly operated with the line ministries and their staff and with the Provincial Administration (District Commissioner, et cetera), and the County Council. It has been, over the past 15 years, a true supporter of the 'oil in the government machinery' philosophy applied at the start of the Dutch support to the ASAL in 1982¹⁰. Prevalent are the ministries of Livestock, Agriculture, Forestry, Water, Works, Culture and Social Services and Education, and the Ministry of Local Government. Noteworthy is that it has not worked with the Ministry of Health. This sector is in West Pokot District supported by an NGO, the Netherlands Harambee Fund (NHF).

Besides the GoK structures that were made responsible for the identified activities, a small percentage of the expenditure and related responsibilities went through NGOs like VI, AIC (African Inland Church) and Jitahidi. NGO capacity can be characterised as limited in the district. The 'classical' way of operation of the ASAL in this district ever since the beginning, has for obvious reasons not resulted in formal implementation through Community Based Organisations (CBOs): a government structure is not geared towards empowering local communities. The latter does not imply that communities were not part and parcel of the planning process and are involved in execution. In a very early stage already, the programme applied the so-called sondeo's (Rapid Rural Appraisals - RRA), jointly executed by the PMU and departmental staff.

Since most of the implementation has traditionally been through ministerial staff, GoK staff is an important implementation stakeholder. Unlike the Keiyo Marakwet and Laikipia programmes, where conflict exists (existed) between the district and divisional staff over control of ASAL implementation, the West Pokot programme had an easy relationship with ministry staff. This perhaps can be explained by the historical tradition of low budget activities spread over a large array of implementing institutions.

This comfortable context changed gradually. The Programme Advisor since 1993 asked formally for administrative reinforcement, which was denied, and on several occasions expressed his worries that critical limits related to project expenditure became ever closer.

The Price Waterhouse Audit that took place during this review period, finally and definitely put an end this "easy" relationship. The programme was closed on the basis of the conclusions of the audit and by November 1997, attempts to have a new start - under certain conditions - had not yet been successful.

¹⁰ By 1997 it had become the 'fuel' instead of the 'oil' in the GoK machinery when ASAL funds of about Kshs. 70 million were equal to the total district budget for recurrent and development expenditure.

3. THE PRESENT PHASE

3.1 PlanOps and Annual Work Plans

The ASAL West Pokot programme prepared a Plan of Operations for the fourth phase (1995 - 1999) in July 1994.

It describes the natural or productive resource base as the background in which the programme operates. It presents the long-term development objectives and the approach, the management and organisation of the programme, as well as the planning, monitoring and evaluation procedures.

The PlanOps puts a strong emphasis on the previous phases where it states that it "will remain fundamentally the same as before". However, a certain shift of emphasis was stated to be introduced by making the conservation of natural resources an objective, and by giving gender aspects a greater weight. New was also the introduction of a credit scheme, "reflecting the insight that innovation is hampered as much by lack of capital as by lack of knowledge among beneficiaries". Another slight change of emphasis was in strengthening attempts to involve beneficiaries both in decision making and in contributing to the cost of projects.

The PlanOps provides information on the management requirements and the five components of the programme. It describes five planning criteria that must guide the identification and approval of projects.

The PlanOps gave as project costs for the five-year period NLG. 9,291,000, out of which the GoK was supposed to contribute NLG. 57,000. Third parties (communities ?) are presented as a p.m. post. Within this framework, annual Work Plans and budgets are prepared and submitted to the donor for approval.

Geographically spoken, the programme is restricted to the semi-arid parts of the district, for obvious reasons. The only exceptions being the Lelan catchment area in the high lands and some other parts that are characterised by a marginalised population. This is not as contradictory as it seems considering the physiographic linkages of the catchment area and the escarpment cum (Kerio) valley at the Eastern border of the district (see also Keiyo Marakwet and the Transect Area Approach), and some areas where people are poor as in the semi-arid zones.

The PlanOps intends to be based on the recommendations of the 1993 review.

3.2 Goals, Objectives, Approach and Strategies

At the highest policy level, the programme formally applies the long-term 'development goal' as formulated in the ASAL policy document of the GoK: "the improvement of the standard of living of the ASAL population by integrating ASAL into the mainstream of the national economy and social development in an environmentally sustainable manner". The PlanOps observes that such a goal will be difficult to achieve in the (then) present situation and that even more specific goals as resting environmental degradation, or significantly improving the position of women will be difficult to achieve by a development programme.

Five programme objectives were assigned to phase IV of ASAL West Pokot. Note that the word 'objective' is used in the PlanOps as targets, as a (realistic, contrary to the unrealistic goal) notion of what the programme actually hopes to achieve. Under this level of 'objectives' the programme applies the term 'purpose', used for the contribution that a particular activity intends to make to the objectives of the programme. In order of priority given by the programme, the following are the

objectives:

- To improve knowledge on how farming (including animal husbandry) can be made more sustainable productive, and to promote the application of such knowledge. 'Sustainably productive' should be taken to mean high-yielding, drought resilient, and ecologically sustainable. Indigenous knowledge must be brought to bear upon these issues, and extension staff should be made aware of such knowledge.
- To stimulate increased participation of the beneficiaries in both the planning, the financing and the implementation of projects as to ensure (a) that they are in line with their felt needs and (b) that they may be sustainable.
- To contribute to the improvement of certain aspects of living standards, such as access to water and education, or at least to counteract their further deterioration.
- To assist in opening new avenues for income generation outside farming, especially for women.
- To facilitate the marketing of products from the district, particularly the marketing of livestock.

Along with these objectives a number of planning criteria apply:

- The *target group* is everybody living in the geographical area the programme operates (see above in § 3.1). Moreover, the activity must be suitable for benefiting the poorer and more disadvantaged groups.
- Where *participation* is concerned, three types of activities can be distinguished: (i) initiated by the GoK, (ii) initiated by communities through local leaders, and (iii) projects undertaken by people in the form of functional groups. The new phase IV is reluctant where the first type is concerned. Type (ii) will finally be decided upon by the DDC and type (iii) directly by the PMU, according to guidelines authorised by the DDC.
- The *environmental* concern is expressed in screening activities for effect on sustainable development. It is explicitly stipulated that the programme will not have an environmental strategy of its own, being only a minor player in the field.
- As far as gender is concerned, the programme applies the DAC / WID criteria for identification, favours the participation of women, and has women as a priority target group for the credit programme.
- *Institutional sustainability* is earmarked as not always required as long the benefits can continue to be felt. In case where such sustainability is essential, guarantees must be obtained in advance.

3.3 Programme Components

Farming is roughly defined as all primary economic activities, except mining and quarrying. Farming obviously includes livestock, agriculture and forestry but can include wildlife exploitation and fisheries.

Under this component it is observed in the PlanOps that the necessary institutional framework not yet exists. However, the production of an Environmental Profile is proposed (outside the ASAL programme structure) that might form the basis for a rough physical planning. The PlanOps is adamant that it will not embark upon land use planning (probably meant as natural resource management) unless the community is willing to pay 50 % of the cost (this is a high conditions considering that in general cost sharing conditions vary between 10 - 50 %).

Infrastructure encompasses both physical and institutional types. The component also includes water other than for irrigation, roads, bridges, rural trading centres and credit.

Off-farm employment is a component that according to the PlanOps offers only limited scope for the ASAL development programme; it can help to develop some infrastructure and help people in pointing the way towards opportunities. Specific target groups are women, graduates from technical schools and handicapped people.

Social services encompass education, culture, and population. Support to primary education is to continue. The cultural aspect was supported by e.g. building a museum for Pokot culture and support to the writing of a Pokot dictionary, but the PlanOps gives no concrete new opportunities. Where population is concerned the PlanOps recognises the magnitude of the problem of population growth and indicates the possibility that the programme might financially assist NGOs in availing family planning facilities. Indirectly it seeks to address the population issue through education of girls.

Under *Co-ordination* the PlanOps groups the functioning of the PMU, support to district planning and the District Focus machinery, and human resource development in general.

It also includes general aspects of environmental management that are not included under a particular sectoral component. It mentions in this context seminars for local leaders, workshops for Environmental Management Committees. Also mentioned are environmental studies like catchment studies and the proposal that was submitted to the Royal Netherlands Embassy for the formulation of an Environmental Profile.

The overall budget of NLG. 9,291,000 was planned to be distributed over different components as follows:

Farming	30 %
Infrastructure	25 %
Off-farm employment	5 %
Social services	10 %
co-ordination	30 %

Further differentiation is not available in the PlanOps since the budget is made according to Dutch budget lines that combine specific expenditure from different components.

3.4 Target Groups

In general the programme has no specific target groups unless the fact that the people to be assisted should live in a certain part of the district and that the activities should assist the poorest of the poor can be considered as 'targeting'.

Only for the off-farm employment are three groups targeted as described above, and women groups are targeted in the credit programme.

3.5 Planning and M& E Procedures

Monitoring and evaluation is through the quarterly progress reports prepared by the Programme Advisor (from the middle of 1995 the programmes were instructed to report on a six-monthly basis). These reports compare physical achievements with financial outlays. Progress reports are based on information supplied by contact officers and supplemented by the adviser's own observations in the field as well as by those of the communities and liaison staff.

This system was in force until 1997, when a log frame approach became operational.

Even with the new system is the ASAL programme depending on the departments since they still have to report, only now according to the format and the indicators provided by the log frame.

4. REVIEW METHODOLOGY

In West Pokot no PRA could be done, due to the sudden temporary closure of the programme at the time when the PRAs were planned to be done. However, much valuable information was collected for the sectoral activity matrix, a geographical analysis and for an impact analysis based on household surveys and comparison with similar studies ten years earlier (see also Annex II, Part Three).

Initially, the matrix was completed by the contact officers and this was not always done up to standards. Verification in the field of all the data was obviously not possible in the context of a review and the PMU had little time to give an input (audit, et cetera). Nevertheless, in the end necessary corrections could be made.

4.1 The sectoral matrix

In all four districts, the intention was to get an idea about project output and effects by involving all participating line ministries, providing self-assessments based on own experience. It was assumed that the programme management team would prepare and guide this process and would check the outcome. Unfortunately, the review team was provided with performance matrix information of generally low quality. However, the annual reports of the programme were of high quality and were used to make a summary of all project expenditure. For the 1993-97 period as a whole total recorded project expenditure appeared to be Kshs. 120 million. In addition Kshs. 30 million was spent on programme management, general support (mainly transport) and human resource development (or: training of a few civil servants, mainly abroad). The programme officers in West Pokot have always tried as much as possible to put 'general support' expenses under the category of the project for which the expenses were actually made (unlike some other ASAL programmes, which makes comparison difficult).

Unlike the ASAL programme in Kajiado, the performance matrix exercise in West Pokot did not produce much solid evidence about the expected or experienced effects of the projects funded by the ASAL programme (such effects were not indicated in the planning), with two exceptions: education and the Museum. However, looking at the evidence presented, we can come to some conclusions about the quantitative achievements.

More qualitative assessments were made indirectly (the PRA could not be executed), through the comparison of the 1997 household survey with similar surveys done in 1982 and 1985.

4.2 The geographical matrix

From the start of the ASAL programme in West Pokot in 1981 a major issue has always been the geographical distribution of projects over 'pastoral' and 'small farmer' areas. It is worthwhile to try and get an idea about the geographical distribution of the project expenditure. The financial information provided by the ASAL programme management in West Pokot, combined with the specific information about the location of projects can indeed give a rather precise indication about the geographical distribution of the ASAL projects over the district during the most recent project period (1993-1997).

To enable a separation between 'pastoral areas' and 'small farmer areas', the latter was further differentiated in 'ASAL/drylands' and 'Highlands', the following geographical allocations were made:


Pastoral

- Alale division,
- Kacheliba division,
- Riwa Location and Serewa sub-location in Kapenguria division,
- Kipkomo location (except the southern part), and Nakwijit sub-location in Sook location, both in Chepareria division,
- Masol location and the lower parts of Weiwei, Lomut and Sekerr locations in Sigor division.

Small-farmer areas in the drylands

- Chepareria division: southern Kipkomo location, most of Sook location, the whole of Batei location,
- Sigor division: all except Masol location and lowland parts of the other locations.

Map Small farmer and pastoral areas in West Pokot district



Small-farmer areas in the highlands

- Kapenguria division: Kapenguria location and Lelan location.

Financial information was attributed to each of the areas as best as possible with the data available¹¹.

¹¹ When the ASAL programme had gone through its first years, it was decided to establish a monitoring and evaluation framework. In 1985 a document was prepared, based on experiences in other ASAL programmes in the country and on established practices within the sectoral departments in West Pokot, with suggestions about this framework. A basic element was the systematic attribution of all expenditure in a year to both a sector and a location, and to prepare location- and sector-specific 'effect and impact assessment guidelines'. Locational Development Profiles and the District Atlas would provide a baseline information package organised per sector per area. In the beginning (until 1987) this

4.3 The household survey of 1997: a geographical comparison of impact

To determine the impact of Dutch-funded ASAL programme interventions on target populations, questionnaires were given to households based in areas with many ASAL projects and in areas with little ASAL programme intervention. For West Pokot, the ASAL intervention areas chosen were Chepkobegh Sub-location with 27 households and Chepareria Sub-location with 28 households, both in Kipkomo Location. The non-ASAL intervention areas chosen were Kongelai Sub-location (in Riwa Location), with 29 households and Ywaleteke sub-location in Kipkomo Location, with 30 households. Chepareria and Ywaleteke are (mainly) small-farmers areas¹², Chepkobegh and Kongelai are (mainly) pastoral areas¹³. All four areas are dryland areas, but not very far from the district headquarters, Kapenguria, in the West Pokot highlands. Differences between small farmer and pastoral areas are considerable, both in 'intervention' and in 'non-intervention' areas. We will present an analysis separating intervention from non-intervention and small farmer from pastoral areas, to enable two types of comparison.

Table *Research design: the four study areas*

	intervention	non-intervention
small farmer	Chepareria (n=28)	Ywaleteke (n=30)
pastoral	Chepkobegh (n=27)	Kongelai (n=29)

To prove that indeed the ASAL programme was much more active in the intervention areas compared to the non-intervention areas, and to indicate the type of ASAL programme interventions, an overview is included of all ASAL projects in the four areas (see annex to this report). It is clear that Chepareria leads by far, in many different sectors, but with a major investment in and around the Nasukuta livestock improvement centre. Chepkobegh follows at a distance. Support to Ywaleteke is rather minor, with the exception of the road. Support to Kongelai is indeed negligible.

4.4 The household survey of 1997 compared with surveys in 1982 and 1985: a diachronic comparison

In the intervention areas (Chepkobegh and Chepareria) a study was done to compare

was done. After 1987 it was no longer regarded a priority by the ASAL management and differences of opinion between the ASAL management and the backstoppers who would guide this process resulted in the termination of the backstoppers work, that would be taken over by the Nairobi-based World Bank section for ASAL. Not much happened afterwards and the situation now is, that most of the locational/sectoral information partly had to be collected from scratch and with less precision than is desirable. In many cases for this 'matrix survey' rather arbitrary allocations had to be made.

¹² In Chepareria 25 households regarded themselves as agro-pastoralists, 3 as sedentary; in Ywaleteke 12 said to be agro-pastoralists and 18 sedentary. The area of Chepareria farmers is rather flat, but quite close to the escarpment, with the exception of the north-western part (near the Chesera seasonal river) which is rather isolated, clearly pastoral, but with very few people; Ywaleteke farmers are located in the foothills of the escarpment. Current populations are estimated to be 14,000 and 7,000 respectively.

¹³ In Chepkobegh 18 households regarded themselves as agro-pastoralists, nine said they were pastoralists, but for all livestock is (far) more important than cultivation; in Kongelai all 29 households said they were pastoralists, although a number of them cultivate small plots along the Suam river. Both Kongelai and Chepkobegh are rather flat areas. Current population is estimated as 7,000 and 10,000 respectively.

the 1997 results with results of a similar study done in 1985¹⁴. In the pastoral non-intervention area, Kongelai, use could be made of a similar study done in 1982¹⁵.

¹⁴ Using the Kipkomo Locational Development Profile, published in 1986, which was made by Bert Vermaat, assisted by Romanus P. Chizupo, in the framework of the collaboration between the University of Amsterdam and the ASAL Programme in West Pokot.

¹⁵ Riwa Location Development Profile, December 1982 (Ton Dietz, Annemieke van Haastrecht, Mirjam Schomaker, assisted by Simon Lopeyok and Romanus Partany).

B. RESULTS OF THE REVIEW

5. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING

5.1 Introduction

A SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) was carried out in West Pokot District with elaborate discussion on the institutional issues that determine and affect the ASAL programme. The participants were chosen by the programme on the basis of advice from the review team to select 30-40 people, including PMU, Heads of Departments, NGO representatives, community leaders and private companies. Unlike in other districts, no information from the PRA (Participatory Rural Appraisal) could be added to the SWOT for reasons explained in chapter 4.

For that matter, the results of the SWOT analysis plus discussions with the PMU form the basis for the observations and conclusions made in this chapter.

5.2 Placement within the Ministry of Land Reclamation, Regional and Water Development

The strengths of placing the ASAL programme in the Ministry of Land Reclamation, Regional and Water Development (MLRRWD) are that the Ministry provides the overall policy framework that justifies the existence and the programme's operations. Furthermore, putting ASAL programmes under the MLRRWD enabled them to focus more on the development of water in the district, a first priority of the population generally. At the district level, the programme works within the government structure, which is very well understood. Government departments accept and understand the programme well. But the weaknesses are many and outweigh the strengths. There is no systematic staff back-up from the ministry's headquarters of sufficient quality, and the GoK was not sending significant operational counterpart funds to the programme. In addition, there is lack of co-ordination of ASAL programmes. The Inter-Ministerial Co-ordination Committee has been moribund and donor interests are not addressed by the ministry. Current placement of the programme in a sector ministry and lack of operational policy guidelines were cited as great weaknesses.

The weaknesses of this placement are that there is little understanding of the ASAL programme concept at the ministry's headquarters, little support and feedback and lack of institutional memory. The Department of Land Reclamation has a weak capacity to co-ordinate ASAL programmes in the country and has no capacity for policy review and development, and staff is posted to the programme without regard to experience. It all results in the situation in which the programme is totally unclear about its mandate within the ministry.

Dialogue between the ministry and donors has been insufficient, leading to conflict of approaches between the donor and the government, and non-understood policy changes from either of the partners.

It can be concluded that ASAL programmes are technically placed in the wrong ministry and, if the current situation continues, possibilities for improved co-ordination, support to districts and dialogue with donors are slim.

5.3 The District Focus for Rural Development policy

All important is the framework as provided by the District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) policy.

As is the case in any other district, the DFRD policy is, in principle, regarded upon as a good philosophy upon which the foundation of various programmes was built. And the approach applied by the ASAL programme makes that they should fit well within this policy. The DFRD is to play a major policy role in ensuring that communities plan and participate in the implementation of their own projects, distributing resources rationally within the district, promoting local resource mobilisation and cost sharing among the stakeholders, meeting the felt needs of communities and improving co-ordination.

To enable the DFRD to take root, fundamental changes were made by the GoK including the transfer of more qualified and experienced staff to the district level to cope with the new challenges. Within this framework, ASAL West Pokot was able to operate and function sufficiently for about 15 years, but in the end quality and motivation of the Kenyan staff was not sufficient. The 'sufficiently functioning' can hardly be attributed to the DFRD policy but rather to the influence of individuals in the programme.

But notwithstanding the above prospects, the DFRD has been facing serious problems. At the grassroots level the strategy has not taken off the ground; partly because the GoK has not been able to provide sufficient means to spread the DFRD to the required lowest levels. The DFRD is based on the idea that all departments can branch at least to the divisional level; this appeared to be too expensive. The weak district economy makes it easy for local leaders to manipulate decisions, thereby defeating the main objectives of the policy. The executive arm of the government, particularly the Provincial Administration and the departments, dominate deliberations at all levels. The legal position of the District Development Committee is not clear. Mobilisation of community resources to support development work largely remains theoretical. And at the local level there is an absence of functional development committees.

Other weaknesses include poor feedback from the district to the communities, the notion that resources must be distributed to all without regard to planning, "*make every one happy*", creation of uneven high community expectations that cannot be met, and inadequate representation of women in decision making. Local identity problems and insecurity further threaten the stability of the system.

Opportunities, however, do exist to improve the DFRD policy. The government can set a framework to encourage grassroots communities to function better, can initiate transparent decision making processes that are free from interference by the executive arm and revive the operations of the District Planning Unit. But the long-term solution to non-performing grassroots organizations is to ensure that people are empowered through formal and civic education. The programme could and should assist more in this respect. It should also play a more active role in providing additional strategies to make the DFRD policy framework operationally effective. At present the DFRD is 'bankrupt' and is predominantly used politically. (see also Part Two, where it is analysed if such remedies might be sufficient).

5.4 The Programme Management Unit

The PMU procedurally comprises the Programme Officer (PO) and the Programme Advisor (PA). But in practice, through expanded PMU meetings, the PMU was enlarged to include the gender specialist and the District Officer (in charge of) Environment. Recently the land use planning officer was assigned. During the time of this review, the Programme Officer was removed from his responsibilities due to alleged misappropriation of funds. SNV assigned an administrator to the programme from February onwards.

The PMU can be assessed as a small functional unit, thereby reducing bureaucracy in its operations, flexible enough, enabling it to move funds from one item to another and from one sector to the other. It facilitates sector co-ordination, quick disbursement of funds and fast decision making due to its small size. Moreover, the PMU is trusted by communities more than the other organizations operational in the district, including government. NGOs, on the other hand considered the PMU as linked too closely to the GoK.

Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that the PMU experiences less political pressure than other institutions. But corrupt practices on the part of the district staff question the ability of the PMU to always be accountable and transparent to both the donor and the Kenya government.

One of the weaknesses of the PMU is that it is too small to always make adequate decisions affecting a multi-sectoral programme of the substantial size as it is now. The SWOT makes clear that the PMU suffers from a 'two-window' or double decision making system, with one officer owing his allegiance to the donor while the counterpart leans towards the government side. Therefore, some officers prefer to deal with the PO on specific matters while on other matters they prefer to deal with the PA. The two-window system is also apparent from a different perspective: the target group of the Pokot on the whole tend to rely on the PA while the implementors of the activities - the departments - tend to relate more with the PO.

Either the set-up and mandates of the programme need reconsideration, or the composition and role of the PMU need an overhaul. For more specific recommendations in this respect, reference is made to Part Two.

5.5 Financial Management

The programme runs the PAM (Project Administration Management) computer software, as developed by DGIS. It is a bookkeeping system based on the Dutch budget code system and is not compatible with the Kenyan system. For that matter the financial information is difficult to translate to the GoK. While the bookkeeping system is Dutch, the financial control mechanism is with the implementors, in the case of West Pokot almost exclusively the line departments, thus the GoK.

The PO and the PA, both being co-signatory to the ASAL programme payments, provides the solid principle of joint responsibility. However, the PO is the sole signatory to GoK funds leaving the PA with little insight in this. The double chain of command where ASAL funds are concerned in preparation and final payments can easily lead to conflict situations. A PA cannot always refuse to co-sign even if the validity of a payment is doubtful.

Formally the ASAL programme depends for the financial control on the GoK structure, and history teaches that this control system is not always watertight and cannot always avoid misappropriation of funds, especially if staff decide to do so. Moreover, from the part of the donor and the PA, no insight in the system exists, which might be considered a structural mistake. During the first phases of the programme, avoidance of major financial conflicts was only possible because the advisors were involved in each and every detail of the programme and checked each activity personally. Such intimate knowledge of all the details of the programme provided the additional control mechanism required. After 1993, this became increasingly difficult due to increased expenditure of the programme and due to the fact that the PA put to use the formally correct position that such a personal control should not be part of their responsibilities, the ASAL programme being a GoK project.

The traditional ASAL implementation structure that characterises especially West Pokot District, in combination with new approaches and elements since 1993, opened the door wider to problems in the financial administration. Likewise for the PMU, either the set-up of the programme needs reconsideration or the system of the financial administration needs an overhaul. This renewal should also make it more appropriate for M&E, which is not the case at the moment since the Dutch budget code system aggregates types of costs incurred under different activities. For more specific recommendations in this respect, reference is made to Part Two.

5.6 District Decision Making

In day-to-day matters related to the programme, the PMU is the main decision making body. The donor, through the PA, plays an important role in the final decision making. The unit is expected to function within the framework of the DFRD. An additional level of decision making, the ASAL Steering Committee was created. It is composed of Heads of Departments and NGO representatives (in brief: all implementing agencies). This committee, chaired by the District Commissioner (representing the Provincial Administration), is a sub-committee of the District Development Committee. It is charged with the responsibility of co-ordinating project activities, setting implementation guidelines and strategies and removing operational problems and constraints. The DDC ratifies project plans and budgets.

The role and influence of the ASAL programme as a major actor in the overall district planning and decision making (and as major financier) is evident.

Appropriation of ASAL funds involves the departments but not the communities. But with powers to transfer funds at will, transparency can be compromised. The programme can only enhance dialogue, co-ordination and co-operation among departments in as far as programme related matters are concerned.

Departments seem to be content with budget ceilings provided by the PMU. The propensity to spend additional resources is always high. But when this is viewed against the background of cost sharing, low levels of community participation, and the implementation capacity of departments, the limits of the absorption capacity of project funds become evident.

Experience teaches that in theory, on paper, decision making is arranged properly, but that in the end, in practice, this is done by the Programme Advisor who controls the funds (now equal to GoK budget, see § 2.2). Moreover, negative forces related to decision making are difficult to change in the present joint venture structure.

5.7 GoK Contribution

Clear insight in the real GoK contributions is difficult. The available information is insufficient to make conclusive statements. However, the general conviction is that the presence of donor funds has caused the government reducing departmental allocations. The picture that emerged is that the 'social sector' departments saw the GoK contribution reduced to close to zero. Agriculture and livestock on the other hand still receive considerable GoK finances but funds are basically earmarked for the higher potential areas, the ASAL programme being considered to take care of lower potential parts.

To ensure there is government commitment to the ASAL programme, there should be a condition for matching funds, also implying adequate insight in GoK finances. The

adoption of this matching fund principle is more critical than the magnitude of the amount of money contributed, as this would enable the government to be much more involved with the programme operations due to the stake that it holds in it. The final product will be the assurance that institutional sustainability is enhanced, accountability of decision making and use of funds is cultivated, thereby promoting transparency.

If such a condition cannot be met, there seems little reason to continue with the ASAL programme as the 'joint venture' it is now. In that case, with NGOs and CBOs, additional capacity will have to be created.

5.8 Overall Approach

The West Pokot programme has changed very little since its start about 15 years ago. It can be characterised as the 'classical' ASAL programme. Rather recently the PMU's capacity has been expanded with e.g. gender (dismissed again) and land use planning expertise, but this had no measurable impact. What did change was an almost doubling of the expenditure on projects implemented from slightly over NLG. 1 million, to over NLG 2 million annually (NLG. 1.9 million in the PlanOps and NLG. 400,000 for education). This certainly led to increased attention for e.g. the productive sector (see chapter 7), but it also opened the door for more opportunities of misappropriation of funds, since everything else remained basically unaltered.

The programme in West Pokot needs to be 'modernised' and learn from the variety of experiences gained in the other districts with Dutch supported ASAL programmes. The fact that it has been closed for a short period of time should be considered the right opportunity to start this process of change.

5.9 Implementation Mechanism

Three mechanisms applied by the programme can be distinguished. Directly by the PMU (e.g. scholarships), through the line departments and through NGOs. Over 90 % goes through the departments and only a small percentage through NGOs. The rest is spent by the PMU.

The mistrust that NGOs in general have of the GoK makes it difficult to use this capacity, although it is rather limited in West Pokot anyway. More distance of the programme from the GoK might nevertheless increase the potential of this mechanism. The intermediate level of the private sector should be better explored, although the clashes some years ago made much the private sector capacity to leave the district.

Considerable resources will have to be spent on continuous and systematic capacity building of institutions other than the line departments.

5.10 Low Input and High Input Strategy

The low input approach is one where the programme has in terms of personnel, a small PMU (one advisor and a Kenyan counterpart) where donor resources are just enough to supplement resources from the Government, NGOs and the Communities. The opposite is true for a high input approach.

The ASAL West Pokot is no longer a low input programme, as demonstrated in the expenditure level over the past years. Also the PMU's capacity was substantially expanded.

There should not necessarily be a problem with the higher inputs if the necessary reorganisation had taken place (see previous paragraphs in this chapter). It can be observed in this context that the donor on the one hand stimulated higher inputs for more impact, but has not been reliable in fulfilling financial commitments made in this respect. During the review period considerable confusion existed about the level of funds available.

The level of GoK contribution has been discussed in § 5.7, and there is no indication that the low level of GoK contribution is related to the higher financial input of the donor. Even a low input is probably considered high enough for the GoK to channel its funds to other purposes than West Pokot District.

5.11 Collaborating Partners

Implementing Partners

The programme has been working mainly with government departments ($\pm 90\%$). The weaknesses of the public sector have no doubt had a big impact on its operations. In the past, the programme collaborated with VI, AIC/RCA and Jitahidi, a local CBO in the field of environment. But co-operation with NGOs and Community Based Organizations has accounted for only 2% of programme expenditures over the period under review. But there are not many strong NGOs and CBOs in the district. Empowerment of these organisations and increased use of the private sector where they have comparative advantage has been discussed earlier under § 5.9

Consulting Firms

ASAL West Pokot has been supported by consulting firms in the areas of improved planning, credit, wildlife, gender, education, and a tentative start was made in land use planning. The programme uses consultants to provide additional expertise that is not present in the present programme set-up. Experiences with this type of backstopping were satisfactory.

The use of this flexible mechanism over which the programme has good control, should be continued.

5.12 Target Groups

The programme operates in certain geographical parts as defined by the ASAL characteristics of the agro-ecological zones. The exceptions are some high potential areas like the Lelan catchment. Within those areas there are no restrictions, so no real target group can be earmarked.

Not to have a real target group is a common characteristic of the Dutch supported ASAL programmes. This is not necessarily a weak point as long as the programme has proper and realistic objectives supported by adequate strategies to achieve the objectives. If objectives, strategies and criteria are neither concerted nor coherent (see chapter 6), the programme will rapidly develop into a series of unrelated small activities that have little coherence or synergy. This is why the introduction of e.g. a log frame is a useful contribution to the quality of the ASAL programmes.

Due to changing land ownership patterns and subdivision of land to small non-viable parcels especially in the medium potential areas, landless and unemployed youths have tended to migrate to town centres such as Kitale, Makutano and Alale in search

of employment opportunities. Certain figures provided suggest that about 50 % of the population is younger than 15 years.

Addressing this emerging and transitory group from the perspective of economic empowerment would not only diversify the economic base of the district but would also create forward and backward linkages for the agriculture / livestock sector. Appropriate strategies will need to be devised taking into account the fluidity of the group.

6. PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES, APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES

6.1 Assessment of Objectives and Strategies

The five programme objectives that were assigned to phase IV of ASAL West Pokot were presented in chapter 3 as a realistic notion of what the programme actually hopes to achieve. The following are the objectives in a summarised form:

- To improve knowledge on how farming (including animal husbandry) can be made more sustainable productive, and to promote the application of such knowledge.
- To stimulate increased participation of the beneficiaries in both the planning, the financing and the implementation of projects.
- To contribute to the improvement of certain aspects of living standards, or at least to counteract their further deterioration.
- To assist in opening new avenues for income generation.
- To facilitate the marketing of products from the district.

Rather than a concerted set of strategies to achieve the objectives stipulated, the programme applies five planning criteria that must guide the identification and approval of projects:

- As far as the *target group* is concerned must the activity be suitable for benefiting the poorer and more disadvantaged groups.
- Where *participation* is concerned, will the programme be reluctant in relation to activities initiated by the GoK, and favour those initiated by communities through local leaders type (iii) directly by the PMU, according to guidelines authorised by the DDC.
- The *environmental* concern is expressed in screening activities for effect on sustainable development.
- As far as gender is concerned, the programme applies the DAC / WID criteria for identification, favours the participation of women, and has women as a priority target group for the credit programme.
- Institutional *sustainability* is not always required as long the benefits can continue to be felt.

A bit outside the framework of the PlanOps, the programme has developed over the last years several strategies or guidelines at the operational level (e.g., policy for cost sharing, guidelines for the farming sector, etc.). A policy for boreholes was prepared just before the PlanOps of the fourth phase. The overall intention of the PlanOps is clearly to continue as in the previous phases with here and there some polite observations into the direction of the 1993 review.

Looking at the above package it must be observed that some attempts were made to include the recommendations made in 1993, but only at a low level of implementation (screening activities for environmental impact but deliberately not having an environmental strategy of its own). A certain shift of emphasis was stated to be introduced in the PlanOps but very little indeed took place.

The overall picture that emerges is of a package that:

- (i) bears little internal coherence, is not concerted, and is little operational.
- (ii) has objectives that are rather obvious and that are hard to transform into an ASAL policy. That should not have been a major problem would they have

been supported by adequate strategies¹⁶.

The PMU was clearly not convinced by the recommendations made by that review. Indeed, the PlanOps 1994-1999 did put a strong emphasis on the previous phases and kept its promise that it "will remain fundamentally the same as before". No structural changes were made in the management of the project.

The above conclusion about objectives and strategies that do not honour the 1993 review is not necessarily a negative one: it merely observes different opinions about what the ASAL programme in West Pokot should do. What should be criticised in West Pokot is the lack of internal coherence of the whole package that renders it inoperational and of little use for progress and impact assessment.

Interestingly, the Annual Report 1995, for the first year of the phase IV and that was written 18 months after the PlanOps, expresses more attention for the development of a strategy for ecologically sustainable development and arresting land degradation as one of the three major innovations for that phase IV. By that time also the first steps were made into the direction of a land use planning activity in the district by organising two workshops on the subject with a consulting company in September 1995. For various reasons, in the years thereafter, very little happened in land use planning cum natural resource management, but for the organisation of two more workshops despite the fact that a backstopping contract had been signed with the consultants. An outline for a LUP strategy has been developed based on the Participatory Planning Workshop that included training in planning tools.

In the year after the handing over of the programme to SNV and the arrival of a new Programme Advisor, several initiatives were taken to develop active strategies instead of applying passive criteria:

- Community participation as a deliberate strategy in identification, implementation and management of projects. Investments were made in the training of communities.
- Delivery of infrastructure like roads and bridges to remedy development constraints.
- Land use planning as a deliberate strategy for natural resource management. A catchment approach is foreseen to be implemented with line departments, and a community based planning exercise to solve land use conflicts near Kerio valley and along the Suam river.
- Capacity building to be focused more on NGOs and CBOs instead of GoK staff.
- More efficient support to GoK. Establishment of a car-pool instead of financing GoK vehicles.
- Improve planning and evaluation capacity of line departments by training of contact officers in PRA, use of the log frame (incl. detailed budgeting), and land use planning.
- Integration of GoK services at the divisional level (unified extension).

When the review took place in the district it was too early to assess the new initiatives, moreover so since a conflict about misappropriation of funds had emerged and a Price Waterhouse audit became organised. The programme was (temporarily) closed after the results of the audit became available.

To prelude the synthesising analysis of the four districts (Part Two), and comparing

¹⁶ It can be observed that making policies concrete is difficult anyway in the traditional Pokot set-up: the DPU has no clear mandate. Moreover, there is a strong donor policy pressure directly to the district level without passing through the national level. GoK district uncertainty is confronted with strong donor ideas.

West Pokot with the neighbouring Keiyo Marakwet programme, it is apparent that these are almost each others opposite in the application of purposeful strategies and the recommendations of the 1993 review, making the comparison between these two programmes extremely interesting and of key importance for conclusions and recommendations about the future of ASAL programmes.

6.2 Achievements of Objectives and Strategies

Impact of activities that resulted from the objectives and criteria and achievement of targets set will be discussed in the next chapter 7. That chapter, thus, bears a relation to the Programme Components (see § 3.3.)

In this paragraph, the review takes an overall look at the degree in which the objectives have been met with the activities. This part is based on discussions with programme staff.

Objective 1

To improve knowledge on how farming (including animal husbandry) can be made more sustainable productive, and to promote the application of such knowledge. 'Sustainably productive' should be taken to mean high-yielding, drought resilient, and ecologically sustainable. Indigenous knowledge must be brought to bear upon these issues, and extension staff should be made aware of such knowledge.

Livestock and crop production had many activities executed, consuming a considerable part of the total expenditure.

However, for 'improvement of knowledge' and / or introduction of indigenous knowledge little happened.

Traditional models of promoting and improving the productive sector continued to be applied. The ASAL areas and their intrinsic problems are neither interesting nor attractive for the departmental staff. The training of extension staff is still a repetition of traditional contents. Retrenchment in the district usually applies predominantly to front line staff (FLS). This FLS has become accustomed to ASAL areas and prevailing conditions and as a result the T&V system with the traditional message becomes gradually more dominant.

The relation between the programme and the agricultural knowledge institutes (KARI research stations) is poorly arranged and not structural.

Three small on-farm pilot plots were arranged in collaboration with KARI but little came out of them. The financing of activities related to drought resistant crops never resulted in a useful report.

Objective 2

To stimulate increased participation of the beneficiaries in both the planning, the financing and the implementation of projects as to ensure (a) that they are in line with their felt needs and (b) that they may be sustainable.

Progress is being made with the participation of communities. Cost sharing is picking up although still at a low level. Participation for execution is easier to achieve.

The climate in which the ASAL programme operates is not conducive for participation to become effective. The programme is fully part of the government

machinery that demonstrates little interest in participation.

GoK appears to be a constraint for this objective. Moreover, several of the NGOs are religious and usually do not take participation seriously.

Objective 3

To contribute to the improvement of certain aspects of living standards, such as access to water and education, or at least to counteract their further deterioration.

The achievements in relation to this objective are almost impossible to assess within the framework of a review (1993 - 1997). The ASAL programme, though, holds the opinion that in certain sectors as water and education access and quality of output improved. This opinion is supported by chapter 7 where also a look at the impact during the period 1982 - 1997 is taken.

However, external factors as increased insecurity and decreased food security dominate and caused an overall feeling that the standard and quality of living is declining.

Objective 4

To assist in opening new avenues for income generation outside farming, especially for women.

Related to this objective, a small number of rather traditional activities were executed. Four posho mills for women were financed out of which three failed. One posho mill for handicapped was supplied. A honey refinery near Kodich closed its doors.

The ASAL programme indeed lacks the capacity to pursue this avenue. Therefore, the poor performance related to this objective is expected to improve drastically with forthcoming credit scheme, that will be co-ordinated externally by a consulting firm.

Objective 5

To facilitate the marketing of products from the district, particularly the marketing of livestock.

At a small scale some activities were executed but effect is doubtful. A few cattle ramps were constructed and in 50/50 collaboration with the County Council a few market places were rehabilitated (maintenance, though, by the County Council is not probable).

Although the ASAL programme contributed to improvements in the infrastructure for better marketing of products, the overall assessment is that the major infrastructure as key roads is deteriorating faster with a negative impact on marketing opportunities. Also, insecurity and ethnic conflicts overruled the impact of the ASAL programme's contributions.

The above suggest a pretty bleak picture of the ASAL programme's achievements in West Pokot District. It must be underlined that such is not necessarily the case and such a judgement should wait until the next chapter.

The conclusion, though, can be that the objectives of the ASAL programme in West Pokot bear little or no relationship with the activities executed (that can still have a positive impact and constitute an efficient and effective package).

6.3 Gender Aspects

Situation of Women

In the pastoralist areas of the district women as well as men are involved in herding of livestock while milking is a responsibility of women and children. Women are also fully responsible for household maintenance activities including house construction and maintenance. In the agro-pastoral areas, women carry out most of the agricultural activities, take part in livestock herding together with men but are responsible for milking as well as most of the reproductive activities. House construction is done jointly with men. In both pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities, women have a much heavier workload than men and have little or no time for leisure.

In the agro-pastoralist areas, women enjoy some degree of control over the grains and other food products. Pastoral women on the other hand have little control over cattle or cash from their sale although they have control over milk and meat for household use. Decision making among the Pokot is considered a domain of men and women play a subordinate role of carrying out decisions taken by men. Male youth once circumcised have greater decision making authority and control over resources than adult women.

Gender approach

In the PlanOps 1995-1999, gender equality is indicated as one of the three dimensions to be given emphasis, the other two dimensions being environmental sustainability and institutional sustainability. A gender adviser joined the programme in 1995 to assist in strengthening a gender perspective in the programme. A few gender related activities have been implemented during the phase under review such as sensitisation of contact officers in 1994 and training of women group leaders in business skills among other women specific activities. A clear approach for gender integration in the programme components is yet to be developed.

Results of Gender Activities

A gender analysis planned for 1997 was intended to provide a basis for developing a strategy for incorporating gender in the programme. As the analysis was not undertaken, a gender strategy has still not been developed. The role of the gender advisor and linkage with the implementing partners have also not been clear. This has resulted in differences in interpretation of the concept and even a negative attitude amongst some implementing partners. It appears that the programme management has not given much support to gender in the past in spite of the emphasis given in the PlanOps. However, there seems to be more interest now to develop a clear strategy for gender and to promote a gender differentiated approach. In 1997, the programme contracted an external consultancy to strengthen gender capacity and support the process of integration. As part of this support, training has been given to the gender adviser and sensitisation sessions held for the liaison officers and heads of departments. This process is planned to continue in 1998.

Education of girls from the pastoral areas of the district has been encouraged by giving bursaries to girls who perform well in KCPE. This has contributed to increasing numbers of girls from the pastoralist areas in secondary schools.

It can be concluded that, compared to the other three districts, the programme has

lagged behind with integrating gender¹⁷. It is also clear that the programme lacks the capacity to develop and implement an effective gender strategy.

There is need for the programme, as a matter of urgency, to develop a strategy for gender to provide meaningful support to the partners in integrating gender in the different components and projects. The role of the gender advisor should also be defined.

In view of this, the mission recommends that the on-going capacity building programme for the gender advisor¹⁸ should continue, but that more staff should participate and acquire skills as well as the attitude necessary to support the process. A gender working group would, for instance, be formed and trained along with the gender advisor.

¹⁷ This much to do with the fact that the programme relies on the line ministries in the traditional way and these line ministries have in the GoK context no incentive for a gender sensitive approach (e.g. no meaningful national gender strategy).

¹⁸ The gender advisor was fired by the beginning of November 1997.

7 MAJOR COMPONENTS AND ACTIVITIES

7.1 Sector balance

Since the ASAL programme in West Pokot started, in 1981, it has always had a broad spread of projects over a wide variety of sectors, with the exception of the health sector. Health projects were and partly still are separately funded by other Dutch sources. These sources are partly governmental (suppletion expert(s) to the Ministry of Health) and partly non-governmental (the Netherlands Harambee Foundation for Health, and support for a hospital and health centres managed by religious NGOs). Support for projects in water development, agriculture, livestock and veterinary services and in education have always been the core of the programme. Gradually forestry and environmental projects became more important, as well as projects in small business development, women group support, roads and bridges and culture (a Pokot and Sengwer Museum; a multipurpose hall). A minor start was made with a credit programme.

During the period 1993-1997 the programme spent Kshs. 150 million, of which Kshs. 120 million (80%) on projects and Kshs. 30 million (20%) on a) programme management, b) what is called 'general programme support', c) institutional support or sometimes called 'human resource development' and d) support to district planning. In 1995 and 1997 the level of expenditure (in Kshs.) was considerably higher than in 1993 and 1994. Also the budget (in Dutch guilders) shows a considerable expansion: from a level of NLG. 1.3 million per year to a level of NLG. 2.0 million per year, responding to the message of the 1993 evaluation to expand the programme and try to get a more substantial impact.

Programme planning seems to have been very realistic. The available budget for projects was almost completely spent during 1993-1997. The budget for general programme expenses was not completely spent in those years. In most sectors actual expenditure was not far from the budget, with three exceptions:

- For cultural projects much more was spent than budgeted;
- For land use planning - a major demand in the 1993 evaluation report - hardly any money was spent until 1997. Land use planning only had a (reluctant) start in 1996;
- For small-scale business/women groups/youth employment only 30% was spent of the money that was budgeted, showing a major problem of absorption capacity in those sectors in West Pokot.

Out of Kshs. 120 million spent on projects in the four years 1993-1997, most went to water resources (25%), livestock and veterinary care (together 15%), education (14%), cultivation (13%), and forestry (12%). Less was spent on roads and bridges (7%), culture (6%), support to NGOs, women groups, youth groups and small business development (together 6%) and environmental (in a narrow sense) projects (2%)¹⁹.

Various further classifications are and can be attempted. The programme management itself uses a broad classification: productive sector (in 1995 and 1996 misleadingly called 'farming'), infrastructure (mainly water and roads), off-farm employment (in 1994 partly included in the 'social sector') and social services. If we streamline this

¹⁹ These figures are a result of the review team's attempt to allocate detailed expenditure figures for 1993-1996 to (sub-)sectors. In response, the ASAL programme management provided slightly different figures, for the years 1994-96 - so excluding 1993 - in which every year shows a different 'organisation' of the expenditure data. Allocation to sectors obviously is not straightforward. To allow a comparison between the two sectoral distributions, we will give both classifications.

information the productive sector (but this includes 'environment') received 48% of all project expenditure, off-farm employment 4% (so together 52%), infrastructure 33% and social services 16%. The review team used a further condensation whereby 'roads/bridges' and productive water resources (mainly for watering livestock, like rock catchments, pans, and shallow wells) were classified together with the productive sector as 'economic projects' while the many domestic water projects were combined with social services projects as 'social projects'. Then most of the money for projects (63%) was spent on economic activities, with a purpose to increase production, conserve natural resources and/or generate income. Less money (37%) was spent on social development: domestic water projects, education, and culture, in that order.

The 1993 evaluation mission strongly suggested to increase the relative importance of productive, or economic projects. The ASAL programme in West Pokot indeed increased the emphasis on the productive sector, although, compared to the other ASAL programmes under review the relative importance of the economic sector is the lowest in West Pokot. To put it otherwise: the programme in West Pokot was most reluctant to change its 'profile'.

Water is the most crucial natural resource in a (semi-)arid environment. All expenditure by the Ministry of Water Development as well as some projects in livestock development (desilting of water dams) and in cultivation (irrigation) can be regarded as water projects; in total 26% of all project expenditure. In addition many projects were related to other aspects of the environment: beside the forestry projects (with much money involved in preserving the Lelan catchment), and the environmental awareness projects (including those implemented by NGOs), there were projects in the Department of Livestock (range rehabilitation), the Veterinary Department (tsetse surveys), and the Dept. of Agriculture (soil conservation, and promotion of jikos); a total of 20% of project expenditure. The total money involved in projects dealing with natural resources, including water resources, came close to half of the total project funds.

The evaluation mission of 1993 strongly suggested much more emphasis on 'the environment' and to include the highland catchment areas. This certainly happened during the last four years, although with more reluctance than elsewhere in developing a 'land use planning approach'.

The ASAL programme West Pokot used a special project category for projects implemented by NGOs (like VI, AIC/RCA, a local NGO Jitahidi). In total their involvement was rather modest, with 2% of all project expenditure channelled through them, if we follow the Review Team's assessment. According to the programme management the percentage was higher, up to 4% of total project expenditure. The West Pokot programme still heavily relied on the government structures for project planning and implementation. Although there are many NGOs in the district, and many of them already for a considerable length of time, their involvement is mainly in health care and education, sectors where the ASAL programme is either not active or where the ASAL programme's emphasis in recent years has become weaker.

It is difficult to estimate the importance of projects that were specifically meant for women (like support for women groups; support for girls secondary education), or where evidently mainly women are the first beneficiaries (most of the domestic water projects; promotion of jikos). If we would add the actual expenditure for these particular projects we would arrive at 20% of all project expenditure.

Table *Sectoral distribution of ASAL programme expenditure in West Pokot, 1993-97*

Sector	Review Team's assessment, 1993-97		Assessment by ASAL Programme management, 1994-97	
	Kshs. x 1000	%	Kshs. x 1000	%
Livestock & veterinary	11,268 & 6,646	9 & 6	15,024	16
Cultivation	15,849	13	13,447	14
Forestry	14,760	12	12,495	13
Environment/ Land use planning	2,462	2	3,920	4
Water resources	29,666	25	23,439	25
Small business, youth & women groups & NGOs	6,927	6	4,417	5
Credit	81	0
Roads & bridges	8,975	7	6,754	7
Education	16,815	14	14,332	15
Culture	6,796	6	743	1
Others (Rural trading centres, population, handicapped)	497	1
Subtotal	120,244	100	95,149	100
Programme management, etc.	29,650		29,626	
Total	149,894		124,775	

7.2 Sector Achievements: Output Measurement Compared to Targets and Assessment of Effects²⁰

Water Resources

Water development is the most important sector in the ASAL programme of West Pokot. This included four gravity water schemes with tap water connections to institutions, communities and individual households, 160 roof catchment projects, one rock catchment, 12 shallow wells, 6 sub-surface dams and one earth dam. Forty two boreholes were rehabilitated and minor repairs were done at another 90 boreholes according to the contact officer (the PA doubts this figure)²¹. In addition, staff training, educational tours and the like have been financed.

Almost all planned targets were completely achieved. The water department in West Pokot seems to be very well organised. According to the water department (but offering very shallow evidence) the various water projects implemented during the

²⁰ This is a quantitative assessment.

²¹ Conflicting information by those involved in the programme. Verification by means of a field check is not possible during a review. However, it underlines the need for better databases.

period under review offered more secure and clean water to more than 2,000 families (or approximately 12,000 people). According to the officers in the water department, the breakthrough of a large variety of water harvesting methods enables the department to offer solutions that are better adapted to local circumstances, with lower maintenance costs and better sustainability.

The Productive Sector: Livestock Development

Within the productive sector, there was dominant attention for the livestock sector, with 6% of all ASAL project funds going to the veterinary sector (including cattle dips, and veterinary and para-veterinary training) and 9% to other livestock projects, as the purchase and sale of improved livestock breeds such as Galla goats and Dorper sheep (more than 500) and Sahiwal cattle (more than 40), the construction of seven County Council sale yards and livestock 'bomas', and much training. Most targets were achieved. Problems were experienced with the Nasukuta sheep and goats multiplication due to diseases. The Nasukuta Centre absorbed much ASAL funds (e.g. on the experimental rehabilitation of more than 100 acres of rangeland). The problems at the Centre also caused delays in livestock training. A project to desilt dams was not successful, because no bulldozer could be put to work. A project to start a revolving fund for veterinary drugs was concluded due to the policy decision to leave this to the private sector. The paravet project had to wait a long time for training materials and kits to arrive. The sale of beehives was not very successful due to competition from an NGO selling hives at subsidised prices and due to low quality of the hives. Workshops to promote buffalo cropping in the Masol lowlands had to be postponed when inhabitants moved away due to the 1996 drought.

The staff of the veterinary and animal health departments judged the effects of their projects as having lower impact than the review team's assessment shows. The attempts to introduce improved breeds of goats and sheep, cattle and camels were only partially successful. If we compare the money involved in Nasukuta (mainly goats and sheep) and the number of shoats actually distributed among the farmers, the effects are relatively poor. It is unclear if the improvement actually resulted in the upgrading of the domestic animals. The attempts to improve local chicken also had meagre effects. Veterinary training (farmers, paravets) and vaccinations (more than 400,000 out of 565,000 planned) seem to have had positive effects, as no outbreaks of epidemic diseases have occurred during the period. The number of people reached with training, both for the livestock and for the veterinary department is rather small. However, the coverage of vaccinations must have been high. Some experiments with range rehabilitation and hay production showed promising results, but these should be judged against possibilities for replication and efficiency.

The Productive Sector: Cultivation

One-eighth of all ASAL project funds was invested in the farming sector, and most projects were executed as planned. There were experiments with drought-resistant crops (although with only meagre synergy with the activities of the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute), agroforestry plots were established, and many fruit trees and sisal seedlings produced, distributed and planted. Twelve indigenous irrigation furrows were rehabilitated (with a 'command area' of 375 acres), and ten pumps were installed at shallow wells to enable the start of irrigated agriculture. As was true for the period prior to 1993, the continuation of a 'low profile' but effective approach to improve indigenous irrigation still has major positive effects.

The Department of Agriculture organised 325 field days with an attendance of 20,000 small farmers in total and 200 farmers were trained to use animal traction at a newly built training facility, while a few of them received ploughs on loan. Staff training, and the acquisition of staff transport was almost all implemented as planned.

However, despite the money involved, the possibilities to replicate experiments with drought-resistant crops is unclear; programme management states that proper reporting on the experiments is still lacking. The fact that field days are attracting large numbers of farmers could mean that successful follow-up is possible. Extension staff is now suggesting the obvious thing: that the attention should be shifted to get a far greater involvement of women farmers.

Environmental Projects

Most projects dealing with the environment were implemented by the Forestry Department, but some NGOs were involved as well. In total 14% of all project expenditure went to this sector. The production of tree seedlings (with an emphasis on fruit trees, fodder trees and bamboo) was high (more than 1.2 million seedlings produced) and tree planting at catchments, on farm boundaries and in farms (mainly fruit trees) was considerable, both in the Lelan highlands and in the drylands. Soil conservation works began to pick up (e.g. with 11 km of terraces planted with trees in Lelan). Environmental workshops (22) and contests began to attract farmers, after a massive attempt to train more than 800 local leaders and to start environmental training at schools as well. Most of the output targets that had been formulated were achieved. In the highlands of Lelan, soil conservation at farms was slower than expected. Also in Lelan "the plan to build a forest protection camp, to build a staff house, to demarcate forest boundaries and to train farmers' households" was not executed as fast as it was planned. Land use planning had a slow start and there was only one minor project dealing with wildlife utilisation. On the other hand, the promotion of improved cooking stoves went better than planned and five former gold mining areas could be rehabilitated as planned.

The Productive Sector: Small Business Projects And Credit

Except for projects directly related to improve the facilities for civil servants dealing with youth polytechnics, women groups and small enterprise development, projects in this sector were not so successful. Fewer women and YP instructors were trained than planned; and only a minority of the existing Youth Polytechnics could be supported. Looking at the money involved the results are rather disappointing. The low coverage of the women and youth programmes in terms of numbers reached makes it doubtful that there are major effects. Unlike in other ASAL programmes, the credit programme is still in its infancy, with very little expenditure during the period under review.

The Service Sector: Education

Support for the improvement of education has always been one of the major elements of the ASAL programme in West Pokot, and was executed with much consistency and devotion. Also during the period under review, a considerable amount of funds went to primary education and some to adult and other education. Although overall project performance is good, some projects were delayed (like building school classes), or fewer people were trained than planned (teacher training, women literacy seminars, adult education workshops, members of parents-teachers associations).

Thanks to the ASAL programme, the education department could maintain a high coverage of primary school supervision and succeeded to improve the performance of P8 children at national exams considerably. Consistent and high-quality ASAL involvement in improving the educational situation in the district appears to be very effective. Specific attention for the increase of girls at secondary schools is also effective. Adult education does not seem to be a success, though, with a rather low coverage.

Other Projects

The major building projects funded by the ASAL programme (multipurpose hall, Museum, important roads and bridges) were all carried out as planned. Improving the roads in the Northwest and the Southeast of the district was an urgent necessity. Unfortunately, the improved road in the Southeast, with the potential to improve the marketing opportunities of the irrigated farms, can (temporarily) not be used effectively due to recent ethnic clashes in the area.

7.3 The Geography Of ASAL Projects In West Pokot, 1993-1997

Out of 120 million Kshs. of project expenditure, 75 million could be located to the level of divisions, locations or even sites (see tables 1 and 2 in the annex to this report). Out of 45 million Kshs. that could not be specified, at least 8.9 million was allocated to 'district pastoral parts' and 10.7 million to 'district small farmers in the drylands'. The remaining 25 million Kshs. (and most of the non-project expenditure) was spent on 'district general' either for district headquarters or for projects where the location was unknown to us.

Major results of the geographical analysis were that most of the ASAL project expenditure went to the small farmer parts of the drylands (46%), but still a considerable part went to the pastoral areas (36%) and to the highlands (17%). The last figure shows that the suggestions of the 1993 evaluation mission to include the catchment areas in the highlands in ASAL's programme mandate was followed up.

Within the small farmer zone most of the project expenditure was spent on water, followed by farming. A very high part of the water expenditure went to one small area (Chepareria town and surroundings). Within the pastoral zone most of the money was spent on livestock, followed by water, and veterinary projects. Within the highland zone most of the money went to Lelan location and was spent on forestry projects.

The project expenditure in terms of divisions was rather skewed, with most money going to Chepareria division (and here most to Kipkomo location, on water and livestock projects mainly), followed by Kapenguria division (mostly highlands).

7.4. An Assessment of Impacts: the Comparison between Intervention and Non-Intervention Areas with a Pastoral and with a Small-Farmer Dominance, and the Comparison between 1982/1985 and 1997

As has been explained in chapter 4 on methodology, a detailed case study was done in four areas in West Pokot, the first one representative of a small farmer area with much ASAL programme attention (Chepareria), the second one representative of a small farmer area with much less ASAL programme involvement (Ywaleteke), the third one representative of a pastoral area with relatively many ASAL projects (Chepkobegh) and the fourth one a pastoral area that was virtually neglected by the ASAL programme (Kongelai). In addition, for the two high intervention areas, a comparison could be done with the situation in 1985, soon after the start of the ASAL programme in West Pokot. For the pastoral non-intervention area results could be compared with a survey done in 1982.

Household Water (see annex tables 3 and 4)

Before the ASAL programme started, tap water already became available to some

households in Chepareria (Rural Development Fund, 1974-1983). It was later extended to more households and the ASAL programme became heavily involved. In 1997 around 80% of all households in Chepareria had access to tap water. Half of them received a connection in the past few years. Recently a few households (11% of the survey households in Chepareria) got access to roof catchment, although this is not sufficient for the dry season. A minority of all the households interviewed in Chepareria still use river or spring water, or make use of dams. In the non-intervention small farm area, Ywaleteke, a tap water project started in 1986, with partial ASAL involvement, but it was implemented very slowly, and only a few households were connected to tap water in 1997 and to roof catchment. Most households still have to make use of dams and springs. In the pastoral zone, the (large) majority of the households makes use of water dams, both in the ASAL intervention area and in the non-intervention area. There is neither tap water, nor roof catchment. Dam construction started during the 1950s in Kongelai and in 1969 in Chepkobegh. Desilting of dams and making new dams (surface as well as subsurface) in Chepkobegh was partly funded by the ASAL programme after 1988.

Communities often identify water as their top priority and the ASAL programme often gets requests to support community water projects. Payment for water services (and hence for maintenance) is apparently only accepted when households are connected to tap water: in Chepareria 82% of all households said they paid for water. But hardly any household in the other areas did so. Households with access to tap water reported that the water was clean, near home (reducing time to fetch water), and plentiful and some commented that they could use it to irrigate their garden. Households without access to tap water complained that the water was often not reliable all year long, that it was not good for human consumption, and that it caused health problems.

Animal Health (see annex table 5)

After investments in water, the ASAL programme in West Pokot invested most in livestock and animal health improvement projects. The household interviews show that the large majority of all households (and all households do at least have a few cattle, goats and sheep) use vaccinations. Only in the non-intervention pastoral area the percentage is a bit lower. Here, the pastoral households also neglect dipping, although the ASAL programme invested in the rehabilitation of cattle dips here, as in the other areas, but dip committees in Kongelai do not seem to function well²² and since the mid 1980s ASAL has given up being active in this area. In all other areas they are and the investments of the ASAL programme and others in dips seem to be effective. Also the recent ASAL attempts to increase the number of trained paravets seems to be effective, although less so in the pastoral area. Given the importance of livestock in the daily life of West Pokot households, the high use of improved animal husbandry techniques is encouraging.

Crop Cultivation (see annex table 6)

The ASAL programme in West Pokot spent some 13% of its project funds on agricultural improvements and enabling the MoA extension service to do their job, although there have not been specific crop production improvement projects in any of the four survey areas. In the ASAL intervention areas the food security situation is slightly less insecure compared to the non-intervention areas (but still rather hazardous; and in the pastoral areas in particular). The extension service is more

²² The security of animal wealth is also much lower. In Kongelai 59% of all households said to have lost animals in cattle raids recently, while in the other three areas hardly any households reported loss of animals due to 'ngoroko'.

active in the intervention areas, but in the small farmer area much more so than in the pastoral area. More farmers in the intervention areas use improved seeds, cultivate drought tolerant crops and use manure (and some even chemical fertilisers) compared to the non-intervention areas. Kongelai, the pastoral non-intervention area, shows by far the most problematic situation. The differences between the four areas cannot only be attributed to ASAL's activities, but the programme did play an important role. Drought tolerant crops (sorghum, millets) are indigenous to the drylands and more necessary in Chepkobegh and Kongelai than in Chepareria and Ywaleteke. However, in Kongelai many pastoralists who adopted riverine cultivation along River Suam after the 1979-81 drought, began to use non-adapted maize varieties, and many still do. The use of animal manure as an explicit activity (with extra labour involved) may not be 100 percent, but during the dry season animals graze and browse the stubble fields, adding manure, even if farmers do not regard that as such.

Environment (see annex table 7)

The awareness of a soil erosion problem is highest in the two areas where gullies and gully formation after rain storms are a phenomenon that can hardly be overlooked: the Chepkobegh area with its loose soils and the Ywaleteke area with its escarpment portions. In Chepareria the problem is less severe and awareness among farmers is lower, despite some more ASAL environmental projects here compared to the other survey areas. In rather flat Kongelai the problem is much less pronounced, but the awareness is still rather high. The ability of the large majority of the farmers in all four areas to express the problem is probably partly a result of recent awareness raising campaigns, e.g. the projects funded by ASAL in which local leaders from all over the district are trained in environmental matters.

The awareness of a deforestation problem is highest in the most densely populated area (Chepareria), where gathering of fuelwood has become a problem and where commercial charcoal production for 'export' makes the problem worse. In less densely populated Ywaleteke (near the Lelan forests) the problem is less obvious and so is awareness. In the pastoral areas the problem is increasing and awareness is rather high.

In areas where terraces could make all the difference (in all areas, except Kongelai), the majority of farmers did construct and do maintain terraces. The percentage of households having terraces is highest in the area where farming without terraces is environmentally destructive (Ywaleteke). Making terraces is a strategy that was propagated since the 1950s and ASAL as well as the extension staff of the Ministry of Agriculture successfully encourage most farmers to continue (but many farmers would probably do that anyway). It is surprising and encouraging that also pastoralists-cum-cultivators in Chepkobegh are now making and maintaining terraces.

Nutrient conservation is less popular (although with 40% of all farmers in all areas except - again - Kongelai, not low). The use of nutrient conservation in the pastoral intervention area (and much more there than in the pastoral non-intervention area), can probably be attributed to ASAL's work.

Few farmers buy tree seedlings and the few that do are in the small farmer areas, more in the intervention than in the non-intervention areas. Many more farmers plant trees on their farms, more in the intervention areas than in the non-intervention areas and far more in the small farming areas than in the pastoral areas. The average number of trees planted, though, is highest in the pastoral intervention area²³, probably due to the examples set by the nearby Nasukuta project, one of the largest ASAL projects in

²³ However, this is because of the enthusiastic activity of five farmers who planted 500, 500, 300 100, and 100 trees each.

the district. Finally, spring protection is hardly practised yet.

Gender And Participation In Women Groups

Gender activities gradually became a more important focus of the West Pokot ASAL programme, with funds channelled to women's co-operatives and other women groups for e.g. water jar construction, jua kali work and training support. Participation of women in women groups is rather high in the small farmer areas (64% in Chepareria and 67% in Ywaleteke, but very low in pastoral areas (15% in Chepkobegh and only 3% in Kongelai). Although it is often thought that neighbourhood-based groups are the main vehicle by which awareness and training can be filtered to the grassroots level, this is questionable in pastoral situations, where family and clans are the main survival network and where many individuals mistrust all externally propagated group formation that cuts across the existing networks. The ASAL programme in West Pokot is struggling with the gender problem since its inception.

The lack of recognised (women, but even more men) groups in pastoral areas is not a result of a lack of confidence in external support. Asked whether they had ever asked for particular support from the ASAL programme, government services or NGOs, 41% of all households in Chepkobegh, the ASAL intervention area, said they did, but only 3% of all households in Kongelai. The figures for the small farmer areas were 75% for the ASAL intervention area and 37% for the ASAL non-intervention area.

Consistent and long-term support to a pastoral area, as was provided by the ASAL programme to Chepkobegh, does make a difference.

Income And Employment (see annex tables 8-12)

The interviews done in 1997 show that a large majority of all households in all four types of areas participate in the sale of crops and in the sale of animals. Surprisingly there is not much difference between the small farmer areas and the pastoral areas. Obviously most households in the pastoral zone do produce some (drought tolerant) crops and many of them sell part of it (but many will buy maize grains or maize meal later in the season). A much larger difference exists between small farmer and pastoral areas in the importance of off-farm income (although with more involvement in the intervention areas compared to the non-intervention areas). A major gap exists between the small farmer-intervention area and all other areas in wage income opportunities. Households in Chepareria are near the divisional headquarters and the growing 'proto-urban' economy of this largest centre in the West Pokot drylands. This is also visible in the percentage of households involved in the sale of milk). Finally, it is good to notice the leading position Kongelai households held in selling honey: the area borders Kodich sub-location where the ASAL programme and others have tried to stimulate commercial honey production. The attempts of the ASAL programme to support commercial honey production in Chepareria and Chepkobegh were less successful²⁴, so it seems. The relatively large sale of eggs can be attributed partly to the recent focus of the ASAL programme on income diversification through poultry. The remarkable fact that also Chepkobegh pastoral women are nowadays very active in commercial production of eggs can probably be attributed to the activity of the National Poultry Development Programme in the area.

If we compare the current situation (1997) with the situation in 1985 some figures are remarkably identical (wage income participation; sale of animals, although there was little sale of milk yet in 1985). However, a major change took place in crop sales in

²⁴ Though the programme management reported that the Kodich refinery was recently closed.

the pastoral area (absent in 1985, but with many households participating in 1997; probably a result of the improved road connection to market centres) and in off-farm activities (a strong growth in the small farmer area; a strong reduction in the pastoral area; part of it can be explained by the crisis situation after the 1984 drought, forcing many pastoralists to find other sources of income, with many households participating in gold digging).

The intervention areas are better off in cash income terms compared to the non-intervention areas, with the small farmer areas in both cases better off than the pastoral areas. Chepareria clearly is in a category of its own, with 2.3 - 4.0 times the cash income level of the other areas. Although not measured, one could probably add that its non-cash income level will also be higher than any of the other areas. The small farmer non-intervention area, Ywaleteke, has a surprisingly low cash income level, lower even than the pastoral area of the intervention zone. Also surprising is the fact that all four areas have approximately the same cash income level based on livestock and in all areas except Chepareria, it is the dominating source of cash income. In the small farmer non-intervention area, there must be a major crop marketing bottleneck. It is indicative for the neglected position of the non-intervention pastoral area that wage income is zero and off-farm income opportunities are also very limited. It is on the other hand probably indicative for the impact of the ASAL programme that the pastoral intervention area shows a far less neglected income composition pattern.

It is possible to differentiate the four areas in terms of the percentage of households earning more than Kshs. 10,000 with a particular source of income in 1997. Relatively rich households mainly base their high income on the sale of animals, with the exception of the small farmer area in the intervention zone where all four sources provide households with an opportunity to earn considerable sums of money.

For the ASAL intervention areas, the results of the comparison between 1985 and 1997 are very interesting. In the small farmer area the economic situation has deteriorated, as in Kenya as a whole²⁵. Real wage income levels have dropped considerably, but also real crop income is much lower now than in the mid 1980s (which was immediately after a severe drought). Off-farm income has stabilised in total real income terms, but probably more work has to be done by more people in the household to get the same real income as in 1985. Animal income is much better than ten years ago, when livestock owners were recovering from the drought: not easily willing to sell animals and not yet selling milk for cash. The composition of income shows a clear shift from crop and wage income dominance in the mid 1980s to a very diversified pattern in the mid 1990s, with livestock leading, but all other types of income almost equally important.

In the pastoral area with a lot of ASAL interventions the average household's cash income position has improved during the last ten years. This is mainly due to increased sale of animals compared to the post-drought year 1985 and to the increased income from off-farm activities (but with gold far less important compared to 1985).

ASAL's very active support for livestock improvements and livestock marketing in the area between Chepkobegh and Chepareria has clearly had a major impact on Chepkobegh households.

We can also compare the changes in the pastoral intervention area, Chepkobegh, with

²⁵ To compare 1996 and 1985 figures the financial figures of 1985 were adapted, using the middle income index figures for inflation, as published in the annual Economic Review, Nairobi. The outcome of the inflation analysis (1996:1985 = 23:100, or: the 1985 Shilling has to be adjusted with a factor 4.4) compares well with the local price development for an average goat in the dryland parts of the district (150 Kshs. in 1985; 650 Kshs. in 1996).

those in the pastoral non-intervention area, Kongelai, for which we have income data for the year 1981. In real cash income terms the situation in Kongelai has deteriorated between 1981 and 1997 (in 1997 Kshs. value from a level of almost 18,000 Kshs. per household to a current level of 14,000 Kshs.)²⁶. In Kongelai there have hardly been any ASAL projects that could have improved the livelihood of pastoralists.

Education (see annex table 13)

Improving primary education has always been one of the core activities of the ASAL programme in West Pokot (funding class rooms, desks, other school equipment, training untrained teachers, et cetera). Also supported by a variety of foreign missions, education has expanded tremendously since the late 1970s. The ASAL programme has been very important in both Chepareria and Chepkobegh, less so in Ywaleteke and only recently a start was made in Kongelai. The current situation still shows a major difference in school attendance between small farmer and pastoral areas and between boys and girls, given the importance of cultural norms that cause male children to be sent to school more easily than female children²⁷. It also shows a clear difference between ASAL intervention and ASAL non-intervention areas, both in the small farmer and in the pastoral zones.

If we take the findings for the first three areas in 1997 as indicative for the average situation in Kipkomo Location as a whole, the average male school attendance would become 72% and the average female school attendance 61%. Data collected in 1985 for Kipkomo Location as a whole shows a male school attendance of 74% and a female school attendance of 44%²⁸. During the period of ASAL involvement the male school attendance had stabilised, but the level of female enrolment had improved considerably. The examination results had also much improved. In Kongelai (the pastoral non-intervention area) the enrolment figures had deteriorated a lot since the early 1980s, from an average attendance level of 40% in 1982 to less than 10% in 1997²⁹.

The impact of some ASAL programme support for polytechnic training and for adult literacy training is not so clear. Less than 10% of all households had a member who had attended polytechnic training, with hardly any difference between intervention and non-intervention areas. Adult literacy training had been or was attended by at least one member of 17% of the households in intervention areas and 7% of households in non-intervention areas. Again small farm areas show a far better attendance score compared to pastoral areas.

²⁶ Using the inflation index in the Economic Surveys, the 1981 Shilling had a current value of 7.1 times the 1996 Shilling. In local terms this is indeed a trustworthy figure, as the price of an average goat in 1996 (650 Kshs.) was about 7 times the value of 1981 (90 Kshs.).

²⁷ School fees are a major bottleneck for sending children to school nowadays, and especially for girls. It is interesting to note that in small farmer areas some households succeed to get an external sponsorship, through the ASAL programme, churches or NGOs. Out of 16 households with daughters in schools in Ywaleteke two were sponsored and out of 20 households with daughters in schools in Chepareria four were sponsored. However, in the pastoral areas there was not a single household reporting the sponsoring of female education!

²⁸ Kipkomo Locational Development Profile, 1986, p. 55. In the four years before the ASAL programme started the number of primary schools had increased rapidly as a response to drought relief measures via primary schools (from 7 to 19) and the number of children in school had increased from 945 in 1978, or less than 25%, to 2,943, or more than 60% of all eligible children in the location in 1982. In 1985 the school attendance was slightly lower. The ASAL programme attempted to maintain the attendance level in the years after the drought and to improve the quality of teaching and facilities.

²⁹ In Kongelai/Riwa the attendance level has always been considerably lower than in Kipkomo Location (30% for boys and 19% for girls in 1979; 48% for boys and 33% for girls in 1982; see Riwa/Lower Mnagei Locational Development Profile of 1982).

Health (see annex table 14)

ASAL West Pokot was not directly involved in health activities in the district. However, the programme had an instrumental working relationship with two Dutch non-governmental organisations (the Netherlands Harambee Foundation for Health and the NHF for Water) which were very active in promoting health awareness in the area from 1983 onwards³⁰. They focused on the health situation at schools, providing water and latrines, with strong community involvement (in Chepareria and Chepkobegh, but also in Ywaletke).

It is obvious from the household survey data that the situation is better in the intervention areas and also much better in the small farmer areas compared to the pastoral areas, where more health-related activities need to be promoted. In small farmer areas increased awareness and increased willingness to contribute to improvements (as the Netherlands' NGOs only provided support if a considerable contribution was given by the local communities) has resulted in major improvements compared to ten years ago when there were no VIP latrines and few simple pit toilets in the area. But there is still much work to be done.

7.5 Conclusion

We can summarise the 1997 findings by comparing the intervention with the non-intervention areas in first the small farmer zone and then the pastoral zone.

Table Comparison of intervention and non-intervention areas in the small-farmer and in the pastoral zone

Variable	Small farmer area: situation in ASAL intervention area better than in ASAL non-intervention area	Pastoral area: situation in ASAL intervention area better than in ASAL non-intervention area
Water situation during rainy season	Yes	No
Water situation during dry season	Yes	Yes
Toilets	Yes	Yes
Education: daughters	Yes	Yes
Education: sons	Yes	Yes
Income: sale of crops	No (Yes in money)	Yes/Yes
Income: sale of animals	No (Yes in money)	Yes/Yes
Income: sale of milk	Yes	No
Income: sale of eggs	No	Yes
Income: sale of honey	Yes	No

³⁰ The Netherlands Harambee Foundation for Health was connected to the Dutch medical doctors working in Kapenguria District Hospital, and paid by the Netherlands Government. The ASAL programme advisor took over responsibility whenever a Dutch doctor was not available. Since 1996 the NHF-H has its own counterpart structure in the district. In 1990 NHF-H did a study about the possible improvements of health at schools and a Dutch financial institution adopted the project that was formulated and instituted its own implementing organisation (NHF-Water).

Wage income	Yes	Yes
Off-farm income	Yes	Yes
Animal health: vaccinations	Yes	Yes
Animal health: dips	No	Yes
Animal health: use of paravets	No	Yes
Food security	Yes	Yes
Visits of government extension agents	Yes	Yes
Use of improved seeds	Yes	Yes
Use of drought-tolerant crops	No difference	Yes
Use of manure	Yes	Yes
Soil erosion perceived as a problem	No	Yes
Deforestation perceived as a problem	Yes	No
Terraces constructed	No	Yes
Nutrient conservation used	no difference	Yes
Tree seedlings bought	Yes	No difference
Plant trees	Yes	Yes
Protect springs	Yes	No difference

From this overview we may conclude that in the small farmer area where the ASAL programme has been far more active than in the non-intervention area, the situation was indeed (much) better in 19 out of 29 indicators. In the pastoral area where the ASAL programme had more interventions the situation was (much) better in 23 out of the 29 indicators. Overall, this could suggest a major positive impact, even more so in the pastoral area than in the small farmer area. The review team is aware that many 'intervening variables' could play a role: e.g. the 'plus' areas could have had a much better situation at the start of the ASAL programme, or other intervening agents could have been active, with either positive or negative results.

Yet, it proved to be useful to look into the various indicators in a more detailed way and also, where possible, to compare the 1997 situation with the situation some ten years ago. Doing so it could be made rather plausible that, indeed, the ASAL programme activities did have a positive impact over the years, and certainly in the pastoral area.

8 MONITORING AND EVALUATION

8.1 Introduction

The purpose of the analysis of Monitoring & Evaluation was to examine the existing data collection and analysis practices and develop proposals for improvement.

The analysis of M&E was done first, by gathering information from key stakeholders through interviews and, second, by analysing the information using the M&E framework.

8.2 Historical Trends

In West Pokot, M&E has been in place since the beginning of the programme, but it was not conducted in a systematic manner. To a large extent, the system depended on the directions of the Programme Advisor. From 1982-86, the system that was set up, relied on progress reports written on a quarterly basis. During this period, the M&E was built around the District Development Officer (DDO). In the system, contact officers would write reports to the DDO's office who later compiled a district report for Project Management Unit. The report was then taken to the ministry headquarters and to the Royal Netherlands Embassy. Field supervision was mainly done by the Programme Advisor and occasionally by the District Planning Unit (DPU).

From 1986-93, a few projects were initiated that were very expensive and focused on infrastructure development. This led to the introduction of a systematic monitoring procedure for funds. Projects were assigned codes which guided the control for funds. An increased direct involvement of the programme was also noted with limited involvement of Sub-District Development Committees (sub-DDCs). However, the programme involved them in field supervisory work whereby the District Executive Committees (DEC) went through them. It is also important to note that some of the financial control procedures which were adopted, were part of the recommendations of a review of M&E conducted in 1984.

From 1993-96, a further improvement in financial administration was introduced. However, there was a shift in the role played by the programme, from direct involvement in implementation to co-ordination. The implementation task was left to the various government departments.

The PMU made the field to monitor the projects on a quarterly basis. The departments also continued with progress reporting on a monthly and quarterly basis. Planning relied on the government established methodology, which was essentially desk planning at the district level with limited consideration of the clients. The set objectives were vague and difficult to monitor. Together with the donor's policy requiring an improvement on M&E which is result oriented, the programme introduced the Logical Framework Approach (LFA).

Contact officers were trained on the LFA in 1996 and they used it to produce the 1997 annual plans. The introduction of this planning methodology marked the beginning of institutionalising a systematic M&E in the programme. From discussions with the PMU, it appeared that the new system is still at take-off stage. The major bottleneck to the implementation of this system was lack of staff to co-ordinate M&E. The programme expected the availability of Assistant District Development Officer to do the co-ordination, but by the time of the review none had been posted. It is important to note that it is only in West Pokot Programme where there is no officer directly involved in co-ordination of M&E.

8.3 Monitoring and Evaluation Structures

The review of structures began with a description of the existing activities and analysis on how these activities serve the various M&E functions.

Activities

Several activities are undertaken to provide information to M&E. These are:

- Steering Committee meetings,
- PMU field visits,
- PMU meetings,
- Contact officers' meetings,
- Monitoring visits at departmental level,
- Diagnostic surveys,
- Reports,
- Cost monitoring,
- Community monitoring activities.

Tools for Data Collection

Besides the monitoring and evaluation activities, the programme makes use of some tools to assist in data gathering and analysis. The activity schedule and budgets in annual plans are some of the tools used in tracking both the financial and activity progress. These tools provide reference points for discussions during M&E meetings.

Apart from these planning tools, the programme has also developed, and is developing, data gathering formats for M&E purposes. The major weakness observed, as in all the other programmes, was lack of tools to measure project effects and impacts.

Data Base for M&E

The programme is generating many data on financial and physical progress. Most of it is stored discretely in various computer software. The financial data are managed through PAM which was introduced by the embassy. Progress data are stored differently. In some programmes, they are stored in software with spread sheets while in others they are not. In West Pokot, a training programme was in place to prepare field staff to use such facilities.

By the time of the review, no programme had an integrated data base that stored both financial and progress data.

In all, it was noted that an organised computerised data base was lacking. What was kept as hard copies data base, were also complex. To a large extent, they were aimed at tracking the request from the community by regions.

8.4 Efforts

In West Pokot, efforts to develop a systematic M&E is more recent than observed in other districts. As such, many of the attributes observed within the M&E environment were typical of the features in formal government establishment. Interviews with the PMU revealed that the programme had made a provision for budget for M&E activities through the District Development Officer's office.

The programme has made a provisional budget for training, studies, workshops and field visits on M&E. PMU also indicated that they have just produced the first plan

using the LFA and this did not show adequate integration of M&E. However, it was already planned that such activities will formally be integrated in the subsequent plans both at programme and project level.

Positive achievements of the log frame in West Pokot:

- Improved monitoring of departmental activities because of the specification of targets.
- Improved effectiveness of implementation due to activity, time and budget specification.
- It introduced the sharing of budgetary controls between heads of departments and the programme.
- The budgeting of activities has been made easy because it relates to activity targets, which are already specified.

Drawbacks with log frame in West Pokot:

- The log frame is not fully internalised due to its recent introduction.

8.5 Functional Aspects of M&E Activities

As a way of analysing the achievements in the functioning of M&E activities, the review focused on monitoring and management; covering control and performance. It also reviewed the evaluation aspects in programmes. In these two aspects, the analysis took into consideration the M&E activities, tools, information gathered and how the information is analysed. Other issues covered were establishment of a data base for M&E as a way of enabling storage, retrieval, analysis and use.

Efforts to develop a systematic M&E in the programme exist but the development based on log frame is still at an early stage. Contact officers have been trained on log frame and have produced the 1997 plans using the methodology. However, they are yet to internalise the technique. Functional features which have been set in place are financial monitoring and activity monitoring through contact officers. Activity targets are monitored through prepared sheets and officers use them for producing monthly reports. According to contact officers, a lot needs to be done to improve the functioning of M&E in the programme. It is also the only programme that does not have an officer assigned to M&E duties. The PMU argued that the role of co-ordinating M&E should be done by the assistant DDO who is not yet posted to the district. As a result of this, efforts to increase the speed of developing a systematic M&E has suffered a set back.

8.6 Gender

The situation in West Pokot gave an impression that integration of gender issues into the M&E process is at the infancy stage. The gender expert designed an assessment format which had not been put in place. However, the implementing staff had been sensitised on gender through workshops. A work programme for gender was also in place with a budgetary provision.

The subject is very sensitive and will require a special methodology for measuring the response. At the moment, the idea is to collect data on a mixture of issues like participation, access and empowerment. The review noted that it was not clear who, and at what level, will be involved in data collection.

Conclusions and recommendations on M&E are valid for all four districts and are, therefore, made in the Overall Report in part Two (see §4.3).

9 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Follow-up to Recommendations Review Mission 1993

The PMU, in 1994, was clearly not convinced by the recommendations made by that review. Indeed, the PlanOps 1994-1999 did put a strong emphasis on the previous phases and kept its promise that it "will remain fundamentally the same as before". This implies that new strategies introduced by the 1993 review as natural resource management got meagre and reluctant attention.

No attempts were made improve community participation, which was a prominent recommendation made. This failure, though, is closely related to the fact that the programme stuck to the traditional oil in the GoK machinery approach; and line ministries do not put such participation up front.

However, the programme did increase the level of expenditure almost twofold and the productive sector got its rightful share but a focused framework was not aimed at.

Institutional Set-up

It can be concluded that ASAL programmes are technically placed in the wrong ministry and, if the current situation continues, possibilities for improved co-ordination, technical and policy support to districts and co-ordination of the dialogue with donors are slim. Especially after the recent turmoil on unaccountable expenditure (Price Waterhouse audit) there is little drive with the programme's management to stay with the parent ministry or even to continue the programme as a joint venture.

If the latter there were to continue, there should be a condition for matching funds, implying adequate insight in GoK finances. The adoption of this matching fund principle is more critical than the magnitude of the amount of money contributed, as this would enable the government to be much more involved with the programme operations due to the stake that it holds in it. The final product will be the assurance that institutional sustainability is enhanced, accountability of decision making and use of funds is cultivated, thereby promoting transparency. If such a condition cannot be met, there seems little reason to continue with the ASAL programme as the 'joint venture' it is now.

The set-up of the management of the programme with a PO and PA with different loyalties, is a constraint and created an ambiguous perspective of the programme (called two-window system in other districts). Either the set-up and mandates of the programme need reconsideration or the composition and role of the PMU need an overhaul. This is discussed in more detail in Part Two.

At present the DFRD is 'bankrupt' and is predominantly used politically in the district. Opportunities, however, do exist to improve the functioning of the DFRD policy, and the programme could and should assist more in this respect. It should play a more active role in providing additional, external strategies to make the DFRD policy framework operationally effective. Such outside strategies are e.g. the PMC et cetera structure in force in Keiyo Marakwet.

Finances

Formally, the ASAL programme depends for the financial control on the GoK structure, and history teaches that this control system is not always watertight and cannot always avoid misappropriation of funds. During the first phases of the

programme avoidance of major financial conflicts was only possible because the Programme Advisors were involved in each and every detail of the programme and checked each activity personally. Such intimate knowledge of all the details of the programme provides the additional control mechanism required. After 1993, this became increasingly difficult due to increased expenditure of the programme and due to the fact that the PA applied the formally correct position that such a personal control should not be part of his responsibilities, the ASAL programme being a GoK project.

The traditional ASAL implementation structure that characterises especially West Pokot District, in combination with new approaches and elements since 1993 opened the door wider to problems in the financial administration. It must be observed that the PA requested additional management capacity for the increased expenditure, which was denied.

Likewise for the PMU, either the set-up of the programme needs reconsideration (see Part Two) or the system of the financial administration needs an overhaul. This renewal should also make it more appropriate for M&E that is not the case at the moment since the Dutch budget code system aggregates types of costs incurred under different activities. Now, information obtained from line ministries (e.g. contact officers) about achievements of the ASAL programme is not always in line with the PA's assessment. This is to be remedied.

Objectives / Strategies

The programme in West Pokot needs to be 'modernised' and learn from the variety of experiences gained in the other districts with Dutch supported ASAL programmes. The fact that it has been closed for a short period of time, should be considered the right opportunity to start this process of change.

The climate in which the ASAL programme operates is not conducive for participation to become effective. The programme is fully part of the government machinery that demonstrates little interest in such participation. This contributed to the poor performance of the programme whereas improved community participation is concerned, thus failing on an important objective. The role of the departments in the whole of the project cycle remained dominating.

In all other four objectives little achievement was made (improvement of knowledge through KARI's research centres failed), except for the one that intended to contribute to the improvement of certain aspects of living standards. As a continuation of the previous phases, it can be safely assumed that this objective was met like in those earlier phases. Furthermore, is the forthcoming credit scheme expected to have a positive impact on the objective "new avenues for income generation". This credit programme will be co-ordinated externally by a consulting firm.

Although the programme experienced turmoil about the use of funds, there should not necessarily be a problem with the higher inputs if the necessary reorganisation had taken place. In Part Two it is argued that implementation capacity should determine the input which leads to the necessity for focused and continuous capacity building with NGOs and CBOs. It can be observed in this context that the donor on the one hand stimulated higher inputs for more impact, but has not been reliable in fulfilling financial commitments made in this respect. During the review period considerable confusion existed about the level of funds available.

Particularly poorly developed in West Pokot are the strategies that should make the objectives operational: the package is not concerted. This presses even more since the programme has no specific target group. Not to have a real target group is a common

characteristic of the Dutch supported ASAL programmes. This is not necessarily a weak point as long as the programme has proper and realistic objectives supported by adequate strategies to achieve the objectives. If objectives, strategies and criteria are not well done the programme will rapidly develop into a series of unrelated small activities that have little coherence or synergy; this is the prominent risk of a process approach the ASAL programmes had at the start. Communities were to provide the programme framework but this combined poorly with the dominant role played by the line ministries.

Focus

For the 1993-97 period as a whole total recorded project expenditure appeared to be Kshs. 120 million. In addition Kshs. 30 million was spent on programme management, general support (mainly transport) and human resource development (or: training of a few civil servants, mainly abroad). The programme officers in West Pokot have always tried as much as possible to put 'general support' expenses under the category of the project for which the expenses were actually made (unlike some other ASAL programmes, which makes comparison difficult).

Major results of the geographical analysis were that most of the ASAL project expenditure went to the small farmer parts of the drylands (46%), but still a considerable part went to the pastoral areas (36%) and to the highlands (17%). The last figure shows that the suggestion of the 1993 evaluation mission to include the catchment areas in the highlands in ASAL's programme mandate was followed up.

Within the small farmer zone, most of the project expenditure was spent on water, followed by farming. A very high part of the water expenditure went to one small area (Chepareria town and surroundings). Within the pastoral zone most of the money was spent on livestock, followed by water, and veterinary projects. Within the highland zone most of the money went to Lelan location and was spent on forestry projects.

The project expenditure in terms of divisions was rather skewed, with most money going to Chepareria division (and here most to Kipkomo location, on water and livestock projects mainly), followed by Kapenguria division (mostly highlands). Despite all this input, external factors like increased insecurity and decreased food security dominate, and caused an overall feeling that the standard and quality of living is declining.

From this overview we may conclude that in the small farmer area where the ASAL programme has been far more active than in the non-intervention area the situation was indeed (much) better in 19 out of 29 indicators. In the pastoral area where the ASAL programme had more interventions the situation was (much) better in 23 out of the 29 indicators. Overall this could suggest a major positive impact, even more so in the pastoral area than in the small farmer area.

Impact since the start

It proved to be useful to look into the various indicators in a more detailed way and also, where possible, to compare the 1997 situation with the situation some ten years ago. Doing so, it could be made plausible that indeed the ASAL programme activities did have a positive impact, and certainly in the pastoral area.

Implementation Mechanisms and Partners

To prelude to the synthesising analysis of the four districts (Part Two), and comparing

West Pokot with the neighbouring Keiyo Marakwet programme, it is apparent that these are almost each others opposite in the application of purposeful strategies and the recommendations of the 1993 review, making the comparison between these two programmes extremely interesting and of key importance for conclusions and recommendations about the future of ASAL programmes.

The mistrust that NGOs in general have of the GoK makes it difficult to use this capacity, although the latter is rather limited in West Pokot. More distance of the programme from the GoK might nevertheless increase the potential of this mechanism. The intermediate level of the private sector should be better explored, although the clashes some years ago made much the private sector capacity to leave the district. The use of the flexible mechanism of consulting companies over which the programme has good control, should be continued.

The programme realises in this respect that to build-up the capacities of other partners than the GoK departments will take considerable time and effort. The programme would, therefore, feel comfortable if it could reduce its focus to a few sectors. It is also in favour of the way the credit sector and the education sector are handled. Implemented either by a consulting firm like credit or steered and guided externally (though implemented by the ASAL programme) like the education sector through the Basic Education Support Programme. External steering through e.g. the preparation of (formulation) missions and concept development could be further developed, but the ASAL programme should have the management and administrative capacity for implementation.

For different sectors, a systematic backstopping structure for the long-term should be put in place (continuing the start that has been made already).

Monitoring and Evaluation

The conclusions and recommendations on the monitoring and evaluation in all the districts are presented in the overall report - Part Two chapter 4.3.

ANNEXES TO DISTRICT REPORT WEST POKOT

ASAL projects in the four 1997 study areas

Chepareria

Water: 1984-85 construction subsurface dam at Nasukuta; 1986 desilting this dam; 1989 water storage tanks at Nasukuta; Chepareria roof catchment and underground storage tank; 1991 Chesera subsurface dam; 1993 water jars Chepareria; 1993-95 improvement water intake Chepareria water supply at Kosulol and other improvements Chepareria water supply; 1994 Nasukuta shallow well; 1995 construction water intake Ririmboi; desilting, extending and repairing Chesera dam; 1995 conservation of Chepareria water supply catchment area;

Education: 1987-88 Chepareria Youth Polytechnic assisted; 1989 desks to Psurum primary school; 1991-92 desks to Mongorion, Nasukuta, Senetwo and Korrellach ps; storage tank Chelomboi ps; 1992 excursion pupils Chelomboi ps; land use demonstration plot Nasukuta ps; seedling protection training Chelomboi and Nasukuta ps; 1993 tools to Chepareria Youth Polytechnic; 1995 Psurum ps completed; building Teachers Advisory Centre Chepareria;

Women group: 1991 rental houses Kasongur women group

Animal health: 1984-86 rehabilitation Psurum cattle dip; 1986 construction Nasukuta dip

Livestock/environment: Nasukuta centre: 1985-87 construction holding ground sheep and goats centre; 1986 introducing camels at Nasukuta; 1987 starting camel exchange programme; start of 20 ha pasture, sorghum and fodder shrubs establishment and training; Nasukuta dam soil conservation and tree planting; 1988 start of multiplication and demonstration for galla goats and dorper sheep; start of exchange programme; 1988-91 staff houses; 1989 start of distributing fodder seeds to farmers; acquisition of four motorcycles; 1989-93 field days for farmers from all over the district; 1991-92 central building and training shed; 1992 equipment; 1992 construction of store for veterinary drugs; 1993 training committee members; 1993-94 manager's house; 1993-95 construction of camel demonstration boma; 1994 selling pasture improvement grass seeds to farmers; 1995 rehabilitation staff houses; 1997 plan to make Nasukuta centre commercially viable; Chepareria livestock market: 1991 building loading ram;

Environment: 1988-94 pastoral forestry/range rehabilitation plot Chesera; 1994 forest extension office Chepareria; assisting tree nursery at Chepareria and fruit trees raised and sold; soil conservation at catchment area of Chesera dam;

Beekeeping: 1988-89 beekeeping training and distribution hives at Nasukuta and Chesera; 1994 promotion campaign at Nasukuta; selling beehives

Poultry: establishment of poultry unit at Nasukuta

Roads: rehabilitation roads in Chepareria town

Chepkobegh

Water: 1988 Rehabilitation Chepkobegh water dam; 1988-92 construction two other water dams; 1994 construction water dam at Pusian

Education: 1985-86 building Chepkobegh primary school; 1988-90 desks to Tirken primary school; Health: 1983-97 monitoring building and assistance to Chepkobegh dispensary

Livestock: 1988 start of information support goats market Chepkobegh

Beekeeping: 1988-89 beekeeping training Chepkobegh and distributing beehives

Ywaleteke

Water: 1991 Propoi water project: taps; 1995 new water intake Propoi; Kosulol community pipeline

Education: 1991-92 desks to Kosulol and Ywaleteke primary schools; trees planted Ywaleteke ps;

Roads: 1992 construction Propoi-Kapchemogen road

Kongelai

Education: 1994-97: building primary school Kongelai

Animal health: 1984-86 rehabilitation of cattle dips at Limangole and Kitelakapel

Table 1 *ASAL project expenditure 1993-1997, type of area, per sector, x 1000 KShs.*

SECTOR	PASTORAL	SMALL-FARMER ASAL	SMALL-FARMER HIGHLANDS	DISTRICT UNSPECIFIED	TOTAL
livestock	11147	-	190	-	11337
veterinary	6512	136	-	-	6648
farming/environ- ment	1807	13833	421	1141	17202
forestry	2252	5630	7423	-	15305
water	10720	14658	604	1103	27085
roads	518	5121	-	3108	8747
education	1577	4357	986	9893	16813
adult education	72	120	-	639	831
culture	-	-	6797	-	6797
youth polytech- nic and women groups	-	283	-	3055	3338
Total	34605	44138	16421	18939	114103

Table 2 *ASAL project expenditure 1993-97, per sector, per division*

SECTOR	ALALE	KACHELIBA	KAPENGURIA	CHEPARERIA	SIGOR
Livestock	232	232	296	7504	133
Veterinary	210	153	0	136	179
Farming, environ- ment	650	1157	421	740	2377
forestry	1126	1126	7423	3378	2252
water	4387	3412	604	17529	50
roads	518		0	0	5121
education	233	649	1681	4109	248
adult education		72	0		120
culture			6797		
off farm, women groups				283	
Total	7356	6801	17222	33679	10480

Table 3 *Rainy season: percentage of households making use of particular water source*

	Intervention areas		Non-intervention areas	
	Small farmer	Pastoral	Small farmer	Pastoral
River/spring	0	26	63	7
(Sub-)surface dam/pan	7	74	23	93
Tap water	82	0	7	0
Roof catchment	11	0	7	0

Table 4 *Dry season: percentage of households making use of particular water source*

	Intervention areas		Non-intervention areas	
	Small farmer	Pastoral	Small farmer	Pastoral
River/spring	7	4	33	24
(Sub-)surface dam/pan	14	97	57	76
Tap water	75	0	10	0
Roof catchment	0	0	0	0
Borehole	4	0	0	0

Table 5 *Percentage of households using animal health measures*

	ASAL intervention area		ASAL non-intervention area	
	Small farmer	Pastoral	Small farmer	Pastoral
Vaccinations	86	92	87	69
Dip animals	89	70	93	7
Use paravets	82	52	87	41

Table 6 *Food security problems, agricultural behaviour and extension support, percentage of households*

	ASAL intervention areas		ASAL non-intervention areas	
	Small farmer	Pastoral	Small farmer	Pastoral
Household experienced food shortages in the last ten years	75	100	97	100
Average length of food shortage	3 months	6 months	5 months	8 months
Visit(s) by government extension service, last year at least once	97	48	97	10
Same, at least once a month	29	7	17	0
Use improved seeds	100	89	90	38
Cultivate drought tolerant crops	71	89	70	52
Use manure/fertilizer	97	67	77	3

Table 7 Percentage of farmers aware of environmental problems, and using proper land management techniques

	ASAL intervention area		ASAL non-intervention area	
	Small farmer	Pastoral	Small farmer	Pastoral
Awareness of a soil erosion problem	75	81	93	55
Awareness of a deforestation problem	61	41	30	48
Having terraces	61	52	73	10
Using soil/nutrient conservation measures	43	41	43	10
Buy tree seedlings	21	0	7	0
Plant trees on farm	64	26	50	3
Average number of trees planted on farm	50	57	14	0
Protecting springs	7	0	0	0

Table 8 Percentage of households participating in various cash income-earning activities, 1997 (and 1985)

	ASAL intervention area (1985 between brackets)		ASAL non-intervention area	
	Small farmer	Pastoral	Small farmer	Pastoral
Sale of crops	71 (93)	67 (0)	90	59
Sale of animals	75 (83)	100 (83)	93	90
Sale of milk	48 (0?)	0 (0)	14	17
Sale of eggs	43	67	80	59
Sale of honey	11	8	9	21
Wage income	50 (43)	7 (7)	7	0
Off-farm income	50 (23)	22 (57)	40	3

Table 9

Composition of cash income, 1997, in KShs per average household

	ASAL Intervention area		ASAL non-intervention area	
	Small farmer	Pastoral	Small farmer	Pastoral
Sale of crops	12,836 = 22%	842 = 3%	1,808 = 10%	1,258 = 9%
Sale of animals, milk, eggs	16,347 = 28%	17,045 = 69%	11,618 = 63%	11,757 = 82%
Wage income	16,359 = 28%	1,556 = 6%	1,589 = 9%	0 = 0%
Off farm income	12,423 = 21%	5,111 = 21%	3,397 = 18%	1,379 = 10%
Total cash income	57,965 = 99%	24,554 = 99%	18,412 = 100%	14,394 = 100%

Table 10 *Percentage of households earning more than 10,000 Kshs. with a particular source of income in 1997*

	ASAL intervention area		ASAL non-intervention area	
	Small farmer	Pastoral	Small farmer	Pastoral
Sale of crops	36	0	3	3
Sale of animals	54	40	33	54
Wage labour	43	4	7	0
Off-farm activities	39	11	10	4

Table 12 *Composition of cash income, 1985 and 1997, in the ASAL intervention areas, in 1997-KShs per average household*

	Small farmer		Pastoral	
	1985	1997	1985	1997
Sale of crops	42,979	12,836	0	842
Sale of animals, milk, eggs	6,138	16,347	13,086	17,045
Wage income	26,312	16,359	2,499	1,556
Off farm income	12,276	12,423	3,463	5,111
Total cash income	87,705	57,965	19,048	24,554

Table 13 *Daughters and sons attend or completed primary schools, percentages of households with eligible children*

	ASAL intervention areas		ASAL non-intervention areas	
	Small farmer	Pastoral	Small farmer	Pastoral
Daughters	88	23	72	8
Sons	95	43	79	9

Table 14 *Type of toilet: percentage of households*

	ASAL Intervention area		ASAL non-intervention area	
	Small farmer	Pastoral	Small farmer	Pastoral
Ventilated Improved Pit latrine	43	0	17	0
Pit	46	15	33	3
None	11	85	50	97