

Royal Netherlands Embassy

Ministry of Land Reclamation,  
Regional and Water Development

# **REVIEW OF THE ASAL PROGRAMMES**

**PART ONE**

**KEIYO MARAKWET  
DISTRICTS REPORT**

ETC East Africa, November, 1997

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

(one list is used for all the reports; for that matter, not all abbreviations will show in the separate reports)

AEZ	Agro Ecological Zone
AIC	African Inland Church
ALRMP	Arid Lands Resources Management Project
AMREF	African Medical and Research Foundation
ARU	Applied Research Unit
ASAL	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands
ASC	ASAL Steering Committee
ATC	Assistant Transect Area Co-ordinator
CAP	Community Action Plan
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CBS	Central Bureau for Statistics
CCF	Christian Children's Fund
CMIP	Co-operative Management Improvement Programme
CMPP	Community Member Participation Programme
COPP	Community Oriented Project Planning
CSRP	Civil Service Reform programme
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDC	District Development Committee
DDO	District Development Officer
DDP	District Development Plan
DEC	District Executive Committee
DEC	Drought Escaping Crops
DFRD(S)	District Focus for Rural Development (Strategy)
DGIS	Directorate General for International Co-operation
DIDC	District Information and Documentation Centre
DO	District Officer
DPU	District Planning Unit
E	East
ECF	East Coast Fever
EMI	Embu, Meru, Isiolo
FES	Field Extension Staff
FLS	Front Line Staff
GA	Gender Adviser
GACP	Gender and Co-operative Programme
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
CMC	Credit Management Committee
CMG	Credit Management Group
GoK	Government of Kenya
GoN	Government of the Netherlands
GSIME	Gender Sensitive Impact Monitoring and Evaluation
HoD	Head of Department
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO	International Labour Organisation (UN)
IS	Implementation Scheme
ITDG	Intermediate Technology Development Group
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KCPE	Kenyan Certificate for Primary Education
KNFC	Kenya National Federation of Co-operatives
KVDA	Kerio Valley Development Authority
KWS	Kenya Wildlife Services
LDF	Laikipia Development Fund
LFA	Logical Framework Approach
LMC	Livestock Marketing Centre



LRP	Laikipia Research programme
LRDP	Laikipia Rural Development programme
LUP	Land Use Planning
LUPA	Land Use Planning Adviser
MDP	Marsabit Development programme
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MIDP	Machakos Integrated Development Project
MIS	Management Information System
MLRRWD	Ministry of Land Reclamation, Regional and Water Development
MRDASAW	Ministry of Reclamation and Development of Arid and Semi-Arid Areas and Wastelands
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoALD	Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development
N	North
NEP	National Extension programme
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NLG	Dutch Guilder
NPO	National programme Officer
NRM	Natural Resources Management
O&M	Operation and Maintenance
OPS	Office of Project Services (UNDP)
PA	programme Advisor
PAM	Project Administration Management
PlanOps	Plan of Operations
PMC	Project Management Committee
PMU	Project Management Unit
PO	programme Officer
PPM	Project Planning Matrix
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
RCA	Reformed Church of Africa
RNE	Royal Netherlands Embassy
RRA	Rapid Rural Appraisal
S	South
SDC	Swiss Development Co-operation
SLO	Sector Liaison Officer
SMS	Subject Matter Specialist
SNV	Netherlands Development Organisation
STD	Sexually Transmitted Disease
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
TA	Transect Area / Technical Assistance
TAA	Transect Area Approach
TAAP	Transect Area Action Plan
TAC	Transect Area Committee
TAM	Transect Area Meeting
TBA	Traditional Birth Attendant
TC	Transect Area Co-ordinator
TOR	Terms Of Reference
TOT	Trainer of Trainers
TPM	Transect Planning Meetings
TPS	Transect Planning Sheets
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development programme
UNSO	UNDP Office to Combat Desertification and Drought
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VI	NGO
W	West
WB	World Bank

WID  
YP

Women in Development  
Youth Polytechnic



## **A. BACKGROUND**

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## 1. BACKGROUND OF THE PROGRAMME

### 1.1 Overview of the District

Keiyo Marakwet Districts are situated in the Rift Valley Province in the north-western part of Kenya, and it borders Uganda. The districts have a combined area of 3,053 sq. km. and stretch between latitude 1 degrees and 15 minutes N, to 0 degrees and 10 minutes N; longitude is between 35 degrees and 10 minutes West and 35 degrees and 40 minutes East. According to the 1989 census, the combined population was 220,000 (more recent census data are not available, only projections made for 1994 at 262,000). At the present time, the population is estimated as 300,000 (CBS, Iten).

Recently 'Keiyo' and 'Marakwet' were formed as separate districts, but for a long time they were administered together as 'Elgeyo Marakwet'. They were the home of two groups of Kalenjin, Keiyo and Marakwet, who had been pushed to the lower part of the Kerio Escarpment, as victims of droughts, and of more powerful pastoral and agro-pastoral neighbours, like the Maasai, the Pokot, the Nandi and the Tugen. Around 1900 the Marakwet occupied an escarpment zone in the northern part of the Kerio Valley, where they used a lot of streams coming from the Cherangani uplands for forms of irrigation that were and are even more ingenious than those of their neighbours, the agricultural Pokot). They had few cattle (as most of the ones they had would occasionally be stolen by the Pokot, but they had a lot of goats and heavily relied on their irrigated sorghum, finger millet, bananas and other fruits.

Around 1900 the Keiyo were confined to the southern part of the Kerio Valley, including the escarpment zone from where the Kerio River originates, before it flows northward, towards Lake Turkana. With a few exceptions, the Keiyo did not develop irrigated agriculture. They eked out a living by making use of escarpment ledges for sorghum and millet cultivation, and by using the valley floor (and - if their enemies allowed - the highland zone towards the west) for their zebu cattle, goats and hairsheep. When the British occupied the area, the Keiyo were soon forthcoming as labour migrants at the nearby White Highland farms, and in particular on those of Boer farmers, originating from South Africa. From the 1930s onwards many Keiyo settled as 'squatters' on these farms and they started to occupy the forest zone on top of the escarpment. 'Climbing the cliff' became a possibility for upward social mobility. After 1970, many of them became relatively affluent small-scale farmers, producing maize, wheat, dairy, pyrethrum and wool. Other Keiyo farmers, as well as some Marakwet, started to migrate to the Cherangani area, and mingled with the original inhabitants there, the Sengwer. From 1976 onwards, the southern part of the Kerio valley was transformed rather drastically by the start of a fluorspar mine. The northern part was opened up in the early 1980s by experimental farms and other activities of the Kerio Valley Development Authority.

The 1989 population census showed that the district of Elgeyo Marakwet had 220,000 inhabitants, of whom 200,000 were Kalenjin. Half of them are Keiyo and half Marakwet. In addition maybe 30,000 Keiyo and 10,000 Marakwet were living elsewhere in Kenya, mainly in the neighbouring highland district of Uasin Gishu, part of the former 'White Highlands'. These nearby people still maintain a lot of ties with the valley. Many remit money and send food and other consumer goods to their relatives in the valley. Many still have an ownership claim to land there, and quite a number have multiple farms: one in Uasin Gishu, one in the Keiyo or Marakwet highlands and one in the valley. Valley farms are often taken care of by (grand) parents, or other family members. Probably 80,000 people are currently living in the valley and escarpment zone, the arid and semi-arid (ASAL) area proper. In 1989, Iten, the headquarters of Elgeyo Marakwet District in the central highlands, had 5,000 inhabitants and all other central places had less than 1,000 inhabitants. Nowadays Iten is the administrative centre of Keiyo District and also locates the ASAL office.



Marakwet is administered from a tiny centre, called Kapsowar.

In the last 30 years, population growth in the Kerio Valley has been rather low, compared to other parts of Kenya, due to massive migration to the highlands<sup>1</sup>. Only the area around the fluorspar mine, in the south of the valley, experienced net immigration. Poverty is widespread. In the north, people with only a meagre access to indigenous irrigation channels are worse off. In the centre, people without major remittances from the highlands have a very low level of living. In the south, households without a direct or indirect share in the fluorspar employment possibilities are very poor. The northern part of the valley, with its fascinating old irrigation practices, would have a high development potential, if there would be a fast outlet and nearby market for its fruits and vegetables. The development prospects of the central part of the valley are meagre. Those of the southern part very much depend on the fluorspar mine. Arable agricultural prospects are bad, with very unreliable rainfall, no realistic irrigation possibilities and severe erosion risks. Livestock prospects are a bit better (goats in particular).

In contrast to its semi-arid parts, Keiyo Marakwet as a total has, unlike the other three ASAL districts under review, quite some land that is suitable for agriculture. 77.5% is categorised as high and medium potential land. The population is concentrated in these better areas. Compared to the other three districts, there is less cattle in Keiyo/Marakwet not only because less land is suitable for cattle, but also because it is risky to keep cattle in the valley. Cattle rustling by Pokot still occurs and pose a serious threat. Herds are smaller and mainly composed of small stock. Zero-grazing is a prevailing activity.

## 1.2 History of the Programme

In 1979 the Government of Kenya declared its intention to start integrated development programmes in all dryland districts, the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands Programme (ASAL). Among donor organizations, USAID took the lead and supported the general strengthening of the national administrative capacity to deal with ASAL areas. In the Ministry of Agriculture an 'ASAL branch' was established. In the (then) Ministry of Economic Planning and Development a specific senior officer was made responsible for inter-ministerial co-ordination. The ASAL branch in the Ministry of Agriculture concentrated on research, an approach that was later strongly criticised in an official evaluation as very expensive, too much time consuming and not enough planning oriented. As a result, the ASAL branch in the Ministry of Agriculture was resolved in 1984. From then onwards, the ASAL activities were almost completely under the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development<sup>2</sup>. In 1989 a separate Ministry for ASAL was established, which became a Department under a new Ministry for Land Reclamation, Regional and Water Development in 1993.

It was the intention to have an ASAL programme for each and every district with ASAL areas, and to get separate donors for all these ASAL districts. With the Machakos Integrated Development Programme (MIDP) continuing as a pseudo-ASAL programme, sponsored by the European Development Fund, and the Baringo Pilot Semi-Arid and Arid Programme directly under the President, the regular ASAL programme started in 1980, with the United Kingdom willing to fund the Embu-Meru-Isiolo (EMI) Programme and the Norwegian development organisation

<sup>1</sup> Both Elgeyo Marakwet and West Pokot experience population movements which are unlike those of most of Kenya, where poor people move from overpopulated highlands to dry lowlands.

<sup>2</sup> Which became the Ministry of Finance and Planning, and later the Ministry of Planning and National Development.



NORAD sponsoring the Turkana ASAL programme. USAID followed with an ASAL programme full of expensive research consultants in the northern part of Kitui District in 1981, while the Danish started a pseudo-ASAL project in the southern part in the same year<sup>3</sup>. The Netherlands accepted involvement in West Pokot and Elgeyo Marakwet Districts in 1982 and in a tiny dryland part of Kiambu District<sup>4</sup>. Switzerland committed itself to Laikipia District in 1984 (to be taken over by the Netherlands later). IFAD accepted the Coastal Districts (mainly Kwale and Kilifi) in 1984 and part of Siaya District (near Lake Victoria) in 1986. Denmark's Danida extended its ASAL involvement to Taita Taveta first (1985) and to the southern part of Machakos later. The Dutch organisation SNV (with funding from the Dutch government) was asked to start an ASAL Programme in Kajiado District, among the eastern Maasai, which started in 1987. Later the same organisation was asked to take over the Elgeyo Marakwet programme (from 1991 until 1994) and the West Pokot Programme (in 1996) and to start a new ASAL programme in Narok District, among the western Maasai<sup>5</sup>. It can be concluded that the Netherlands provided the most continuous and after 1993 the most important support for the ASAL programmes at the district level. In 1987 the stage was set. Of all the districts with arid and semi-arid lands most had a donor for an ASAL Programme<sup>6</sup>.

After a promising start in the early 1980s under the (then) Ministry of Finance and Planning, in the second half of the 1980s all donors more or less got a free hand to develop their own district-specific approach, together with district-based civil servants. The idea of a multi-sector programme was adhered to everywhere, with the District Development Committees responsible for 'integration', and in some cases with a specific role for civil servants from various ministries who formed an ASAL programme liaison group. Supported by the Royal Netherlands Embassy, and by others involved from the Dutch side, in Dutch-sponsored ASAL programmes the basic philosophy was: 'low profile / input', 'process approach'<sup>7</sup>, 'support the decentralisation to the district level', 'support district civil servants to do their work better', 'try to get the local people's participation as much as possible', and 'try to support the local economy with the ASAL funds available'.

During the late 1970s the Royal Netherlands government and its Embassy in Nairobi had developed a preference for working in the western part of Kenya and to work in really poor, marginal areas. When the ASAL programme started as a Kenya-wide attempt to uplift conditions in all dryland areas of the country, it was evident that the Netherlands would participate, and in any of the north-western districts. Turkana district in the far Northwest could have been selected but it was already 'claimed' by the Norwegian aid agency. West Pokot became an obvious choice. It was among the poorest and most marginal of all Kenyan districts at that time, and it was located in the western part of the country. On top of that, the Netherlands already had some experience in West Pokot, before the ASAL Programme started<sup>8</sup>, and an influential and widely respected Dutch officer who had worked in West Pokot happened to work at the Netherlands Embassy when the request came to adopt one or more district ASAL programmes. Elgeyo Marakwet was added because it was close by<sup>9</sup> and the

<sup>3</sup> The 'Mutomo Soil & Water Conservation Project'.

<sup>4</sup> The Ndeiya Karai area, constituency. It functioned from 1982-84.

<sup>5</sup> That was aborted because of political reasons.

<sup>6</sup> But the North and Northeast of the country did not get a donor, the security problem was probably the major issue; Marsabit District had some research-related activities funded by the German GTZ and GTZ also funded a Livestock Development programme in Samburu district.

<sup>7</sup> In Dutch development parlance also called 'programmatic approach'.

<sup>8</sup> During the period 1971-1975 the Special Rural Development Programme had Kapenguria division as one of its pilot areas, with a Dutch 'development volunteer' (of the organisation SNV), stationed in Kapenguria and with a considerable amount of money at his disposal.

<sup>9</sup> It probably played a role that a Dutch religious organisation, based in Eldoret, worked in West Pokot and in Elgeyo Marakwet as well.



Kerio Valley was also referred to as one of the poorest areas of the country.

With the 'process approach' as the guideline, it was decided to start with a few starter activities and to spend time to get to know the problems and history of the ASAL areas in the two districts. The Netherlands Ministry engaged a team of geographers from the University of Amsterdam (associated with the Institute for Development Studies of Nairobi University) to do four types of studies: archival research to find out about all development initiatives in the past, mapping the district's current government and NGO facilities (and its history), judging the population supporting capacity of the area and assessing people's livelihood strategies. During the 1982-1988 period it resulted in a District Atlas for each of the two districts, in a large number of 'Locational Development Profiles', in the start of District Information and Documentation Centres and in academic publications (a.o. a Ph.D. thesis).

During 1985 a major controversy had become apparent between the Dutch programme co-ordinator in Elgeyo Marakwet (backed by the Royal Netherlands Embassy) who wanted to maintain the level of funding and the 'low profile' character of the programme and the district authorities who wanted a fourfold increase of the ASAL budget, and more emphasis on productive investments. Unlike West Pokot, where the Dutch programme co-ordinator had succeeded to become a strong force in district development planning, there was a big 'distance' between the Dutch programme co-ordinator in Elgeyo Marakwet and the district bureaucracy in Iten. In 1986, the Dutch programme co-ordinator became ill, and after he left the country his replacement took a long time. When the newly recruited Dutch programme co-ordinator started during the second half of 1987, he discovered that the vacuum had enabled considerable embezzlement of ASAL funds. It was decided to continue with a few commitments and to 'clean the mess first' before new donor funds would be committed. The programme was de facto closed in became finally transferred and after a period of much confusion, in 1991 a new Dutch programme advisor was appointed, and the programme could make a new start, sub-contracted to SNV (until 1994, when the involvement of DGIS became direct again).

### **1.3 The 1993 Review and Recommendations**

The joint Kenyan Netherlands 1993 Review built on the 1985 evaluation in which it was recommended that the programme should pay more attention to the development of long-term strategies and to put more emphasis on the development of the productive sector and environment (according to the 1993 review report).

The overall conclusions and recommendations of the 1993 Review were:

- To make the broad ASAL objectives operational in the individual districts by being more explicit on the objectives; enough experience had been gained to this purpose.
- To prepare better ASAL plan documents based upon a proper problem analysis.
- To complement the 'bottom-up' approach with a 'top-down' element since a number of broader issues need analysis and initiatives from national and / or district level.
- A more gender specific strategy and approach had to be elaborated with special reference to community participation in all phases of the planning cycle.
- Institutional strengthening should be considered as one of the priority objectives. Training needs should be assessed and PMU's enlarge to increase their capacity.
- With regard to the productive sector and environment, a thorough analysis of development constraints and potentials should be conducted and long-term

development strategies developed. This priority should be translated in financial as well as personnel means to be made available.

- To further consider the financing of the removal of bottlenecks in the rural road network (under certain conditions).

For Keiyo Marakwet District it was concluded that, after the restart in 1991, the ASAL programme had mainly concentrated on community based planning. Numerous workshops based on the Community Oriented Project Planning (COPP) at locational and district level were executed to this purpose. Further, the 1993 review was rather negative about the level of problem analysis of major development issues. Especially environmental problems cannot be addressed through the participatory process: these need initiatives from the district or even national level. This resulted in insufficient attention paid to strategies addressing major constraints. In line with this was the conclusion that the available database is insufficient. Moreover, training had received inadequate attention.

#### *Achievements*

The community based planning approach had concentrated on the Kerio Valley only. Considering the functional relationships between the highlands, the escarpment and the valley, the geographical area of the ASAL programme had to be enlarged.

#### *Sustainability*

Remains an open question.

#### *Collaboration with line ministries*

The mission observed a lack of clarity among district officers regarding the basic concepts and objectives of the programme. Also the absence of liaison officers hampered proper communication between programme and line agencies.

The capacity of the PMU was considered as insufficient leading to improper monitoring and evaluation.

#### *Strategy*

The conclusion was that the programme addressed the majority of the specific problems the district is facing except for infrastructure and human settlement. The strategy of COPP was considered inadequate to cope with the existing environmental degradation.

As far as the cost sharing strategy is concerned, a more systematic policy was recommended upon.

The mission supposed that the programme could achieve higher levels of expenditure when the district capacity improves through institutional strengthening by the programme and sees little opportunities for collaborating partners beyond the line ministries; NGO capacity is very limited.



## 2. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING

### 2.1 The ASAL Keiyo Marakwet

Implementation of ASALs is based on the principle of shared responsibility between the Government of Kenya (GoK) and the Government of the Netherlands (GoN). The Kenyan Ministry of Land Reclamation, Regional and Water Development (MLRRWD) is the Kenyan parent ministry at present. All ASAL programmes are co-ordinated by the ASAL department of this ministry.

From the donor side is the programme funded by the Minister for Development Co-operation through the Directorate General for International Co-operation (DGIS). As explained above, implementation had an 'intermittent' character. Until 1988 was the programme directly implemented by DGIS through the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Nairobi. After the intermission, the responsibility for the implementation was in 1991 handed-over to SNV (Netherlands Development Organisation). SNV has a Kenyan office and country director, and keeps in contact with Kenyan authorities in consultation with the Embassy. In 1994 did the programme go back to direct DGIS implementation.

The programme started in 1982/3 as the ASAL programme for Elgeyo Marakwet District. Since 1995 has the district been split up in two: in Keiyo District in the South and Marakwet District in the North. The northern district has a new headquarters in Kapsowar, whereas Iten remains the headquarters for Keiyo District. The ASAL programme continued to operate in both districts. The Marakwet District claims that the programme has not properly been established in its area of jurisdiction for all the key staff still remain in Iten. The district division further had no major impact on the programme, besides the fact that some official institutions at the district level have understandably doubled.

At the district level is the programme answerable to the District Development Committee (DDC), in line with the District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) strategy that has been the guiding policy for ASAL implementation. The membership of the DDC comprises Heads of Departments, Parastatals and NGO's working in the district and elected leaders. The programme is a member of the District Planning Unit (DPU).

Responsibility for the programme's operations is with the Programme Management Unit (PMU). This PMU consists of the Kenyan Programme Officer (PO) and the Dutch Programme Advisor (PA) and includes the Gender Specialist and the Dutch Land Use Planning Advisor. Also as part of the PMU can be mentioned the Assistant Programme Advisor, the M&E specialist, and the programme accountant. Departments had also identified liaison officers, generally not the Heads of Department, to work with the PMU in planning specific activities which are initiated or implemented by the departments. Liaison officers now are basically the Transect Area Co-ordinators (TCs) as part of a new organisational structure (see § 2.2): TCs and their assistants total 12. Thirty one people, partly GoK staff, are employed as support staff.

Over the years, the programme made substantial investments in the DFRD management structure, supporting Provincial Administration (District Commissioner, et cetera) in the formation and training of the DDC, the Divisional Development Committees and Sub-locational Development Committees.

Policy issues are the subject of deliberations in the ASAL Steering Committee (ASC) that in generally assists the ASAL programme. The ASC is a sub-committee of the DDC and - in the traditional setting - its membership comprised the Heads of major



government departments with which the programme is collaborating. Now it has been extended with the TCs, TAC chairman and NGO representatives.

The programme has financial procedures which are based on slightly modified GoK procedures. The PAM (Project Administration Management) accounting system is developed under auspices of the GoN. It is a bookkeeping system in place to facilitate both external and internal audits. The 'control system', however, is located within the GoK financial procedures. Both the Programme Officer and the Programme Advisor are co-signatories of the donor funds<sup>10</sup>. The Programme Advisor is not a co-signatory of the GoK funds which are solely managed by the Programme officer.

External monitoring is carried out by the Royal Netherlands Embassy while the internal monitoring is done by the PMU. The reporting and monitoring system is since 1997 based on the logical framework approach; before this, it was materialised in the quarterly reports of the different collaborating departments. These resulted in ASAL's quarterly progress reports (six-monthly later). Expenditure reports are produced monthly.

## **2.2 GoK / NGO / Private Sector Partners**

This ASAL programme has during Phase I (1983- 1988) predominantly operated with the ministries and their staff and also with the Provincial Administration, the County Council as a true example of the 'oil in the government machinery' approach applied at the start of the Dutch support to the ASAL in 1982. Prevalent were the ministries of Livestock, Agriculture, Forestry, Water, Works, Culture and Social Services, Health and Education. Besides the GoK structures that were made responsible for the identified activities, a small percentage of the expenditure and related responsibilities went through NGOs, but NGO capacity can be characterised as limited in the district.

However, since the start of Phase III, has the programme been working at a new organisational structure. This was different from the one in Phase I & II, although during the phase II already a lot of focus was placed with Community Oriented Project Planning.

Now, in Phase III, it operates geographically concentrated in four so-called transect areas each covering a toposequence running from the highlands, via the escarpment to the (Kerio) valley. Each Transect Area has a Transect Area Co-ordinator (TC) and two assistant co-ordinators, one for the highlands and one for the valley (these co-ordinators might now be called the liaison officers). The whole of the operational area of the districts is covered with 14 of such TAs, that will gradually become covered in the future. Activities in the TAs are managed by Project Management Committees (PMCs) at the community level.

In parallel, the traditional role of the Head of Department (see e.g. the report on West Pokot) has changed drastically. He is no longer responsible for identification and implementation; his power went to the communities. This does not imply that departmental staff is no longer involved: especially the field staff like divisional and front line staff are part and parcel of the implementation.

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<sup>10</sup> This official arrangement was changed on the basis of a letter from the RNE. Now, an interim arrangement is in force under which only the PA signs the cheques. The MLRRWD is not in agreement.



### **3. THE PRESENT PHASE**

#### **3.1 The PlanOps and Work Plans**

The ASAL programme in Keiyo Marakwet Districts prepared a draft Plan of Operations for the fourth phase (1995 - 1999) in October 1994. The final draft was made in May 1995, and approval came in November thereafter.

It describes the natural resource base as the background in which the programme operates. It presents the context of the long-term development objectives and the programme objectives, the dimensions and the themes and the management and organisation of the programme, as well as the planning, monitoring and evaluation procedures.

#### **3.2 Objectives, Approach and Strategies**

The development objectives of the programme are based on those formulated in the ASAL policy document of September 1992. The overall objective is "to improve the standard of living of the ASAL population through integrating it into the mainstream of the national economy and social development in an environmentally sustainable manner". At this highest policy level, the ASAL document stipulates 10 efforts or sub-objectives to achieve the overall objective:

- developing human resources,
- strengthening of community participation,
- application of low-cost and appropriate technologies,
- reclaiming and protecting the natural environment,
- diversification of traditional modes of production,
- new avenues for off-farm activities,
- improved delivery of social services and extension,
- improved infrastructure,
- strengthened capacity for drought prevention, intervention and recovery,
- expanded and intensified relevant research.

The programme intends, in its PlanOps, to contribute to these long-term objectives. The programme accepts the challenge of the magnitude of the problems to be solved by accepting these objectives, but attaches eight large 'ifs' that depend on factors that are external to the programme.

The development of the programme objectives was done on the basis of the recommendations made by the 1993 review, and turned out to be a lengthy process. The PlanOps 1995 - 1999 was done by Objective Oriented Project Planning (OOPP), mainly with staff of the line agencies, the district administration and the parent ministry. It capitalised on the Community Oriented Project Planning (COPP) that took place in the previous phase. As a result seven objectives were considered to be realistic (several indicators were added). In order of priority these are:

- Improved knowledge on sustainable farming and to promote the application of such knowledge. 'Sustainably productive' should be taken to mean high-yielding, drought resilient, and ecologically sustainable. Indigenous knowledge must be brought to bear upon these issues, and extension staff should be made aware of such knowledge.
- Increased participation of the beneficiaries in both the planning, the financing and the implementation of projects as to ensure that they are in line with their felt needs and that they may be sustainable.
- Level of awareness raised regarding the need to reclaim and to conserve the

- environment and integrating environment issues within production activities.
- Planning capacity on district level strengthened and co-ordination between development actors improved.
- Improved access to basic services.
- Awareness for income generation outside farming, especially for women.
- Marketing of products facilitated.

Unlike the programme in West Pokot, the programme in Keiyo Marakwet accepts the challenge of the magnitude of the problems to be solved by accepting the 10 objectives of the national ASAL policy. Interestingly, the two first programme objectives derived from the national policy (highest priorities) are literally identical to those of West Pokot. The last three are rather similar.

The difference is in objectives 3 and 4.

The PlanOps expresses the clear notion that environmental issues have to be addressed at the district or even the national level and that designs will have to cover large areas. In line with the 1993 review it expresses the needs for a multi-sectoral database and consequently mention studies and investigations as a core component of the new phase III.

Further, the PlanOps is not different from other PlanOps in describing financial procedures, planning procedures, transport, procurement, etc.

The objectives 3 and 4 lead, however, to a strategic framework that signifies a clear break with the ASAL programmes as they were. The PlanOps introduces the notion of 'local level landuse planning' as a tool proved useful from experiences elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa. It also introduced the concept of transect areas (the cover of the PlanOps is illustrated with such a transect: a toposequence running from the highlands to the valley and covering different agro-ecological zones). It, furthermore, introduced the notion that a top-down element had to complement the traditional bottom-up approach.

Another diversion from the past was that clear budget targets were defined and roughly 50 % was to be allocated to the productive sector.

The total five year budget was proposed at NLG. 17,500,000. Community and GoK contributions were given as p.m. posts. The budgets were evenly distributed over the period, with no growth foreseen (note that in the actual budget proposal 40 % is earmarked for the productive sector): 1995 at NLG. 3,671,100, 1996 at 3,385,100, etc. Expenditure in practice for 1995 was about NLG. 1.5 million and 1996 about 2.9 million.

### 3.3 Programme components

The programme components are:

- Productive sector and natural resources, comprising agriculture, livestock production, and forestry.
- Infrastructure, comprising water, roads and land survey.
- Off-farm employment.
- Social sector, comprising education, adult education, technical training, social services, health.
- Co-ordination and institutional support.

In this, the programme is not really different from the past or from neighbouring programmes. The difference is in the transect approach that creates the link for the constraints and (environmental) problems in force in the district. A second major



difference is not in the PlanOps, but is the result of the considerable changes in the operational structure of the programme. This process of operational changes culminated in a strategic decision by the programme, and by 1997 it was no longer the 'oil in the government machinery'.

Four out of 14 transect areas (TAs) are operational, each with a Transect Area Coordinators (TC) and project management committees (PMCs) for activities in the transect. The COPP in phase II had clearly paid off. Moreover, the traditional role of the line departments and the Head of the Department as responsible and in charge of the budget for the activities, no longer existed. Departmental staff were still involved in the ASAL programme activities but mainly in the form of front line staff (FLS) and subject matter specialists (SMSs).

This important change over the years can best be illustrated by the following table.

	1994	1995	1996	1997
<u>History</u>	PlanOps	PlanOps / Awareness Raising Campaigns / PRAs	Transect Area Committee	Project Management Committee (PMC)
<u>Planning</u>	Heads of Department and subject matter specialists	PRAs / Community Action Plan (CAP)	Transect Area Action Plans (TAAPs)	TAAP / implementation schedules
<u>Implementation</u>	Departments on-going	Departments on-going	Department / Transect Area Action Plan	TAAP / implementation schedules
<u>M&amp;E</u>	Departments reports	Departments reports	Financial monitoring at PMC and transect level	Input-Output effect monitoring on the basis of implementation schedules

The major breakpoint with the past in the organisational structure is in the 'dotted' field in the table.

### 3.4 Target Groups

Target groups are all the people living in one of the active transects. The four transects at present cover about 25 % of the district area the programme is supposed to cover, including close to 30 % of the population in that area. The programme intends to spread also to the remaining 10 transect areas in the future (perspective for full coverage is estimated at 15 years).

### 3.5 Planning and M& E Procedures

The traditional system was that the Programme Advisor prepared a quarterly progress report (in 1994 it became 6-monthly). The report compares physical achievements with financial outlays and is based on information supplied by the Head of the Department, supplemented by the observations of the Programme Officer and Advisor in the field as well as by those of ASAL field staff. The PlanOps promised to improve on this. In the table above the changes were summarised.

## 4 REVIEW METHODOLOGY

See also Annex II, Part Three.

### 4.1 The sectoral matrix

The performance matrix information of the ASAL programme in Keiyo Marakwet provided the evaluation team with useful material on the type of projects, and with data on targets and achievements and sometimes impact for each individual project for the period 1993-1996.

However, the financial data in the matrix were of low quality moreover, data on the financial contribution by the community were hardly given. To get an impression of the financial input in the different sectors, we used the computer print-outs of expenditure of the ASAL programme and tried to connect them to the projects in the various sectors. The team, therefore, uses a slightly different way of categorising than the Project Advisor. However, there are no major differences in sector expenditure between the ASAL office figures and the team's.

For the 1993-96 period as a whole total recorded project expenditure was about 80 million Kshs. In addition to that, Kshs. 136 million was spent on programme management, general support and human resource development; in short expenditure that could not be traced to particular projects.

### 4.2 Household Survey

In the 1997 survey in Keiyo Marakwet 160 households were interviewed, 40 in each Transect area (E, H, M and P). The households in the Transects were randomly selected; the (sub)locations were chosen in conjunction with the PMU. Out of the households interviewed, 75% were located within the transect areas, and 25% outside.

In Keiyo Marakwet it was decided not to use the comparison between intervention and non-intervention areas, as was done in the other three districts. Measuring differences in effect and impact of the present Transect Area Approach in and outside the transects, would hardly be expected to give results, because the TAA method was only recently introduced. However, the programme has on and off been running since 1982, so it should have been possible to select areas of ASAL intervention and non-intervention. Consequently, the 1997 survey gives information about the present situation and might in future be used as a baseline, but cannot give information about effects and impact of ASAL.

However, two small areas in the present survey in the northern Marakwet part of the Kerio Valley (in total 29 households) can be compared with survey areas that have been studied as part of the ASAL baseline study in 1982/86 (in total 131 households)<sup>11</sup>. This gives us some information about developments at household level since the beginning of the 1980s and possible effects and impact of ASAL in these two small areas.

### 4.3 PRA

The Participatory Rural Appraisal was designed to provide qualitative information to

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<sup>11</sup> Ton Dietz, Annemieke van Haastrecht, Henrietta Moore, Sally Sebinot Kipkore and Raymond Suter: Endo, Mokoro and Embobut Locations. Locational Development Profile for the ASAL Programme Elgeyo Marakwet, Iten, May 1987.



complement the matrix and household interview data. The information was sought at policy, operation strategy and implementation levels, to determine the extent to which community members are targeted and reached in programme interventions.

Discussions with the PMU facilitated an understanding of district background, policy guidelines and operation strategies. The PMU also assisted in selecting areas and projects to be visited. Criteria for selection of areas and projects to be visited included representatives of the key sectors of programme intervention and co-relation with areas where the household surveys were done. In Keiyo Marakwet, visits were concentrated in Transect H in Keiyo District and Transect P in Marakwet District. The team visited 13 projects in Keiyo Marakwet, had discussions with project management committees (PMCs), and with household members in various localities. Discussions were held with the implementing staff, about the projects, but also about staff training and capacity building. The PRA results are presented together with the data from the sectoral matrix.

## **B. RESULTS OF THE REVIEW**

## **5. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING**

### **5.1 Introduction**

A SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) was carried out in Keiyo Marakwet Districts with elaborate discussion on the institutional issues that determine and affect the ASAL programme. The participants were chosen by the programme on the basis of advice from the review team to select 30-40 people, including PMU, Heads of Departments, NGO representatives, community leaders and private companies. Information from the PRA (Participatory Rural Appraisal) could be added to the SWOT.

For that matter, the results of the SWOT analysis plus the PRA and discussions with the PMU, form the basis for the observations and conclusions made in this chapter.

### **5.2 Placement within the Ministry of Land Reclamation, Regional and Water Development**

The strengths of placing the ASAL programme in the Ministry of Land Reclamation, Regional and Water Development (MLRRWD) are that the Ministry provides the overall policy framework that justifies the existence and the programme's operations. Furthermore, putting ASAL programmes under the MLRRWD enabled them to focus more on the development of water in the district, a first priority of the population generally. At the district level, the programme works within the government structure, which is very well understood. Government departments accept and understand the programme well. But the weaknesses are many and outweigh the strengths. There is no staff back-up from the ministry's headquarters except for the provision of the Programme Officer. GoK was not sending counterpart funds to the programme and, in addition, there is lack of co-ordination of ASAL programmes. The Inter-Ministerial Co-ordination Committee has been moribund and donor interests are not addressed by the ministry. Current placement of the programme in a sector ministry and lack of continuous policy guidelines were cited as great weaknesses.

The weakness of this placement are that there is little understanding of the overall ASAL programme concept at the ministry's headquarters, little support and feedback and lack of institutional memory. The Department of Land Reclamation has a weak capacity to co-ordinate ASAL programmes in the country and has no capacity for policy review and development, and staff are posted to the programme without regard to experience. It all results in the situation in which the programme is totally unclear about its mandate within the ministry.

There are possibilities to improve the situation. At the district level, the SWOT participants supported fully "privatisation" of ASAL implementation through contract management (which does not exclude line departments or its staff). Pointed out were conflicts of approaches between the donor and the government and policy changes from either of the partners.

It can be concluded that ASAL programmes are technically placed in the wrong ministry and, if the current situation continues, possibilities for improvement, at least in the short run, are slim.

### **5.3 The District Focus for Rural Development policy**

All important is the framework as provided by the District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) policy.



As is the case in any other district, the DFRD policy is, in principle, regarded upon as a good philosophy upon which the foundation of various programmes was built. The strengths of the DFRD can be described as the efforts by the government to build up capacity to plan and implement projects at the district level. This was gradually accomplished by posting senior officers to the district to improve technical appraisal of projects, increase of district budgets and district cash floats. And the approach applied by the ASAL programme make that they should fit well within this policy. The DFRD system was to encourage bottom-up planning thereby enlisting community prioritisation of projects, mobilisation of local resources including sharing of project costs and promotion of sustainable development. The DFRD was to facilitate closer supervision of project.

Thus, the DFRD was to play a major policy role in ensuring that communities plan and participate in the implementation of their own projects, distributing resources rationally within the district, promoting local resource mobilisation and cost sharing among the stakeholders, meeting the felt needs of communities and improving co-ordination. Within this framework, ASAL Elgeyo (Keiyo) Marakwet was able to operate and function sufficiently for about 15 years. The 'sufficient operations' can hardly be attributed to the DFRD policy but rather to the influence of individuals in the programme.

But notwithstanding the above prospects, the DFRD has been facing serious problems. Increased poverty, reduced GoK funding, donor fatigue, corruption and insecurity are the main threats to District Focus Strategy.

At the grassroots level the strategy has not taken off the ground; partly because the GoK has not been able to provide sufficient means to spread the DFRD to the required lowest levels. The DFRD is based on the idea that all departments can branch at least the divisional level; this appeared to be too expensive. The weak district economy makes it easy for local leaders to manipulate decisions thereby defeating the main objectives of the policy. The executive arm of the government, particularly the Provincial Administration and the departments, dominate deliberations at all levels. The legal position of the District Development Committee is not clear. Mobilisation of community resources to support development work largely remains theoretical. And at the local level there is an absence of functional development committees.

Other threats/weaknesses include negative political interference, creation of uneven community expectations thereby causing apathy, discrimination of women in decision making due to stringent traditional beliefs and widespread localised corruption.

Opportunities, however, do exist to improve the DFRD policy. The government can set a framework to encourage grassroots communities to function better, can initiate transparent decision making processes that are free from interference by the executive arm and revive the operations of the District Planning Unit. But the long-term solution to non-performing grassroots organizations is to ensure that people are empowered through formal and civic education. This can be achieved through increased training of local leaders, reactivating and strengthening local development committees and increased dialogue with the government policy makers.

At present the DFRD is 'bankrupt' and is predominantly used politically. The ASAL programme in Keiyo Marakwet Districts understood this clearly and played an active role in providing additional strategies to make the DFRD policy framework operationally effective. The entire reorganisation of the operational structure that took place in the transect approach, should be considered as an empowerment of the communities and, thus, as an important addition to the DFRD policy. The process of continued decentralisation of all sort of responsibilities should be continued.



The drawback is, however, obvious. TACs and PMCs do create also a structure partly separated from the formal one. The TACs are answerable to the Divisional Development Committees, and communication with the local authorities is facilitated by having the local MP, DO, councillors, chiefs, etc. as ex-officio members of the committee. Without the umbrella of the ASAL programme such a structure might disintegrate easily. Moreover, as long as peace and harmony about ASAL's activities is prevalent the structure will function properly but has - except from the communities - little backing in case of conflicts.

#### **5.4 Split of District**

For various reasons, the government occasionally finds it necessary to split districts into two. In 1994, Elgeyo Marakwet District was split into Keiyo and Marakwet Districts. This implied a separate, self-contained district administration in each of them. The ASAL programme has been forced to cope with this split. Co-ordination of the, at present, four transects (two in each district) has to be done from Iten district headquarters for Keiyo (as it was for the former Elgeyo Marakwet district). The SWOT revealed that there has been a lot of complaints from the new Marakwet District, suggesting that there would be a lack of enough time and other resources to enable the PMU to give equal attention to the two districts. The review team finds little reason to support such complaints. Each district is equally supplied by the programme with two transects and in fact more funds went to Marakwet (this statement is based on information provided by the PMU and supported by the Kenyan transect co-ordinators).

Nevertheless, it adds to the work load of the programme management since they have to operate with two administrative structures. Since the PMU can only be located in one district it can become vulnerable to political pressures and manipulation from the other district. The complaints from Marakwet District might be an indication in this respect.

Therefore, as long as the ASAL programme is a joint venture of GoK and the donor, implying a clear responsibility with the district administration for its implementation, it is recommended that once districts are split, the government and the donor can agree on (a) to create another district programme with its own administrative structure or (b) to phase out one of the districts. The choice to depend on on-going commitments.

Would such a joint venture for the ASAL programmes be abolished, little objection would exist to continue operating in the same geographical area as before the split.

#### **5.5 The Programme Management Unit**

The PMU, although technically comprising the programme advisor and the programme officer, expanded itself to include the gender specialist, the land use planner, the monitoring and evaluation officer, the assistant PA, the assistant PO, and an accountant.

During the time of this review, the PMU appeared to be performing its duties and responsibilities well. It was reported that there was good sector co-ordination, thereby facilitating the attainment of the programme objectives. The PMU could be assessed as a small functional unit, thereby reducing bureaucracy in its operations, flexible enough, enabling it to move funds from one item to another and from one sector to the other. Due to the detailed planning in force, the PMU now has (deliberately) less flexibility, although the quarterly TAC meetings can shift funds.



The PMU strongly supports community participation in the project cycle, gender and environmental issues are given high priority. Disbursement of funds is usually prompt and reliable. Decisions are made without delays and there is close project supervision.

Moreover, the PMU is trusted by communities more than the other organizations operational in the district, including government. It also acknowledged that it experiences less political pressure. But corrupt practices on the part of the district staff question the ability of the PMU to always be accountable and transparent to both the donor and the Kenya government.

One of the weaknesses of the PMU is that it is too small to always make adequate decisions affecting a multi-sectoral programme of the substantial size as it is now. To implement the activities, there was over-reliance on technical expertise from government departments. The SWOT also made clear that the PMU suffers from a 'two-window' or double decision making system, with one officer owing his allegiance to the donor while the counterpart leans to the government side. The population in the transect areas tend to rely on the PA while the implementors of the activities - the departments - used to relate more with the PO. The latter factor is diminished in importance now that the new role for the line ministries has been established.

Either the set-up and mandate of the programme needs reconsideration or the composition and role of the PMU needs an overhaul of the terms of reference for donor staff and GoK staff to avoid conflicts. For more specific recommendations in this respect, reference is made to Part Two.

The Keiyo Marakwet programme has made a strategic decision to start the reorganisation of the operational structure (e.g. by redefining the role of the line departments in identification and implementation of its activities). This step in itself is fully supported by the review team but should (i) be pursued consequently and (ii) not be done in isolation from the management structure in the three other districts.

## **5.6 Financial Management**

The programme runs the PAM (Project Administration Management) computer software, as developed by DGIS. It is a bookkeeping system based on the Dutch budget code system and is not compatible with the Kenyan system. For that matter the financial information is difficult to translate to the GoK. While the bookkeeping system is Dutch, the financial control mechanism was with the implementors, until last year the line departments, thus the GoK.

Up to March 1997, the PO and the PA were co-signatory to the ASAL programme payments, which provided the solid principle of joint responsibility (see also footnote 10). However, the PO is the sole signatory to GoK funds leaving the PA with little insight in this. The double chain of command where ASAL funds are concerned in preparation and final payments can easily lead to conflict situations. A PA cannot always refuse to co-sign even if the validity of a payment is doubtful.

Formally the ASAL programme depended for the financial control on the GoK structure, and history teaches that this control system is not always watertight and cannot always avoid misappropriation of funds. During the first phases of the programme it became clear that major financial conflicts occur (the programme had even to be stopped due to such a conflict in 1988) unless the advisors were involved in each and every detail of the programme and checked each activity personally. Such intimate knowledge of all the details of the programme would provide the additional control mechanism required.

After 1993, this became more and more difficult due to increased expenditure of the



programme and work load in the PMU. Serious conflicts about financial matters between the PA and the PO surged (again).

The PMU already took quite useful steps to improve the situation by having the PAM system introduced in each transect and by making the PMCs (the communities) the responsible control mechanism. It is too early to assess whether this will work adequately. It also contradicts the character of the joint venture with joint responsibilities of the ASAL programmes as agreed upon between GoK and GoN.

The above does not imply that the review team recommends against these steps. It does recommend that the donor and the GoK see this change in the control responsibility (and the changed role of the line ministries - see § 5.5) in the perspective of all the ASAL programmes. The consequent conclusion could be that, de facto, the idea of the 'joint venture' has been left in Keiyo and Marakwet Districts and should be formalised and taken to its final consequences - also for the other districts.

### **5.7 District Decision Making**

The Programme Management Unit (PMU) is the most important decision making organ on day-to-day matters related to the ASAL programme. The Unit is supposed to operate within the framework of the District Focus Strategy. While project beneficiaries annually generate project proposals from the transect level, major decisions on the projects' fate are made by the PMU. The donor, through the PA, plays an important role in such final decision making by setting a policy framework. Once the projects meet the criteria set for financing, the PMU forwards them to the sectors to which the projects belong for technical evaluation.

An additional level of decision making, the ASAL Steering Committee was created. It is composed of Heads of Departments and NGO representatives (in brief: all implementing agencies). This committee, chaired by the District Commissioner (representing the Provincial Administration), is a sub-committee of the District Development Committee. It is charged with the responsibility of co-ordinating project activities, setting implementation guidelines and strategies and removing operational problems and constraints. The DDC ratifies project plans and budgets.

Appropriation of ASAL funds used to involve the departments but not the communities. The programme could only enhance dialogue, co-ordination and co-operation among departments in as far as programme related matters were concerned. This has changed drastically, since now the power for identification with the TACs in the transects and implementation with the PMCs. The SWOT observed that departments now "complain bitterly" of being ignored and sidelined (six months after the SWOT took place it looks as if complaints are becoming less).

Yet, the principle of the strategic decision is fully endorsed by the review. However, the conclusion and recommendation of this paragraph should be similar to those of previous § 5.6 on 'financial management'.

That, de facto, also for decision making the idea of the 'joint venture' has been left in Keiyo and Marakwet Districts and should be formalised and taken to its final consequences - also for the other districts.

### **5.8 GoK Contribution**

Clear insight in the real GoK contributions is difficult. The available information is insufficient to make conclusive statements. However, the general conviction is that



due to the presence of the ASAL programme in the districts, GoK funds were scaled down.

To ensure there is government commitment to the ASAL programme, there should be a condition for matching funds, implying also adequate insight in GoK finances. The adoption of this matching fund principle is more critical than the magnitude of the amount of money contributed, as this would enable the government to be much more involved with the programme operations due to the stake that it holds in it. The final product will be the assurance that institutional sustainability is enhanced, accountability of decision making and use of funds is cultivated, thereby promoting transparency.

If such a condition cannot be met, there seems little reason to continue with the ASAL programme as the 'joint venture' it is now.

## **5.9 Overall Approach**

The Keiyo Marakwet programme has changed drastically since its start almost 15 years ago. It can be characterised as the most 'modern' ASAL programme. The PMU's capacity has been expanded with e.g. gender and M&E capacity and an expatriate land use planning expertise (full time). What also changed was an almost tripling of the expenditure in Kshs. (over 29 million in 1993 to over 86 million in 1996) or from under NLG. 1 million, to almost NLG 3 million. This certainly led to increased attention for e.g. the productive sector (see chapter 7), but especially to make natural resource management in so-called transect areas the very heart of the programme. Another new aspect has been described in previous paragraphs: the drastically changed role of the GoK in the form of its line departments.

The programme in Keiyo Marakwet especially is in the forefront of implementing the recommendations of the 1993 review. Considering the consequences of this and considering the risks involved (see § 6.2) further development and strategic decisions should be taken in a wider forum than that of the single ASAL programme. If the donor continues to support the 1993 recommendations, the Keiyo Marakwet programme experience should be carefully analysed on its appropriateness for the other three districts.

## **5.10 Low Input and High Input Strategy**

The low input approach is one where the programme has in terms of personnel, a small PMU (one advisor and a Kenyan counterpart) where donor resources are just enough to supplement resources from the Government, NGOs and the Communities. The opposite is true for high input approach.

The ASAL Keiyo Marakwet is no longer a low input programme, as demonstrated in the expenditure level over the past years. Also the PMU's capacity was substantially expanded.

There appear to be little or fading away problems up to now with the higher inputs especially because the start of necessary reorganisations took place (see previous paragraphs in this chapter). It can be observed in this context that the donor on the one hand stimulated higher inputs for more impact, but has not been reliable in fulfilling financial commitments made in this respect. During the review period considerable confusion existed about the level of funds available. Moreover, the PMU claims that the only restriction to embark upon new / more transects is a financial one. If this assessment is correct, a gap exists between words and deeds.



The level of GoK contribution has been discussed in previous § 5.8, and there is no indication that the low level of GoK contribution is related to the higher financial input of the donor. Even a low level of input is probably considered high enough for the GoK channel its funds to other purposes than Keiyo Marakwet Districts.

### **5.11 Collaborating Partners**

The ASAL programme has been working with various organisations that have increased implementation capacity of the district. Government departments have been the key agents through which most of the interventions were channelled to the transect area committees and the project communities. NGOs have played a very small role in Keiyo Marakwet, but consultancies have been well-used in community training and awareness creation.

#### *Government Departments*

The programme has depended on the skills and expertise within government to plan and execute projects particularly in the productive, infrastructure and the social sectors. But available capacity within each department varies. In Keiyo Marakwet Districts, placement of the necessary staff was made a pre-condition in the choice of transect area.

Also after the introduction of the new organisational structure, the departmental staff represents the major implementing capacity available.

#### *Non Governmental Organizations*

The absence of numerous able NGOs in these districts is a major hindrance to implementation through this channel. Moreover, the programme observes that NGOs focus on the needy groups by mainly funding projects in the social sector. They also operate rather independently making it difficult to apply preferred strategies. On top of that it appeared that NGOs are less interested in the environmental issues which long-term problems represent the main thrust of the programme. They also focus their activities in specific geographical areas.

There should be more astute efforts to have a common policy for all NGOs and have improved co-ordination between them. Strengthening this collaboration would improve the districts' capacity to undertake projects and to enhance co-ordination of activities.

#### *Community Based Organizations*

The programme benefited from working with CBOs such as Transect Area Committees (TACs), Project Management Committees (PMCs), women groups, et cetera. The programme has been supporting capacity building for CBOs in order to improve their capacity to implement projects, and impressive progress has been achieved. Detailed and systematic preparation by the PMCs through Implementation Schemes (IS) for each project's activities have become standard practice. Such ISs specify date, activity, requirements, implementors, venue and source of contribution.

For implementation the system of contract agreements has been introduced, e.g. signed by the Project Chairman and the Transect Co-ordinator, and approved by the PMU.

Despite the considerable achievements, systematic and continuous attention to the capacity building of such CBOs will have to be given for the programme to have sufficient future implementing structure. Awareness raising and organisation took



place but various elementary skills the CBOs will need in the future are insufficiently present. This capacity building will claim considerable parts of the human and financial resources available (see also § 5.10).

### *Consulting Firms*

ASAL Keiyo Marakwet has collaborated with consulting firms in promoting community awareness through Community Oriented Project Planning Community, awareness campaigns and for the promotion and formulation of the credit programme. More collaboration with these partners, though expensive, is required in order to inject additional expertise in the management of a district programme that has diverse objectives to fulfil. The credit programme and other economic empowerment type of activities can better be implemented by the private sector as government institutions are ill equipped to administer them.

The use of this flexible mechanism over which the programme has good control, should be continued.

### **5.12 Target Groups**

The programme operates in a certain geographical parts as defined by the transects. Within those areas there are no restrictions, so no real target group can be earmarked.

Not to have a real target group is a common characteristic of the Dutch supported ASAL programmes. This is not necessarily a weak point as long as the programme has proper and realistic objectives supported by adequate strategies to achieve the objectives. If objectives, strategies and criteria are not well done the programme will rapidly develop into a series of unrelated small activities that have little coherence or synergy. This is why the introduction of e.g. a log frame is a useful contribution to the quality of the ASAL programmes.

The main economic activity pursued by people in Keiyo and Marakwet districts is livestock and small scale agriculture. Over 60 per cent of households earn their incomes from livestock sales, subsistence and commercial agriculture in the highlands. This is the main reason why the programme supports livestock and crop production sectors. Through this support, the major economic groups in the district are reached. But changing social and economic circumstances have contributed to the emergence of other groups who cannot be absorbed by the current socio-economic order and therefore require special attention. Due to changing economic circumstances, groups whose economic plight is not addressed by the agriculture sector have emerged. The youth (including the disabled) require employment opportunities in small scale enterprises and Jua Kali sub sector. But they are ill-equipped with skills to enable them to cope with the present day challenges in the private sector. Addressing this emerging group from the perspective of economic empowerment would not only diversify the economic base of the district but would also create forward and backward linkages for the agriculture sector.

Addressing the youth, this emerging and transitory group, from the perspective of economic empowerment would not only diversify the economic base of the district but would also create forward and backward linkages for the agriculture / livestock sector. Appropriate strategies will need to be devised taking into account the fluidity of the group.



## 6. PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES, APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES

Land use planning was - for understandable reasons - left out of the ToR for the review. A separate mission was assigned to look at that issue. Despite the fact that the review team was not assigned to assess LUP, in the case of Keiyo Marakwet it appeared to be impossible to say or write anything if LUP is not assessed. Everything is closely related to LUP since it became the centre activity in the programme. The LUP planning mission turned out to be a backstopping mission that provided useful support to the districts.

Certain aspects, however, of the LUP approach that are not relevant for a backstopping, are relevant for a review. For that matter did the review team decide to review the LUP approach in this chapter.

### 6.1 Assessment of Objectives

Seven objectives were considered to be realistic and indicated in chapter 3. In order of priority these are (summarised):

1. Improved knowledge on sustainable farming and to promote the application of such knowledge.
2. Increased participation of the beneficiaries in both the planning, the financing and the implementation of projects.
3. Level of awareness raised regarding the need to reclaim and to conserve the environment and integrating environment issues within production activities.
4. Planning capacity on district level strengthened and co-ordination between development actors improved.
5. Improved access to basic services.
6. Awareness for income generation outside farming, especially for women.
7. Marketing of products facilitated.

In chapter 3 it was already observed that there is great similarity between these objectives and those of West Pokot District. The difference is in objectives 3 and 4. Emerging from these two objectives (that are not in the PlanOps of West Pokot) comes the Strategic Framework for Local Level Planning and District Level Planning, a strategic framework that signifies a clear break with the ASAL programmes as they were. It, furthermore, introduced the notion that a top-down element had to complement the traditional bottom-up approach.

By the time of the 1997 review, the implementation of this Strategic Framework made clear that the proper bases had been laid for the implementation of the recommendations of the 1993 review. The Framework is highly suitable for the realisation of the objectives of the programme

### 6.2 Assessment of Strategies and Approaches / Land Use Planning

#### *Introduction*

Since the proposed core of the programme strategy was based on Local Level Land Use Planning, this type of planning became the key element in the programme. The approach contained elements of COPP and the catchment approach. The choice was made to develop and apply the approach in some selected areas: the transect areas.

The criteria applied to the establishment of the transect boundaries resulted in



functional units. The sectors included part of the valley, the escarpment and water catchment in the highlands. Besides such geomorphologic criteria, socio-political and administrative factors were considered. At the next stage of decision making were dynamism in communities, quality and success of line ministries and characteristics of locations.

After selection, all actors (community, district administration, line agencies, ASAL programme) joined in an intensive process of awareness raising and sensitisation on environmental, gender and planning issues followed by problem analysis, solution finding and prioritisation of solutions.

A summary of the applied Transect Area Approach is given in the position paper prepared for the Land Use Planning backstopping mission that was executed during this review:

- Step 1 Set-up basic organisation
- Step 2 Awareness raising and training
- Step 3 Planning and design
- Step 4 Programme endorsement
- Step 5 Programme implementation
- Step 6 Programme monitoring and evaluation

This methodology was developed by two Task Forces (one for each district), appointed by the ASAL Steering Committee. The two Task Forces created one Working Group / Think Tank of 10 persons. Besides the delineation and identification of 14 TAs, the organisational structure was developed. At TA level Transect Area Committees were installed responsible for developing a Community Action Plan. The members of the TACs are chairpersons of the different Project Management Committees (PMCs). The ASAL programme selected from the line agencies the four Transect Area Co-ordinators and the eight assistant Transect Area Co-ordinators.

The result can be observed in the Transect Areas Action Plans. These systematic and detailed Plans underline the impression of the thorough systematic way in which the programme is operating. Content wise, they look like a mix of community priorities with a short-term perspective and PMU points of attention from a long-term perspective. Implementation of the latter activities only has started at a modest scale (e.g. a few work shops were organised from the long-term perspective of buffer zone management). Looking at what activities are on-going, the programme is not that different from the past, although it has created a considerably different outlook for the future. Whether the outlook created will be realised depends in what way and how far (how 'tough') 'conditions' for attention to long-term natural resource management aspects the programme intends to apply, can be harmonised with the short-term community priorities.

#### *The backstopping mission*

The backstopping mission concluded that the programme had laid a thorough foundation for successful implementation of local level land use planning, and that with TAA being the central approach in phase III, the programme has adopted resource management as a focal issue in its strategy, rather than a separate activity.

The review mission fully agrees with this and can only conclude that the strategy applied in Keiyo Marakwet has been very successful in fulfilling the recommendations of the 1993 review, while creating a framework that can make the objectives to be met. A major step was made already in meeting the objective 3 and 4. It made the ASAL programme in Keiyo Marakwet the most modern one, in contrast to the one in neighbouring West Pokot. Likewise the backstopping mission, is the



review team very positive about the considerable achievements of the programme during the period under review. Strategies were well defined and applied.

However, the backstopping mission concludes its report on Keiyo Marakwet with five observations cum recommendations. These observations underline the conclusions made by the review team that up to now preparations have been made and implementation of activities from the natural resource management perspective has just taken off. Success can only be assessed in the future, and the backstopping mission observes some constraints that threaten the eventual success.

#### *Balanced implementation*

The review team agrees with the recommendations made by the backstopping team. However, the backstopping report carries the notion that such recommendations are the appropriate answer to solve the constraints. In that respect the review team is less convinced. Not that better recommendations can be thought of, but possibly some of the issues observed will prove not to be solvable within the framework of the ASAL programme.

All will depend on two factors. First, the speed and magnitude with which the communities in the transects will identify themselves with long-term environmental issues and become prepared to address these for the sake of future generations. Second, to what degree the programme (or PMU) will be able to find the proper balance between 'conditions' and projects favoured by the communities.

In doing so, the programme might be confronted with major constraints (risks) at various levels.

At the lowest level this will be the future collaboration, or lack of it, between (sub)chiefs and the PMC. (Sub)chiefs are part of the Provincial Administration and are directed by Parliament through the Office of the President. Through this hierarchy agendas different from the PMU c.q. donor can emerge and put the programme in a difficult position.

The programme has plans to develop the TACs into NGOs and considers the programme to become a limited company. Thus, at the medium level, the programme as a Ltd. company or the TACs as NGOs will always need law making and law enforcement and rely on the by-laws as formulated by the Councils. The backstopping mission mentions this in observation number five (e), but it is rather uncertain that this mission's recommendation to "strengthen and formalise the existing (often) informal linkages between the created institutions for land use planning (PMC, TAC) and district institutional structure" will provide an adequate or sufficient solution. There is little reason to believe that proper by-laws will arise or that the programme will be left in peace if real controversial long-term environmental issues and interests of powerful people will become at stake. The programme will then try to operate on the legal territory of Kenya without the proper permission.

At the highest level the risk is that ASAL will start trying to by-pass the formal GoK structures and will try to create its own legal environment. It is a problem faced by several national and international environmental NGOs. The urge is then to get for the ASALs (through bilateral policy discussions ?) the mandate for the ASALs to do what they consider the right and proper thing to do from a long-term perspective. May be such an attempt might even be successful, but is that what development co-operation wants. To get a sort of 'concession' to run part of a sovereign state?

The review team is not in the position to judge the above or to have an opinion about it. It just wants to raise the points and the inherent risks. It underlines that the direction taken by the programme is a consequent execution of the recommendations



of the 1993 review. To arrive at long-term and structural impacts in natural resource management by a programme a programme has to start operating like the one in Keiyo Marakwet. And the preparations made are well done.

The only advice the review team wants to give is that considering the risks involved and the high vulnerability of a programme in the risky process, that from now onwards (now that the implementation has started and preparations have been made) the forum for decision making (to find that proper balance) will be wider than that of the district ASAL programme. A wider forum for deliberations than is now operational (basically the PMU) might avoid political pitfalls and provide wider support and backing for decisions.

### **6.3 Assessment of Strategies and Approaches / Gender Aspects**

#### *The Situation of Women*

In both Keiyo and Marakwet Districts, women are responsible for most of the farming activities and for all the reproductive activities. Livestock herding is done by both men and women with men playing a bigger role during the dry spells when livestock have to move greater distances in search of water and pasture. Even then, women remain responsible for the young and weak stock.

Both women and men have access to land for farming and grazing activities. However, on the use of land for permanent crops or structures, decisions have to be taken by men. While women take control of small harvests used for the family subsistence as well as milk and poultry products, they cannot take decisions on the sale of bigger livestock. Income from larger sales of produce or livestock is controlled by the men.

Decision making at the community level is the domain of men and traditional beliefs and values have tended to perpetuate this situation. Indeed most of the formal leaders such as chiefs, assistant chiefs and village elders are men. The workload of women also reduces their chances to attend meetings and other development activities.

#### *Gender approach*

The Transect Area Approach (TAA) aims to increase the participation of the target groups in the planning, decision-making and implementation of development activities. The decentralisation of decision making to the community level (PMC level) gives the community greater opportunity to take decisions on their own projects and to take responsibilities for their implementation. This active participation is intended to provide the environment for women to participate alongside men in the different stages of the projects.

While a number of gender related activities have been implemented in the two districts such as gender sensitisation at community level, formation of gender working groups and support to women specific activities, the programme has not as yet developed a clear strategy for gender. Even then, it is stated in the objectives that gender will be integrated at all levels and in all the components of the programme. The programme has a gender adviser since mid 1996 who is also a member of the PMU.

#### *Results of Gender Interventions*



A training workshop for the gender working group from the two districts together with the Transect Area Co-ordinators (TCs) and Assistant Transect Area Co-ordinators (ATCs) provided insight into the concept of gender and its application in the development process. Although it is still too early to measure the results of this workshop, it is noted that the gender working groups have organised gender sensitisation sessions for four women PMCs and initiated women specific activities. It is observed that while the programme has an objective to "integrate gender at all levels of programme", the gender activities so far have been geared towards starting up women's projects such as production of energy-saving cookstoves, promotion of water tanks and establishment of kitchen woodlots. Although these are important activities to meet women's specific needs they should be seen in the context of the overall strategy of mainstreaming. This confusion may be as a result of the fact that the gender adviser is relatively new and has not yet developed a clear approach for gender.

Problem analysis has been done in all the transects using Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) and community workshops. Women as well as men have been consulted and participated in the analysis and planning. It is evident that the use of PRA tools, the use of video and other informal methods of communication have stimulated women to participate more actively compared to formal meetings and classroom type of training.

The TAA has stimulated the formation of community groups and project management committees ( PMCs). A number of these are involved in economic activities related to agriculture and livestock production, water provision or income generation through off-farm activities. While women are members of the general PMCs, a number of women specific PMCs have emerged, undertaking a variety of activities including horticulture, dairy production, brick making and production of energy conservation cookstoves among other economic activities.

A milk processing plant established on cost sharing basis in Marakwet District has provided a convenient marketing channel for milk and has further stimulated the production of milk in the area. Initially the majority shares in the milk plant were owned by women who also had bigger representation in the management. Apparently, this situation has changed over time and the management and share-holding has become dominated by men.

Emphasis by the programme on the participation of the community in all the stages of the project cycle and the training in project management skills have contributed to strengthening of the capacity of men and women to identify, plan and implement their own projects. As a result, there is greater enthusiasm and a sense of ownership among the PMCs, both mixed and women specific PMCs.

With the focus on relatively smaller areas of coverage and better facilitated and motivated extension staff, there is closer interaction between extension staff and farmers contributing to improved technical skills by farmers and pastoralists. However, women's participation is still much lower in extension activities compared to men. In one training of trainers session, for instance, out of 40 participants only 5 were women. Extension and training reports do not always differentiate the participants by gender so the disparity is not easily noticeable.

The economic empowerment fund has been started by the programme to promote economic development by providing funds to groups involved in income generating activities. The loans have been given to both men and women. Experience so far shows that the majority of loans to women are used for general commerce. A few women have invested in livestock. As of June 1997, 30% of the total number of loanees were women, having taken 28% of the total amount funded. The credit fund has stimulated enterprise development and increased employment opportunities for



men, women and youth. It is not yet clear to what extent women have control over the credit given or the benefits accruing from it. This aspect needs to be included in future monitoring.

Gender sensitisation at the PMC level and the increased attention for gender by the field extension staff has contributed to most PMCs incorporating a few women in the committees. Unfortunately, the women are in many cases very few compared to men (one or two women out of 11 committee members) and their actual contribution minimal.

Comments of a male PMC member in Keiyo:

“Although the women are now members of the committee, they are shy and cannot speak in the meetings. We have to take decisions for them”.

Informal meetings and use of on-farm training sessions have attracted more women to attend. Women specific PMCs also give women more opportunity for participation and confidence building.

It can be concluded that a step has been made but has been slowed down by lack of clarity and vision. The role of the gender advisor has also not been clear, resulting in a focus on women's activities rather than facilitating an overall gender strategy.

During the gender review workshop which was part of this review, useful suggestions were generated that would help the gender advisor and PMU to develop an overall gender strategy that is geared towards creating gender equality.

The gender working group would be useful instruments. Members should be selected based on capacity and commitment, and their capacity should be developed.

## 7 MAJOR COMPONENTS AND ACTIVITIES

This chapter summarises the findings and analysis of the physical and financial information collected about the programme for the period 1993-1996. This information was primarily collected through the activity matrix, The PRA, the programme's financial records, community visits and discussions. Moreover, it was tried to make a comparison with the situation in 1982/86, using household data from the Locational Developments Profiles for Endo, Mokoro and Embobut Locations. The household survey of 1997, assisted in this.

### 7.1 Sector Balance

#### *History*

In 1982, at the start of the ASAL programme in Elgeyo Marakwet - at that time still one district - ASAL avoided to move in certain sectors for various reasons. The Dutch were active in the Rural Access Roads Programme (later Minor Roads Programme), which meant that in the earlier years ASAL did not spend in this sector. In the Kerio Valley, the Kerio Valley Development Authority (KVDA) had a number of large-scale, top-down irrigation projects, which required careful manoeuvring in that sector.

In the early 1980s, the ASAL office in Nairobi tried to mobilise support for an 'ASAL Women's group programme', but only in the 1990s the first women's projects turned up in Keiyo Marakwet.

During the first ten years, the same circumspection was evident about 'environmental' projects. There was some support for tree nurseries and anti-erosion measures and land management, but the involvement was precarious. On the one hand the 'environmental issue' was a highly sensitive one, in an area with severe erosion, and a strong memory of unwanted government interference during colonial times. On the other hand, the Kerio Valley Development Authority more or less claimed that sector and relations between KVDA and ASAL have always been rather tense. Only after the evaluation of 1993, outspoken Dutch policies resulted in a change of focus, with 'land use planning' becoming the core of the programme.

However, there were many other urgent problems that could be attacked. Improvement in agriculture, education, technical training, support to the drinking water sector, and to health were obvious priorities. Agriculture received the largest contribution from ASAL, and much money went also to Youth Polytechnics. Education, water and livestock projects received considerably less. In total, over 380 projects were implemented by the ASAL programme between 1982 and 1996.

A major investment was made in 1985 / 1986 in the start of the rehabilitation of the Katapseron Furrow. The planning for this (politically selected) furrow was about Kshs. 1.1 million plus 3.1 million thereafter. Most of that money (about NLG. 700,000) was used in the preparation of the access road, the construction of several houses, tractors, and the start of the rehabilitation. Technical input was supplied by the Provincial Irrigation Unit Rift Valley. All in all, in 1987 / 1988 the project had to be abandoned a.o. since the technical design was not feasible. By now, it can be concluded that this money went down the drain and the Katapseron furrow may serve as an example of not how to do it.

#### *1993-1996*

The performance matrix information of the ASAL programme Keiyo Marakwet



provided the review team with useful material on the type of projects, as well as on targets and achievements. However, the financial data in the performance matrix sheets were of low quality, and data on the financial contribution by the community were hardly given. Instead of using the information on budgets, as provided in some of the performance matrix sheets, the team used the programme's computer print-outs of expenditure and tried to connect them to the projects in the various sectors. The team, therefore, used a slightly different way of categorising than the Programme Advisor does.

However, there are no major differences in sector expenditure between the ASAL office figures and those of the review team, with the exception of cultivation, where the team's figure is considerably lower. Part of the cultivation expenditure figures - according to the PA - might in the team's figures be under the heading of marketing, research or small credit. Furthermore, the team has a more detailed categorising of the non-project expenditure. Both sets of figures are presented in the table below, but the text is based on the team's figures.

For the 1993-96 period as a whole, the total recorded expenditure in Keiyo Marakwet was Kshs. 216 million. Expenditure almost tripled during the period. It increased from 29 million in 1993, via 49 million in 1994, 52 million in 1995 to 86 million in 1996. Expenditure approximately followed the budgets for these years, which means that planning was done properly.

Of the total of Kshs. 216 million for that period, the team could attach some Kshs. 80 million to expenditure for specific projects. In addition, Kshs. 136 million was spent on running the office, cars and related costs, investments, and group training, courses, workshops, consultants, et cetera; expenditure that could not be traced to particular projects.

The table below gives an overview of the project expenditure for the major sectors.

*Table Expenditure ASAL Keiyo Marakwet 1993 - 1996*

	Kshs. x 1,000	%age of projects	%age of total	ASAL progr. figures %age
<b>DESCRIPTION</b>				
<b>Project Expenditure</b>				
Livestock, animal health, fisheries	15,498	19.3	7.1	8.7
Cultivation	2,932	3.7	1.4	3.5
Forestry	4,540	5.7	2.1	
Environment	3,445	4.3	1.6	
Forestry / Environment				2.9
Roads / bridges	20,493	25.5	9.5	8.8
Water resources	17,576	21.9	8.1	9.2
Education, adult ed. & techn. education	14,007	17.4	6.5	5.6
Health	1,831	2.3	0.8	0.9
Gender				0.3
<b>Total project expenditure</b>	<b>80,313</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>37.1</b>	<b>39.9</b>



<b>Expenditure that could not be related to specific projects</b>				
Courses, workshops, training, ASAL staff, consultants, NGOs	30,987		14,3	
Group training	27,883		12,9	
Economic empowerment				20.4
Strategy development				1.0
Small credit, topical research, revolving funds, marketing, co-operatives	9,419		4,3	
Co-operatives				0.7
Small equipment	3,333		1,5	
Large equipment	11,171		5,2	
Cars & related costs	25,502		11,8	
Investments				9.2
Office costs, casual labour, security & miscellaneous	17,804		8,2	
Travel & accommodation	7,526		3,5	
Feasibility study, training O&M, various	2,718		1,3	
District planning / Information / Public relation				5.3
Overhead				23.4
<b>Total expenditure that could not be related to specific projects</b>	<b>136,343</b>		<b>62.9</b>	<b>60.0</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>216,656</b>		<b>100,0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

As clearly described in the recommendations of the 1993 evaluation, the productive / economic sector should be the main focus of the programme. The purpose being to increase production, conserve natural resources and/or generate income. This has been achieved in Keiyo & Marakwet: 63% of all project expenditure was allocated to this sector.

Roads and bridges received the largest single allocation: a quarter of all project expenditure. Livestock production, animal health, forestry, environment and cultivation followed in that order. Although much money was spent on water, only a small part of it (13% of all water expenditure<sup>12</sup>) was used for productive water, e.g. for spring protection, drought reserves and catchment protection.

Less money (37%) was spent on social development: domestic water projects, education and health, in that order. Water is the most crucial natural resource in a (semi-)arid environment. All expenditure by the Ministry of Water Development as well as some projects in livestock development (desilting of dams) and in cultivation (irrigation), can be regarded as water projects; in total 22% of all project expenditure was spent on water projects, including livestock water and irrigation. Different types of household water supplies received the majority of the water funds.

In Keiyo Marakwet, 14% of all project funds were spent on projects that can be characterised as beneficial for the environment: activities like zero grazing and livestock fodder production, tsetse eradication and tick control, soil conservation, energy preservation (improved jikos), forestry projects, fisheries development, and environmental training.

<sup>12</sup> The PMU estimates this figure to be higher: 35 - 40%.



Moreover, a considerable part of the money that was not attributed to projects was spent on the preparation of the "transect approach to land use planning". In the last three years, 'community based land use planning' was at the centre of the activities in Keiyo/Marakwet. They focused on 'improvement of bottom-up planning through sensitisation, awareness raising of and problem analysis with the local communities'. Numerous workshops, courses and group training were held, as a follow-up on the previously used method of 'Community Oriented Project Planning', without doubt resulting in improved planning capacity at the grass root level. Apart from preparing the population for this approach, a number of roads had to be built to reach all areas in the transects. The team estimates that at least one quarter, but more likely one third, of all expenditure was spent on land use planning (preparations), in line with the central position this strategy has<sup>13</sup>.

Projects that were specifically meant for women, or where it is evident that mainly women are the first beneficiaries (most of the domestic water projects; promotion of jikos, poultry projects), received 22 % of all project expenditure.

In principle, 70% of the ASAL budget should be spent in the four active Transect Areas, and 30% outside the transect to complete, among other purposes, projects that were started under ASAL II. In this context, it should be mentioned that in 1996 32% of the ASAL budget has been disbursed through "Economic Empowerment" (a commercial credit fund), which covers the whole district area, irrespective of transects. This percentage is rapidly increasing. According to the programme management, the credit budget will no longer be part of the ASAL budget from 1998 onwards. An additional Kshs. 1.5 million has also been used to support the activities of collaborating NGOs. Two beneficiaries have been Cheptebo AIC that put up an agricultural training centre and World Vision, in a joint water project venture.

## **7.2 Achievements Compared With Targets** (see tables in the annexes to this district report)

### *Livestock*

Workshops, training, field days and tours were, as in most areas of the ASAL programme in Keiyo and Marakwet, all accomplished as planned. Implementation of infrastructure constructions (cattle troughs, bandas, dips, a goats multiplication centre, fodder tree nursery, tannery), or providing farmers with improved breeds (dairy cow, Sahiwal, goats and sheep, and chicken) appeared to be much more difficult: the targets were only partly achieved, or not at all. Even when a structure is completed, as in the case of the cattle dip in Murkutwo, continued operation and maintenance are difficult.

One of the major achievements of the programme and the local community is the fact that the Mala milk plant in Kapsowar is operational. Originally this was a women's project to establish zero-grazing, but now it is a community project (the men took over the management) for marketing milk, and a successful one at that. The Mama cattle feed processing plant is under construction and prospects are good. The Murkutwo fruit processing plant, also originally a women group activity, was disrupted due to insecurity.

The Biretwo poultry unit was completed. It facilitates the production of layers and broilers, that are sold at interested community members at the market price. Demand

<sup>13</sup> The PMU has a different view. They consider this percentage to be 5.3 (see the table before). Investments made in roads, soil conservation, agroforestry et cetera, are considered to be sectoral programmes by the PMU.



from the communities was high. The unit was, nevertheless, closed by the programme since it was economically not feasible and required continuous financial input.

### *Cultivation and Environment*

The major achievement is the start of an (experimental) transect approach with two transects in Keiyo and two in Marakwet District operational. Preparing the population for the approach appears to be on schedule. By now, many projects have been proposed and are planned. Implementation will take place in the coming years. The other projects in forestry and cultivation show a scattered array of all types of training and other activities, mainly on schedule or slightly delayed (tree planting, rehabilitation of micro catchments, training sessions on integrated pest management, pest control, irrigation in Keiyo, some of the extension activities and some of the research activities).

The tree nursery in Murkutwo, though said to be run by a PMC, is managed by an employee of the Forest Department. The role of the community was unclear, as in most projects in this field.

### *Water Resources*

The information for the matrix, provided by the water department, was of a deplorable quality. However, the PRA team visited a number of water projects that supplied the review team with additional information. An essential part of the water programme, providing eight rural centres with clean drinking water, was a success, and thanks to the ASAL programme, a considerable portion of the population in the Kerio valley now has access to clean drinking water.

Kipkarin gravity water project in Tambach Division, was started by a few people, but expanded to become a community project. The intake and reservoir are complete, the piping is on-going.

Delays in disbursement of ASAL funds have been frustrating the Kamining micro-catchment project. This gravity-piped water scheme has been in operation since 1967. In 1995 ASAL supported a plan to expand the scheme. The intake was initially wrongly sited, but this was corrected through the committee's intervention. Progress is slow.

ASAL I did the survey and design for the Chesongoch water project, ASAL II constructed the reservoirs and distribution pipes, and the current ASAL III, together with the community, is continuing to help on completion of the various lines.

Kimiter furrow. This 8 km long furrow has been in use for 200 years and is now being rehabilitated with ASAL support. The community contribution in labour and materials is said to be 60% of the total cost. In general, ASAL expects that the community contributes about 30% of the costs of projects, often in labour and materials. Water projects and many other projects, often require a registration fee and a fee for the maintenance fund. In many cases only few households have contributed to the maintenance fund. This endangers sustainability of the projects.

### *Small Business*

Supplying Youth Polytechnics with tools is on target and the training of YP instructors even has a much larger achievement than targeted. Also here, construction of, in this case, a mechanics could not get 'performance matrix' information.

Financial problems and poor management hamper many business attempts by youth and women groups. The ASAL programme decided to no longer put money into this



sector.

### *Education*

With the exception of adult education and training, the considerable support for education seems to be implemented as planned.

## **7.3 Assessment of Effects and Impact**

The performance matrix exercise in Keiyo Marakwet Districts produced data about the expected or experienced effects of the projects funded by the ASAL programme, for a considerable number of sectors. The PRA team also came up with a number of effects after their assessment of the programme. Looking at the evidence, we can come to some observations.

### *Livestock*

- Zero grazing: project management committees were formed, although not as many as planned. The feeding management improved, as well as the area under napier grass.
- Paravet training: improved local ability to treat minor livestock diseases.
- Livestock upgrading: a few model farmers improved the quality of their herd and / or flock, increased meat and milk production per animal. Because of ASAL, farmers are more inclined to improve on-farm conservation activities, change 'local breeds' for improved ones and to lobby for individual land ownership.
- Poultry: this seems to be a very successful part of the programme considering the judgement of the communities. The quality of the chicken has been improved, and egg production increased. Eighty farmers can now be regarded as commercial egg farmers, each with 30-300 birds, though disease risks are very high. Yet, as indicated before in § 7.2, the programme decided to no longer put funds into this activity
- Livestock water: the distance to livestock watering points has been decreased. Hides and skins improvement: the quality of hides and skins has been improved and therefore farmers fetch a much higher price for their hides and skins.
- Tick control: cattle health improved.
- Beekeeping: honey quality and the marketing of honey and wax improved; a small refinery has been built (with a potential to earn 90,000 Kshs. per annum).
- Camel introduction: results are unclear, also given the permanent danger that the Pokot will raid them. The future seems doubtful.
- Livestock fodder: chances of successful introduction of zero grazing and grade cattle increased and, hence, the 'modernisation' of land management and land ownership.
- Agro-industries: interesting attempts to establish rural industries. The mala plant is a very successful undertaking and providing many people in the area around the plant with extra income.
- Also the prospects for the feed processing plant look promising.

### *Cultivation and Environment*

- Forestry: the number of on-farm tree nurseries and on-farm trees has increased; soil and water protection improved; more forest has been protected.
- Soil conservation: there is more knowledge about the approach to be followed for micro-catchment rehabilitation.
- Crop and horticulture improvement: coffee, mango, banana and pineapple

- production has gone up.
- Furrow rehabilitation: in Marakwet there is more secure irrigation water at five indigenous irrigation areas. In Keiyo, attempts have been made to introduce irrigation.
- Energy: although the scale on which the introduction of liners is taking place is still limited, the introduction is very successful and makes the use of firewood for cooking much more efficient. It results in higher environmental awareness among women, lower environmental degradation (firewood) and less work for women. A jiko production activity for income generation and fuelwood conservation is on-going in Marakwet.
- Fish farming: like in Kajiado the idea seems to pick up; individual farmers are also making fish ponds now. It is questionable if the local people will change their diet and accept fish, but people from other areas, living in the local centres, will readily buy the fish.
- Agricultural extension: PRA methods have been introduced. The knowledge, mainly on coffee, dryland crops and fish farming, among extension staff and farmers has been increased. The quality of agricultural training at schools improved.
- Farm management: related to the transect approach, some knowledge was gained about 'model' farms at the various sites. In Marakwet the approach resulted in the formation of marketing groups.

#### *Water*

The domestic water situation in the Kerio Valley improved considerably (better health, lower work load for women, with side effects like gardens near water places). The environment around water points is now better protected. It was also expected that more people would come down from the escarpment to the service centres in the valley (however, the security situation in the North resulted in exactly the opposite).

#### *Small Business*

Youth Polytechnics: teaching on the YPs improved. Probably there is more attention for the problems of school leavers and especially for school and Youth Polytechnic leavers who want to start a small business (but the team could not get information about this). Maybe there is a higher inclination of the youth to stay in the Valley and try to start a small business there. Better working conditions for 'jua kali' workers and improved quality of the products. The student / teacher ratio is unfavourable.

#### *Education*

In fact the ASAL programme took over some of the financial provisions of the GoK to support primary and secondary schools and literacy classes. It can be expected that it did something to stop the recent deterioration of GoK finances for education. Drop out rates from literacy classes reduced and enrolment improved. It is unclear if enrolment of primary and secondary schools did improve. It is also unclear if ASAL's approach succeeded to increase parent's contributions and involvement.

The PMU is negative about this sector that will be implemented (like the health sector) outside the transect area approach. Through the Basic Education Support Programme a budget of NLG. 50,000 will be made available for 1998<sup>14</sup>.

The PMU has the outspoken preference that if the health and education sectors will continue, this should be organised outside the strict ASAL / TAA framework.

<sup>14</sup> The PMU has strong preference that if the health and education sectors will continue, this should be organised outside the strict ASAL framework / TAA. Implementation, though, can be under the programme.



[Implementation, though, can be under the programme (see also Part Two).

#### *Other*

The support for road improvement in and towards the Kerio Valley was long overdue. The agricultural potential of the northern Marakwet area, in particular, could much better be developed with reliable roads. With the recent ethnic upheavals in the area, the situation and the prospects now are very uncertain.

### **7.4 The Situation in Keiyo Marakwet; 1997 compared with 1982/86**

#### *Introduction*

The 1997 household survey in Keiyo and Marakwet selected households in nine sub-locations in the four transects, where ASAL is operating since 1995. Two of these survey areas (indicated with circles on the map below) had been studied as part of the ASAL baseline study in the 1980s: Sibow (or Sibou) near the divisional headquarters in Tot in 1982 (n = 30) and Kisoka (the villages Kasang and Kacheturgut) in 1986 (n = 101). In 1997 fewer households were studied: 10 in Sibou and 19 in Kisoka. Comparison of these two cases over a period of ten years can give an idea about changes in the northern Marakwet part of the Kerio Valley (see map next).

#### *Irrigated Agriculture*

This part of Marakwet is an area where indigenous irrigation already exists for a long time, sometimes assisted by external agencies (including ASAL), but mostly operating in a rather autonomous fashion, and with complex arrangements of water rights. Irrigation rights do change from year to year, and irrigation needs as well. Sibou's water security used to be much better than Kisoka's, but this probably changed recently, due to improvements in the furrows serving the Kisoka area.

In 1982 most households in Sibou used irrigation; in 1997 only 60% did.


In Kisoka the situation in the very dry year 1984 was critical, with only 35% of all households having access to (tiny bits of) irrigation water, and most of the harvests failed. In 1997, 77% of all households could irrigate their crops.

Many indicated that 1994 and 1995 had been bad years. The continued lack of water resulted in food insecurity: 100% of all households in Sibou and 90% in Kisoka said they experienced food shortages during one or more years during the last decade, and all households in Sibou as well as more than 60% of all households in Kisoka said that they produced less than half of all the food they needed in 1995.

#### *Water and Health*

In principle everyone had and still has a right to use water from escarpment streams and irrigation furrows for domestic purposes (in Sibou this was still done in 1997 by everyone; in Kisoka by a minority). According to the 1997 Keiyo Marakwet survey, 60% of all households still use a river or stream as their wet season water source. Recently many households in Kisoka got access to tapped water, nowadays used by 77% of all households.

Hygienic measures are still poor in most households: only 25-30% of all households boil water before drinking. In Sibou, 70% of the households nowadays use a latrine (one even a VIP latrine); in Kisoka only 26% has a simple latrine. Hardly any latrines, though, were present 10 years before.



### *Education*

Primary education enrolment had already reached 100% in Sibou, in 1982, for boys and for girls. This was still the situation in 1997. Sibou is near Tot, and this was the area where education started in the 1950s and rapidly increased during the 1970s, under catholic guidance. In Kisoka 85% of all eligible children went to school in 1986. This is still true for girls in 1997; for boys it is a bit lower (82%). The strong influence of the Catholic mission at Chesongoch is very evident, but not reaching everyone.

### *Income Levels*

#### Sibou

It is not possible to make a valid comparison between income levels in 1982/86 and 1997. Some indications can be given, though. In 1982, Sibou was generally regarded



as relatively rich by Marakwet standards, with more than 40% of all households getting income from a job or 'salary' (mostly labour migrants elsewhere sending remittances) and 25% of all households getting income from casual labour work in the area (mostly working for the then newly established Kerio Valley Development Authority Farm). In 1982, on average about 2,000 Kshs. were earned by selling crops (sorghum, some maize, some millet) or beer - in 1997 monetary terms<sup>15</sup>. However, some Sibou farmers had one or more plots in the highlands and some of the sales were from those plots.

Households without remittance income had an average expenditure level in 1982 of 3,000 Kshs. (in 1997 money terms); those with remittance income considerably more (40,000 Kshs. per average household). In 1986 the number of households with access to 'salary income' had gone up to 60%, but average income was only 15,000 Kshs. for each of these households, much below the 1982 level. Half of all households sold farm produce, but proceeds were lower than in 1982. New alternatives (commercial honey production, sale of chicken and eggs, commercial sale of milk, off-farm income) were all very limited. The total estimated income level in 1997 was 12,000 Kshs./household. Probably this was only half the level of 1982. Of the total monetary income in 1997, 70% came from jobs, almost 20% from animal sales and almost 10% from crops. In 1997, the security situation in Sibou was bad, with ethnic warfare with the Pokot threatening life, and probably undermining agricultural activities and income generation, and probably much more so than in Kisoka.

#### Kisoka

In the early 1980s, Kisoka was a poor corner in the Marakwet part of the Kerio Valley, in the mid-1980s, after the disastrous drought and goat's disease of 1984 it was heavily dependent on famine relief. Only 15% of all households had any income from a job or a 'salary' and only 3% of all households had any monetary income from the sale of crops, while the yields of the most important crop, millet, were extremely low. In 1997, the situation had become much more healthy, with 30% of all households getting income from a (labour migrant) salary, half of all households sold crops, most sold animals, 10% even milk, and 20% eggs, while 15% had income from off-farm activities in the area. The average monetary income level, which was close to zero in 1984-86, had gone up considerably, to a level not far from 20,000 Kshs. per household, more than one-and-a-half times the monetary income level of Sibou. In Kisoka, half of all monetary income came from jobs, 25% from crop sales, 20% from the sale of animals, milk and eggs, and 5% from off-farm activities.

The average Kisoka household is more 'advanced' in the use of external inputs compared to the average Sibou household in 1997. In Sibou 50% make use of paravets to improve animal health against 63% in Kisoka. In Sibou an average household spent Kshs. 1,000 on animal inputs, in Kisoka Kshs. 3,000. In Sibou hardly any farmer used animal manure as a deliberate strategy to improve the nutrient status of the soil; in Kisoka 25% of all farmers did. In Sibou 30% use improved seeds, in Kisoka 56%. In Sibou 30% practice (improved) beekeeping, in Kisoka 47%. In Sibou 10% had members who had attended polytechnic training, in Kisoka 32%. All these scores, in both areas, were probably much above the situation ten years ago. But the situation in 1997 shows a very interesting change of attitude in Kisoka, while farmers in Sibou were more sticking to their old ways.

#### *Environmental Awareness and Management*

The majority of all households in the area regarded soil erosion as a problem (80% in Sibou; 74% in Kisoka), with 60% of the farmers in Sibou and 40% in Kisoka actually using soil conservation techniques, and all farmers build and maintain terraces (as

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<sup>15</sup> Assuming that the 1982 shilling had a value of 6.5 times the 1997 value.



they have always done). Many farmers use drought-tolerant crops (millets, sorghum), although probably less than in 1982 when these were the crops all farmers used, and maize cultivation was still relatively unimportant. Forty to fifty % of all farmers in both areas regard deforestation as a problem. All use firewood, and 10% of the households in Kisoka use improved cooking fires. Half of all farmers in both areas nowadays buy tree seedlings. Half of the Sibou farmers and 70% of all Kisoka farmers actually plant trees.

## 7.5 Conclusions

- The transect area approach, by arranging implementation through Project Management Committees, has enhanced community organisation, project planning (including the correction of faulty plans), management capacity (including setting their priorities) and responsibility sharing at grassroots level.
- Almost all workshops, training, field days and tours in the ASAL programme of Keiyo and Marakwet, were accomplished as planned. Implementation of projects, building of structures are often behind schedule. The day to day running of projects and the maintenance of structures is even more difficult. This might be partially due to the recent start of the programme, but not exclusively.
- Popular projects include water projects, livestock improvement and potential business enterprises such as the processing of milk or fruits, and marketing of horticultural produce. Generally, where the perceived benefits of the project are clearly desirable at household level, and results can be expected in the short or medium term, community members participate with enthusiasm.
- In comparison, environment and general community welfare projects with no obvious household benefits are not yet stimulating this kind of community participation.
- Although tree planting has been taking place in the highlands, recently much forest has been cleared in the Marakwet Highlands by people fleeing from the Marakwet Valley because of the insecurity in that area. Most activities in the Marakwet Valley suffered from this insecurity.
- The sustainability of many projects is endangered by the fact that members are unable or unwilling to contribute to maintenance funds. Keiyo Marakwet Districts are poor compared to e.g. Kajiado and Laikipia Districts.
- The Transect Area Approach requires much input by certain community members, and by subject matter specialists, field and technical staff. Sometimes they are heavily overloaded, which hampers the progress of projects. Areas outside the transects are neglected until new transects are made 'active'.
- The considerable number of PMCs (more than 300 out of which more than 150 are active) meant that in the last two years the ASAL funds were divided over a large number of projects. This, sometimes, meant that more expensive projects were delayed because of lack of funds. In this 'high input' programme, financial input now has become the restrictive factor - also for the activation of new transect areas.
- The successful Economic Empowerment Project implies that a lot of people are able to get credit to start commercial activities, nevertheless, its terms have marginalised poorer members of the community.

If we compare the situation in the northern part of the Marakwet Keiyo valley since the start of the ASAL programme, improvements have taken place in certain areas since the 80s.

- The water and hygiene situation improved, in agriculture and livestock a number of changes took place (improved seeds, more use of animal manure



and better animal inputs, more use of paravets, more beekeeping), and more polytechnic training took place.

- In Kisoka, irrigation improved, and income from all sorts of agricultural sales increased considerably. Part of these changes can be attributed to ASAL, because they were active in most of the mentioned fields.
- In both areas hardly any changes took place in education.
- In Sibou, income was only roughly half of that at the beginning of the 80s. That is certainly due to the bad weather conditions in the last few years and even more so to insecurity.
- A high percentage of women (40% in Sibou and 60% in Kisoka) were members of women groups, but here again the strong and consistent influence of the Catholic Church will have played a major role.
- According to the 1997 survey, the increased sale of milk, and therefore income, in transect M is certainly an attribute of the Mala plant, even though almost half of all milk sales in the area went through other channels. The Mala plant probably contributed to the increased awareness on marketing in general.
- The awareness of environmental problems and the actual behaviour to improve environmental management, can at least partly be credited to the ASAL program's activities. Almost everybody, men as well as women, knew about the ASAL programme. In both areas, 10% of the interviewed households had already benefited from the ASAL credit programme, that was only recently introduced.

## **8 MONITORING AND EVALUATION**

### **8.1 Introduction**

The purpose of the analysis of Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) was to examine the existing data collection and analysis practices and develop proposals for improvement.

The analysis of M&E was done first by gathering information from key stakeholders through interviews and second by analysing the information using M&E framework. Interviews were conducted at three levels: Project Management Unit, implementing staff and community.

### **8.2 Historical Trends**

The initiative to develop a systematic M&E in Keiyo Marakwet began in 1995. This was necessitated by the donor policy that advocated a result oriented management, based on LFA. Since then, management has striven to develop an M&E system based on activity targets and objectively verifiable indicators. Several tools have been developed and implemented, while others are still being tested.

Unlike other ASAL programmes, Keiyo Marakwet plans to introduce a systematic M&E at all levels of institutions involved in project implementation. The uniqueness stems from the involvement of local institutions such as Project Management Committees (PMCs) and Transect Area Committees (TACs) in M&E. These institutions have received training on M&E.

Transect Area Co-ordinators (TCs) have also been trained on LFA with skills and knowledge used in the production of the current annual plans.

### **8.3 Monitoring and Evaluation Structures**

The review of structures began with a the description of the existing activities and analysis on how these activities serve the various M&E functions.

#### *Activities*

Several activities are undertaken to provide information to M&E. These are:

- Steering Committee meetings,
- PMU field visits,
- PMU meetings,
- Contact officers' meetings,
- Monitoring visits at departmental level,
- Platform meetings,
- Diagnostic surveys,
- Reports,
- Cost monitoring,
- Community monitoring activities.

#### *Tools for Data Collection*

Besides the monitoring and evaluation activities, the programme makes use of some tools to assist in data gathering and analysis. The activity schedule and budgets in



annual plans are some of the tools used in tracking both the financial and activity progress. These tools provide reference points for discussions during M&E meetings.

Apart from these planning tools, the programme has also developed and is developing data gathering formats for M&E purposes. The major weakness was lack of tools to measure project effects and impacts. Keiyo Marakwet argued that their implementation process was not at an advanced stage to give responses at the effects and impact level.

#### *Data Base for M&E*

The programme is generating much data on financial and physical progress. Most of it is stored in various software. The financial data are managed through PAM which was introduced by the embassy. Progress data are stored differently.

By the time of the review, no programme had an integrated data base that stored both financial and progress data. In Keiyo Marakwet, the M&E expert had a computer facility to support M&E functions. Part of the activity target data collected were stored in these computers. They were thinking of giving further training to the M&E expert to be able to use the facility effectively.

It was noted that an organised computerised data base was lacking. The hard copies data base were also complex. They were aimed at tracking the requests from the community by regions. However, from the magnitude of information that will be contained in these formats over time, it will be difficult to use them as a tool for management due to difficulties in analysing quantities of data.

#### **8.4 Efforts**

M&E activities were specified in annual plans and supported by budgets at programme level. These activities included ASC meetings, surveys, HoDs meetings, field visits by FLS, co-ordination meetings and development of M&E. Apart from these activities, there were also others which were regularly held, but had no budgetary implications. They included PMU and PMC meetings.

At the project level, the integration of M&E activities in annual plans was not explicit. Although, evidence of activities supporting M&E functions, such as zonal TPMs, TAC and PMC meetings, existed, they were not directly identified as M&E activities. This implied that other implementation activities such as co-ordination and implementation procedures compete with generation of M&E information. The outcome of such a situation would be M&E information which is of little use or has limited relation with project design specifications. According to the comparative studies done on GOs and NGOs M&E systems, information of this nature is contained in minutes which usually show little outputs or effects of the programmes. As such, they add to a pile of information load, which has little value to project decision making.

One positive attribute of M&E which is evolving, although at an initial stage, were linkages between local institutions involved in project implementation. The linkages between institutions such as PMU, TAC, TPM and PMC existed through regular meetings. From the discussions held with one of the PMC visited, the reports of their meetings are normally reported to TAC for action. From TAC, the report goes to zonal TPM which ultimately gets it to the PMU. If some of these meetings would specifically be planned for M&E functions, then chances of generating good quality data through the use of the established formats would be high.



Linkages with institutions set under the district focus for rural development, such as sub-DDCs and locational DDCs, appeared to be weak. Apart from the involvement of individual members of the committees (Chiefs and District Officers) there was no evidence of PMC or TAC reports being discussed in such parallel fora. Moreover, the participation of District Officers in TAC was still on paper and not existing in reality.

Management support for M&E was considered adequate. Within the PMU, there was an officer directly in charge of co-ordinating the activities. Other members of the PMU had also undertaken several initiatives to assist in the development of formats for information gathering. Further evidence of adequate support was also reflected in budgetary allocation for development of an M&E system.

Skills on M&E were not considered adequate by the implementing staff. The PMU's argument in this respect was that the system being developed was still new and provision to improve skills through training was already set out in plans.

Positive achievements of log frame in Keiyo Marakwet:

- It improved the involvement of the beneficiaries in planning.
- It increased the speed of implementation of activities because the activity /time chart is made clear.
- Transparency in implementation was improved because everybody, including the community members, knows the budget for all the activities.
- It created an environment for working together with other agencies.
- The community was empowered in recognising their rights in project implementation.

Drawbacks with log frame:

- The orientation towards the use of log frame planning has taken a long time.
- The process of planning takes too long because of the involvement of clients and local institutions.
- Over-empowerment of the community sometimes led to mistrust of officers and breakdown of protocol.
- The involvement of the beneficiaries in a participatory way led to ambitious identification of projects which cannot all be funded by ASAL.
- The programme has inadequate know-how to institutionalise M&E designed from log frame at the lower level of implementation.
- Facilities in the field were inadequate to undertake follow-up activities such as report writing.

## **8.5 Functional Aspects of M&E Activities**

The programme in Keiyo Marakwet is developing a systematic M&E which is integrated within the planning and implementation process. The development was observed to be at an early stage with several data gathering tools still in the process of being developed and others being tested. A positive achievement of the programme was the effective involvement of local institutions such as TAC and PMC in supervision and activity monitoring. The programme went further to provide an introductory training on monitoring and evaluation.

Members of PMCs and TACs were using activity and budget schedules as tools for discussions during monitoring meetings. This implied that discussions during such visits were focused on the achievement of targets. What was very impressive was the ability of a PMC to interpret schedules and make adjustments. According to the field



staff, this ability was made possible because members of the PMC are actively involved in making the plans. On the one hand, field staff felt this was over-empowerment, sometimes leading to loss of protocol (the PMC taking their complaints directly to PMU). On the other hand, the PMU felt it was a positive achievement which has enabled the community to know their rights in project implementation.

The programme is also using software PAM for financial management. The analysis of variance was used as a control measure. However, the functional role of heads of departments in budgeting and budgetary control was not clear. Transect Area Coordinators, though drawn from different departments, have direct links with the PMU. Supervisory control over them by heads of departments was not demonstrated.

Other functional features of M&E such as monitoring of output targets and effects, and establishing a data base, were still under consideration, but not yet in place.

## **8.6 Gender**

The gender expert was part of the PMU. A work programme for integrating gender into the on-going activities was also in place. The gender work group was active in the field, interacting with local institutions, raising awareness and discussing gender issues with the community.

Apart from this, some of the data collection formats had incorporated gender segregated data at participation level. Others did not have such provisions. Discussions with the gender expert indicated that some of the formats had not reached her office. The review team was given an assurance that such considerations will be given attention in the future. A weakness noted within the M&E set-up was the separate implementation of gender issues through the work group, giving little chance for integration into the mainstream M&E system.

## 9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### *Follow-up to Recommendations Review Mission 1993*

Unlike the programme in West Pokot, the programme in Keiyo Marakwet accepts the challenge of the magnitude of the problems to be solved by accepting the 10 objectives of the national ASAL policy. Interestingly, the two first objectives (highest priorities) are literally identical to those of West Pokot. The last three are rather similar. The difference is in objectives 3 and 4 that stipulate awareness raising regarding the need to reclaim and conserve the environment, and improved planning capacity and co-ordination between development actors. Such objectives are missing in West Pokot.

These two objectives formed the basis for land use planning in the transect area approach and the new operational structure that put far more power with the communities. The basis was laid for a mix of top down and bottom up planning. Major improvements were made in the systematic planning of activities.

The programme in Keiyo Marakwet especially is in the forefront of implementing the recommendations of the 1993 review. Considering the consequences of this and considering the risks involved (see final chapter 9) further development and strategic decisions should be taken in a wider forum than that of the single ASAL programme. If the donor continues to support the 1993 recommendations, the Keiyo Marakwet programme experience should be carefully analysed on its appropriateness for the other three districts.

### *Institutional Set-up*

It can be concluded that ASAL programmes are technically placed in the wrong ministry and, if the current situation continues, possibilities for improved co-ordination, technical and policy support to districts and co-ordination of the dialogue with donors are slim. There is little drive with the programmes management to stay with the parent ministry or even to continue the programme as a joint venture. To ensure there is government commitment to the ASAL programme, there should be a condition for matching funds implying adequate insight in GoK finances. The adoption of this matching fund principle is more critical than the magnitude of the amount of money contributed, as this would enable the government to be much more involved with the programme operations due to the stake that it holds in it. The final product will be the assurance that institutional sustainability is enhanced, accountability of decision making and use of funds is cultivated, thereby promoting transparency. If such a condition cannot be met, there seems little reason to continue with the ASAL programme as the 'joint venture' it is now.

To ensure there is government commitment to the ASAL programme, there should be a condition for matching funds, implying also adequate insight in GoK finances. The adoption of this matching fund principle is more critical than the magnitude of the amount of money contributed, as this would enable the government to be much more involved with the programme operations due to the stake that it holds in it. The final product will be the assurance that institutional sustainability is enhanced, accountability of decision making and use of funds is cultivated, thereby promoting transparency. If such a condition cannot be met, there seems little reason to continue with the ASAL programme as the 'joint venture' it is now.

The set-up of the management of the programme is a constraint and created an ambiguous perspective of the programme (called two-window system in other districts). Either the set-up and mandate of the programme needs reconsideration or



the composition and role of the PMU needs an overhaul.

At present the DFRD is 'broke' and is predominantly used politically in the district. Opportunities, however, do exist to improve the functioning of the DFRD policy, and the programme assisted in this respect. It played an active role in providing additional strategies to make the DFRD policy framework operationally effective. Its new organisational structure strongly involves the communities in the TAA through PMCs. The drawback is, however, obvious. TACs and PMCs do create also a structure partly separated from the formal one. The TACs are answerable to the Divisional Development Committees, and communication with the local authorities is facilitated by having the local MP, DO, councillors, chiefs, etc. as ex-officio members of the committee. Without the umbrella of the ASAL programme such a structure might disintegrate easily. Moreover, as long as peace and harmony about ASAL's activities is prevalent the structure will function properly but has little backing in case of conflicts.

Formally the ASAL programme depends for the financial control on the GoK structure, and history teaches that this control system is not always watertight and cannot always avoid misappropriation of funds. During the first phases of the programme avoidance of major financial conflicts was only possible because the advisors were involved in each and every detail of the programme and checked each activity personally. Such intimate knowledge of all the details of the programme provide the additional control mechanism required. After 1993, this became more and more difficult due to increased expenditure of the programme and due to the fact the PAs applied the formally correct position that such a personal control should not be part of their responsibilities, the ASAL programme being a GoK project.

Either the set-up and mandate of the programme needs reconsideration or the composition and role of the PMU needs an overhaul of the terms of reference for donor staff and GoK staff to avoid conflicts. The Keiyo Marakwet programme has made a strategic decision to start the reorganisation of the operational structure (e.g. by redefining the role of the line departments in identification and implementation of its activities. This step in itself is fully supported by the review team but should (i) be pursued consequently and (ii) not be done in isolation from the management structure in the three other districts.

The PMU already took quite useful steps to improve the situation by having the PAM system introduced in each transect and by making the PMCs (the communities) the responsible control mechanism. It is too early to assess whether this will work adequately. It also contradicts the character of the joint venture with joint responsibilities of the ASAL programmes as agreed upon between GoK and GoN.

The above does not imply that the review team recommends against these steps. It does recommend that the donor and the GoK see this change in the control responsibility (and the changed role of the line ministries - see § 5.5) in the perspective of all the ASAL programmes. The consequent conclusion could be that, de facto, the idea of the 'joint venture' has been left in Keiyo and Marakwet Districts and should be formalised and taken to its final consequences - also for the other districts.

### *Objectives / Strategies*

The review mission can conclude that the strategy applied in Keiyo Marakwet has been very successful in fulfilling the recommendations of the 1993 review, while creating a framework that can make the objectives to be met. A major step was made already in meeting the objective 3 and 4. It made the ASAL programme in Keiyo Marakwet the most modern one, in contrast to the one in neighbouring West Pokot.



Likewise the backstopping mission is the review team very positive about the considerable achievements of the programme during the period under review. Strategies were well defined and applied.

All will depend on two factors. First, the speed and magnitude with which the communities in the transects will identify themselves with long-term environmental issues and become prepared to address these for the sake of future generations. Second, to what degree the programme will be able to find the proper balance between 'conditions' and projects favoured by the communities.

The only advice the review team wants to give is that considering the risks involved and the high vulnerability of a programme in the risky process, that from now onwards (now that the implementation has started and preparations have been made) the forum for decision making (to find that proper balance) will be wider than that of the district ASAL programme. A wider forum for deliberations than is now operational (basically the PMU) might avoid political pitfalls and provide wider support and backing for decisions.

Not to have a real target group is a common characteristic of the Dutch supported ASAL programmes. This is not necessarily a weak point as long as the programme has proper and realistic objectives supported by adequate strategies to achieve the objectives. If objectives, strategies and criteria are not well done the programme will rapidly develop into a series of unrelated small activities that have little coherence or synergy. This is why the good quality of the strategies in the Keiyo Marakwet programme is so important and why introduction of e.g. a log frame is a useful contribution to the quality of the ASAL programmes.

#### *Focus on Sectors*

Almost 63 % of expenditure over the review period could not be related to specific projects but was spent on workshops, training, equipment, overhead, et cetera. Out of the 37 % on specific project expenditure, 63 % was allocated to the productive / economic sector (see footnotes 12 and 23). The largest single allocation went to roads and bridges and 'water' projects were the most popular.

Activities that can be characterised as beneficial for the environment used 14 % of project funds and the review team estimates that at least 25 % but probably one third of all expenditure was spent on land use planning (preparations), in line with the central position this strategy has. Closely related to this is the high level of environmental awareness that was observed in Keiyo Marakwet.

Projects that were specifically meant for women, received 22 % of all project expenditure.

The on-going Phase Three of the ASAL programme, is generally implementing on target, and financial planning is done correctly since underspending on annual budgets hardly occurs.

In the few locations where a comparison could be made with the situation of the 1980ies, a probable positive impact of previous phase could be observed. Improved supply of irrigation water features strongly in this (and increased sale of agricultural produce), as well as the improved general water and hygiene situation.

#### *Implementation Mechanisms and Partners*

The transect area approach, by arranging implementation through Project Management Committees, has enhanced community organisation, project planning



(including the correction of faulty plans), management capacity (including setting their priorities) and responsibility sharing at grassroots level. Also after the introduction of the new organisational structure, the departmental staff represents the major implementing capacity available.

There should be more astute efforts to have a common policy for all NGOs and have improved co-ordination between them, especially in Keiyo District. Strengthening this collaboration would improve the districts' capacity to undertake projects and to enhance co-ordination of activities.

Considerable, systematic and continuous attention to the capacity building such CBOs will have to be given for the programme to have sufficient future implementing structure. Awareness raising and organisation took place but various elementary skills the CBOs will need in the future are insufficiently present. This capacity building will claim considerable parts of the human and financial resources available (see also § 5.10). The use of this flexible mechanism of consulting companies over which the programme has good control, should be continued.

There appear to be little or fading away problems up to now with the higher inputs especially because the start of necessary reorganisations took place (see previous paragraphs in this chapter). It can be observed in this context that the donor on the one hand stimulated higher inputs for more impact, but has not been reliable in fulfilling financial commitments made in this respect. During the review period considerable confusion existed about the level of funds available. Moreover, the PMU claims that the only restriction to embark upon new / more transects is a financial one. If this assessment is correct, a gap exists between words and deeds.

### *District Split*

As long as the ASAL programme is a joint venture of GoK and the donor, implying a clear responsibility with the district administration for its implementation, it is recommended that once districts are split, the government and the donor can agree on (a) to create another district programme with its own administrative structure or (b) to phase out one of the districts. The choice to depend on on-going commitments.

Would such a joint venture for the ASAL programmes be abolished, little objection would exist to continue operating in the same geographical area as before the split.

### *Monitoring and Evaluation*

The conclusions and recommendations on the monitoring and evaluation in all the districts are presented in the overall report - Part Two chapter 4.3.

# **ANNEXES TO DISTRICT REPORT KEIYO MARAKWET**



# **ASAL PROJECTS KEIYO MARAKWET 1993-1996**

Table 1 *Livestock and animal health care*

Sub Sector	ASAL Funds (x 1000 Kshs.)	Project	Target	Achievements	%
Zero grazing	3240	workshops,	17	17 w. 169 farm.	100
		demonstrations,	10	5	50
		field days,	6	6	100
		tours,	3	3 with 21 farm.	100
		follow up vis.,	12	8	65
		groups formed,	16	3	20
		dairy cows acq.	130	24	20
Paravets	2551	training and equipping	87	75	85
Livestock upgrading	2213	barazas,	70	50	70
		Sahiwal to farmers,	27	14	50
		follow up visits,	50	35	70
		tour on dairy goats,	1	1	100
		improved goats and sheep to farmers,	292	91	30
		goats multipl. centre.	1	0	0
Poultry	2232	poultry unit construction.	1	1	100
		improved chicken exchange.	..	5300	..
		farmers tour.	1	1 with 21 farm.	100
		farmers training,	..	193	..
		vaccination campaign.	..	20000	..
Liv. water	1542	constr. & rehabilit. troughs.	16	3	20
		constr. water jars.	40	28	70
Hides & skins improvement	1211	constr. bandas	7	3	45
Tick control	848	rehabil. dips	8	4	50
Draught animals	306	no information			
Beekeeping	284	training workshops.	8	8	100
		tours,	3	3	
		seminar.	1	1	
		equipment bought,	31	31	
		survey.	1	1	
Camel production	271	camels introduced	2	2	100



Tsetse eradication	137	no information			
Liv. fodder	120	fodder tree nursery, species experiments.	1 6	0 6	0 100
Machinery	102	no information			
Dry season animals	69	no information			
Livestock-based Agro-industries	..	milk plant,	1	1	100
		feed processing plant,	1	1	100
		tannery	1	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>15126</b>				

Table 2 *Cultivation and environment*

Sub Sector	ASAL Funds (x 1000 KShs)	Project	Target	Achievement	%
Forestry	4540	seedling production, tree planting,	0.95 m	0.94 million	100
		springs protected,	0.11 m	59,000	55
		ha forest planted,	7	7	100
		km. live fence,	1	7	700
		farmers training on farm nurseries,	15	9	60
		training forest guards,	400	320	80
			20	20	100
Soil conservation	1882	ha rehabilitated, micro catchments rehabilitated.	2.5 5	2.5? 3 with 14 km grass strips	100? 60
Crop and horticulture improvement	1855	crop bulking plots,	21	15	70
		training integr. pest management,	14	6	45
		farm surveys,	60	65	110
		buy coffee hand pulpers,	25	20	80
		coffee tour,	1	1 with 22 farm.	100
		coffee field days,	4	3	75
		coffee training,	4	4	100
		mango processing tour,	1	1 with 10 farm.	100
		banana weevil controls on farms,	400	150	40
		pineapple suckers,	20000	20000	100
		mango tree improv.	220	176	80
		mango marketing tours,	16	12	75

Env sensitisation	1111	no information			
Traditional furrow rehabilitation	901	furrows rehabilitated	5	5 in Marakwet	100
		group formation,	3	3 in Keiyo	100
		farmers training,	18	12 in Keiyo	65
		tour,	1	1 with 10 farm.	100
		design intakes	3	1	35
Energy	452	improved jikos sold,	1520	954	65
		survey trips,			
		training women	10	10	100
		groups members	150	163	110
		educ. tours	2	2 with members	80 100
Fish farming	363	introduce fish ponds,	24	22	90
		tour	1	1	100
		training	15	15	100
Agr. extension	347	staff training,	36	19	55
		farmers training,	10	10 w. 123 farm.	100
		field days	4	2 w. 660 farm.	50
		4k club training,	165	120	75
		educ. tours.	5	3	60
Farm management	176	soil sampling,	500	200	40
		selection model farmers,	40	36	90
		data collection	18	18	100
		model farms,			
		tour.	1	1 with 5 model farmers	100
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>11280</b>				

Table 3 Water resources

Sub Sector	ASAL Funds (x 1000 Kshs.)	Project	Targ-et	Achievements	%
Rural water supply	5229	construction	8	8	100
Gravity water supply	9691	no information			
Catchment rehabilitation	870	no information			
Spring protection	857	protected springs	8	4	50



Drought water reserve	584	no information			
Ferro cement tanks	260	no information			
Roof catchments	85	construct water tanks	..	4	..
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>17576</b>				

Table 4 Small business

Sub Sector	ASAL Funds (x 1000 Kshs.)	Project	Target	Achievements	%
Youth polytechnics	812	training instructors, support YPs with basic tools, construction of mechanics workshop	22 8 1	38 7 0	175 90 0
school leavers training	543	no information			
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1355</b>				

Table 5 Education

Sub Sector	ASAL Funds (x 1000 Kshs.)	Project	Target	Achievements	%
In-service course untrained teachers	3896	training	470	490	105
Training of adult education teachers	2747	training	352	237	65
Support to secondary schools	1263	lab equipment			
Inspection adult literacy classes	1048	inspection visits	494	494	100
Inspection of schools	950	inspection visits	444	409	90

Teaching materials adult education	807	all schools	152	152	100
Building materials to schools	647	primary schools	22	22	100
Support primary schools	649	basic equipment to schools	8	8	100
Incentives to schools with good results	565	best schools at KCPE exams			
school feeding	80	no information			
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>12652</b>				

## 2.6 *Other*

Sub Sector	ASAL Funds (x 1000 Kshs.)	Project	Target	Achievements	%
Health projects	1831	family planning via traditional birth attendants, dispensaries, VIP latrines, school training.			
Chesoi-Chesongoch road	4347	culverts	10	10	100
Main valley road, rural roads	8419	gabions, general maintenance	12		
Transect roads	7727	no information			
<b>Total roads</b>	<b>20493</b>				



Royal Netherlands Embassy

Ministry of Land Reclamation,  
Regional and Water Development

# **REVIEW OF THE ASAL PROGRAMMES**

## **PART TWO**

### **OVERALL REPORT**

ETC East Africa, November, 1997

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

(One basic list is used for all the reports; for that matter, not all abbreviations will show in each of the separate reports)

AEZ	Agro Ecological Zone
AIC	African Inland Church
AIP	ASAL Investment Programme
ALRMP	Arid Lands Resources Management Project
AMREF	African Medical and Research Foundation
ARU	Applied Research Unit
ASAL	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands
ASC	ASAL Steering Committee
ATC	Assistant Transect Area Co-ordinator
CAP	Community Action Plan
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CBS	Central Bureau for Statistics
CCF	Christian Children's Fund
CMC	Credit Management Committee
CMC	Credit Management Committee
CMG	Credit Management Group
CMG	Credit Management Group
CMIP	Co-operative Management Improvement Programme
CMPP	Community Member Participation Programme
COPP	Community Oriented Project Planning
CSR	Civil Service Reform Programme
CSR	Civil Service Reform Programme
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DANIDA	Danish International Development Assistance
DDC	District Development Committee
DDO	District Development Officer
DDP	District Development Plan
DEC	District Executive Committee
DEC	Drought Escaping Crops
DFRD(S)	District Focus for Rural Development (Strategy)
DGIS	Directorate General for International Co-operation
DIDC	District Information and Documentation Centre
DO	District Officer
DPU	District Planning Unit
E	East
ECF	East Coast Fever
ECU	European Currency Unit
EMI	Embu, Meru, Isiolo
FES	Field Extension Staff
FLS	Front Line Staff
GA	Gender Adviser
GACP	Gender and Co-operative Programme
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIS	Geographical Information System
GoK	Government of Kenya
GoN	Government of the Netherlands
GSIME	Gender Sensitive Impact Monitoring and Evaluation
HHS	Household Survey
HoD	Head of Department
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO	International Labour Organisation (UN)

IOV	former evaluation department of DGIS
IS	Implementation Scheme
ITDG	Intermediate Technology Development Group
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KCPE	Kenyan Certificate for Primary Education
KNFC	Kenya National Federation of Co-operatives
KVDA	Kerio Valley Development Authority
KWS	Kenya Wildlife Services
LDF	Laikipia Development Fund
LFA	Logical Framework Approach
LMC	Livestock Marketing Centre
LRDP	Laikipia Rural Development Programme
LRP	Laikipia Research Programme
LUP	Land Use Planning
LUPA	Land Use Planning Adviser
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDP	Marsabit Development Programme
MIDP	Machakos Integrated Development Project
MIS	Management Information System
MIS	Management Information System
MLRRWD	Ministry of Land Reclamation, Regional and Water Development
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoALD&M	Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development & Marketing
MRDASAW	Ministry of Reclamation and Development of Arid and Semi-Arid Areas and Wastelands
N	North
NEP	National Extension Programme
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NLG	Dutch Guilder
NORAD	Norwegian Assistance to Development
NPO	National programme Officer
NRM	Natural Resources Management
ODA	Overseas Development Administration
O&M	Operation and Maintenance
OPS	Office of Project Services (formerly UNDP, now UN)
PA	Programme Advisor
PAM	Project Administration Management
PAWS	Problem Analysis Workshops
PlanOps	Plan of Operations
PMC	Project Management Committee
PMU	Project Management Unit
PO	Programme Officer
PPM	Project Planning Matrix
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
RCA	Reformed Church of Africa
RNE	Royal Netherlands Embassy
RRA	Rapid Rural Appraisal
S	South
SDC	Swiss Development Co-operation
SLO	Sector Liaison Officer
SMS	Subject Matter Specialist
SNV	Netherlands Development Organisation
SRDP	Special Rural Development Programme
STD	Sexually Transmitted Disease
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
TA	Transect Area / Technical Assistance



TAA	Transect Area Approach
TAAP	Transect Area Action Plan
TAC	Transect Area Committee
TAM	Transect Area Meeting
TBA	Traditional Birth Attendant
TC	Transect Area Co-ordinator
ToR	Terms of Reference
TOT	Trainer of Trainers
TPM	Transect Planning Meetings
TPS	Transect Planning Sheets
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSO	UNDP Office to Combat Desertification and Drought
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VI	NGO
W	West
WB	World Bank
WID	Women in Development
YP	Youth Polytechnic

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## The First Ten Years of Netherlands Supported ASAL Programmes

- 1 ASAL programmes have a considerable history in Kenya that formally started in 1979 with the establishment of an ASAL section in the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development<sup>1</sup>, and the publication of an ASAL policy document. Since then, development of ASAL areas has been shifted between ministries and even had its own ministry for some years until 1993, when ASAL was merged into the MLRRWD.
- 2 All major donors have been involved in a large variety of ASAL programmes. The Netherlands' support to ASALs started in 1983 (West Pokot and Elgeyo Marakwet Districts<sup>2</sup>) and was in 1987 extended to include Kajiado District. In 1993, Laikipia District completed the quarter, when taking this district over from the SDC.
- 3 The initial philosophy of the Netherlands supported ASAL programmes can be characterised as emphasising the responsibilities of the people and their government for development. ASAL support should strengthen existing institutions and 'oil the government machinery' in the district. This was to be achieved through the programmatic or process-approach. The donor input in district development efforts should be modest (both in TA and in finances) and flexible. The programmes were to be multi-sectoral, and community participation to be encouraged.
- 4 Basically, these ideas governed the ASAL programmes till 1993, when a review of these programmes resulted in a call for more 'impact' in view of the 'massive' problems in force in the ASAL areas. The programmes were to focus on the productive sectors, and on land use planning or natural resource management. The PMUs were to be strengthened, and the budgets to be increased considerably to achieve that higher impact by addressing the fundamental long-term issues featuring prominently in the ASAL districts. At the same time, all the strong points of the programmes as they had functioned for between 5-10 years were to be maintained.

## This Review

- 5 Using a number of methods like PRAs, HHSs and an activity matrix, the current Review Team assessed the achievements of the programmes since 1993. However, assessing project outputs (compared to targets) is difficult, especially where projects do not have consistent management information (MIS) and monitoring systems, recording systematically the data required. The management problems faced by the PMUs can be partly traced back to this.
- 6 Output data from GoK staff like liaison officers and Heads of Departments, was not always consistent with information from the PMU. Various cross-checks were needed to arrive at a satisfactory picture of quantitative outputs achieved.

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<sup>1</sup> This became the Ministry of Finance and Planning and later on the Ministry of Planning and National Development.

<sup>2</sup> For a brief period the Netherlands also supported two ASAL divisions (Ndeiya and Karai) in Kiambu District.



- 7 If assessment of outputs is cumbersome as explained above, assessment of project effects, or qualitative impact is even more difficult. It is not easy to directly assess the quality of the output (or activity), neither is it possible to directly assess whether the output produced gives value for money. The main reason is that the MIS does not produce the required information to base such an assessment on. Nevertheless the PRAs provided information for the most recent period, and in the two 'oldest' districts, West Pokot and Elgeyo Marakwet (now split into Keiyo and Marakwet Districts), an indirect qualitative assessment was made, using baseline data collected during the first half of the 1980s, while comparing those with the 1997 situation.
- 8 Quantitative and qualitative achievements were related to the management aspects and the institutional setting of the ASAL programmes. Finally, the macro-context in which the ASAL programmes are now operating was analysed.

### **Output and Targets**

- 9 Looking at the extent to which project targets have been met, it can be concluded from the activity matrices that, in a quantitative sense, the ASAL programmes have been quite successful. In the majority of projects, 75% or more of the target had been met. Very few cases achieved less than 50% of the target. In almost all cases, acceptable explanations could be given for not meeting the target. Predictably, the projects directly benefiting households achieved the best results, in physical performance as well as in adequate community contribution and participation.
- 10 Moreover, all programmes honoured the 1993 review by spending the biggest part of their funds to the productive sector. In the same venue, budgets and expenditure increased considerably from 1994 onwards.
- 11 Monitoring of these achievements can be improved if activities (and outputs within these activities) can be treated as cost centres. This is possible with EXACT software introduced in Kajiado District by SNV. The PAM system, in use in the other districts, is a bookkeeping system, that serves predominantly the Dutch financial administrative system. The PAM system contributes to the flexible or sometimes inconsistent way of relating expenditure to activities.
- 12 In order to enable the management to perform better, priority should be given to development of the current project administration system into an operational MIS. The MIS relates planned and actual inputs, activities and outputs. The programme managers ought to be trained - if required - to be able to use such a crucial management tool. In addition to the MIS, priority should be given to the development of an effect monitoring system, simple and co-ordinated - if not integrated - with the MIS.

### **Effects and Impact**

- 13 As indicated above, defining and measuring project effects and impact, is more difficult than is the case for outputs. The basis for the impact assessment consists of actual information from programme staff and staff implementing projects, PRAs and household surveys. The first two methods are fairly subjective, the third is fraught with other methodological pitfalls. Attempts have been made to eliminate biases and intervening factors.
- 14 With all the required provisos, it is fair to assess that the projects in the field of domestic and productive water, livestock, and agriculture, all seem to have



generated positive effects, in particular since those projects command high priority of the people.

- 15 The social sectors like education and health are variable. Education definitely is a success story in West Pokot District, and is slightly positively assessed in Kajiado. Nevertheless, these two social service sectors are, on the whole, met with some reservations. Implementation is sometimes frustrating, in other cases little successful, and ASAL's involvement on those sectors not always fits strategies chosen (e.g. the Transect Area Approach in Keiyo Marakwet Districts cannot be applied to the education programme).
- 16 Considering the longer term, it was clear in West Pokot and (Elgeyo) Marakwet, that for a high number of indicators, the areas with ASAL interventions were considerably different (better of) than non-intervention areas. The conclusion should be that also as 'low input' programmes since 1983, the ASAL programmes in those districts contributed to the quality of living of the communities involved.
- 17 The Review Team considers that monitoring in the ASALs can be improved (and is being improved considerably over the past years by the PMUs) by using e.g. EXACT software, as stipulated above. Evaluation of impact, effect on the quality of living of the people involved, is considered by the Review Team as an exercise that is difficult to realise within the framework of the ASAL programmes, or even by periodic external 'evaluations'. In the part on M&E, specific recommendations are made in this respect.

### **Land Use Planning / Environment**

- 18 In land use planning (or natural resource management) - so strongly emphasised by the 1993 review mission - the achievements have laid the foundation for the concrete action in three out of four districts. West Pokot District made a rather modest start with LUP, but it never took off.
- 19 Keiyo Marakwet is the most 'advanced' programme where LUP is concerned. The programme made natural resource management the centre of its activities. Being the most advanced it will also be the first programme that will have to face the consequences of trying to combine the 'bottom-up' approach (that proved to be successful for projects in most of the other sectors) with 'top-down' elements that should address the long-term (environmental) issues that threaten development in the ASAL areas.
- 20 The Review Team highly appreciates the efforts made in Keiyo Marakwet with the Transect Area Approach, and with the transfer of responsibilities from line department to communities in those areas. Yet, for three levels the Review Team points out the risks involved, and concludes that only the future will make clear if the proper balance can be found between the first priorities of the communities, and the perceived long-term issues.

### **Gender**

- 21 Gender has a place on the district development agenda. Concrete progress in the districts, even where gender advisors have been present for a considerable period, has not been fully convincing. Several recommendations are made for several aspects to improve the existing situation.
- 22 An overall recommendation is, that in order to facilitate joint activities such as training on specific aspects, technical support in developing strategies and



methods, carrying out studies and facilitating exchange meetings, central co-ordination will be needed. The facilitation has, in the past, been provided by both the Embassy and SNV. It is recommended that, in the next phase, short-term expertise be contracted to provide this facilitation and backstopping when and as required.

### The Context

- 23 The context in which ASAL programmes had to function has not been particularly easy. The failure by the GoK to implement policies that would have produced sustained growth of employment, production and income is, in the face of rapid population growth, a major factor that has caused increased poverty, also in the ASAL areas. Introduction of cost sharing for health and education services has increased the financial burden on poor families, or has excluded them from these essential services altogether.
- 24 Provision of public services to the people, including social services as well as economic services like agricultural extension, marketing, rural infrastructure and so on, suffers increasingly from gross inefficiency, corruption, and a de-motivated civil service, leading to an even poorer quality.
- 25 Some of the other factors that have contributed to an almost hostile development climate are:
  - unwillingness of the government to de facto decentralise decision making to the districts;
  - district financial allocations in general have been reduced over the past years;
  - political power games in the various districts in which, among others, government - and where possible donor - funds have been used as weapons; ethnic and group conflicts are unscrupulously exploited in this arena; private gains of those in power seem to be a strong motive;
  - cattle raiding which has increased insecurity substantially, especially in West Pokot and Marakwet Districts.
  - conflicts over land and water resources between the various users which in most districts are the political centre stage.
- 26 In the Review Team's view, depict the highly politicised land (and water) conflicts an arena where donors will probably not be able to achieve much, implying serious constraints for (land use) planning and management of major issues. The risks mentioned in relation to the Keiyo Marakwet LUP focus (see above), should be read in the light of this opinion.
- 27 Aiming at high impact, searching to address fundamental long-term issues are, by all means, the key principles in the Netherlands' policies for the ASAL programmes. The context analysis makes clear the enormity of the overruling factors in force. In line with this is e.g. the overall perception of the inhabitants of West Pokot District, that their situation has deteriorated over the past 10 - 15 years. This is despite the positive contributions made by e.g. an ASAL programme.

### Objectives

- 28 Basically the objectives of the ASAL programmes have remained unchanged from the inception till 1997. The objectives can be summarised as:
  - (i) raising the standard of living of the population by efficient and sustainable

- resource use;
  - (ii) support to decentralised planning and implementation of development activities and strengthening and 'oiling' the government machinery to do so; and
  - (iii) promote a participatory approach involving communities in prioritising, planning and implementation of projects. In 1993, the objectives to create impact and to emphasise the productive sectors and land use planning, were added.
- 29 The Review Team holds the opinion that the objectives are still valid but not necessarily achievable simultaneously and in one programme. It also endorses the recommendation made in the 1993 review that the programme should focus on the productive sector. The programmes have indeed, since 1993, emphasised the productive sectors with three out of four programmes spent 60% or more on projects in the productive sectors (including land use planning). The Review Team also holds the view that the approach to involve local communities as much as possible in planning, implementation as well as management of projects, should continue to be the guiding principle for projects in most sectors and should be further strengthened.
- 30 With the drive to generate impact and with a stronger focus on 'top-down' elements, while at the same time with the wish to maintain the seasoned qualities, an almost inherent inconsistency has been introduced into the programmes. Trying to combine those two programme lines is a factor that contributed to the programmes becoming difficult to manage and to control. It contributed to the reinforcement of the so-called 'two window' management system<sup>3</sup>, that has contributed to the programmes becoming difficult to control.
- 31 The management structure or the mandate of the programme needs, therefore, reconsidering.

### **The Joint Venture GoK / GoN**

- 32 Working within the government structure does not make it always easy - and sometimes even next to impossible - to have communities fully involved in the planning and implementation of projects. This is despite the fact that the District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) policy has emphasised decentralised decision making and community involvement since 1983.
- 33 Some of the factors that make working in and through the government structure ineffective and inefficient are:
- an unmotivated civil service in which corruption has become endemic;
  - highly centralised decision making despite the formal decentralised DFRD system;
  - ASAL funds as an incentive to further reduce allocations to the districts leaving departments basically without development funds and hardly funds for O&M; and,
  - resistance against giving more responsibilities to communities.
- 34 The problematic experience in working in and through the government structure should be taken to its logical consequence. This means that the second objective (see above) has to be re-interpreted. The government is no longer the preferred partner in implementing the ASAL programme. The programme management

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<sup>3</sup> For a certain kind of activities the PA was approached, for other types the PO.



selects the partner most fit for a project to be planned and implemented. Institutional support is given to all partners co-operating with the programme. The programme should be formally dissociated from the government structure and be no longer a 'joint venture' between the GoK and the GoN. It should be managed by a single window management system.

- 35 The ASAL programmes are misplaced with the MLRRWD and would be in a better position with the Ministry of Planning and National Development. However, if the joint venture is to be abolished, the choice of a real parent ministry is not very relevant. Looser bilateral arrangements might be applicable as, for example, the one in force for the EU financed Community Development Trust Fund.

### Future Arrangements

- 36 The Review Team is of the view that the institutional arrangements that could do justice to the objectives, maintain the strengths of the proven ASAL approach, avoid the problems inherent to working within the government structure, and accommodates the new challenges, should consist of two 'institutional set-ups' (for want of a better expression):

- (i) Four district ASAL programmes, without the joint responsibility. Each programme will be managed on behalf of the donor. The partners for co-operation and implementation will be selected on merit and potential (not excluding line ministries). The approach should be firmly based on community participation. Activities should be contracted out, and the practice of open-ended co-operation be replaced: all this in line with the present Laikipia 'model'. Essentially, the programmes will be managed as a private organisation. The number of sectors should be reduced to three: water (productive and domestic), livestock and agriculture (crops). The main reasons<sup>4</sup> for the proposed changes are the expected increase in effectiveness and manageability of the programmes. The three sectors selected have a high priority according to the target group.
- (ii) Centrally co-ordinated and guided programmes for at least credit (micro-/small business), and education, to which health could be added. The implementation is to take place through the framework and network of the ASAL programmes. The latter two social services sector programmes have, in general, proven to be problematic in the context of an ASAL programme but, at the same time, have shown successes under specific circumstances. For that matter, these sectors should not be excluded from Dutch support. With this proposal important sectors that highly affect the livelihood of the people, can get attention without interfering with the main business of the ASAL programmes.

- 37 For land use planning or natural resource management, a central co-ordination through TA is proposed. In the case of land use planning are initiatives from the centre such as research and development, innovation and co-ordination of activities in the districts - learning from each others' successes and failures - two essential characteristics. Moreover, depending on the balance applied between top-down long-term activities and short-term community priorities, decision making should be brought to a higher level than that of the individual districts; more political and strategic 'clout' must be seen to.

<sup>4</sup> Throughout the reports more reasons are given for this reduction like: the priorities of the communities and their focus on productive sectors, the need not to spread too thinly, the need to focus more on capacity building of (new) partners like NGOs and CBOs, the frustrations very often with the social services sectors, et cetera.

- 38 For the sectoral programmes (ii), the mode of implementation is, in the Review Team's view, clear: contracting out to a capable private organisation. The same could apply to the TA for land use planning.
- 39 For the four district programmes (i), the situation is more complicated. Characteristics of these programmes such as strong community participation, intangible benefits, and (an element of) process approach, suggest that they are more suitable for either implementation 'in eigen beheer' or for commissioning to SNV. The Review Team has no strong preference for either one or the other but feels strongly about opting for just one mode of implementation and not two, as is currently the case.



# 1 HISTORY AND POLICY BACKGROUND OF ASAL PROGRAMMES

## 1.1 The Basic Problems in ASAL Areas

The problems in ASAL areas are complex. They are not only interwoven within the ASAL areas but there are also strong links between ASAL areas and the (high potential) rest of the country. Any attempt therefore to summarise the problems in one or two pages is bound to (over)simplify and to miss a few issues.

In all districts the agro-ecological zones (AEZs) IV to VII (semi-humid to very arid) are present, though in different proportions. Despite their diversity in soils, landscapes, altitude, geographical location etc. they have a number of problems in common.

Looking at the population growth of all ASAL areas it appears that the average growth rate is in line with the national average. The situation in the Rift Valley ASALs is apparently different - with higher growth rates caused by net immigration - from the other provinces creating also specific problems.

Population growth in the 'Dutch' ASAL districts is above the national average. In the eighties (latest official figures available) the growth rate ranged between 3.5 % p.a. in Elgeyo Marakwet to 5.6 % in Kajiado compared to the national average of 3.3 %. In the preceding decade it were Laikipia and West Pokot that recorded the highest growth figures: 7.0 % and 6.6% respectively compared to a national average of 3.4 %.<sup>5</sup> Population density, especially in those parts of the district where conditions for agriculture are better, has increased over the past decades with a factor of 3 to 4. People have been moving in from the neighbouring high potential areas.

Migration is not a simple uni-directional movement. High population growth, a limited agricultural potential (even when temporarily over exploited), policies and practices that do not enhance optimal landuse, are factors that intensify the already existing employment problem. People - especially the young - migrate to market centres and towns in order to find a way to survive by way of legal means e.g. (self)employment or by illegal means e.g. as paid cattle raiders.

Rapid natural population growth up to the nineties exacerbated by net immigration, has increased the pressure on land. The increased population has a number of negative impacts: environmental degradation, purchase of land for speculative purposes, reduction of the size of land holdings to economically unfeasible units. Agricultural techniques imported from high- and medium potential areas and reduction of the fallow period, deplete soils rapidly. Degradation and erosion of soils is the negative impact of unsuitable landuse practices.

With the exception of a few pockets of high agricultural potential, farming in the ASAL areas is subsistence in nature. The pressure on land pushes subsistence farmers to even more marginal lands, making them - and their families - more vulnerable to the vagaries of the climate. Frequent droughts means frequently lack of food. Usually there is hardly any cash in the household to help them to survive. This makes them dependent on food aid, thus creating or reinforcing the dependency syndrome. Unlike the pastoralists, subsistence farmers have no wealth they can sell in times of drought, to get cash to buy food (see § 3.5 on food security).

Expansion of land under crops, to include marginal (range)lands, causes degradation of these lands which, in order to be used in a sustainable way, can only be used for extensive grazing. Increase of land under crops reduces the area for dry season

<sup>5</sup> In the seventies the growth rate of Elgeyo Marakwet was even negative: -0.6 % p.a.



grazing. Reduction in communal grazing lands, even with on the average a stationary livestock population, leads to overgrazing, which is another source of environmental degradation. The impact of subsequent droughts is, therefore, much more severe occasionally, causing massive loss of livestock.

In three of the 'Dutch' ASAL districts - West Pokot and Marakwet being the most notorious - cattle raiding is a serious cause for insecurity, as well as economic damage (loss of livestock) to the districts.

Conflicts between wildlife and livestock interests are endemic in all ASAL areas. Tourism is a very important earner of foreign exchange, therefore priority is given to wildlife and pastoralists are not adequately compensated from the revenues.

Poverty even in relative terms has increased over the past 20 years in West Pokot and Keiyo and Marakwet. In absolute numbers poverty has increased in all four districts (for a detailed discussion on poverty see chapter 1 of Annex III: 'Macro-Economic and Sectoral Development and Policies and Poverty in Kenya'). poverty is as much a result of the environmental problems as it is a cause of these problems. Deforestation resulting from the need for agricultural land and wood fuel has a negative impact on the environment: reduced capacity to retain water, erosion, and soil degradation.

Not all of the problems mentioned above occur with the same intensity in each of the districts. The conflict between livestock and wildlife for example is only relevant for Kajiado and Laikipia. Deforestation is for example more problematic in Keiyo and Marakwet than in Kajiado, although in all districts the cutting of whatever wood is available for fuel, without adequate replacement planting, is a threat to the environment.

Alternative sources of income mainly outside agriculture have to become available for the people and their environment to survive. It is a crucial government function to create the conditions which make it possible to achieve this, thus creating a climate in which donor assisted programmes, such as the ASAL programmes, can become effective.

## **1.2 The ASAL GoK Policies**

The Arid and Semi-Arid Lands of Kenya cover about 80 per cent of the land surface but are inhabited by about 25% of the population. Due to the importance of the ASALs in the economy of the country, concerted efforts started to be made to exploit the available potential in these areas. Most of the meat and meat products come from the ASAL areas. To exploit this potential, numerous constraints particularly the fragility of the environment, policy and institutional requirements, demographic distribution, limited potential for crop production and poor infrastructure were to be addressed in ASAL programming.

The history of ASALs<sup>6</sup> reflects government and donor policy changes. In terms of timeline, the history can be traced to three distinct periods: (a) Pre-1978 ASAL Policies (b) First Generation of ASALs 1978-1988, and (c) Second Generation of ASAL Development, 1989 -1997.

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<sup>6</sup> In the text frequently the expression ASALs is being used. This could either mean ASAL areas or ASAL programme. It will be clear from the context whichever interpretation should be given.



### *Pre - 1978 ASAL Policies*

After independence (1963), the government established a Range Management Division in the Ministry of Agriculture (1963) and the subsequent establishment of ancillary Ranch Section in the Ministry of Water Development. From institutional perspective, the government, with support from donors, started six Special Rural Development Programmes (SRDP)<sup>7</sup>, three of which became ASAL programmes in the early seventies.

The devastating droughts of the early 1970s gave fresh impetus to ASAL thinking within and outside government. The Government's belief that benefits from investment in high potential areas and industry would trickle down to the people living in ASALs, started changing. During the decade of the 70s, donor and government meetings were not only dominated by appeals for food relief but also by long term development funds for the ASALs.

As a prelude to the commencement of the first generation of ASALs, the government with the assistance of USAID prepared "A Marginal Lands Investment Study (1976)" for Machakos, Kitui, Baringo and Embu Districts. Various research projects were also set up with the aim to increase knowledge of the ASAL areas.

### *First Generation of ASALs 1978 - 1989*

The Kenya Government's firm commitment to ASALs came in 1979 with the establishment of an ASAL section in the Ministry of Planning and National Development and the production of a policy document entitled "Arid and Semi-Arid Lands, the Framework for Implementation, Programme Planning and Evaluation." The policy document was presented to donors in 1979. It outlined the government's objective and strategies for the implementation of projects in ASAL areas. The objectives of the programme were stated as (a) development of human resources (b) exploitation of productive potential (c) resource conservation and (d) integration with the national economy. The objectives remain valid up to this time. Various government policy papers notably National Development Plans and Sessional Papers, particularly the Sessional Paper No 1 of 1986 on Economic Management for Renewed Growth, attest to this.

The framework for making ASAL policies operational was through integrated, multi-sectoral district programmes. Various donors supported this initiative with the European Economic Community (EU) declaring interest in Machakos. Other programmes were started in Baringo (World Bank), Turkana (NORAD), Kitui (USAID) West Pokot and Keiyo Marakwet (DGIS) and Kwale - Kilifi District ASAL Programmes (IFAD). Other programmes that received funding during the decade included ASAL Kajiado (DGIS), Kitui and Taita Taveta (DANIDA), Laikipia Rural Development programme (SDC, Swiss) to become Laikipia ASAL (DGIS) and a host of other programmes.

During the implementation of ASAL programmes in the 1980s, the government formulated a policy for decentralised planning, budgeting, implementation and decision making to the district level. The District Focus Strategy for Rural Development (DFRD) provided a good policy framework that assisted the ASAL programmes to operate within an agreed policy. The policies inherent in this strategy were quite similar to ASAL policies.

The ASAL programme put significant amount of resources in capacity building at all

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<sup>7</sup> (1) Tetu - Nyeri (2) Vihiga (3) Migori / Kihancha (4) S. Kwale (5) Mbeere (6) Kapenguria.



levels and supported projects in the productive (including infrastructure) and social sectors. Projects specifically meant for raising the welfare of women were funded. Community participation in planning was almost absent. Community involvement in project implementation was seen in terms of provision of free labour and local materials for project execution. Sustainability of completed projects was questionable.

### *Second Generation of ASAL 1989 - 1997*

Before the Second Generation of ASALs started, UNDP and IFAD provided technical assistance (1988) for the preparation of technical reports on the strategy, policy and ASAL Development Programme 1989-1993. These papers formed the basis for revising the 1979 ASAL policy.

At the beginning of this period, most of the ASAL programmes were co-ordinated by the Ministry of Planning and National Development. In 1990 the government created a ministry in charge of Arid and Semi Arid Lands. The Ministry of Reclamation and Development of Arid and Semi-Arid Areas and Wastelands (MRDASAW) gave a new dimension to the ASALs.

The new ministry, with support of the World Bank, established a unit based at the World Bank office to assist the government in various fields of ASAL development. This unit was partly funded by DGIS. A number of technical papers were prepared by the team under the direction of the World Bank Nairobi office.

The team co-ordinated the writing of an Environmental Action Plan for ASALs and produced district specific Environmental Action Plans for all the ASAL districts. The team also finalised the ASAL Development Policy document (1992) which continues to guide ASAL development to date.

The revised ASAL Policy, 1992, stated that the objective was to improve the standard of living of the ASAL populations by integrating ASAL into the main stream of the national economy, by social development, and all in an environmentally sustainable way. This policy was to be achieved through various measures some of which are: developing human resources and institutional capacities in ASAL areas for more effective and efficient preparation, planning and implementation of projects and programmes, strengthening communities' participation and involvement in determining and executing development approaches, enabling ASAL communities and institutions to apply low-cost and appropriate technologies aimed at increasing productivity in agriculture and livestock production and at developing natural resources. Other pronouncements inter alia, were to reclaim where damaged, and protect the diverse and valuable yet fragile natural environment in the different agro-ecological zones and improving the infrastructure, access to inputs and goods and to output delivery channels as well as to alternative energy systems.

Due to the emphasis that the new ministry gave to marginal areas, many programmes were commissioned during the short time of its existence. Among them are Coast ASAL Development Programme, ASAL Laikipia and the Drought Preparedness, Intervention and Recovery Programme.

In 1993, the ministry was merged with the Ministry of Water Development and Ministry of Regional Development to constitute the current Ministry of Land Reclamation, Regional and Water Development (MLRRWD). By putting ASAL matters in a sector ministry, ASALs became peripheral in the country's development agenda. All staff from the former ministry were put into one department. Many left for it did not appear that their skills were to be used. The Department of Land Reclamation lost key personnel without efforts being made to replace it with the required expertise to address the emerging issues in the ASALs. Due to this



weakness, many ASAL projects have either been terminated or transferred to other ministries (Kitui/Taita Taveta). Only the Dutch funded ASAL programmes remained with the MLRRWD.

### *GoK Management of ASAL*

When the oversight was with Ministry of Planning, issues of planning data gathering, including resource surveys, were at the fore of management. When oversight was with a stand-alone ministry for the ASALs, comprehensive development issues took centre stage. When oversight was moved to a ministry primarily concerned with water resource development, these historical foci seem to have been neglected. Staff, particularly those without water background, moved away for they did not see career paths clearly. Resources have also dwindled in the ministry. Consequently there is little systematic supervision of the activities undertaken by ASAL programmes. It is necessary that policy dialogue be re-started within government and with other interested parties about organising effective oversight within GoK.

That is not all. The few staff left in the ministry with oversight appear to push personal or section agendas in uncoordinated way. It is in this context that the shrewd programme managers have lobbied sections of the supervising ministry to get specific activities accepted and pushed. It is also clear that the donor and the ministry are not engaged as they were in previous times when both systematically developed approaches to ASALs in a co-ordinated fashion.

ASAL areas do not generate enough political muscle that they are a force in national political calculus for resource allocation. Since the onset of the programmes, the key justification was that ignoring their development fate would negatively impact on the development of the nation in the medium and long-term. This argument needs to be paid attention to in the wider GoK system. Donors, detached from the political calculus, have a role to play in this.

## **1.3 Programme Approaches**

### *Introduction and Background*

In this section the experience of other ASAL programmes is briefly summarised. It occurred to the team that many approaches to ASAL development have been tried already. The team has tried to derive useful lessons from these past experiences. Conclusions relevant for the current review have briefly been highlighted in text boxes.

The government's policy framework as enunciated in 1979 provided guidance to donors and Non Governmental Organisation on Government's thinking on ASAL development. Though the policy did not specify that each interested donor would support a district based programme donors were given freedom to select districts of their choice. During project formulations, each donor came up with strategies and approaches that were expected to achieve the goals as set in the policy document. Below are summaries of the different approaches and philosophies.

### *European Union - Machakos Integrated Development Programme*

The first fully fledged ASAL programme was funded by the then European Economic Community in Machakos District beginning 1978 - the Machakos Integrated



Development Programme (MIDP) . The programme objectives were to increase the productivity of the available resources and raise the standard of living of the rural population in the district. MIDP had the following components: - Agriculture, Livestock Development (Animal Production and Veterinary), Co-operative Development, Afforestation, Rural Water Supply, Rural Industries, Social Services, Adult Education (and Programme Management).

The financial outlay of the programme during the first phase was ECUs 17.7 Million. The second phase had a budget of ECUs 15.2 Million. The government contributed 13% of total donor funds.

The programme set up a Programme Management Unit (PMU) whose functions were to administer and co-ordinate the programme, plan and monitor implementation and control finances.

During the late 1970s, the capacity of districts to plan, implement and monitor projects was quite dismal. The donor and government recruited 13 expatriate personnel to ensure the programme was well managed and implemented<sup>8</sup> by the line departments. The programme was not only high input in terms of personnel but also in terms of funding. As these TAs were not familiar with government procedures, there was continuous conflict between them and the government staff who were also not well versed with project matters. Pressure to justify high salary bills and staff maintenance costs led to hurried implementation of projects that were not properly conceived. Communities could not cope with this desire to show results. Top-down planning was the main approach of the programme especially during the first phase. Project beneficiaries were involved as providers of labour and local materials. Although sustainable development lingered on the minds of the PMU, it was not a priority until the second phase of the programme.

The lessons learnt from MIDP are that high input programmes bear considerable risk of low community involvement, high cost overheads, pressure to show results; likelihood to fund projects that are not well conceived and of constrained management (PMU); a programme difficult to monitor and prone to corrupt practices.

The amount of planning, co-ordination, supervision and monitoring was overwhelming. Financial management and control consumed most of the management time. Government disbursement system was complex and was abandoned during the second phase in favour of direct payment. To reduce the enormous programme overheads, the heavy TA personnel was phased out and replaced by qualified GoK staff and volunteers. From 1986, the management of the programme started being a problem as corrupt practices and tendencies to defraud programme funds became apparent.

Phase Two was restructured to provide less funds, less personnel and a strengthened PMU. Phase two had to end prematurely due to widespread lack of accountability.

#### *Overseas Development Administration (ODA)- EMI Project)*

In 1981, the Overseas Development Administration (UK) commenced its support to lower Embu, Meru and Isiolo districts. The objective of the programme was to assist the government in working out measures that are technically, economically and socially viable in order to maintain and develop agricultural and livestock production

<sup>8</sup> The 13 TAs were distributed as follows:

1. Programme Advisor (PMU), 7 Water Engineers, 1 Farm Management Specialist, 1 Livestock Specialist, 1 Soil and Water Conservation Engineer, 1 Rural Industry Specialist and 1 Credit Specialist.



in ASAL areas of the three districts.

EMI had five components which functioned as separate projects but centrally co-ordinated. The main components were (a) Dryland Farming Project (b) Forestry Project (c) Goat and Sheep Project (d) Isiolo Livestock Development Project (e) The Programme Office which managed a Small Project Fund.

A Programme Management Unit was established in Embu town with no representation in the other districts. Every project had technical assistance personnel. Disbursement of funds was direct, from ODA (UK) to a local bank in Embu town.

During the review of 1990, the Review Team could not see any impact created by the programme. The achievements of the Isiolo Livestock Development Project were minimal. Insecurity in Isiolo district contributed a lot to this. Numerous studies were carried out but they were not translated into projects. The Isiolo hospital was built as a parallel project. The goat and sheep project was collapsing due to diseases and lack of impact on the small stock farmers. The project was eventually terminated. The dryland farming project was more a trial/ demo project than an extension service. The small project fund aimed at assisting community based projects achieved more than the other components.

The programme was mainly top-down with expatriate personnel managers and compliant GoK staff. Managing the programme from Embu was not an easy task. Government departments in Meru and Isiolo complained about not knowing what the programme was doing in their district. The Provincial Development Committee was also at a loss.

Lessons learnt are that co-ordination of a programme covering more than one district from a central point can be problematic. Direct funding has elements of lack of transparency and can cause concern by the government of the recipient country. Research oriented projects are top down in nature and so community involvement runs into trouble. The Small Project Fund, administered by the PMU was more responsive to community needs than the other projects. Insecurity can make a project moribund.

In addition to the heavy TA presence, the continuous injection of consultants contributed quite a lot to the overhead costs. Although the Government was represented at the Embu office by a senior programme officer, it never got to know the amount of money spent on the different activities particularly the heavy TA costs and transport expenses.

EMI created no impact in the three districts.

Seven years from then, it is difficult to trace any impact. The goats project was an outright failure, the Isiolo Livestock Development Project remains in consultancy reports and the Dryland Farming Project had insignificant impact. Decentralisation of EMI was agreed upon in 1990 but the project was terminated in 1991.

#### *International Fund for Agricultural Development ;IFAD Coast ASAL Project*

In 1991, IFAD and GoK formulated a 7 year multi-district multi-sector programme covering the whole of Coast Province. The formulation was hurried and did not take many development dimensions of the region into account. IFAD agreed to loan the government US \$ 19.2 million on concessionary terms.



The long-term objective of the programme was to develop and test, under arid and semi arid conditions, technologies that integrate water, livestock, crops and forestry and environmental activities through adaptive research. If successful, these technologies would be duplicated in other parts of ASAL. The short term objectives were to focus on institutional development, support to District Focus, extension and to increase productivity.

In order to support the District Focus system, the programme was implemented using GoK procedures and systems. The programme therefore suffered from all GoK hiccups which include budgetary cuts, tying money in inappropriate budget items, delayed disbursements, stoppage of expenditures, low district cash floats and complex tendering procedures.

The programme established Programme Management Units in Taita Taveta, Kwale, Kilifi, Tana River and Lamu District Headquarters. As an after-thought, another co-ordinating office was set up in Mombasa. The Mombasa office was managed by a National Programme Officer (NPO) supported by three local technical assistance personnel; a Chief Technical Advisor, an Extension Specialist and an Environmentalist. Although the programme was funded by IFAD, supervision responsibilities were vested in the UNDP/OPS.

Many layers of management e.g. Nairobi (UNDP/OPS) Ministries, National Programme Officer stationed in Mombasa and PMUs for each district did not improve programme management. Government systems were clearly shown not to work. On average, projects implemented through government take many years to complete. Credit / empowerment projects cannot fit in the government system. Other structures must be devised.

Vehicles and equipment tendered through GoK only arrived in the third year of the programme. Supervision Reports (Aide Memoirs) pointed this out but the way out was marred by procedures. Establishment of M&E systems through GoK proved difficult. A credit programme could not be implemented due to cumbersome procedures to identify an institution to manage the scheme. Audit reports were never available. A long stand-off between GoK and IFAD has been the result. The impact created by the Coat ASAL projects is difficult to discern.

#### *DANIDA - Kitui Integrated Development Programme*

DANIDA involvement in ASALs started in early 1980s with a soil and water conservation (S&WC) project in Mutomo Division of Kitui District. During the same period, USAID funded the Kitui ASAL Programme. The USAID project was high input in terms of technical personnel with some being stationed at Nairobi. The consulting firm produced many reports but evaluation showed little was achieved. There was total lack of consultation at community level.

The Mutomo S&W conservation project concentrated on natural resource developments; conserving soil, building roof catchments and rock catchments. The management of the programme was division based. The management structure resembled other district based management structures. The project was top-down. Community participated in conservation activities due to the tools given free by the programme.

When USAID pulled out of Kitui, DANIDA undertook to support a high input project covering the whole district. The Mutomo Division based project ceased to exist. A



Programme Management Unit was established. The PMU established Divisional offices which de-linked the programme from Heads of Departments. These offices were subsequently abolished after continued outcry by the departments.

Currently DANIDA has a co-ordinating office for all its ASAL programmes in the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development and Marketing in Nairobi. DANIDA decided to quit MRDASAW.

The DANIDA experience in Kitui showed that Divisions are closer to project beneficiaries than working from the district level. Linking PMU with divisional offices served to alienate the Heads of Departments. A higher level management structure might improve government/donor collaboration and provide back up support to the programmes. 'Carrots' do seem to work.

But with time, working with Heads of Departments proved anathema and DANIDA started a process of decentralising to the divisional level again. The programme was bedevilled by corruption to such an extent that it took many to count. The cases failed for it was pointed out that GoK officers did not sign for the payment but the DANIDA advisers are the ones who authorise the payments. The divisional staff are better co-ordinated and are nearer the communities. Seepage of project resources reduced substantially.

#### *GTZ - Marsabit ASAL Programme (MDP)*

The German Government through GTZ is currently funding three ASAL programmes in Marsabit, Samburu and Trans Mara districts. These programmes are co-ordinated by the MOALD &M. GTZ involvement in Marsabit started with the funding of Marsabit Development Programme which emerged from two separate projects funded earlier. These are Western Marsabit Development Project and the Camel Extension Project. The main focus of these projects was livestock.

The lesson learnt here is that management from far does not work. Programme objectives should also be realistic to avoid frustrations once impact is not seen.

Finally creating good will among the partners is a prerequisite to achieving people's goals and aims.

The Marsabit Development Programme (1992) was based in and managed from Nairobi. The project manager and project veterinarian visited Marsabit District only for short periods. When a proposal came to decentralise the project, the team leader objected and their contracts were terminated. "Marsabit Development remains an unknown term in Marsabit District".

In 1992, MDP put its offices in Marsabit town. The main task of the programme was to create an atmosphere of recognition, mutual understanding and trust among the stakeholders i.e. Government, NGOs and people. The existing PMU structures are used to implement the programme. The main programme objective was found too ambitious and was therefore changed from "Higher standards of living through sustainable development in Marsabit District" to "Productivity stabilised and self-reliance increased in Marsabit District". This, most likely, was the result of realising that impact (1st objective) cannot be created easily.



### *World Bank ASAL Team*

The World Bank ASAL Team was put together by the Government and the World Bank (Regional office) in 1990. The project was funded by the Netherlands Government, GTZ and UNSO. The government of Kenya provided three experts as counterparts.

The objective of the Nairobi based project was to assist development programmes in ASAL areas to have a higher and sustainable (positive) social, ecological and economic impact. The project components were to assist in finalising GoK's ASAL Development Policy, prepare conceptual and operational strategies related to ASAL development, assist GoK, donors and NGOs in preparing and planning projects and supporting institutional capacity building of the MLRRWD.

The team succeeded in finalising the ASAL Development Policy, ASAL Environmental Action Plan and 24 ASAL District Specific Environmental Action Plans. Numerous conceptual papers were produced including 'Management of District Integrated Development Programmes', 'Human Resource Development', 'Land Tenure Issues', 'Capacity Building', 'ASAL Infrastructure' and 'Women and Development'.

Experience gained here is that suspicion can destroy good strategic planning. The World Bank ASAL Team produced good work whose use is minimal by government and donors alike. The latter did not take kindly to what they saw emerging as World Bank co-ordination.

The ministry's capacity was strengthened through training in GIS and preparation of ASAL Investment Programme (AIP). Unfortunately, when the Ministry was merged with other ministries this capacity leaked away.

The Unit wound-up once ministries were merged in 1993.

Most of these papers remain on the shelves in various government and donor offices. The District Environmental Action Plans are not used. But the ASAL Policy is still a useful document to which frequently reference is made. The ASAL Investment Programme was finally funded by the World Bank and renamed "Arid Lands Resource Management Programme". It is now being implemented from Office of the President. It covers the North-Eastern Province and the arid part of Tana River district. It is managed from Nairobi but has field officers. All implementation is through the GoK.

Many approaches have been tried in efforts to develop ASAL areas. Success in these approaches seem to be closely linked to the level of awareness and education in each community, the macro-economic issues affecting the entire country at any given time, the ability of the government to move development without condoning corruption and the capability of donors to participate in joint policy and strategy development and funding and finally managerial competence of the PMUs.

## **1.4 Netherlands Development Co-operation Policy**

### *General Policies With Focus On Kenya.*

The central overall objective of Dutch development policy has been sustainable poverty reduction. In various periods the emphasis of actual policies has been



different. Till the end of the sixties, policies were to a large extent based on the belief in the trickle-down effect. The seventies were the era of re-distributive policies and much more targeted intervention. In the eighties structural adjustment became the leading idea emphasising the economic sustainability of development policies. At the end of the eighties - when some of the negative implications of structural adjustment become apparent - adjustment was given a 'human face'.

As a result of the emphasis on sustainability of project or programme results, the issue of institutional development gained prominence although it never made it to 'spearhead' status. It seems nevertheless right now to be part of mainstream policy. In development policy in the nineties, still aiming to reduce poverty, the economic aspect is linked more explicitly to social as well as political aspects. Good governance, democratisation, human rights, corruption and land reform have increasingly become issues in the consultations between the Netherlands and Kenya at various fora.

Basically, good governance - including transparency and accountability - is seen as a prerequisite to reduce direct donor influence in development assistance. This reduction takes the form of less project aid and more programme aid. However, in actual practice the distinction is blurred. Reduction of donor influence also takes the form of stimulating 'ownership' of aided projects to the recipients/beneficiaries. These are the two distinct changes in emphasis in Dutch development assistance policy. Another change in emphasis is returning to the original idea of technical assistance: technical support without building an entire project around it.<sup>9</sup> Programmes and projects will be supported that aim at strengthening the capacity of (government) institutions to formulate and implement sound policies themselves.

Traditionally Dutch bilateral development assistance to Kenya has had a large rural development component with agricultural development as the main focus. It is envisaged that rural development - building on the expertise gained in this field - will remain a major focus of Dutch policy.

Another major concern, addressed by Dutch development assistance, is environmental sustainability. Policy emphasis on this sector has a shorter history in Dutch policy but has gained some prominence following the recommendations made by the IOV on the basis of an extensive field survey in 1990. Gender, as an aspect to be included in all development efforts, has gained importance. For these fields, sector specialists - attached to the Embassy - operate in Kenya. Poverty reduction, environment and gender used to be labelled 'spearheads' of Dutch development assistance policy, implying that in all programmes and projects these issues should be included. Although spearheads have been eliminated from the policy jargon, as substantive issues they remain very important in Dutch aid policy. The issues are presently mainstream policy.

The number of sector specialists has increased- some working on a regional basis, others assigned to a particular country - and their position has been strengthened. Another not unrelated development within the ministry (DGIS) is the reorganisation that has led to formation of thematic directorates. The policy thinking seems to become more thematic and sectoral. The prominence of the process approach in multi-sectoral programmes is likely to come under some pressure. Demands for accountability, transparency and other management aspects as well as the demand for measurable impact seem to strengthen this shift in thinking.

Other focal points of Dutch policy in Kenya are urban poverty, (drinking) water and sanitation and education (and research); reproductive health will have a similar status

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<sup>9</sup>It is interesting to note that the present DGIS (Directorate General for International Co-operation) started its bureaucratic life as DITH (Directorate of International Technical Assistance)



from 1998. Also health care and education and research are covered by a sector specialist (operating from Dar es Salaam).

Reproductive health does not seem to have attracted a lot of attention in shaping Netherlands - Kenyan development co-operation. This is the more surprising since Kenya has consistently one of the highest population growth rates in Africa and in a few - admittedly high potential and better developed areas - fertility rates have decreased quite dramatically (though they are still high). Population growth rate reduction can, therefore, be done. Failure to broaden the attempts to reduce family sizes also to poorer households in less developed areas will increase inequality in Kenya.

An issue that has pervaded Netherlands policy in this field is, what kind of development activities should be contracted out and which should be implemented by DGIS through its own recruits ('eigen beheer'). The issue became somewhat more complex with SNV increasingly implementing projects funded by DGIS. Kenya is one of the countries where DGIS implements quite a number of projects 'in eigen beheer'.<sup>10</sup>

As a result of too many priorities, Netherlands development assistance is very wide ranging. With shifting emphasis between priorities it is not easy to find a consistent line in development co-operation policy but for the one constant factor, sustainable poverty reduction.

Concentration in Kenya has been attempted, sectoral/thematic as well as on a geographical basis: Western Kenya and some ASAL districts in the Rift Valley province.

#### *Policies Related to ASAL Programmes.*

The Netherlands development co-operation policy climate in which ASAL programmes had, and still have, to operate has not been very stable. Rather frequently shifts in emphasis, or the introduction of new elements tend to have caused some confusion with the PMUs. Moreover, it is felt that the policy emphasis depends to some extent on the strengths and views of sector specialists and desk officers in the Embassy.

During the eighties the ASAL programmes showed great similarities, despite the limited policy guidance from DGIS. The programme advisers came from the same 'school'. Especially since 1993 and with increased responsibilities of the embassies, the latter have tried to tighten the policy grip on the ASAL programmes. Nevertheless they have grown much wider apart than in the previous period.

Fortunately there has been a strong and stable factor in the policy: sustainable poverty reduction. That is precisely what the programmes have tried to achieve since their respective inception. The added emphasis on environmental sustainability certainly has had and still has an impact on the programmes, in particular by making land-use planning the strategic umbrella of the programmes. The fundamental truth that the productive potential of the area needs to be maintained seems to become more and more accepted wisdom at policy level. This wisdom is reflected in the current emphasis of the ASAL programmes. Although there is a difference in degree and interpretation, all ASAL programmes have given land use planning a central role in their strategies.

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<sup>10</sup> In contrast for example to Pakistan where all projects are contracted to either Dutch or local consultants or to a combination of Dutch and Pakistani consultants.



It can safely be assumed that the gender aspect has gained full recognition at the policy level. In that sense the impact is clear. Turning recognition into concrete proposals and implementing those is not an easy task. Although attempts have been made in this respect, tangible results are rather limited ( see section 5.7 for a detailed discussion of the gender aspect).

One of the focal points of development policy was family planning/birth control recently broadened and renamed as reproductive health. This focal point has by and large failed to make an impact on the ASAL programmes. It did not catch the attention of the 1993 review mission and has apparently not been advocated strongly from the donor's side to have it included in the ASAL programmes. This is despite the overriding need to reduce the population growth. This is especially important in ASAL areas because there is little evidence that fertility there is reducing significantly. On the contrary, indications are that fertility has recently increased.

In view of (recent) experiences with the GoK at macro level, as well as at district level, an increased emphasis of Netherlands policies on good governance, including anti-corruption measures, increasing transparency of (financial) procedures and accountability, democratisation and decentralisation, is highly relevant to the ASAL programmes. A gradual shifting away from co-operation with the government in planning but especially implementation of projects (particularly strong in Laikipia) can be considered as a response to the failure of the GoK to address these issues. The earlier established system of direct funding responded to the lack of transparencies, lack of efficiencies and delays in the GoK financial system. These developments in the ASAL programmes are in line with emphasising good governance. It is hard to assess whether it can be seen as an impact.

The recommendations to be made regarding the future of the ASAL programmes (see chapters 5,6 and 7 in particular) certainly can be seen as an impact of this new policy emphasising good governance.

## **2 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NL SUPPORTED ASAL PROGRAMMES**

### **2.1 The Start of the Netherlands Supported ASAL Programmes**

The Netherlands became involved in ASAL development in 1982 in West Pokot, Elgeyo Marakwet and the tiny Ndeiya Karai area (which was terminated in 1984/85). Dutch support to the ASAL programmes in West Pokot and Elgeyo Marakwet (with a break of a few years) has continued to date. The ASAL programme in Kajiado started with Dutch support in 1987 and the programme in Laikipia in 1993.

The ASAL policy objectives formulated at the national level - as outlined in § 1.1 - guided the individual ASAL programmes, including the Dutch supported programmes.

The ASAL programmes took off with the following characteristics:

- The basic philosophy on which the ASAL programmes have been designed is that development is a matter of the Kenyans and their government. The development process can only be facilitated by external sources;
- Programme activities are implemented through existing organizations, initially mainly the government structure. Later NGOs and community organizations came more in the picture. Creation of parallel structures must be avoided;
- In line with the objective to support the planning and implementation capacity of the government in the district, ASAL programmes can be viewed as 'oil in the government machinery';
- A bottom-up approach, strengthening the community base of district development activities, thereby supporting the district focus policy;
- Flexibility in programme design and implementation which became known as the process approach (developed at DGIS);
- External input in the programme should be modest ('low input approach'). The district development programme should not become dependent on Dutch input in terms of money and expertise;
- Poverty being the main problem in Kenya, the programme's activities should be targeted at the poor sections of the population in the ASAL districts.
- As the programmes developed and responding to changes in emphasis of Dutch development policy, increasingly attention was paid to environmental and gender issues.

Essentially, the points highlighted above remained the main characteristics of ASAL programmes (West Pokot, Elgeyo Marakwet and Kajiado) till the review of 1993. This does certainly not imply that ASAL programmes in the three districts have been carbon copies.

The Laikipia programme took off in a somewhat different way right from the inception. In sections that follow differences in the programmes will be exposed and discussed.

### **2.2 The 1993 Evaluation and Recommendations**

In 1993, three of the ASAL programmes were evaluated. The fourth ASAL programme, now in force (in Laikipia), was new as far as Dutch support is concerned. During the 10 years before this 1993 evaluation, the three districts had been evaluated several times but always separately. Such evaluations consistently supported the development philosophy and strategy of the ASAL programmes since the first one started in 1983. The joint 1993 evaluation intended - after 10 years had passed - not to compare the individual qualities of the programmes but, in the end, to assess at a



compare the individual qualities of the programmes but, in the end, to assess at a higher level of abstraction the policies and strategies, as well as the principles applied in its relation to Dutch and Kenyan policies in force at that moment.

Considering the importance of such an exercise, a process approach was opted for. The evaluation was executed in distinct phases over a period of more than seven months. The phases are:

- Preparatory phase during which the three district teams were composed.
- Impact analysis by the programmes themselves in the form of position papers.
- Implementation of the district evaluation, simultaneously with three in-depth studies on water, education and the productive sector.
- The three (draft) district reports formed the basis for a discussion paper prepared by the consultant that was discussed during a week-long seminar with extensive participation (incl. Dutch advisors and counterparts of similar programmes in Tanzania).
- The seminar resulted in an overall final report with three district specific annexes.
- The final phase was the feedback of the results of the evaluation into policy development (appraisal memorandum, plans of operations).

The district evaluation reports (again) supported the overall policies, strategies and philosophies of the three ASAL programmes, as the low external input philosophy, participatory bottom-up approach and implementation not to be done by the ASAL programmes but through existing channels (GoK, NGOs, target groups or CBOs).

However, what happened after this point in time is of crucial importance for this 1997 review. Within DGIS in The Hague, the impression existed that insufficient insight in the underlying courses of the poverty situation in the ASAL districts existed, that the sub-activities of the programme had too much an ad-hoc character for which reason a structuring, overall framework was lacking. It all gave way to the opinion that the ASAL programmes, as they were by 1993, were resulting in tiny little nice things but were unable to address the fundamental issues nor had any (or insufficient) impact on these issues. If ASAL programmes were unable to address issues such as over-population, accelerated land degradation, insufficient employment and output of the productive sector, it was "dweilen met de kraan open" (putting on the fire while the house is burning).

So, the consultant not only evaluated what ASAL had done, but also what ASAL had not done. Methodologically this is questionable since the ASAL programmes' impact was now assessed as if they were stand-alone, traditional integrated rural development projects. They were, however, essentially a part of the district development plan and integrated in the district planning process ("the oil in the government machinery")<sup>11</sup>.

This opinion of inadequacy of the ASAL programmes clearly featured in the discussion paper the consultant prepared for the ASAL seminar. A paper that contained several recommendations to remedy this (undesirable to some) situation. The opinion also clearly featured in the overall report and in the appraisal memorandum (based on an evaluation report !). It must be observed that the far majority of the seminar participants gave little support the recommendations that went beyond the ASAL programmes as they were by 1993. It must also be observed that the recommendations in the overall report did not result from the (positive) district evaluation reports. The four Dutch advisors (incl. the one for Laikipia), had outspoken difficulties with quite a number of them that were considered as impossible to be implemented within the existing ASAL programme structure (minutes of their January 1994 meeting).



The donor, in its appraisal memorandum, nevertheless, decided to continue with the ASAL programmes in the four districts but that on the basis of a solid problem analysis (additional studies) and a more focused assessment of the development potential of the districts, a priority setting of the operational targets was necessary considering the means available. This implied that, whereas the principles mentioned before (low-input, participatory bottom-up approach, use only existing capacity) were underlined to continue, the following had to be added<sup>11</sup>:

- The productive sector should receive more attention since the programmes were too much focused on the social sectors.
- The participatory identification techniques are inadequate to result into activities that will address all the issues that are essential for a sustainable development of the districts. The ASALs, thus were to loose contact with the major development problems. Strategic analyses should be added to the bottom-up approach to result in interventions that could address the major problems. In certain sectors, scale increase and a higher speed of the development process, were considered necessary.
- The financial input in the districts was too much determined by non-substantiated assessment of the district's capacity and the bottom-up identification process. The time had come to accelerate the programmes to arrive at higher impact. This should lead on some occasions to higher financial and technical input in the ASAL programmes by the donor.

This resulted in a core programme in the districts roughly at the former levels, but with additional funds for programme support by means of a central ASAL co-ordinator with a budget for technical assistance and for projects (this at the same level for each district). At the Embassy level, the concept of LUP for sustainable resource management was introduced as the main provider of a systematic framework for the ASALs.

The above can be summarised by stating that the donor became more ambitious about the ASAL programmes. Since 1994, she wanted the ASAL programmes to have a high impact and to be able to address the major development issues in order to arrive at changes that have a structural impact. For that matter, a centrally located programme support was decided to be added to the core programmes. This met with heavy opposition from the ASAL programmes.

In any case, the central ASAL co-ordinator never happened and the 'addition' to the ASAL programmes has been 'tried' in the different separate district programmes.

The analytical and strategic approach was left to individual Dutch advisors who, like in the past, could more or less determine to accept the new instructions or additional approach. The advisors could pretty much determine what the programme would look like.

This resulted in questions at the donor side that certainly are reflected in the thoroughness and the drift of the ToR for this 1997 review (see next § 2.3) to take fundamental look at these district programmes this time.

### **2.3 The purpose of the 1997 review**

The complete Terms of Reference for the 1997 review are given in Annex I in Part Three.

Not only is this 1997 review in accordance with the arrangements between the GoK and the NL governments, it should also prepare decision making for possible future



commitments. All four programmes are synchronised and the commitments will come to an end by the end of 1997. At the same time some contracts for Dutch advisors will expire.

The review will serve two purposes. First, it will assess the impact of the four programmes especially taking into account the instructions to the programmes that resulted from the 1993 joint evaluation (see §2.3). The result of this exercise is given in part one of the review report. In essence it should have been a self-evaluation to be done by the individual programmes. In practice it turned out to be an external evaluation by the Review Team, with inputs from the programmes.

For this purpose, the Review Team used four different techniques to collect data: impact matrices on the basis of work plans, financial reports, etc.; HHSs, PRAs, and swot analyses. Impact was assessed in a quantitative way as well as qualitatively.

The use of four different techniques might appear to be excessive at a first glance. However, discussion about the work plan to execute the ToR between the donor and the consultants resulted in consensus about this approach. Previous evaluations had made clear that impact assessment of ASAL programmes is an extremely difficult undertaking that was hardly successful. The assumption for this review was that neither technique will be able to arrive at hard and unquestionable conclusions but that in case each technique used pointed into the same direction, a safe assumption could be made that the conclusion is justified.

Second, considering the changes that took place in the policy and political context since the conception and start of the ASAL programmes, the donor considered that it was time to analyse these changes, and to study the impact on the ASAL programmes. This information, together with the information from part one, would lead to recommendations on the future perspectives for the role of the ASAL programmes.

Therefore, in this Part Two, the macro-economic aspects like SAPs, liberalisation and privatisation policies are analysed, as well as the policy framework of the two bi-lateral partners.

The Review Team started the six-months assignment on 7 April 1997 and delivered the draft report on 10 October 1997. Over that six-months period various briefings were given in different fora.

### 3 IMPACT OF CHANGING CONTEXT ON ASAL PROGRAMMES

#### 3.0 Introduction

ASAL programmes do not function just in a physical environment only. They function in an economic, institutional and political environment as well. In this chapter an attempt is made to trace the impact of macro-economic developments and policies, the institutional and political environment might have had on ASAL programmes. It is quite obvious that these factors could not only influence to some extent the programme approaches and strategies, but will also affect the impact ASAL programmes might have. Adverse economic conditions, reduced spending on social sectors, insecurity, political instability and so on, might all have a negative impact on the living conditions of the population thereby countering positive effects the ASAL programmes may have.

#### 3.1 Macro-Economic Policies.

The leading objective of the macro-economic policy has been to achieve a high level of growth of GDP in order to increase employment and raise living standards of the population. It cannot be concluded that the government of Kenya has succeeded in this. For large sections of the population the standard of living is lower now than it was 20 years ago and growth of employment has not kept pace with the rapidly rising labour force resulting from a high rate of population growth. Development of income per capita is the result of growth of income and growth of the population.

To reduce poverty, the requirements to be met are, as experience shows:

- Broad based and equitable economic growth, that
- Makes use of the poor's most abundant resource: labour;
- Provision of basic social services to the poor.

Kenya performed quite well from independence till the second half of the seventies on these requirements - though growth never has been equitable - but from the early eighties onwards performance decreased.

The main macro-economic issues that had to be addressed at the beginning of the eighties can be summarised as:

- A distorted economic structure,
- Over-extension of the public sector,
- Budgetary deficits.

From these three main issues it is clear that structural adjustment of the economy was required. Kenya was among the first countries in sub-Saharan Africa to receive a structural adjustment loan from the World Bank. We will briefly touch upon the policies that have addressed these issues.

##### *Distorted Economic Structure*

A policy was initiated to get the prices right, meaning they would give the correct market signals. The policy package consisted of import liberalisation, foreign exchange decontrol, liberalisation of domestic trade and prices and improving the legal and regulatory framework of the economy. Implementation of these policies was somewhat half-heartedly and occasionally frustrated by illegal practices. Nevertheless some progress is made and many prices including the exchange rate by and large



reflect true scarcities.

### *Over-Extension of the Public Sector*

The elements in the policy addressing this issue, are privatisation and restructuring of public enterprises and civil service reform. A fairly serious effort was made to divest government interest in quite a number of enterprises. According to the latest official information the government has divested 155 out of 207 non-strategic enterprises (agricultural processing industries, hotels etc.). Reform of the strategic parastatals is slow. Both processes share a lack of transparency most likely leading to sub-optimal revenues for the government.

The civil service reform programme (CSRP) aims at containing the cost of the civil service as well as making it more effective and efficient. This implies considerable reduction in size of the civil service by reducing its tasks to what can be considered as its core business. It also calls for a rise in pay of civil servants to at least a minimum living wage. The share of expenditure for operation and maintenance in the ministerial budgets has to be increased significantly. Ministerial reforms should include these elements and put them in an appropriate organisational structure. Except for the reduction of the civil service in the lower job groups, through the voluntary early retirement scheme, CSRP is stuck in the planning phase. Hardly any implementation is going on. There is also no evidence that the recommendations, prepared by the donor mission reviewing the CSRP early 1997, are being implemented.

### *Budgetary Deficit*

The GoK has not been able to live within its means, implying a budget deficit. Financing the deficit required very substantial government borrowing, causing high interest rates, high levels of government debt servicing, insufficient expenditure on O&M. Public investment has been quite unproductive moreover. The GoK has by and large failed to implement the required budget rationalisation policy. The only significant exception was that the budget deficit for the last few years, has more or less been eliminated largely by increasing revenue. The underlying problems, however, have hardly if at all been touched upon.

### *Expenditure Cuts and Cost Sharing*

From the point of view of sustainable financial and economic management, cuts in expenditure on health and education and making people to contribute to the cost of these services, can be defended and could even be considered necessary. Expenditure by the government in real terms per student in primary education has decreased by about 15%, and by about 10% per student in secondary education, over the period 1982- 1992. There are no signs that the situation has improved since. On the contrary it probably has continued to worsen. Real government expenditures on health show a declining trend. In 1992 expenditures were 13% less than ten years earlier. With an estimated increase in population during that decade by about 40%, real expenditure per head of population has decreased quite dramatically. Again, no indications could be found that the situation has changed for the better since then.

### *Effects of Macro-Economic Policies*

Have structural adjustment policies affected the poor and the poor in ASAL areas in particular? And, have structural adjustment policies affected the ASAL programmes? These are questions that need to be addressed in this review but are very difficult to answer without substantial research. What follows are only partial answers based on existing information.



The government never fails to assert that the current state of poverty in Kenya is, to a large extent, brought about by structural adjustment policies. The Review Team does not share that view.

As is reported in chapter 1 of Annex III, poverty has indeed increased over the past decade and a half. The facts are undeniable. That in the same period structural adjustment policies had to be implemented also cannot be denied. However, that does not imply that increase in poverty is caused by structural adjustment. One ought to realise in the first place that serious structural imbalances in the economy necessitated structural adjustment. Going somewhat further back in the economic history of Kenya, it could well be argued that if the government had implemented the strategy outlined by the ILO mission in 1973, the country would not have run into the economic trouble it faced in the late seventies/early eighties.

Our assessment is that the continued economic stagnation rather is the result of the failure to implement structural adjustments than that it can be considered the result of structural adjustment per se. Essential parts of structural adjustment have hardly been implemented (civil service reform, expenditure reforms et cetera), and what has been implemented is marred by corrupt practices. This factor, as well as decreasing confidence in the incumbent political establishment and the bureaucracy, as well as the worsening security situation in the country, have been the main barriers to sustained high level growth.

This does not mean that reduction in expenditure on social services did not hurt the poor most - of course it did as is well illustrated in chapter 3 of Annex III. The same holds for the complement of that measure - cost sharing. But the government did have policy options here that could have spared the poor and put the burden more on the rich. The government chose not to do so.

Generally speaking there is little reason to believe that the effects of structural adjustment policies have affected the poor people in ASAL areas more than the poor elsewhere. Market reforms that should result in better prices (lower input and higher produce prices have to some extent materialised) have limited impact because many producers in ASAL areas function still outside the market system (subsistence farmers), have to make use of parallel markets, lack adequate market information and are exploited by unscrupulous traders and suffer generally from badly developed marketing channels including ill developed and/or maintained rural infrastructure.

Retrenchment of the civil service, privatisation and restructuring of government enterprises which may lead to a decrease in public employment does not affect ASAL areas worse than other areas. On the contrary urban areas are likely to be affected more. Also there is no reason to believe that the poor in ASALs are hit harder by reduced social sector expenditure and cost sharing.

The deterioration of rural infrastructure, which does affect people in remoter areas - including ASAL areas - more than others, is only partly a result of insufficient allocations especially for maintenance. It is the unproductive use of the funds by the government - as elaborated in chapter 2 of Annex III - rather than the lack of funds per se, that has contributed to this situation. This has nothing to do with structural adjustment. On the contrary it has everything to do with the failure to improve government management, one of the aims of civil service reform (ministerial rationalisation) and budget rationalisation.

Summarising, we could say that elements of adjustment policies have made the poor in ASALs worse off in terms of accessibility of health and education facilities, and that the failure to implement other structural adjustments (and other formulated policies) has affected the poor negatively in their economic opportunities.



Looking at the question whether macro-economic policies have had an impact on the ASAL programmes, one could look at it the deductive way or the inductive way. Taking a deductive approach to the question, one could argue that there has been no need for programmes to respond to the effects of macro-economic policies. Problems addressed by the ASAL programmes have basically all increased due to a failure to implement sound macro-economic policies. This holds for social sectors as well as productive (economic) sectors. No changes in direction of the programmes are dictated as a consequence. Taking an inductive look at the programmes, it can be assessed that in none of the plans of operations or annual plans it is stipulated that the entire plan or parts of it respond to situations caused by structural adjustment policies.

So the answer to the question whether macro-economic adjustment policies have had an impact on the ASAL programmes reads in all probability: no.

### **3.2 Population Dynamics**

Population growth will continue. Although the natural rate of population growth is decreasing, this is likely to be less so in (A)SAL areas, due to net immigration and the recent increase in fertility rates which are most likely brought about by better health services and improved availability of clean water. The other aspect of the dynamics is that the share of the under 25 age group also is still rising and will continue to do so.

In one respect these population dynamics certainly have not failed to have an impact of ASAL programmes. The emphasis on productive sectors, the increase in programme budgets and attempts - though modest - to provide support to activities aiming at increasing (self)employment outside agriculture is to be seen as an impact of the mounting population pressure. However, one may cast doubt on whether this is the result of sound strategy development. If this had been the case one would have expected that family planning/birth control would have been the mainstay of support to the health sector in the various programmes. This is not the case. The least one could have expected is an explanation why family planning has not been included in the programme. No explanation was found either. From 1998 reproductive health will be a focal point for Dutch policy.

The lack of focus on youth, as a group requiring special attention, and, the lack of activities in the field of family planning and birth control seems to indicate a lack of awareness of the seriousness of the problem. It is the Review Team's view that these issues should be taken up seriously in developing programme strategies.

### **3.3 Role of GoK**

A number of factors related to the role of the GoK could be listed that are (in)directly related to the functioning of the ASAL programmes. Some of the main factors include:

- Failure to even make an effort to fight corruption;
- Increasing reliance on a client oriented system;
- Ineffective and inefficient use of public resources;
- Frequent political and politically motivated interference in (district) planning;
- Reluctance to introduce truly democratic reforms;
- Unwillingness to decentralise decision making and misusing the DFRD policy;
- Lack of a personnel policy;
- Unwillingness to control ethno-political clashes;
- Failure to provide security.



These are some of the main factors that have made the climate in which ASAL programmes have to work and try to achieve their objectives increasingly difficult. This is especially the case for the objectives stating that the ASAL programme:

- Shall support the decentralised planning process (including community participation) as outlined in the district focus for rural development;
- Shall strengthen the district and divisional/location administrative machinery to improve the capabilities for planning, implementation and monitoring of projects; and,
- Shall increase the capabilities of GoK personnel working in the district in general as well as the personnel working specifically in activities supported by the ASAL programme.

Important elements in the approach of ASAL programmes have been (i) that the programme is not implementing projects but uses existing - mainly government - channels (relevant line departments) and (ii) that ASAL shall be a source of complementary funding and limited technical assistance input to avoid that the district becomes dependent on ASAL (low input approach).

The above mentioned objectives and approach have commonly been referred to as 'oiling the government machinery' in the districts.

The factors mentioned in the beginning of this section have created a situation in the districts where civil servants are not appointed and or promoted on merit, are frequently transferred, have increasingly to look for alternative sources of income - including corrupt practices - to supplement their decreasing real wages/salaries. Few people are caught for corrupt practices and most get away with it. Frequent political interference in setting district development priorities, planning and implementation of projects is another aspect of the district planning climate. Achieving increased capabilities in planning and implementation of projects is hard in such conditions.

DFRD - rather than serving its original purpose of decentralisation - has increasingly been used by the central government to favour those districts that would support the current government (and victimise the others). The client oriented approach, moreover, has created a climate in which one goes to the government to obtain - usually financial - support. The idea that communities (and individual households) should be responsible for their own development at the local level, has seriously been weakened.

Genuine decentralisation of power, all the way down to the people has been frequently frustrated by the government administration with the provincial administration (OP, PCs, DCs, chiefs and assistant chiefs) in the driving seat. This is an explanation for the Keiyo and Marakwet programme building a decentralised parallel structure (for details see previous chapter).

The civil service reform programme offers, in principle interesting opportunities to increase effectiveness of ASAL programme support to the government at district level. A programme of ministerial rationalisation, if indeed properly implemented, would lead to a significant degree of de-concentration and decentralisation of decision making power.

In terms of actual implementation hardly anything has happened yet, despite the fact that it was envisaged long back, as early as 1983 according to the original DFRD policy document.

A core feature of the CSRP is to re-define the role of the government and the civil



service in Kenya. Whatever the precise outcome of this re-definition will be, it can be safely assumed that the government will (have to) gradually reduce its implementing capacity. It will retain those implementing functions it can perform more effectively and efficiently than the private sector or which are directly related to e.g., State security. More activities planned for by the government - clear policy formulation and overall planning remain important functions of the government - will be implemented by the private sector. Many state enterprises have been privatised already on the correct assumption that the private sector is better in running commercial enterprises in a market environment than the government. Many government institutes, workshops, etcetera are bound to follow. This will create - since hardly anything of this policy is as yet implemented - opportunities for ASAL programmes to stimulate this process and to work with private sector partners.

The irony of this situation is that the worse the government is functioning (at district level and below), the greater the need to do something about it, but also the more restricted a donor is to effectively assist in improving this situation. This holds true particularly in the fields of policy making, planning and public resource use, tasks that (by definition) cannot be alienated from the government. On paper the problems are recognised and policies are formulated to address the issues, but implementation frequently has the character of window dressing or counters the original intentions of the policy.

### **3.4 Conflicting land use**

#### *Kajiado Conflicting Land Use*

Pastoral production occupies the bulk of the population of the district and is the primary land use. However, significant parts of the district are wildlife reserves although a lot of game is outside these areas. Historically, the Maasai have always protected wildlife as they produced livestock on the same land carrying wildlife.

There has been expansion of cultivation in Kajiado District and not just in the better watered Ngong and Loitokitok divisions. Cultivation has expanded to riverine, swamps and other ecological niches where there is moisture to support a crop. These alternative land uses limit the biomass available for pastoral production.

Although one talks about pastoralism in Kajiado, perhaps there ought to be some qualifications for this system has serious structural conflicts. First, pastoralism has been organised in group ranches. This means that there are limits on membership and thus on access to specific land pieces. Second, since group ranches operate under a specific law, entry into them, and thus acquisition of land by the progeny of the members, is not guaranteed. This is a central issue in Kajiado for some of the younger age sets who were not around and thus were not registered as members when the group ranches were being formed in the 70's, do not have access to the land resource within the ranches. This becomes clear as ranches are subdivided by committees of old men without young or women, thereby "selling wealth for poverty". Third, subdivision is accelerating rather than diminishing. Subdivision is critical from a variety of views. It takes land from the group title to individual title in law. At individually owned land management has usually improved leading to more and better and increased production. In the remaining grazing areas the land tends to degrade. These are exceptions, however. Sociologically and economically it marginalises the young and women for they do not get title deeds at times. Some of the subdivided land is bought by either immigrants or elite Maasai. Large numbers of the poor then do not have access to land. They have to drop out of pastoralism. They become marginal cultivators, askari in Nairobi or labourers in the small towns.

Just as group ranches do not distribute benefits equitably so are the various uses of



wildlife. In the past benefits were collected by the county council in trust to the population of Kajiado. It is generally accepted that those benefits went to the Maasai elite. In the past ten years some ranches have accepted wildlife related tourism. The benefits of this land use seem also to be controlled and distributed unevenly for they are controlled by the same committees who control the ranches. Even where tourism lodges have been put up and clear income can be shown, the distribution of the income leaves a lot to be desired as evidenced by the many cases in the courts. Land use for tourism assures some local, national and international elites the benefits without clear evidence that the ordinary Maasai benefits. This then is the context within which land use for wildlife is contested in Kajiado.

Finally, urban land use has arrived in Kajiado. Ngong division is a bedroom for Nairobi. Kitengela is becoming an industrial site for Nairobi. Namanga and Loitokitok are becoming border export sites. These new land uses are not systematically controlled by Maasai. To the extent they, in the long term, will generate more employment and income than pastoralism, they should become objects of development in land use planning.

#### *Laikipia Conflicting Land Use*

Laikipia presents some very difficult land conflicts. These are between large-scale ranchers, hemmed in Mukogodo Maasai or Dorobo pastoralists and immigrant cultivators having settled on sub-divided plots. These conflicts will be sharpened by the conflict over water especially since floriculture, using enormous quantities of water, is expanding quite rapidly.

#### *Elgeyo Marakwet Conflicting Land Use*

The Keiyo and the Marakwet have historically had a land use system which integrated both the lowlands, the escarpment and the uplands production within the family production unit, within a clan setting. The main family homesteads generally were in the healthier escarpment. Temporary use of settlements were in the other two zones. This does not seem to be adequately reflected in the plan of operations of the ASAL programme. Settling on the escarpment was healthier for it avoided the temperature and disease extremes of the uplands and the Kerio valley bottom. Ecologically speaking, the ecotone escarpment was more interesting, as are all ecotones, for it provided the widest range of plants and animals. A substantive research point is whether this classical settlement pattern and land ownership still pertains. If it is changing, this ought to be documented before any land use plans are made for the various zones for the settlement changes will influence land use. Such documentation ought to map land holding not just by the nuclear families but by the extended families and clans, since its utilisation follows those patterns. It is too easy and thus not accurate to speak of communal land especially in the Kerio as the excuse for not doing conservation work there. There is controversy on whether the escarpment is more degraded than the valley bottom.

The Review Team raises this issue for the land use thinking in the programme is set to relocate the population from the escarpment. It is argued that the land is degrading. The programme proposes to move the population and use the area essentially for non-cultivation. The Review Team is not sure whether this supposed land use conflict is real. It may well be true that there are more people on the escarpment cultivating than in past times and thus increasing degradation there. If this is the case, it may well be that what is called for is introduction of land conservation techniques rather than relocating of population from the area its traditions see as the more healthy if not more productive. There are several reasons for this argument. First, agricultural



techniques for both crop and livestock production are less developed for the three zones than in other smallholder parts of the country. The issue is simply that the three zones need different techniques to produce optimally. Techniques in this sense also include crop and livestock types and varieties. Second, there is a sense in which internal transformation / innovation is limited by the migration of significant numbers to the plateau, ex-white highlands. Production there is more large-scale than smallholder. It also generates food surpluses which carry the populations in the traditional areas. Since there are no drastic shortages in the traditional sectors, there is no internal pressure to change techniques or to evolve more land quality friendly production systems. This is the arena for the programme to come up with techniques which will improve the land and production.

### *West Pokot Conflicting Land Use*

The basic conflict on land in West Pokot is between pastoralists and cultivators. The wetter uplands which in historic times were used by the pastoralists as dry season or reserve grazing lands are increasingly cultivated. This means that such lands are taken out of the pastoral production system for Kenyan cultivators do not allow pastoralists to graze on stover and stubble after harvesting as is the case in West Africa.

The second major conflict is perhaps pastoral land use versus mining. Whereas this, to date, is not as extensive, it is likely to grow. Again pastoral areas are taken out of biomass production by mining.

The third land use conflict is between pastoralists and wildlife. This currently is not major although some game reserves have been created. As the western tourist circuit gets developed, shelf proposals call for expanding game reserves and parks in West Pokot. If the pattern in Narok and Kajiado is to be followed, it is conceivable that pastoral areas will be taken over by non-Pokot.

### *Summary and Conclusions: Politics and Land Use Conflicts.*

It should be noted that there are substantive issues on whether district programmes can address as complex issues and politics subsumed by the structural land use conflicts enumerated above. The Review Team, in discussions with a variety of programme advisers, SNV staff and Embassy officials, was informed that one of the objectives of thinking about centralising all ASAL programme activities in Nairobi was to get formal policy clout at the national level so as to address issues of land use. This is in the Review Team's opinion probably difficult to achieve. The reasons are that pastoralists' production systems are not easily tolerated at the national policy levels for they represent non-development. Second, pastoralists are under-represented at national policy levels and thus unable to argue for support of such efforts. Third, pastoral production systems are under (severe) pressure as the young of the systems get sucked away to urban life. Fourth, market forces favour non-pastoral land use including cultivation, ranching and wildlife.

Yet, more central co-ordination of the landuse planning focus is recommended further down to, informally, build up as much support to the districts as possible.

It should be noted that the cultivators have very large political influence based on the historical national politics. Since they do not favour wildlife, seek to satisfy their land hunger, and articulate these issues effectively, it is doubtful they can be stopped from taking over pastoral and wildlife land. Nobody says it will not be conflictual. The politically determined margins for donor programmes to engage in land use planning and land management are small. Moving into this field implies considerable risks of (part) failure (see also the section on landuse planning in the next chapter).



### 3.5 Food Security and Droughts

#### *Kajiado: Food Security and Droughts*

For Kajiado, the past ten years have not been a drought disaster as the seventies although there has been localised droughts in the past few years. These localised droughts have impacted on food security even though there have not been major disasters. However, the impact on food security when rainfall has been substandard is greater in the nineties than in the past. There are several reasons for this.

First, the population, including the dependent population has grown. The changes in population (for the entire periods of 7, 10 and 10 years respectively) between 1962-1969, 1969-1979 and 1979-1989 are 25.6%, 73.5% and 73.6%. There are now many more people in the district leading to pressure on the food resources. Most of this change is driven by in-migration. The migrants have settled in the wetter areas of the district essentially around Ngong and Loitokitok.

Second, food tastes have changed. This is driven by changes in lifestyles but part of it is driven by decreased numbers of livestock which traditionally provided for most of the food resources for Maasai. These are meat and blood. It is argued that since the extensive livestock deaths of the seventies, Maasai diets have to include maize and its derivatives of necessity.

The lack of secure food resources has led to adoption of cultivation, essentially of maize at times in areas not suitable for it. It should be noted that there are pockets of the district where famine relief food has been provided by public and NGO agencies over the past four years. Field survey interviews elicited the response that 97% of the respondents argued that they had experienced food shortages lasting more than six months in the past ten years.

The national market has penetrated the district more than the other pastoralist districts thereby enabling the livestock keepers to sell their animals in exchange for grains. The proximity to the Nairobi market assures Kajiado of good returns from livestock products. They have therefore been able to take advantage of the improving terms of trade for meat producers compared to grain producers driven by the deregulation of both the meat and grain trading regimes introduced by the structural adjustment programmes over the past few years.

#### *Laikipia: Food Security and Drought*

There have been droughts in Laikipia in the nineties. This has had major food security impacts on the pastoralists and immigrant smallholders. There have been occasions when public institutions have provided food. Within the structure of shortages, it is perhaps the pastoralists who are hit hardest although decontrol of meat prices has improved their terms of trade relative to grain farmers.

Immigrant smallholders have come from grain growing areas and family networks are able to produce some support during stress periods. Other family members in grain growing areas of the Rift Valley can be accessed. This conclusion is from extensive drought coping mechanism studies which show that migrants use kin networks to get some food.

It should be noted that the inter-census percentage changes in population since 1962 show that Laikipia population has been increased at 8%, 102.3% and 62.8% (entire periods of 7, 10 and 10 years, respectively). Immigration will continue since



significant numbers of smallholders who have bought land in the district have yet to settle. However, it should be clear that this district will for the long term be a net importer of food for a variety of reasons. First, other than the south-western part, the bulk of the district is too dry for maize growing. Even the maize varieties developed for the dry low altitude ASALs does not appear to do well in the district. Research has not developed varieties for high altitude dry regions.

The circumstances of the pastoralists continue to be extremely insecure. Land degradation is endemic. Population pressure is growing. The pastoralists are forced to settle for they are hemmed all around. The livestock in this degrading land cannot provide enough food for the existing population. Although the pastoralists' terms of trade are improving, this is not enough to assure them of food security. The next drought will see them asking for handouts. What is called for are strategies to take some of the population out of pastoralism.

There are some who argue that this district, other than the pastoral area is not a candidate for food insecurity. This is not so for such an argument does not take into account that the poor immigrants are only surviving because they use the unoccupied lands of other purchasers of land to keep livestock. Once all the land buyers take up the land, the district will become a chronic food insecure district though grain can be moved now freely from neighbouring districts.

#### *Elgeyo Marakwet: Food Security and Drought*

The inter-census population percentage changes since 1962 are -1.1%, -6.5% and 45.4% (for the entire periods of 7, 10 and 10 years respectively). Many question the latter. The issue is who migrated to the district. Some argue that this represents the political strategy of KANU that wanted more population shown for political purposes. This tends to be supported by public statements that the people of Elgeyo Marakwet should not adopt family planning so as to increase their population so as to claim a larger share of national development funds.

What is clear is that significant numbers of the population had moved out of the district into the former white highlands. Even that movement has continued to the nineties with formal purchases of land or acquisition of public land, mainly forest reserves, cut out for settling those from the district in good books with the political machine. It should also be noted that the natural population has not exploded as in some of the other ASAL districts where services have improved so much that they drive the population growth. Growth should become reality in the next few years, as improvement in health services particularly, begin to reduce the mortality rates.

Given this extensive settlement out of the district and into some of the best farmlands in the former white highlands, one of the main ways of coping with food insecurity has been inter-family flows. There are no formal studies of this in Elgeyo Marakwet but in other parts of Kenya this has been shown to be a key coping mechanism.

What is dramatic in Elgeyo Marakwet, particularly in the more arid areas of the Kerio valley, is the underdeveloped agriculture. Erosion is extensive. Agricultural techniques are traditional. Productivity per acre is low compared to other smallholder areas with similar ecological attributes. Marketing is problematic since the roads are very bad. There is extremely limited trading infrastructure (shops, trading centres, banking outlets, co-operatives etc.) Given the bad roads. These facts have a way of making food security unattainable by the populations in the Kerio part of the district.

It is also in the Kerio part where there has been drought, particularly in the Marakwet area which also is an area of extremely limited communication. This coupled with raiding means that these populations are extremely food insecure.



In this district then it is clear that part of assuring food security is improvement of road communication which would trigger marketing including imports of food and the lowering of its costs. Conservation of land would also lead to higher productivity.

#### *West Pokot: Food Security and Drought*

Since 1962, the inter-census percentage increases in population have been 39.8%, 92.4%, and 42.1%. Most of this growth was driven by smallholder cultivator immigrants who essentially settled in the wet uplands. They produce a variety of crops with maize being central to the production system. Since significant numbers opened new land which had never been cultivated, productivity per acre has been good. Some Pokot moved into smallholder production but not in large numbers to assure those who remained in the pastoral production system access to grains through inter-family transfers. The major impact of the settlement in the uplands is the cutting of forest for farms thereby starting the downward ecological spiral of less infiltration, increased surface runoff, storm floods, erosion and less water available in the rivers which assure water for pastoral production all year round. This is most clear in the Lelan area where considerable inputs into conservation have been supplied by the programme to stem this downward spiral.

Pastoralists are food insecure increasingly because of extractive land use practices in the highlands. Reserve grazing areas are cultivated. In key highland sources of water for pastoral regions, land is degrading and thus providing less water for animals all year round. In the dry lowlands, land degradation, driven by inappropriate stocking rates and collapse of traditional reserve grazing management systems, is increasing. In the same lands, mining activities also degrade land or make land unavailable for grazing. Mining also reduces the quality of the limited water resources. Finally raiding limits grazing areas. All these factors impact negatively on the food security of the pastoralists.

Another factor which has led to increased food insecurity for the pastoralists is the ethnic cleansing that made non-Pokot to leave the district. This, in turn, caused the collapse of the trading and distribution infrastructure that was mainly operated by these migrants. In the more remote areas commodities do not reach in the same amounts as previously. Thus minor droughts have triggered major food shortages in the pastoral areas. The NGO infrastructure, mainly staffed by migrants, also collapsed. There is thus a good chance that a major drought, like in the seventies, will be really disastrous for the pastoralists. This is the cost of ethnic cleansing.

The decontrol of meat prices should have led to improving terms of trade for West Pokot pastoralists. Returns to them have not been particularly good for essentially two reasons. First ethnic cleansing led to the movement from the district of cattle traders who collected animals for large national traders. Second, the local traders, usually allied with KANU big men, tend to be more exploitative than the outsiders for it is a buyers' market. Pastoralists lack marketing information (prices) which puts them in a weak position. Distance from the large national market denies entry to small traders.

The most important factor in assuring food security to pastoralists is to ensure security in the pastoral areas. This will not just protect their animals from being raided but will also allow other players to get into marketing of livestock. It will also assure that grain traders will come back to the pastoral areas in numbers which effectively reduce grain prices. Security of non-Pokot will be critical in this for their trading networks will be useful in both the marketing of livestock and the grains needed as food supplements.



### 3.6 Insecurity (cattle raids)

#### *Kajiado: Insecurity*

Livestock raiding has not been a major problem in Kajiado over the past four years. Consequently security has been adequate. During 1992 and 1993, there were rumours of possible ethnic clashes but these did not come about. The demographics of the district did not favour the indigenous people throwing out the immigrants. The latter are possibly the majority in the district. This reality was understood by the community and the politicians of the day. It is also possible that the Kajiado Maasai have more real and fictive kinship among the immigrants than in all the other districts where ethnic cleansing took place.

#### *Laikipia: Insecurity*

There has been limited livestock raiding in the northern parts of Laikipia District. This raiding has not been extensive. Consequently it has not impacted on programme activities as is the case in other districts.

As opposed to raiding, defined as large scale stealing of livestock by organised raiding armies, Laikipia has experienced livestock stealing particularly in the smallholder and ranch areas. Livestock stealing is distinguished from raiding by scale. Usually those stealing livestock are thieves in very small bands as opposed to raiding armies. The numbers of livestock stolen characteristically are few.

The importance of livestock stealing seems to be part and parcel of both ethnic and class conflicts in the district. It appears as if the poor smallholders steal from the rich land owners. The ethnic pattern seems to be between Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu. Whereas the stealing has taken place in limited form, given the class and ethnic basis of competition of land resources in the district, it can be hypothesised that in the future, this kind of activity can escalate if the national political and business elites begin to finance the looting and raiding as they have allegedly done in districts like West Pokot and Samburu.

#### *Keiyo Marakwet: Insecurity*

During the nineties, there has been extensive raiding of livestock in Elgeyo Marakwet, especially in the Marakwet part. Raids have been by Pokot mainly but other ethnicities have also been involved. People working in the Marakwet side argue that the raids have such a major impact that populations which had moved permanently to the Kerio valley have shifted back to the escarpment or the plateau. Schools, trading centres and churches have been evacuated at times. Field interviews in the district suggest that there are few people willing to be stationed in the Kerio valley parts where most of the raids take place. But perhaps most significant is the fact that the raids have had a major impact on the Marakwet in terms of denying them livestock production since they have lost a lot of livestock.

As is usual, pastoralists or agro-pastoralists who loose livestock try to cope by either counter raiding or intensifying cultivation. The Marakwet, who have lost livestock, are not in a position to organise counter raids for the Pokot, Turkana and Tugen seem to be very well armed. They argue that they do not have godfathers in the KANU ruling circles to ensure that they not only get the guns but are protected from state agencies who mount gun collection campaigns in their areas. Since counter raids are not possible, the Marakwet are falling into cultivation at times in lands which should be left to other uses. This contributes to degradation. The raids have also kept them from operating the traditional irrigation systems. This contributes to serious food



insecurity also.

The effects of raids in the new Marakwet District have a major negative impact on development of the people. There is urgent need to intensify development activities in the new district. However, the donor ought to seek assurance at the highest GoK levels that security will be guaranteed by the state. Since otherwise the effectiveness of assistance is greatly impaired

#### *West Pokot: Insecurity*

The Pokot, whether found in West Pokot District or in Baringo District, are one of the major livestock raiding groups. Raiding has not slowed down. If anything, Pokot raiding seems to be abetted by their godfathers.

It is alleged that recent raiding, whether in Turkana, Pokot, Marsabit or north-eastern Kenya, is driven by big business. The financiers, based in Nairobi and with access to the powerful in the country, finance the purchasing of the guns. The favourite is the AK 47, easily procured from their colleagues running gun trade in the wider greater horn of Africa region. The financiers use ex-armed forces personnel to organise raiding parties in military fashion. The locally based experts plan the logistics of the raiding and the delivery of the animals to points where they can be picked by trucks. Recruitment into the raiding armies is essentially from the unemployed youth available in all pastoral districts urban centres. These are contracted for a particular raiding job. Once the animals are delivered to the pick up points, guns tend to be collected if participants do not want to be paid with guns.

Several points regarding the impact of raiding, on development in general and West Pokot in particular, should be made. First, recent raiding is allegedly driven by national political elites. Second, the fruits of raiding (livestock) are usually taken away from pastoral production. They get into national and international markets. Three, the accumulated raiding profits go out of the districts mainly although raiding labour is paid and that money stays within the districts. Four, young men are taken out of pastoral production by the new type of raiding. Fifth, endemic raiding limits development. Communities are too insecure to undertake development and development financiers and workers do not want to work in those regions. This negative impact is more vicious in districts like West Pokot where raiding was coupled by ethnic cleansing.

The state should assure donors of security so that benefits of development resources put into those areas by donors can go to the intended beneficiaries.

### **3.7 Institutional Setting**

#### *Parent Ministry*

The MLRRWD has the mandate to co-ordinate and manage ASAL programmes in the country. The main reason for placing the ASAL programme in the MLRRWD was probably to enable the ministry to give more attention to water issues. But ASAL development is much more than just water. Environmental and land use issues are critical and so they need to be addressed in a fragile ecology. Because of the nature of ASAL development, a sector ministry is not well placed to co-ordinate multi-sectoral programmes.

The co-ordination of ASAL programmes has been moving from one ministry to the other. Originally, the ASAL section in the MoALD & M co-ordinated ASAL efforts. In 1978, co-ordination was moved to the Ministry of Planning and National



development (having different names by that time). But in 1989, a new ministry for ASAL development was created. In 1993 that good progress made was reversed and the ministry was merged with others to constitute the MLRRWD.

Over the last four years, there has been no meaningful dialogue between the ministry and the donors. Lack of this dialogue has made some donors to reduce collaboration with the ministry, others have withdrawn altogether.

But at the moment, there are ASAL programmes that are co-ordinated by other ministries. The Arid Lands Resources Management Programme (ALRMP) and the Drought Preparedness, Interventions and Recovery programme are under the Office of the President. The Kitui / Makueni and Taita Taveta, Marsabit, and Samburu ASALs are under the MoALD&M. Area based programmes such as the Siaya farmers' groups community support project are under the Office of the Vice President and the Ministry of Planning and National Development. The Dutch ASALs are the only ones remaining with the MLRRWD.

This scattering of ASAL programmes in numerous government ministries denies them commonality of policy direction and makes it difficult to use lessons learnt from one programme to improve another. It is a clear message that the GoK does not take ASAL development seriously now.

At the headquarters' level, support to the district programme has been in the form of assigning a programme officer and a few GoK staff. Policy review and technical support from the headquarters is clearly lacking. The department of land reclamation has been weakened. Vacant posts are never filled. The technical and the planning office have lost good staff to other government departments or NGOs. There has been no efforts to fill these vacancies. The possibilities for improvement are dim.

#### *Donor Co-ordination*

Co-ordination of donors in various fields of development is the best way to ensure that donor and government policies are harmonised. The Ministry of Finance has the responsibility to co-ordinate donors. However, donor co-ordination by the Ministry of Finance is limited to the bi-lateral talks where each donor discusses its portfolio separately. The talks are limited to broad sectoral and project discussions without detailed analysis of project outcomes.

In the past, and as far as implementation of projects in ASAL areas is concerned, the government used to convene meetings under the umbrella of inter-ministerial co-ordination committee to discuss programme objectives, strategies and approaches, and implementation of projects with a view to sort out problems, removing constraints and initiating adjustments where necessary. High level donor conferences were also organised for government to explain its position on issues pertaining to ASAL development policy. Donor co-ordination in the sense explained above does not take place anymore. The inter-ministerial co-ordination committee stopped to exist even though it is recognised in the ASAL development policy paper.

In 1990, the idea was born to establish a joint GoK donor ASAL policy team. The main reason for this was that indeed under the umbrella of the GoK policy paper, more specific ASAL policies should be established to provide an operational framework for all the donors involved in ASAL programmes. Indeed, a high variety of approaches existed, since in fact every donor went about ASAL development his own way (see also § 1.2 in e.g. West Pokot and Keiyo Marakwet District reports).

After deliberations, the GoN committed itself to assign an ASAL specialist to the new team, and so did GTZ; UNSO followed suit during the second year of the existence of



that team. GoK assigned three experienced ASAL specialists and the WB offered office facilities. The team started its functioning with a major seminar in the Aberdare country club in February 1991, that was attended by all donors and GoK staff. The five-day seminar resulted in a set of priorities and a clear indication to the team what should be considered a priority.

Due to its location, the team became known as the ASAL WB team, and this appeared to be more than a name. A rather impressive list of policy cum investment documents were produced, but apparently the team had not been able to produce documents that became used in practice, either by the ASAL programmes or by the donor community, except for the WB.

In the end it may be concluded that the ASAL (WB) team prepared for the WB its investment policy for the arid areas that resulted in the WB financed arid lands resource management project in all the arid districts of Kenya.

Another aspect of the existence of the ASAL (WB) team was that the WB during that period started functioning as the lead in donor co-ordination. By the time the GoK decided to abolish the ASAL ministry and transfer ASAL programmes to the newly created MLRRWD, all donors were outspoken negative and considered this to be a start of diminished policy attention for the ASAL programmes. Strong arguments were given by especially the Netherlands and GTZ to strongly protest and to, at least, have ASAL programmes transferred back to the Ministry of Planning and National Development. Taking the decisive lead, the WB argued for a more low key approach and would take the necessary action in informal ways. In the end very little happened, the donor community fell apart after 1993, most ASAL donors went to other ministries, the ASAL team ceased to exist and the World Bank committed itself to the aforementioned ALRMP (about US \$ 60 million) executed under the Office of the President.

### *District Partners*

Over a long period of time, the main partners in ASAL development have been government departments. NGOs, community based organizations and the private sector did not play a very significant role. That pattern is, however, rapidly changing.

### *Government Departments*

Department heads, have, from the first ASAL programmes, had a stake in the (management of) the programmes. This emanated from their positions as departmental heads, members of the ASAL steering committees, members of the DEC's, members of the main DDC and liaison officers from their departments in the programme. A few departments also utilised their membership in the DPU to claim some management role in programmes.

Over the past years (since 1993 in particular) divisional level staff have been involved in programme activities to a greater extent than before. Programme advisors argue that they are better trained, more responsive to the participatory/bottom-up approach and there is less corruption at this level. It could not be established whether it is the rent rate which is less or it is absence of rent seeking behaviour.

This change in the pattern has tended to marginalise the district level. This is done subtly by ignoring steering committees, negotiating activity plans with non-departmental heads. Utilising lower level staff, giving daily allowances to the lower level staff, thus builds loyalty to the programme there rather than at the district level. This has been a source of tension between the PMU and departmental heads as well



as between divisional and district level staff. District level staff have essentially become marginal to programme activities. Relations between PMU (and especially the advisors) and department heads have, as a result, become uneasy. The advisors thought of departmental heads as sometimes uncooperative, sometimes as colluding with elements of the PMU for rent seeking. This is not too surprising for departmental heads do not see themselves as part and parcel of programmes.

However, such has the risk that the district bosses at some point will pull rank on lower level staff thereby threatening field activities. In other donor projects, where district levels have been ignored, departmental heads have reacted by continuously moving divisional level staff to ensure that no project activities continue.

Another risk could be loss of commitment of staff at the lower level for some of the programmes are creating their own parallel structures at this level. Currently these structures draw on technical skills from this level. It should also be realised that it is doubtful that divisional level staff can make major programming input particularly in shaping the nature of programmes.

At times new organizations, like ARU in Laikipia, are created to essentially do the work which could have been carried out by departments, ironically sometimes with staff from the same ministries.

#### NGOs in Districts

Some church NGO, with extensive capacities in various districts, have assisted ASAL programmes in managing implementation. Among these are the Catholic Church and the CPK church. They have been major development actors in as varied districts as Marsabit, Kitui and Turkana where the Catholic Church has always been active. The CPK church, in turn, has been a major development actor in West Pokot in the past. The AIC has been an important actor in Kajiado.

International NGOs basically get their own funds and rarely solicit funds from district ASAL programmes. In a few, there has been co-operation between them and the programmes. These are found in Kajiado, where Farm Africa, AMREF and ITDG are active. CCF is found in Elgeyo Marakwet.

Where church NGOs, international NGOs and national NGOs are found, they could become important development management tracks for they usually operate at community level. Their overheads are generally lower than other development implementors.

#### Community Based Organizations

All programmes have spent resources creating CBOs to implement activities. Perhaps most outstanding in this respect are the TACs in Keiyo Marakwet. Credit groups in several districts are another pathway.

Where programmes have not created CBOs, they have taken over/used existing ones to assist in implementation. Examples are ranch committees implementing water both for livestock and human in several of the districts. In general using existing CBOs is recommended for supply (donor) driven CBOs are not usually sustainable. They first spend an inordinate time building legitimacy and die with the pulling out of the donor. In any case, during the second generation of ASALs there are many existing CBOs whose inter-mediating roles have been clarified by communities. It therefore should not be necessary to spend resources creating non-sustainable appendages to programmes.



CBOs are most useful to communities when they are multi-activity. If they are so, communities can absorb the organisational costs. If they are sponsored, the organisational costs are high and the sponsor ends up paying for them.

Utilising CBOs is important for it is part of the development of community capacities. This alone is a major objective of development. It is the only pathway to community O&M. It means, therefore, that programmes have to invest in time to upgrade skills with such groups. This type of skill upgrading is best delivered in the context of specific development activity implementation. It is on this score that there are failures in programme management for most of the CBO training is conducted as stand-alone and not part and parcel of learning by doing. CBOs have not been taken seriously enough that they are included in the whole project cycle.

There is also an argument being bandied around in the programmes that CBOs need technical inputs from divisional level staff. This may be so for specific aspects. However, there is a flip side. Many farmers know more about some development activities than the lower level technical officers. The point is that there is usually extensive expertise in CBOs which is not exploited, for few development actors take the time to identify this expertise. It should be audited and used by programmes throughout the project cycle for farmer to farmer extension has been proved more efficient than all other types. The real challenge to programmes is imaging how to use CBOs to maximise the transfer of knowledge, including planning and monitoring knowledge, to the CBOs.

### *The Role of SNV*

Institutionally the role of SNV is not clear. When implementing DGIS funded projects such as the ASAL programmes, SNV is neither considered as part of DGIS and thus implementing a project 'in eigen beheer' nor does it operate on a level playing field with private organisations / consultants. This has everything to do with the special status of SNV adequately labelled as a quango - a quasi NGO. SNV is a foundation and its policies are guided by a board on which the ministry is represented (but has neither a majority nor a right to veto). SNV staff and operations are fully paid from the budget of the minister for development co-operation. The majority of headquarters staff of SNV are actually ministerial staff assigned to SNV. Field staff are in majority on contract basis for a specific assignment and a specified period.

SNV feels quite strongly about its own position related to matters of development policy and strategy. On the other hand the SNV's policies and development strategic ideas usually do not deviate dramatically from those of the ministry. SNV can't afford to differ fundamentally in approach and strategy from the ministry, since the latter is the sole fund provider of SNV.

SNV views the ASAL programmes in which it is involved as SNV programmes which are funded by DGIS. It does not see itself as implementing a DGIS programme. This position is also partly due to the fact that SNV (Kenya) has directly or indirectly played an important part in identifying and formulating ASAL programmes (Kajiado, Elgeyo Marakwet, West Pokot).

That also in Kenya SNV feels strongly about its own role in ASAL programmes and is committed to them can be derived from the fact that they do put some of their 'own' resources in those programmes.

It is the Review Team's view that if SNV would continue to be involved in the ASAL programmes, it would have to be on the basis of agreed Plans of Operation (including budgets) and approved Annual Plans and budgets. Reporting needs to be on outputs



(results), activities and inputs (financial and other) and what outputs have contributed to agreed objectives. The RNE monitors SNV on the basis of these reports. The grounds for interference in the programme by the RNE should only be found in insufficient achievements that cannot be satisfactorily accounted for.

On the other hand, SNV should loyally implement the programme in accordance with the agreed Plans of Operations and Annual Plans, even in the face of SNV policy changes, either at HQ or at country level. SNV should also refrain from pushing policy issues that are not included in the agreed plans.

## **4 ANALYSIS OF ACHIEVEMENTS, IMPACT AND EFFECTS OF THE ASAL PROGRAMMES**

### **4.0 Preamble**

To ease the reading of this Part Two of the review as a stand-alone report, this chapter begins by presenting in § 4.1 the final concluding chapters of the separate district reports of Part One. The reader who is familiar with these separate district reports can disregard § 4.1.

After this, in § 4.2, a synthesising analyses is given of the four district programmes. This analysis starts with a part that looks at operational aspects like the PMU, financial management, et cetera followed by parts that analyse the key focuses of the ASAL programmes: environment cum land use planning (or better natural resource management), and gender. Understandably, the changing context in which the ASAL programmes operate, as presented in the previous chapter 3, provides the backdrop for all this.

### **4.1 District Specific Conclusions and Recommendations**

#### **4.1.1 West Pokot**

##### *Follow-up to Recommendations Review Mission 1993*

The PMU, in 1994, was clearly not convinced by the recommendations made by that review. Indeed, the PlanOps 1994-1999 did put a strong emphasis on the previous phases and kept its promise that it “will remain fundamentally the same as before”. This implies that new strategies introduced by the 1993 review as natural resource management got meagre and reluctant attention.

No attempts were made to improve community participation, which was a prominent recommendation made. This failure, though, is closely related to the fact that the programme stuck to the traditional oil in the GoK machinery approach; and line ministries do not put such participation up front.

However, the programme did increase the level of expenditure almost twofold and the productive sector got its rightful share but a focused framework was not aimed at.

##### *Institutional Set-up*

It can be concluded that ASAL programmes are technically placed in the wrong ministry and, if the current situation continues, possibilities for improved co-ordination, technical and policy support to districts and co-ordination of the dialogue with donors are slim. Especially after the recent turmoil on unaccountable expenditure (Price Waterhouse audit) there is little drive with the programme’s management to stay with the parent ministry or even to continue the programme as a joint venture.

If the latter were to continue, there should be a condition for matching funds, implying adequate insight in GoK finances. The adoption of this matching fund principle is more critical than the magnitude of the amount of money contributed, as this would enable the government to be much more involved with the programme operations due to the stake that it holds in it. The final product will be the assurance



that institutional sustainability is enhanced, accountability of decision making and use of funds is cultivated, thereby promoting transparency. If such a condition cannot be met, there seems little reason to continue with the ASAL programme as the 'joint venture' it is now.

The set-up of the management of the programme with a PO and PA with different loyalties, is a constraint and created an ambiguous perspective of the programme (called two-window system in other districts). Either the set-up and mandates of the programme need reconsideration or the composition and role of the PMU need an overhaul. This is discussed in more detail in this Part Two.

At present the DFRD is 'bankrupt' and is predominantly used politically in the district. Opportunities, however, do exist to improve the functioning of the DFRD policy, and the programme could and should assist more in this respect. It should play a more active role in providing additional, external strategies to make the DFRD policy framework operationally effective. Such outside strategies are e.g. the PMC et cetera structure in force in Keiyo Marakwet.

### *Finances*

Formally, the ASAL programme depends for the financial control on the GoK structure, and history teaches that this control system is not always watertight and cannot always avoid misappropriation of funds. During the first phases of the programme avoidance of major financial conflicts was only possible because the Programme Advisors were involved in each and every detail of the programme and checked each activity personally. Such intimate knowledge of all the details of the programme provided the additional control mechanism required. After 1993, this became increasingly difficult due to increased expenditure of the programme and due to the fact that the PA applied the formally correct position that such a personal control should not be part of his responsibilities, the ASAL programme being a GoK project.

The traditional ASAL implementation structure that characterises especially West Pokot District, in combination with new approaches and elements since 1993 opened the door wider to problems in the financial administration. It must be observed that the PA requested additional management capacity for the increased expenditure, which was denied.

Likewise for the PMU, either the set-up of the programme needs reconsideration, or the system of the financial administration needs an overhaul. This renewal should also make it more appropriate for M&E that is not the case at the moment since the Dutch budget code system aggregates types of costs incurred under different activities. Now, information obtained from line ministries (e.g. contact officers) about achievements of the ASAL programme is not always in line with the PA's assessment. This is to be remedied.

### *Objectives / Strategies*

The programme in West Pokot needs to be 'modernised' and learn from the variety of experiences gained in the other districts with Dutch supported ASAL programmes. The fact that it has been closed for a short period of time, should be considered the right opportunity to start this process of change.

The climate in which the ASAL programme operates is not conducive for participation to become effective. The programme is fully part of the government machinery that demonstrates little interest in such participation. This contributed to



the poor performance of the programme whereas improved community participation is concerned, thus failing on an important objective. The role of the departments in the whole of the project cycle remained dominating.

In all other four objectives little achievement was made (improvement of knowledge through KARI's research centres failed), except for the one that intended to contribute to the improvement of certain aspects of living standards. As a continuation of the previous phases, it can be safely assumed that this objective was met like in those earlier phases. Furthermore, is the forthcoming credit scheme expected to have a positive impact on the objective "new avenues for income generation". This credit programme will be co-ordinated externally by a consulting firm.

Although the programme experienced turmoil about the use of funds, there should not necessarily be a problem with the higher inputs if the necessary reorganisation had taken place. It is argued that implementation capacity should determine the input which leads to the necessity for focused and continuous capacity building with NGOs and CBOs. It can be observed in this context that the donor on the one hand stimulated higher inputs for more impact, but has not been reliable in fulfilling financial commitments made in this respect. During the review period considerable confusion existed about the level of funds available.

Particularly poorly developed in West Pokot are the strategies that should make the objectives operational: the package is not concerted. This presses even more since the programme has no specific target group. Not to have a real target group is a common characteristic of the Dutch supported ASAL programmes. This is not necessarily a weak point as long as the programme has proper and realistic objectives supported by adequate strategies to achieve the objectives. If objectives, strategies and criteria are not well done the programme will rapidly develop into a series of unrelated small activities that have little coherence or synergy; this is the prominent risk of a process approach the ASAL programmes had at the start. Communities were to provide the programme framework but this combined poorly with the dominant role played by the line ministries.

### *Focus*

For the 1993-97 period as a whole total recorded project expenditure appeared to be Kshs. 120 million. In addition Kshs. 30 million was spent on programme management, general support (mainly transport) and human resource development (or: training of a few civil servants, mainly abroad). The programme officers in West Pokot have always tried as much as possible to put 'general support' expenses under the category of the project for which the expenses were actually made (unlike some other ASAL programmes, which makes comparison difficult).

Major results of the geographical analysis were that most of the ASAL project expenditure went to the small farmer parts of the drylands (46%), but still a considerable part went to the pastoral areas (36%) and to the highlands (17%). The last figure shows that the suggestion of the 1993 evaluation mission to include the catchment areas in the highlands in ASAL's programme mandate was followed up.

Within the small farmer zone, most of the project expenditure was spent on water, followed by farming. A very high part of the water expenditure went to one small area (Chepareria town and surroundings). Within the pastoral zone most of the money was spent on livestock, followed by water, and veterinary projects. Within the highland zone most of the money went to Lelan location and was spent on forestry projects.

The project expenditure in terms of divisions was rather skewed, with most money going to Chepareria division (and here most to Kipkomo location, on water and



livestock projects mainly), followed by Kapenguria division (mostly highlands). Despite all this input, external factors like increased insecurity and decreased food security dominate, and caused an overall feeling that the standard and quality of living is declining.

From this overview we may conclude that in the small farmer area where the ASAL programme has been far more active than in the non-intervention area the situation was indeed (much) better in 19 out of 29 indicators. In the pastoral area where the ASAL programme had more interventions the situation was (much) better in 23 out of the 29 indicators. Overall this could suggest a major positive impact, even more so in the pastoral area than in the small farmer area.

### *Impact since the Start*

It proved to be useful to look into the various indicators in a more detailed way and also, where possible, to compare the 1997 situation with the situation some ten years ago. Doing so, it could be made plausible that indeed the ASAL programme activities did have a positive impact, and certainly in the pastoral area.

### *Implementation Mechanisms and Partners*

To prelude to the synthesising analysis of the four districts (Part Two), and comparing West Pokot with the neighbouring Keiyo Marakwet programme, it is apparent that these are almost each others opposite in the application of purposeful strategies and the recommendations of the 1993 review, making the comparison between these two programmes extremely interesting and of key importance for conclusions and recommendations about the future of ASAL programmes.

The mistrust that NGOs in general have of the GoK makes it difficult to use this NGO capacity in the present programme, although the NGO capacity is rather limited in West Pokot. More distance of the programme from the GoK might nevertheless increase the potential of this mechanism. The intermediate level of the private sector should be better explored, although the clashes some years ago made much the private sector capacity to leave the district. The use of the flexible mechanism of consulting companies over which the programme has good control, should be continued.

The programme realises in this respect that to build-up the capacities of other partners than the GoK departments will take considerable time and effort. The programme would, therefore, feel comfortable if it could reduce its focus to a few sectors. It is also in favour of the way the credit sector and the education sector are handled. Implemented either by a consulting firm like credit or steered and guided externally (though implemented by the ASAL programme) like the education sector through the Basic Education Support Programme. External steering through e.g. the preparation of (formulation) missions and concept development could be further developed, but the ASAL programme should have the management and administrative capacity for implementation.

For different sectors, a systematic backstopping structure for the long-term should be put in place (continuing the start that has been made already).

### *Monitoring and Evaluation*

The conclusions and recommendations on the monitoring and evaluation in all the districts are presented in chapter 4.3 of this report.



#### 4.1.2 Keiyo Marakwet

##### *Follow-up to Recommendations Review Mission 1993*

Unlike the programme in West Pokot, the programme in Keiyo Marakwet accepts the challenge of the magnitude of the problems to be solved by accepting the 10 objectives of the national ASAL policy. Interestingly, the two first objectives (highest priorities) are literally identical to those of West Pokot. The last three are rather similar. The difference is in objectives 3 and 4 that stipulate awareness raising regarding the need to reclaim and conserve the environment, and improved planning capacity and co-ordination between development actors. Such objectives are missing in West Pokot.

These two objectives formed the basis for land use planning in the transect area approach and the new operational structure that put far more power with the communities. The basis was laid for a mix of top down and bottom up planning. Major improvements were made in the systematic planning of activities.

The programme in Keiyo Marakwet especially is in the forefront of implementing the recommendations of the 1993 review. Considering the consequences of this and considering the risks involved (see final chapter 9) further development and strategic decisions should be taken in a wider forum than that of the single ASAL programme. If the donor continues to support the 1993 recommendations, the Keiyo Marakwet programme experience should be carefully analysed on its appropriateness for the other three districts.

##### *Institutional Set-up*

It can be concluded that ASAL programmes are technically placed in the wrong ministry and, if the current situation continues, possibilities for improved co-ordination, technical and policy support to districts and co-ordination of the dialogue with donors are slim. There is little drive with the programmes management to stay with the parent ministry or even to continue the programme as a joint venture. To ensure there is government commitment to the ASAL programme, there should be a condition for matching funds implying adequate insight in GoK finances. The adoption of this matching fund principle is more critical than the magnitude of the amount of money contributed, as this would enable the government to be much more involved with the programme operations due to the stake that it holds in it. The final product will be the assurance that institutional sustainability is enhanced, accountability of decision making and use of funds is cultivated, thereby promoting transparency. If such a condition cannot be met, there seems little reason to continue with the ASAL programme as the 'joint venture' it is now.

The set-up of the management of the programme is a constraint and created an ambiguous perspective of the programme (called two-window system in other districts). Either the set-up and mandate of the programme needs reconsideration or the composition and role of the PMU needs an overhaul.

At present the DFRD is 'broke' and is predominantly used politically in the district. Opportunities, however, do exist to improve the functioning of the DFRD policy, and the programme assisted in this respect. It played an active role in providing additional strategies to make the DFRD policy framework operationally effective. Its new organisational structure strongly involves the communities in the TAA through PMCs. The drawback is, however, obvious. TACs and PMCs do create also a structure partly separated from the formal one. The TACs are answerable to the



Divisional Development Committees, and communication with the local authorities is facilitated by having the local MP, DO, councillors, chiefs, etc. as ex-officio members of the committee. Without the umbrella of the ASAL programme such a structure might disintegrate easily. Moreover, as long as peace and harmony about ASAL's activities is prevalent the structure will function properly but has little backing in case of conflicts.

### *Finances*

Formally the ASAL programme depends for the financial control on the GoK structure, and history teaches that this control system is not always watertight and cannot always avoid misappropriation of funds. During the first phases of the programme avoidance of major financial conflicts was only possible because the advisors were involved in each and every detail of the programme and checked each activity personally. Such intimate knowledge of all the details of the programme provided the additional control mechanism required. After 1993, this became more and more difficult due to increased expenditure of the programme and due to the fact the PAs applied the formally correct position that such a personal control should not be part of their responsibilities, the ASAL programme being a GoK project.

Either the set-up and mandate of the programme needs reconsideration or the composition and role of the PMU needs an overhaul of the terms of reference for donor staff and GoK staff to avoid conflicts. The Keiyo Marakwet programme has made a strategic decision to start the reorganisation of the operational structure (e.g. by redefining the role of the line departments in identification and implementation of its activities. This step in itself is fully supported by the Review Team but should (i) be pursued consequently and (ii) not be done in isolation from the management structure in the three other districts.

The PMU already took quite useful steps to improve the situation by having the PAM system introduced in each transect and by making the PMCs (the communities) the responsible control mechanism. It is too early to assess whether this will work adequately. It also contradicts the character of the joint venture with joint responsibilities of the ASAL programmes as agreed upon between GoK and GoN.

The above does not imply that the Review Team recommends against these steps. It does recommend that the donor and the GoK see this change in the control responsibility (and the changed role of the line ministries - see § 5.5) in the perspective of all the ASAL programmes. The consequent conclusion could be that, *de facto*, the idea of the 'joint venture' has been left in Keiyo and Marakwet Districts and should be formalised and taken to its final consequences - also for the other districts.

### *Objectives / Strategies*

The Review Team concludes that the strategy applied in Keiyo Marakwet has been very successful in fulfilling the recommendations of the 1993 review, while creating a framework that can make the objectives to be met. A major step was made already in meeting the objective 3 and 4. It made the ASAL programme in Keiyo Marakwet the most 'modern' one with a natural resource management focus and transfer of responsibilities to communities, in contrast to the one in neighbouring West Pokot.

The Review Team is very positive about the considerable achievements of the programme during the period under review, and agrees in this with the backstopping mission. Strategies were well defined and applied.



The success of the applied strategy will depend on two factors. First, the speed and magnitude with which the communities in the transects will identify themselves with long-term environmental issues and become prepared to address these for the sake of future generations. Second, to what degree the programme will be able to find the proper balance between 'conditions' and projects favoured by the communities.

The only advice the Review Team wants to give is that considering the risks involved and the high vulnerability of a programme in the risky process, that from now onwards (now that the implementation has started and preparations have been made) the forum for decision making (to find that proper balance) will be wider than that of the district ASAL programme. A wider forum for deliberations than is now operational (basically the PMU) might avoid political pitfalls and provide wider support and backing for decisions.

Not to have a real target group is a common characteristic of the Dutch supported ASAL programmes. This is not necessarily a weak point as long as the programme has proper and realistic objectives supported by adequate strategies to achieve the objectives. If objectives, strategies and criteria are not well defined, the programme will rapidly develop into a series of unrelated small activities that have little coherence or synergy. This is why the good quality of the strategies in the Keiyo Marakwet programme is so important and why introduction of e.g. a log frame is a useful contribution to the quality of the ASAL programmes.

#### *Focus on Sectors*

Almost 63 % of expenditure over the review period could not be related to specific projects but was spent on workshops, training, equipment, overhead, et cetera. Out of the 37 % on specific project expenditure, 63 % was allocated to the productive / economic sector (see also footnotes 12 and 23 in the district report in Part One). The largest single allocation went to roads and bridges and 'water' projects were the most popular.

Activities that can be characterised as beneficial for the environment used 14 % of project funds and the Review Team estimates that at least 25 %, but probably one third of all expenditure was spent on land use planning (preparations), in line with the central position this strategy has. Closely related to this is the high level of environmental awareness that was observed in Keiyo Marakwet.

Projects that were specifically meant for women, received 22 % of all project expenditure.

The on-going Phase Three of the ASAL programme, is generally implementing on target, and financial planning is done correctly since underspending on annual budgets hardly occurs.

In the few locations where a comparison could be made with the situation of the 1980s, a probable positive impact of previous phase could be observed. Improved supply of irrigation water features strongly in this (and increased sale of agricultural produce), as well as the improved general water and hygiene situation.

#### *Implementation Mechanisms and Partners*

The transect area approach, by arranging implementation through Project Management Committees, has enhanced community organisation, project planning (including the correction of faulty plans), management capacity (including setting their priorities) and responsibility sharing at grassroots level. Also after the introduction of the new organisational structure, the departmental staff represents the



major implementing capacity available.

There should be more astute efforts to have a common policy for all NGOs and have improved co-ordination between them, especially in Keiyo District. Strengthening this collaboration would improve the districts' capacity to undertake projects and to enhance co-ordination of activities.

Considerable, systematic and continuous attention to the capacity building of such CBOs will have to be given for the programme to have sufficient future implementing structure. Awareness raising and organisation took place but various elementary skills the CBOs will need in the future are insufficiently present. This capacity building will claim considerable parts of the human and financial resources available (see also § 5.10). The use of this flexible mechanism of consulting companies over which the programme has good control, should be continued.

There appear to be little or fading away problems up to now with the higher inputs especially because the start of necessary reorganisations took place (see previous paragraphs in this chapter). It can be observed in this context that the donor on the one hand stimulated higher inputs for more impact, but has not been reliable in fulfilling financial commitments made in this respect. During the review period considerable confusion existed about the level of funds available. Moreover, the PMU claims that the only restriction to embark upon new / more transects is a financial one. If this assessment is correct, a gap exists between words and deeds.

### *District Split*

As long as the ASAL programme is a joint venture of GoK and the donor, implying a clear responsibility with the district administration for its implementation, it is recommended that once districts are split, the government and the donor can agree on (a) to create another district programme with its own administrative structure or (b) to phase out one of the districts. The choice is to depend on on-going commitments.

Would such a joint venture for the ASAL programmes be abolished, little objection would exist to continue operating in the same geographical area as before the split.

### *Monitoring and Evaluation*

The conclusions and recommendations on the monitoring and evaluation in all the districts are presented in chapter 4.3 of this report.

#### 4.1.3 Kajiado

##### *Follow-up to Recommendations Review Mission 1993*

The programme has quite consistently followed up the recommendations made by the 1993 Review. In relation to the specific recommendations for ASAL Kajiado, some of the results are:

- there are major improvements in project formulation, together with collaborating partners, and monitoring;
- there has been an emphasis on the productive sector;
- the programme has continued to develop the "bottom-up" approach;
- capacity building of the various partners at district and local (groups) level has been strongly supported, 30% of the expenditure is on capacity building;
- livestock, water and education have received considerable attention.



With respect to the overall recommendations, the following has been achieved:

- attention is paid to the link between bottom-up and top-down approach, in particular through development of a strategic framework for natural resource management (thus considering the productive sector and environmental impact); clearly this is not yet fully achieved and the programme intends to continue paying attention to the development of this framework in the coming year;
- institutional strengthening is a priority objective of the programme and a major component, the PMU has increased in capacity;
- the programme has continued to develop a more gender specific strategy.

#### *Institutional set-up*

The placement in the Ministry of MLRRWD is not considered successful. Support and feedback are insufficient. The Department of Land Reclamation does not have enough capacity to co-ordinate the different ASAL Programmes.

At present the programme feels hampered by the many different lines of responsibility, which creates too much bureaucracy for the programme. At district level the DDC and the ASAL Steering Committee and at National level the Ministry, SNV and the RNE need to be consulted, kept informed and make major decisions, such as the approval of the PlanOps and Annual Plans.

The decision-making and reporting structures should be simpler and clearer to facilitate an easier management of the programme. Now, plans have to be submitted to several organisations, and these organisations e.g. RNE and SNV-Kenya, again need to consult internally (gender, environment, et cetera), and with their headquarters in The Hague. This makes the situation confusing and complicated. The GoK and GoN should simplify procedures for approval.

The PMU has been strengthened and is functioning well. However, the capacity remains limited. The risk of the two window system is realised by the programme, but will require continued attention to avoid conflict and consumes time.

The ASAL Steering Committee is not sufficiently effective to support the programme in major policy and decision making. Furthermore, there should be more input of NGOs and CBOs in policy development. Now policy issues are focused on the government, e.g. through the Steering Committee. There should be an increased role for target group representation. The programme will need to find a way of how to establish such representation but needs the green light from higher authorities to do so, or a different programme set-up.

According to the 1993 Review, more attention should be paid by the programme to assisting the sub-DDCs. The programme has tried to support these institutions, but concluded that the District Focus concept is not really functional, in particular at the lower levels.

The programme presently functions as a "joint venture" between the GoN and the GoK. If the programme would continue to function as a joint venture, more commitment from the GoK would be required. Commitment should be expressed in matching funds and transparency of GoK funding in the district to avoid double financing of projects. As the programme also calls for less complicated structures and more straightforward relationships with collaborating partners, alternatives to the joint venture structure should be explored.

The programme has supported the District Focus in its implementation. However, the



conclusion remains that the government structures and the strategies applied are incapable of achieving the objectives of the District Focus. As a result the programme has devised its own, complementary strategies to facilitate community participation.

### *Finances*

Formally the ASAL programme depends for the financial control on the GoK structure, and history teaches that this control system is not always watertight and cannot always avoid misappropriation of funds. During the first phases of the programme avoidance of major financial conflicts was only possible because the advisor was involved in each and every detail of the programme, and checked each activity personally. Such intimate knowledge of all the details of the programme provided the additional control mechanism required.

Either the set-up and mandate of the programme needs reconsideration or the composition and role of the PMU needs an overhaul of the Terms of Reference for donor staff and GoK staff to avoid financial conflicts.

The programme already took a very useful step by introducing EXACT software, that greatly improves the (financial) monitoring capacity.

### *Objectives / Strategies*

The objectives of the programme are well formulated, logical, and clearly linked to project activities. Strategies have been successfully formulated and proven to be effective.

Improvement can still take place in terms of linking the objectives more clearly to the programme level and the PMU feels that a better problem analysis at programme level is still required. The objectives should still be more linked to problems in the district, e.g. through a spatially defined framework. The programme is working on this and will continue to pay attention to it. Presently, Resource Management Areas have been described and conclusions drawn on spatial and ecological differentiation of programme activities. This has to be translated into a "strategic planning framework" which will guide the programme in deciding which activities should be supported, where, and what should be the focus of the programme.

Community participation, land use planning and gender have been three major strategies of the programme. Land use planning is expected to provide the overall framework for the programme, as well as local level integration and management of natural resources. Community participation focuses on "bottom-up" problem analysis, prioritisation and implementation, ensuring proper identification of activities and sustainability. The programme's gender approach is expected to ensure equal benefits of programme and access to resources. The programme will continue to develop and utilise these strategies.

### *Sectoral Focus*

The programme feels that there is a risk of spreading themselves too thinly, and there may be a need to prioritise more, rather than take on new activities. There is, however, still scope to grow within the present programme, not by taking on new activities but rather by increasing the coverage of these activities.

Emphasis on the productive sector will continue. There is a need to pay more attention to the linkages between the ASAL and the high potential areas in the district,



in particular looking at natural resource usage. Attention is now paid to this through the development of the Resource Management Areas, but in the long run this should also be reflected in the choice of activities.

Activities in water development, livestock development and agriculture will require continued attention. In livestock, sufficient attention needs to be paid to commercialisation of the sector. Agricultural activities should consider the linkages with the higher potential areas and pockets with higher potential. The programme has not yet been successful in supporting wildlife utilisation, but will continue to search for options. Forestry activities should focus on settlements and bomas, directly linking woody biomass production to utilisation for fencing and energy.

Education is considered crucial for the future of these areas. If less people of this increasing population will find a place in the pastoral economy, it will be necessary to steer the balance in alternative directions, in particular by providing more education. Considering the need to prioritise, education could become a separate programme altogether with separate funding, preparation, policy development, et cetera, and only administration at the district level.

Housing, health and sanitation are at risk of being a variety of loose activities. The programme is, therefore, focusing more on integrated boma development, considering each of these sectors.

Capacity and institution building are considered as crucial by the programme. Much attention has been paid to this at various levels: district, divisional and CBOs. The present changes in resource management and ownership, as a result of subdivision, increasing population and degradation of resources, require new or adapted local institutions to deal with these challenges. Thus, the programme will need to continue and increase attention to local institutions for natural resource management. The individualisation which is taking place, hand in hand with the changes, also implies that individual capacities to plan, experiment with and manage natural resource use, need to be supported.

### *Implementation Mechanisms and Partners*

The programme functions well within the current system of implementation. Nevertheless, in future there should be more shift towards increased responsibility to the communities, whereby government departments play mainly a facilitating role. An increased role for the private sector is expected, e.g. in execution of water development projects.

There is a preference for a straightforward relationship between the programme and implementation partners. Collaborating partners should be selected according to the objectives of the programme and their capacity.

The lack of a clear target group has not necessarily hampered the programme. Objectives are well formulated and indicate where possible "for who". However, the recent changes in resource utilisation have also led to an increased differentiation in the target group, including now landless, absentee landlords, youth with less perspectives in the traditional pastoral system and others. The programme will need to review who will be reached by the present selection of programme activities and if major groups, whom the programme would consider to support, would require alternative activities.

### *Monitoring and Evaluation*

The conclusions and recommendations on the monitoring and evaluation are valid for



all the districts and are presented in Chapter 4.3 of this report.

#### 4.1.4 Laikipia

##### *Follow-up to Recommendations Review Mission 1993*

The programme has made an effort to include the recommendations of the 1993 Review Mission into its PlanOps and Annual Work Plans. Details of this inclusion are presented here.

With regard to recommendations on Strategy and Approach, the following observations can be made:

- The programme has applied a “high input” approach, as generally advised, to allow the programme to have more impact.
- With respect to finding a balance between a “bottom-up” and “top-down” approach, the programme has developed five planning modules which vary between “bottom-up” and “top-down”, complementing each other.
- The programme has included gender as a mainstream approach and initiated Gender Sensitive Impact Monitoring and Evaluation.
- The programme has included non-ASAL areas such as Ngarua Division in West Laikipia, to ensure that the linkages between non-ASAL and ASAL areas are incorporated.

The programme has paid attention to institutional strengthening and District Planning, in particular through an intensive awareness creating campaign amongst communities and training of communities, expansion of the PMU with qualified local staff, making use of outside expertise and supporting the DPU in implementing the District Focus Strategy.

The productive sector and environment have been the main focus of attention of the programme. An Applied Research Unit for farming systems in ASAL has been created and is financed by the programme. Relevant research questions and appropriate solutions are developed with and through the ARU. The programme concentrates on the land use, land ownership, farm size and farming systems problems, which are the main issues in the district. Some policy issues, such as irrigation are brought to the attention of appropriate fora by the programme.

##### *Institutional set-up*

It can be concluded that the ASAL Programme is placed in the wrong Ministry. Technical and policy support and feedback is insufficient. The ASAL programme would prefer to operate outside the Ministry, thus opening scope for a more flexible and less time consuming management system.

The programme presently functions as a “joint venture” between the GoN and the GoK. If the programme would continue to function as a joint venture, more commitment from the GoK would be required. Commitment should be expressed in matching funds and transparency of GoK funding in the district, to avoid double financing of projects. As the programme also calls for less complicated structures and more straightforward relationships with collaborating partners, alternatives to the joint venture structure should be explored.

For improved day-to-day management of the ASAL programme a simpler system of management and reporting is required. The present system of reporting at District and National level, to GoK and GoN is considered too time consuming.



The District Focus for Rural Development policy is considered a relevant concept, and the programme as well as the Team support this concept of decentralisation and increased participation in decision making. However, it does not function with the present planning capacity and the resources made available. Government support to the District Focus is insufficient. The programme has actively strengthened the District Focus, but does not believe in its sustainability.

The ASAL programme has been successful in setting up an Applied Research Unit, to provide inhabitants of the district with alternative options for farming and livestock keeping. ARU has fulfilled the research needs in the productive sector, developed alternative options and created greater awareness of these alternatives. The programme made a deliberate choice to set-up a new organisation, considering that the present LRP and Department of Agriculture could not fulfil the district needs for alternative options which were urgently needed.

The "high input" approach of the programme is considered successful. It allows for flexibility, experimentation and more impact in the district can be achieved.

### *Finances*

Formally the ASAL programme depends for the financial control on the GoK structure, and history teaches that this control system is not always watertight and cannot always avoid misappropriation of funds.

Either the set-up and mandate of the programme needs reconsideration or the composition and role of the PMU needs an overhaul of the terms of reference for donor staff and GoK staff to avoid conflicts.

The Laikipia programme has made a strategic decision to start the reorganisation of the operational structure by redefining the role of the line departments in the implementation of its activities and by thus having better control over the expenditure. They now operate on a contract-basis with all partners that demonstrated sufficient capacity to do so. This step in itself is fully supported by the Review Team but should (i) be pursued consequently and (ii) not be done in isolation from the management structure in the three other districts.

The new operational structure contradicts the character of the joint venture with joint responsibilities of the ASAL programmes as agreed upon between GoK and GoN.

The Review Team recommends that the donor and the GoK see this change in the control responsibility (and the changed role of the line ministries in the perspective of all the ASAL programmes. The consequent conclusion could be that, de facto, the idea of the 'joint venture' has been left in Laikipia District and should be formalised and taken to its final consequences - also for the other districts.

### *Objectives / Strategies*

The programme has, during the inception phase, through workshops at different levels, facilitated a process of participatory problem analysis and identification of activities. During this phase, objectives of the first phase of the programme were set. As a result, numerous immediate objectives (some of them confused with activities) have been identified with no links to higher level objectives such as medium term or overall objectives.

The danger of this identification process and this level of objective setting, is that



each activity in itself may seem relevant, and can be translated into an immediate objective. Focusing the programme or "narrowing down", now depends on the success and achievements of different activities rather than relevance and specific programme choices. The programme could experiment more efficiently if it did not formulate, experiment and subsequently omit unnecessary ballast (e.g. activities which ultimately do not really fit into the programme). The programme should, therefore, formulate higher level objectives to ensure that at that moment already a focus is decided upon and thus choices are made why certain activities will take place and others not.

The main strategies applied by the programme to achieve its objectives are: community participation, land use planning, capacity building, innovation in the productive sector, economic empowerment and gender. Each of these strategies are considered relevant and complementary. The strategies could be made more explicit and defined more clearly by the programme.

The programme has translated the strategies into five planning / financing modules. These modules are complementary and include different levels of planning (bottom-up and top-down). The translation of strategies into planning modules is appreciated and considered useful. There is still scope for improvement, e.g. by limiting the number of planning modules, to facilitate programme management and an understanding of the functioning of the programme for outsiders and clients.

### *Sectoral Focus*

Project expenditure in the productive sector is above 48%. Presently water development is considered part of the social services sector. This can be considered correct but a major part of the water development activities is also directly related to the productive sector. Project expenditure in the social/service sector is 38%, including all water development projects. 12% is spent on the planning and capacity building. Overhead is 23%, this includes the vehicle pool.

The programme has developed a wide range of activities, which range is now, in the third year of this phase, being reduced. Most disappointments have been within the social/services sector, with as a result that the project is automatically focusing on the productive sector. Within the productive sector, it is also becoming clear which project activities are successful and which not. The programme acknowledges that the principle of only supporting successful projects does not always apply, since in some cases not yet successful, but relevant activities remain to be supported (e.g. animal traction).

In the productive sector, many project activities have been implemented aiming at diversification and sustainable intensification of the agriculture and livestock systems. The district was urgently in need of alternative options, in particular for farming. The programme has successfully supported the development and extension of such alternatives. The credit programme has provided the much needed financial requirements for implementation of such alternatives. Smaller activities such as support to the Jua Kali sector, fisheries and wildlife utilisation have been limited in their achievements.

The major expenditure category in the social services sector is water development. The programme has recorded considerable success in water development. Support to improved education is also considered successful. Improved education and increased participation in education is considered essential for the future of the district as an increasing number of people will need to find employment outside the agriculture and livestock sector.



Higher level policy decisions and interventions are particularly needed in the livestock and irrigation sector. Both are threatened by un-sustainable practices and severely limited resources.

### *Implementation Mechanisms and Partners*

The programme started its implementation particularly with government departments. After a phase of experimentation with various partners, several have been excluded. The result of providing each institution with an opportunity to perform, has been that such exclusion usually took place without clashes.

The programme prefers straightforward collaboration with implementing agencies, GO, NGO, CBO, consultancy firms and private sector, on the basis of performance. The programme has experimented with a wide range of partners and, on the basis of their performance, has continued or discontinued collaboration. The strategy of "weeding out" appears to be successful. However, it is the Team's opinion that this could be done more efficiently if the programme linked collaboration more closely to its objectives. Presently, the objectives are numerous (see above). Improved objectives and the combination of objectives and performance could limit unnecessary experimentation with partners.

An explicit target group analysis did not take place. This has led to the situation whereby the activities formulated, reach specific groups and, thus, the type of activities financed defines the target group. This functions well if the objectives are well formulated and contain information on "for who". This is not always the case in the programme.

### *Monitoring and Evaluation*

The conclusions and recommendations on the monitoring and evaluation in all the districts are presented in the overall report - Part Two, chapter 4.3.

## **4.2 Synthesising Analysis**

### **4.2.1 Operational Aspects**

#### *General*

The present four ASAL programmes are all rather different in the way they have interpreted their mandate as given on the basis of the 1993 review. Understandably, differences do result from varieties in the geography and demography of the districts. But the present differences are more and bigger than would be justified by such varieties. Also, the differences now are much bigger than they were during the first phases.

This is interesting since until 1993 each district programme was highly autonomous and only with the 1993 review did the donor make a start for more co-ordinated operations of the programmes. The joint review in 1993 was the first step in this, since until then, even the evaluations and backstopping were done on a district by district basis by different teams and at different points in time.

The conclusion can only be that greater similarity during the first phases was the result of having Programme Advisors with very similar ideas and backgrounds. West Pokot and Elgeyo Marakwet at that time were started by the same advisor and the



advisor in Kajiado District from 1987 onwards had been working in the ASAL programme under the West Pokot advisor for more than three years. The second advisor in West Pokot had very much the same philosophy and background as his predecessor, for which reason until 1993 Kajiado and West Pokot operated rather identical. Elgeyo Marakwet had been closed in 1988 and since its start later on, the then advisor placed different accents, went slightly into a new direction in that district, but no fundamental changes were made.

This changed from 1994 onwards. A new approach for the ASAL programmes resulted from the review at the end of 1993, and approximately at the same time the Programme Advisors in West Pokot, Kajiado and Elgeyo Marakwet were succeeded (Laikipia District had just been added to the Dutch supported ASAL programmes). The new advisors came in with different experiences and different backgrounds, except for the new advisor in West Pokot. In all districts apart from West Pokot the PMU tried to shape the programmes according to the new directives. The result is that by 1997, West Pokot programme is still a very 'traditional' one and that the three other districts each did it their way (although West Pokot did raise the level of expenditure by paying more attention to the productive sector, the operational structure, strategies and style of management remained unaltered).

The conclusion is that the person of the Programme Advisor is in a position to largely shape the strategies and the operational structure according to his vision<sup>11</sup>. Over the period under review this resulted in different approaches, each with interesting characteristics. To a large extent this period has been one of preparations, of doing the groundwork for the execution of the recommendations of the 1993 review. In that sense the different kinds of experimental approaches are fruitful in their variety.

However, now that implementation of the new approaches will become ever more important, the Review Team recommends that important strategic decision making should become more harmonised than is now the case. This is no plea for a straight jacket but one for more frequent and more systematic exchange of information, and for creating a larger forum for decision on the scope and objectives the ASAL programmes are supposed to apply.

### *The PMUs*

Formally or informally (in so-called extended PMU meetings) all PMUs have been increased considerably, with various types of expertise like gender, land use planning, et cetera. This expansion of the PMU influenced the programmes and the direction in which they have been moving. Nevertheless, the basic structure of the PMU has not changed with the Kenyan Programme Officer as formally responsible and the Dutch Programme Advisor as the counterpart. In practice though, the advisors have been in charge of the programmes. Be it alone for the fact that policy development and guidance from the side of the GoK have usually been at a rather high and general level of abstraction, contrary to the involvement of the donor. For a few years, from 1991 - 1993, this seemed to become different with a full-fledged and distinct ASAL ministry and the joint WB team supported by DGIS, GTZ, the WB, the GoK and finally Norad (see also donor co-ordination).

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<sup>11</sup> There may be two other reasons which have led to this divergence of the four programmes:

- Two / three programmes were handled by RNE and one (later two) by SNV.
- The Programmes were searching for a new approach. The well-known integrated rural development approach of funding a variety of sectors through a variety of government institutions, was becoming less appropriate, and the emphasis on natural resource management (land use planning) was supposed to provide a new framework. This searching for a new approach, which could be looked at and interpreted in a variety of ways, led also to the variety of approaches tried out.



In the traditional set-up at the start, back in 1982, with the programme oiling the GoK line departments to implement the programme's activities that were basically identified by those departments and executed under the responsibility of the Head of Department, this was not experienced as a problem. However, the programmes became more established and PAs more experienced. Moreover, especially after 1993, more money became available, the role of the line departments in the project cycle of identification, implementation and monitoring changed in most districts, and other collaborating partners than the GoK emerged (although departments still represent by far the major capacity in the districts). The review made clear that in the PMU, a 'two-window' mode of functioning developed, with the PO and his contacts sometimes leaning to the departments and the PA sometimes leaning towards the NGOs, CBOs and target group in general. The introduction of elements in the programmes that did not directly emerge in the districts (be it communities or departments) but rather at the donor side, contributed to this two-window system. If you have such a double management system, both partners (PO and PA) need to be such personalities that they can, and are prepared to, handle to dichotomy of responsibilities and power. It is just not an easy position to be in for both. Apart from that, it hampers quick and straightforward management.

The conclusion is that although in principle the role and responsibilities of PO and PA are clear, confusing situations occurred during the period under review. The Review Team is not saying that the present PMUs make the programme un-manageable. There is, though, sufficient reason to reconsider the PMU, its functioning and responsibilities within the PMU.

It is recommended that, depending on the choices made about the future of the ASAL programmes, the PMUs should be overhauled.

### *Financial Management*

All programmes in all four districts have been confronted with problems about (alleged) misappropriation of funds. This is not restricted to the review period; the programme in Elgeyo Marakwet was even closed because of such problems in 1988 and only started again in 1990.

The Review Team has had no insight in the so-called 'value for money audit' by Price Waterhouse that was undertaken during the review. It only knows that certain amounts of expenditure in each of the districts were not accounted for and that, because of this, ASAL West Pokot was closed down (temporarily probably).

In this context the Review Team has not collected data that can fully substantiate a conclusion and recommendation but at least strong indications were obtained during this review for the following.

ASAL programmes in the beginning were 100 % determined by the Dutch Programme Advisor, who was by then usually called the Programme Co-ordinator. They not only decided on, but also knew every little detail of the activities and those who implemented those activities. In practice, they effectively controlled the programmes. Misappropriations were detected in an early stage and could be corrected within the framework of the programme / district. Problems remained of small-scale and internal programme affairs. It went wrong in 1986 - 1987, when the Dutch PA in Elgeyo Marakwet was sick for a long time at the end of his contract period and was not succeeded until six months later; the programme continued nevertheless during all these months. Substantial misappropriations that occurred finally led to the decision by the donor in 1988 not to renew the commitment.



Below - under the heading 'impact' - will be discussed that such early ASAL programmes had a positive impact on the communities that benefited from the interventions. It was effective, but was it efficient? No hard data are available but personal, verbal information and experience made clear that (i) it is not always possible for the PA to refuse payments even if the claim is obviously not correct, and (ii) that the PA every now and then knowingly accepted exaggerated claims for e.g. night outs, fuel, spare parts, et cetera. Such acceptances effectively 'oiled' the government machinery and kept key ministries alive and operational outside the strict framework of the ASAL programme. In the past, figures of 10 - 20 % of total expenditure for this type of 'oil' money circulated. Such 'extra' expenditure was thought to be justified considering the joint venture character of the programme and the line departments being the executors of the programme. The changing role of the government from implementor to facilitator alone would make such a practice nowadays more difficult to accept.

The above is not implying that without a Dutch Advisor the ASAL programmes cannot be financially managed properly. It does imply that the financial management structure is very much based on the detailed knowledge and controlling role of the Dutch advisor under the direct payment procedure that characterises the programmes. The PAM that was developed by the first PA for West Pokot (in collaboration with a computer expert) is a bookkeeping system. The control system in the traditional ASAL management set-up is with the implementors, predominantly the GoK line departments. If this formal control system is not supplemented with the detailed controlling role of the Dutch advisor (the advisors that took over after 1993 started operating differently in most cases), the system becomes very open for uncontrolled unaccountable expenditure. Even more so since the level of expenditure in all districts increased considerably after 1993. In most of the districts it appeared that additional measures were taken to complement the officially existing financial management structure like the shifting of the control mechanism to communities (PMCs) in Keiyo Marakwet, and specific contract agreements instead of open-ended budget provisions with departments in Laikipia. This was not the case in West Pokot where - verbal information - the Price Waterhouse audit discovered more irregularities than in the other districts.

The conclusion is that the present financial management system is too much linked with the ideas and practices in force at the start of the ASAL programmes. Major changes took place in the nineties without revisions of the financial responsibilities and management set-up. In essence, this conclusion is similar to the one for the PMUs.

It is recommended, therefore, that depending on the choices made about the future of the ASAL programmes, also the financial management system be critically analysed and improved where necessary.

### *Objectives and Strategies*

The importance of a consistent and cohesive set of objectives and strategies is underlined by the fact that neither district has specific target groups. If objectives and strategies are lacking the programme will end up with a scattered array of activities that have connections, will not be complementary. The district reports make clear that except for West Pokot, the districts have developed in their own way immediate objectives and strategies. These usually function well, although for some districts recommendations are given that could improve their functioning.

West Pokot's package is inadequate, but the present advisor has distinct ideas that could remedy this situation once the programme has started again. The Laikipia programme exposes itself too much to the danger of spreading itself too thinly in



unnecessary directions by not defining its objectives well enough.

#### *Decision Making and Reporting Structure to GoK, RNE and SNV*

Especially for the districts managed by SNV the conclusion is that the bureaucracy is putting much pressure on the work load, creating also delays and confusion. PlanOps and annual Work Plans are to be submitted to the district and to three other institutions (MLRRWD, SNV, RNE) that not only need to consult internally (gender, environment), but RNE and SNV also need to consult with their offices or headquarters in The Hague.

The recommendation above under the heading 'general' about a better central strategic decision making, could be utilised to have the different institutions involved give clear mandates to such a co-ordinating mechanism with control and assessment in retrospect.

#### *Low input and High Input*

Higher input in financial terms might have contributed to misappropriation of funds in the districts, especially so in West Pokot. However, the root cause for this has little to do with the level of funding.

There are no indications that the level of funding has impact on the GoK cash flow to the districts, although the presence of an ASAL programme is not stimulating for the GoK to transfer money to key departments.

In financial terms the 'joint venture' of GoK and the GoN is non-existent. There seems little reason from a budgetary point of view to continue the joint venture, unless a principle of matching funds will be applied.

Higher input of technical expertise is negative only if the ASAL's should remain the joint venture with the GoK, since it does strengthen the position of the PMU (or PA) while it reduces the importance of some key line departments. Besides this, the permanently employed extra capacity is not excessive but rather relatively modest. The flexible instrument to use consulting companies for additional temporary extra capacity, has been working well and should be continued.

Despite the increased level of funding, the dimensions and scope of the problems (especially the long-term ones), are such that most programmes would favour a concentration on a few key sectors, to avoid spreading too thinly.

Moreover, the shift away from line departments towards, where possible, NGOs, CBOs and the private sector, would necessitate the earmarking of considerable human and financial resources to awareness creation and continued capacity building with such organisations. This conclusion is most clearly expressed by the Keiyo Marakwet experience. A more confined sectoral focus for the ASAL management will assist in creating the maximum potential for continuous capacity building.

The Review Team underscores this conclusion and recommends that the ASAL programmes concentrate on three sectors that generally cover the first priorities of the population like water, livestock and agriculture. Such a focus would nicely match the approach to make natural resource management the central theme of the programmes.

To avoid misunderstanding, this does not imply that social sectors as education and health should not get attention in the districts. In the following chapters the Review Team will make recommendations for such sectors.



### *Institutional Setting*

There is little doubt about the conclusion that the present parent ministry is providing fully insufficient technical guidance or policy support. At the same time, the conclusion should be that it would make little difference to have the programmes become part of another ministry like e.g. Planning and National Development. As long as a ministry will not provide the programmes with a clear mandate to arrive at the changes that de facto are dictated by the GoK's own policy papers, there seems little purpose to continue with the parent ministry construction.

The conclusion is that as long as clear policy commitment by means of proper mandates is not present and as long as financial commitment is not present by means of matching funds and transparency of GoK funding in the districts<sup>12</sup>, the present 'joint venture' makes little sense.

The Review Team recommends that the ASAL programmes will operate outside a parent ministry structure, until some minimum conditions have been met by the GoK. This would not only reduce the work load of the management but would also provide the programmes with more flexibility in their management. Discussions between the donor and GoK should lead to a proper bilateral agreement for the ASAL programmes.

### *Collaborating Partners*

All districts started the implementation of their activities with the GoK line departments. Except for West Pokot, this has changed considerably. Keiyo Marakwet developed a community based organisational structure changing the previously central role of the departments (and departmental Heads), Laikipia experimented with various GoK partners and excluded several on the basis of experience, and Kajiado is clearly on its way to place increased responsibility with the communities and have the departments play a facilitating role.

The obvious recommendation is that the organisational structure of the programmes should be (come) such that a straightforward relationship with all types of implementing agencies (GoK, NGO, CBO, consulting firms and the private sector) is possible. Such relationships will not be based on the presumption of a joint venture but should be on the basis of performance and be established on the basis of business contracts. Of course, collaborating partners should not be selected only on the basis of performance but also on the basis of the objectives of the programme.

### *Impact*

The district reports made consistently clear that all districts (including West Pokot) managed to increase their expenditure drastically after 1993 and in a way as recommended upon in 1993. Considerably more emphasis was given to the productive sector and - in most districts - to the development of a land use planning framework (with different degrees of progress though). Despite the above made observations and recommendations, the programmes generally did a good job and sincerely tried to develop new directions for ASAL. Planning targets were well met usually.

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<sup>12</sup> Because of this lack of transparency, double funding of activities has been reported.



That does not imply that a positive impact on the population of the districts was achieved during the review period, a period that was too short to measure such an impact. However, existing detailed baselines in West Pokot and Keiyo Marakwet Districts made it possible to measure impact in those districts since the beginning of the ASAL programmes in 1982/3. It is not possible to filter out ASAL programmes without a shadow of doubt, but there are sufficient indications to conclude that the traditional ASALs had a positive impact on the population: in ASAL intervention areas living conditions are systematically better than in non-intervention areas.

The concluding argument is that also as low input programme that functioned as “the oil on the government machinery” the programmes had a clear and positive impact in line with their objectives. This is not an argument to go back to old ASALs. The way the newer ASALs have been operating in their activities is, as far as positive effect on the population is concerned, up to now probably not different from the original ones.

It is recommended, therefore, that new directions and objectives introduced after 1993, should be applied and practised in such a way that the positive, original aspects of the original ASAL programmes are not put at risk.

#### 4.2.2 Environment / Land use Planning Aspects

Land use planning was - for understandable reasons - left out of the ToR for the review. A separate mission was assigned to look at that issue. Although the Review Team was not assigned to assess LUP, it appeared to be impossible not to discuss LUP from the Team's perspective. Important aspects of the ASAL programmes are closely related to LUP since it became the centre activity in some of the programmes.

The LUP planning mission turned out to be a backstopping mission that provided useful support to the districts. Certain aspects, however, of LUP approach that are not relevant for a backstopping are relevant for a review.

For that matter the Review Team decided to review the LUP approach in this chapter.

The ASAL Programmes did not, traditionally, have a separate component “environmental”. However, throughout the existence of the programmes, considerable attention has been paid to activities that are related to the environment, in particular as the productive sector was almost entirely based on the use of natural resources in those districts. Much of the programmes' supported activities were always in the productive sector: livestock, agriculture and water. Sustainability aspects were considered to some extent as the long-term impacts of activities were often taken into account. However, attention to environment was, in particular during the earlier phases, not explicitly an overall strategy of the programmes, and there are certainly instances where the long-term impact of activities was not foreseen.

The 1993 review, stressed the importance of an overall strategy for the programmes, taking into account more emphasis on natural resource management and the productive sectors. This fits very well with the view that “environment” should not be seen as certain activities or a sector, but rather an overall strategy for sustainable natural resource use and management. It is from this perspective that the translation of emphasis on environment should be seen in the present-day ASAL programmes. Therefore, this section deals with environment as it is translated as an overall strategy for the programmes through “land use planning”.



### *Introduction: Planning in ASAL*

Resource use is considered the main source of income for the majority of the inhabitants in the ASAL areas, while resource degradation is considered the major threat with often irreversible consequences for these fragile areas. The bulk of the ASAL area, with lowest population densities, consists of the actual arid areas. Semi-nomadic livestock keeping is the main enterprise here. Wildlife is important in these areas with as associated resource uses: parks, tourism and some forms of wildlife utilisation. The latter is a relatively new form of resource use and there is scope for expansion. Agricultural production takes place at a small scale in pockets of high potential areas (e.g. irrigation along rivers and bucket irrigation around water pans). This is an important source of income in some areas.

Most (land use) planning methodologies have focused up to now on sustainable agricultural production. The key planning problem in the ASAL areas is that the resource uses are quite different. In these areas (semi)-nomadic pastoralism and wildlife conservation are main resource uses. Many of the methodologies developed for land management / landuse planning have focused on agricultural production. Less static forms of landuse, such as pastoralism and wildlife utilisation, which appear to be more suitable for fragile ecosystems such as the ASAL areas in Kenya, require a different approach. For example, more attention needs to be paid to vegetation resources since differences occur over longer time-spans than seasons only.

### *Main Resource Use Issues / Trends and Changes*

In the semi-humid areas shortage of land is the major issue threatening both crop production and livestock production. The result is a reduction of cultivation cycle and reduction of communal grazing areas.

In the semi-arid areas, livestock production is declining as a result of loss of pasture lands to agriculture, settlement and wildlife reserves. A particularly important bottleneck is the loss of key production areas serving as dry season grazing areas. As a result, pastoralists are increasingly dependent on sources outside the livestock sector and sedentarisation of pastoralists is on the increase. Degradation of vegetation is in particular serious in the dry season grazing areas, around settlements and water points.

Nomadic pastoralism, with as characteristics mobility for optimal use of water and pasture resources, is recognised as an efficient use of resources in arid areas. New opportunities such as wildlife utilisation and tourism are emerging but it is not clear yet if these will provide sufficient sustainable alternatives. Game ranches and ostrich farms are found in some areas. National parks provide some income through revenue sharing and some employment.

Land degradation is serious in some areas. Degradation of vegetation can be noticed in terms of decreased biodiversity, loss of useful (grazing) species and increased presence of (unpalatable) invader species, decrease of woody biomass. The main reasons for degradation are overgrazing and increased population leading to increased use of woody biomass for cooking, fencing, building materials, etc. Water resources are limited in these areas and the needs or demands are increasing. There is a danger of over-utilisation and degradation of water resources, in particular through irrigation. Soil degradation is also a serious problem in specific areas.



### *Key Role of Resource Users*

Improved sustainable use and management of resources imply that those who use and manage the resources should take part in the planning process. Thus, landuse planning can only be relevant and successful when all crucial stakeholders are involved. This requires a thorough understanding of the land / resource users (stakeholders) and an understanding of the decision-making processes in resource use. This implies that in planning user needs, user priorities, their constraints and possibilities need to be given prime priority.

Communication and negotiation between stakeholders often take place through representatives of resource users and other stakeholders.

### *The Different Districts*

Against the backdrop of the above, the Review Team observes that all districts have recognised the importance of natural resource management and seriously tried to pay proper attention to it (note that in West Pokot the start and implementation were seriously delayed due to several reasons that go beyond the scope of this review). All districts also recognised the specific aspects of a planning process in ASAL, as being different from planning in higher potential areas.

Yet, considerable differences exist between the districts.

In West Pokot and Kajiado districts it has been tried to start LUP and to gradually integrate it into the two ASAL programmes, that were well-established at that time and in full implementation (note though, that West Pokot has delayed the process considerably and has basically not started yet). Considering the importance of natural resource management issues in the ASAL districts, it is foreseen that this planning tool will gradually play an ever increasing role in the structuring of the programmes. Presently, in Kajiado District, Resource Management areas have been described and conclusions drawn on spatial and ecological differentiation of programme activities<sup>13</sup>. The Resource Management Areas contribute to the district level framework, the local level land use planning contribute to identifying specific problems and solutions. This will become translated into a 'strategic planning framework' that will guide the programme in deciding which activities should be supported where, and what should be the focus of the programme. The programme is well on its way in this respect.

The situation in Laikipia and Keiyo Marakwet districts is different. The Laikipia programme started being financed by the Dutch in 1993 after taking over the programme from Swiss Development Co-operation (SDC). One might state that this ASAL programme started anew at that time. Although the ASAL programme in Keiyo Marakwet dates back to 1983, due to several circumstances, almost a fresh start was made after the 1993 evaluation. This partly explains the already more prominent place of LUP in these two districts already from 1993 onwards.

In Laikipia LUP is to be a key focus and is synonymous with natural resource management; but the latter is not exclusive for the programme. Land use planning in Laikipia has concentrated at the district and farm level. A considerable number of activities that do not directly originate from a sustainable landuse perspective were developed making it a programme of considerable multi-sectoral dimensions after four years already.

In Keiyo Marakwet, since 1993 an expatriate landuse planner was added to the PMU.

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<sup>13</sup> The structure chosen is a Kenyan District Land Use Planner employed by SNV, and backstopping through a consultancy company.



This came out to be a permanent position up to now and might partly explain the fact that for the ASAL programme in these districts it can be stated that “ .... with the TAA being the central approach in Phase III, the programme has adopted resource management as a focal issue in its strategy, rather than a separate activity” (LUP backstopping mission May 1997, see Part Three, Annex IV). Indeed, quite considerable and successful efforts of the programme were put into the development of the transect methodology and the building of the capacity of the implementation structure at various levels.

### *Conclusions & Recommendations*

Not all solutions can be found from within (with the ‘resource users’) and the circumstances are rapidly changing. New options for resource use are required. Understandably, none of the districts has been able to find a definite answer to the methodological and institutional issues this implies. Yet, the Review Team holds the opinion that effectively combining the experiences will make clear that considerable achievements have been made.

It was made clear in the above that the importance of LUP for sustainable natural resource management purposes is strongly underscored by the Review Team. Keiyo Marakwet has been the most consistent and innovative in following up the recommendations of the 1993 review mission. But exactly the fact that they have gone much further already than the other districts, means that they have already reached the larger consequences of the approach. For that matter, the risk analysis presented for Keiyo Marakwet Districts in that report is repeated at this place.

“The Review Team agrees with the recommendations made by the backstopping team [for Keiyo Marakwet Districts]. However, the backstopping report carries the notion that such recommendations are the appropriate answer to solve the constraints. In that respect the Review Team is less convinced. Not that better recommendations can be thought of, but possibly some of the issues observed will prove not to be solvable within the framework of the ASAL programme.

The success of the strategy applied will depend on two factors. First, the speed and magnitude with which the communities in the transects will identify themselves with long-term environmental issues and become prepared to address these for the sake of future generations. Second, to what degree the programme (or PMU) will be able to find the proper balance between ‘conditions’ and projects favoured by the communities.

In doing so, the programme might be confronted with major constraints (risks) at various levels.

At the lowest level this will be the future collaboration between (sub)chiefs and the PMC or lack of it. (Sub)chiefs are part of the Provincial Administration and are directed by Parliament through the Office of the President. Through this hierarchy agendas different from the PMU c.q. donor can emerge and put the programme in a difficult position.

The programme has plans to develop the TACs into NGOs and considers the programme to become a limited company. Thus, at the medium level, the programme as a Ltd. company or the TACs as NGOs will always need law making and law enforcement and rely on the by-laws as formulated by the Councils. The backstopping mission mentions this in observation number five (e), but it is rather uncertain that this mission’s recommendation to “strengthen and formalise the existing (often) informal linkages between the created institutions for land use planning (PMC, TAC) and district institutional structure” will provide an adequate and sufficient solution.



There is little reason to believe that proper by-laws will arise or that the programme will be left in peace if real controversial long-term environmental issues and interests of powerful people will become at stake. The programme will then try to operate on the legal territory of Kenya without the proper permission.

At the highest level the risk is that ASAL will start trying to by-pass the formal GoK structures and will try to create its own legal environment. It is a problem faced by several national and international environmental NGOs. The urge is then to get for the ASALs (through bilateral policy discussions ?) the mandate for the ASALs to do what they consider the right and proper thing to do from a long-term perspective. May be such an attempt might even be successful, but the question is if this is what development co-operation should aim at.

The Review Team is not in a position to judge the above or to have an opinion about such a question. It just wants to raise the points and the inherent risks. It underlines that the direction taken by the programme is a consequent execution of the recommendations of the 1993 review. To arrive at long-term and structural impacts in natural resource management, a programme has to start operating like the one in Keiyo Marakwet. The preparations made are well done.

The only advice the Review Team wants to give is that considering the risks involved and the high vulnerability of a programme in the risky process, that from now onwards (now that the implementation has started and preparations have been made) the forum for decision making (to find that proper balance) will be wider than that of the district ASAL programme. A wider forum for deliberations than is now operational (basically the PMU) might avoid political pitfalls and provide wider support and backing for decisions."

More effort should be given to the co-ordination of the LUP effort in the four districts. District differences will remain to feature, but a more common ground (based on mutual experiences) should be found by a combination of participatory techniques and the externally oriented methodologies.

#### 4.2.3 Gender Aspects

##### *Gender Related Problems and Concepts*

Analysis at the community level and discussions with the staff of the programme and implementing partners revealed some of the gender-related problems and needs and the action (or lack of it) taken by the programme to address them. These include the following:

- Low participation of women in community decision-making processes, both in quantitative and qualitative terms which often leads to their views not being adequately presented or their problems and needs being adequately addressed in programme activities. Women's low participation in development forums such as extension and training sessions also limits their access to information and skills on new technologies and interventions.
- Women's limited access to and control over resources and benefits including land, livestock and agricultural produce, income, technologies, information and skills.
- Disparities in education between boys and girls brought about by socio-cultural traditions and values that hinder the enrolment and advancement of girls.
- Poor access to basic services such as domestic water and health; Although deteriorating health services, lack of drugs and inability to pay for health services affects poor families as a whole, women and children experience



- greater hardships.
- Unequal division of labour, heavy and increasing workload of women due to mobility of men and youth to urban centres in search of employment and changes in the division of labour with women taking up more and more tasks that were previously performed by men.
- Limited income sources to women, poor access to credit and poor marketing infrastructure.
- Frequent droughts and insecurity were also identified as problems, especially affecting food security.

### *Gender Approach*

Since 1994, a number of activities have been undertaken to promote gender equality in the programmes and to address some of these problems and needs, with varying degrees of emphasis. Activities and approaches include gender training and sensitisation programmes for different actors, incorporating gender in sector activities and other programme components and support to women specific activities among other approaches. Each district programme has a gender advisor to support the integration process; Kajiado and Laikipia District programmes have had gender advisors since 1991 and 1993 respectively while in West Pokot and Keiyo Marakwet the advisors were recruited in 1995 and 1996 respectively.

### *Results of Gender Interventions*

As a result of these deliberate actions by the programmes, the Review Team observes that the gender concept has been introduced in the districts and that the interest and appreciation for it has been created among the partners both at the organisational and community level. The creation of interest for gender is considered an important step considering the socio-economic biases and misconceptions that often surround this concept.

In all the district PlanOps, gender is indicated as one of the dimensions to receive emphasis during implementation. It is also indicated in the annual Work Plans, with more prominence in the annual Work Plans and log-frames for 1997. In the Keiyo and Marakwet programme for instance, gender integration is formulated as an immediate objective while the Kajiado programme considers gender an integral part of all objectives. The target groups in the Kajiado programme are also differentiated by gender.

In a few cases, indicators for participation in projects are formulated in a gender sensitive way. One of the indicators for a water project, for example is the increase of the number of women in water management committees to one third of the total membership by 1998. A project promoting draught animal power has formulated an indicator; "90 men and 70 women utilising animal power for ploughing, weeding and transportation by 1998".

In some cases, however, the indicators and targets for participation are expressed in a gender neutral way. Less attention has also been given to developing indicators for monitoring the effect of projects and activities on women and men. This makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of interventions on men and women and to make necessary adjustments during implementation.

### PRA

Participatory Rural Appraisal has been used for problem analysis, and needs identification. In Keiyo and Marakwet, this has been given a lot of emphasis, while Laikipia has relied more on community workshops. Women as well as men



participated in these sessions and their needs were incorporated. Women's specific problems such as scarcity and distance to fuelwood and water have been identified and addressed through the projects. It is observed, however, that in many cases very few women participated compared to men. PRA facilitation teams were also dominated by men with some teams having only men. This male domination in the facilitation teams could reduce the freedom of women to express their opinions. It is also observed that gender was in some cases not part of this analysis. Identifying problems and constraints in the existing gender relations such as the traditional division of labour and the control of resources, would provide useful insight for planning and implementation of programmes. It would also be an eye opener for both the extension staff and the community members participating in PRA, thus hence increasing appreciation for a gender differentiated approach. It is further observed that the staff facilitating PRA did not have sufficient skills to incorporate gender and to facilitate the analysis of gender relation.

Training on participatory planning has been organised for implementing staff. In Keiyo and Marakwet programme, this has been done at the transect level for extension staff and project management committees (PMCs). In Laikipia, the training has been given to the district, division and community level while in Kajiado, a comprehensive training programme has been given to the liaison officers at the district level. West Pokot has not as yet organised this type of training. Further training on gender inclusion in the logical framework has been organised by the RNE in consultation with the ASAL programmes to strengthen the capacity of programme management and gender advisors for incorporating gender in the logical framework. RNE has also organised bi-annual meetings between the programmes for exchange of experiences and thematic discussions. These activities have improved the planning and increased attention to gender although further support and practical guidance in application are still required.

#### Considerations to Gender

The interest for gender among implementing partners is evident in the implementation of various projects and activities in the field;

In the first instance, a number of extension staff now incorporate gender sensitisation in on-going extension and training activities. In Keiyo / Marakwet, community theatre and video have been used to stimulate discussion on gender issues during field days and other training sessions.

Secondly, consideration for gender has been made in the selection and implementation of projects. The water projects, for example, were in the past focused on livestock even though women were walking long distances in search of domestic water. During this phase, domestic water has received substantial attention through the promotion of water tanks, protection of springs and provision of separate taps for women at community project sites. This has given women greater access to safe water and reduced the distance and time spent on water collection. The promotion of kitchen woodlots, agroforestry and energy conservation through improved cook-stoves has also reduced their workload.

#### Productive Sector

The projects in the productive sector have also paid attention to women and men's needs and preferences. In the livestock sector for instance, the programme has supported the big stock such as the improvement of the cattle breeds and marketing structures to which men have an interest while at the same time promoting small stock such as sheep and goats, piggery and poultry to which women have greater access. Non-conventional livestock such as camels, bee-keeping and rabbit keeping have created opportunities for women and youth.

The introduction and promotion of Drought Escaping Crops (DECs), horticultural crops and the promotion of cash crop production in the districts are contributing to



increased food security and income earnings for men and women and for families in general. As women have greater control over food products such as grains and vegetables, increased production in this field contributes to household food security and increased incomes for women, giving them a sense of independence. Increased milk production is also considered an important strategy to improve family nutrition and provide increased income to women as they have greater control over milk and cash from milk sales.

An interesting technology promoted by all the programmes is the use of oxen and donkeys for ploughing, weeding and transportation. Since these activities are mostly undertaken by women, adoption of this technology contributes substantially to reduction in the workload of women. As the oxen are owned and controlled by men, training in the use of the technology has been given mostly to men. Use of donkeys is promoted as women have greater control over their use and there are no prohibiting traditional beliefs against the use of donkeys for work. In some of the communities, it is believed that bulls used for work will die of East Coast Fever (ECF). It is therefore preferable that women carry out these tasks rather than the bulls (oxen). The programmes have tried to raise awareness against this belief.

Technical training through on-farm demonstration, educational tours, field days and training sessions have been organised for men and women farmers. It is observed that:

- In general, fewer women attend training sessions especially when organised away from home and that more women participate in informal training sessions such as field days and on farm demonstrations than is the case for formal training sessions.
- The level of attention and interest to attract women to training and extension activities depends to a large extent on the awareness and commitment of the extension workers concerned.
- Women and youth groups provide a useful entry point for reaching these groups with technical messages and information.
- Women participate more actively in women specific groups than in mixed groups.

#### Social Sectors

Programmes in the social sector have also responded to the needs of men and women. The promotion of education for girls is a notable example. All the programmes have responded to the plight of the girl child caused by cultural traditions and practices that hinder her participation in education. Sensitisation programmes on the need for furthering the girls' education against the tradition of circumcision and early marriage and the provision of bursaries, have increased the enrolment of girls especially in secondary schools. It has also increased the motivation of girls to enrol and continue in education. While achievements have been noted, it has to be realised that change in these deeply rooted cultural values and attitudes will be slow and continued efforts and creativity will be needed for several years to come.

Health programmes such as the training of Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs), awareness on sanitation and nutrition and the promotion of improved housing technologies have contributed to improved health status for women and children in Kajiado. Although health related problems are among the problems identified by the target groups and extension workers, they have received little attention in the other three Districts. In Laikipia, support to health had to be discontinued due to problems of transparency with the implementing department.

While the programmes implemented are relevant and address both men's and women's needs, there is insufficient gender dis-aggregated data to enable clear understanding of the situation of women and to identify gender concerns in the various sectors and projects. Such analysis would provide a useful basis for



It can be concluded that the present PMU has shown commitment to support gender and has initiated a positive start in 1997. The Review Team, however, sees an important need for close follow-up and support in the next phase. In this regard, the proposed capacity building programme is considered necessary. It is recommended that a gender working committee be formed, composed of men and women from the partner organizations to support the process of gender integration. These should be trained together with the gender advisor and equipped with gender analysis planning and monitoring tools, to strengthen the process. This will not only be more efficient but will provide stronger in-house capacity for gender.

### Keiyo Marakwet.

The TA approach of the programme and the use of participatory methods and tools has given women greater scope for participation due to the proximity of activities and improved interaction with extension staff. However, it must be stressed that the approaches and participatory tools used are not by themselves automatically gender sensitive and that the gender advisor must continually assess and provide guidance in the selection and use of such tools including PRA, demonstrations and field days, community theatre and video etc.

Gender working groups have been formed in the two districts to strengthen gender in the field. These have been trained on gender together with Transect Area Co-ordinators (TACs) and assistant Transect Area Co-ordinators (ATACs). Since the training the gender working groups have organised gender sensitisation sessions for women PMCs and initiated women specific activities.

The Review Team observes that while the programme has an objective "To integrate gender at all levels of the programme", the gender activities so far have been geared towards starting up women's projects such as promotion of kitchen woodlots, production of energy-saving cookstoves etc. Although these are important activities to meet women's specific needs, they should be seen in the context of the overall strategy for mainstreaming and addressing both the practical and strategic needs of women and men.

It can be concluded that the process of introducing gender to the district partners has been initiated and that interest among extension staff to increase women's participation in project activities is high. They should be further assisted and guided to address in a systematic way, the existing gender imbalances in the division of labour, access to and control over resources and decision-making, both at the household and community level.

### Kajiado.

The programme considers gender an integral part of all the programme components as stated in the plan of operation and annual Work Plans. It is also explicit that the programme targets men and women. Gender specific activities include training of liaison officers on gender, participatory planning and monitoring, formation and support to women's lobby groups as an instrument to lobby for women's rights to education and community level decision-making, support to girls education and support to women and youth groups. Achievements have also been made in the integration of gender in specific sectors and activities by making projects and technologies more responsive to women's and men's needs and by encouraging participation of men and women in extension and training activities.

Kajiado, more than any of the three programmes has given substantial support to the social sector. The programme has also addressed both the practical needs such as improving food security and income earnings, provision of domestic and livestock



water, attention to health and housing, as well as the strategic needs of men and women such as addressing gender disparities in education, women's limited access to productive resources, unequal division of labour and women's workload and the decision-making processes at the community level.

It can be concluded that the programme has made recognisable achievements in planning and implementation of gender interventions which have created a positive impact at the community level. In the next phase, the programme should further strengthen this process by developing clear objectives and developing gender capacity at the division and field level. In view of the existing cultural barriers to gender equality in decision-making and access to resources, the programme should develop effective gender sensitisation programmes for men and women at all levels. Such programmes should be a joint venture between the different actors in order to address constraints in the various sectors and activities.

### Laikipia.

The PlanOps for 1995 indicates that all the programme components will have a gender perspective. The approach is further articulated in the Work Plan and log frame for 1997. The programme emphasises the approach of mainstreaming but also implements specific activities in response to women's specific needs and priorities. An elaborate gender sensitisation and training programme has been implemented for the partners at different levels including community level. This has created a common understanding and support for gender among the actors.

Some achievements have been made in integrating gender in different sectors and activities by responding to women's and men's felt needs and opportunities, making technologies responsive to women's and men's needs and building on local knowledge and experience. Efforts have also been made to identify and address gender concerns such as women's heavy workload and imbalances in decision-making and access to resources and benefits between men and women. The programme has also made efforts to address specific problems of female headed households who form an important category in the district. The Review Team considers the formation and support to women's leagues an important strategy to increase women's participation in community decision-making and to improve their position.

It can also be concluded that the programme has succeeded in making gender an important consideration in the various project components and the responsibility of all the actors, not only for the gender advisor. The PMU has given support and importance to the whole process of integration and this has further strengthened acceptance and attention by the different actors.

Building on present experiences, the programme should in the next phase elaborate a clear strategy for gender to address the gender concerns of different target groups and strengthen the capacity of implementing actors of different levels.

### *Results of Brainstorming Workshops*

As part of the gender review, a workshop was held with programme staff and partners for all the four programmes to share preliminary results and brainstorm on the future strategies for gender. The workshop identified the following as and concerns for future attention:

- Socio-cultural factors and attitudes that work against one gender or another.
- Unequal access to resources and benefits.



- Low participation of women in decision-making.
- Unfavourable credit policies.
- Low awareness and misconception of gender among some implementing actors.
- Inadequate skills for incorporating gender in planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

The workshops also gave suggestions on actions and strategies to address these concerns. These included developing a clear vision, objectives and strategies that would lead to empowerment of women and men, equality in access to research and decision making and towards transformation of gender roles. Suggested elements of the future gender strategy involved;

- capacity building on use of participatory and gender tools;
- integration of gender in all programme components, sectors and activities;
- support to women's specific activities;
- organisation and strengthening of women's and youth groups and organizations;
- awareness creation and advocacy; and,
- Gender analysis and research on specific aspects.

The role of gender advisor was seen to be one of facilitation, concept development, guidance and support to different actors.

## *Conclusions and Recommendations*

### Conclusions

The Review Team concludes that in general the programmes have employed a gender and development approach for analysing the roles of women and men and encouraging the participation of women, particularly in implementation. The programme has successfully introduced the gender concept to the District partners and created the appreciation for it as a relevant and important concept in the development process. This is an important step considering the sensitivity of the subject. In the next phase, focus should be given to developing specific skills of the implementing staff at the District and Divisional levels for gender analysis and incorporating gender in the planning and implementation of the different sectors and projects.

Gender advisors play an important role in ensuring attention for gender by the different actors. However, some of them do not have sufficient capacity to provide practical guidance in incorporating gender in the different sectors and stages of the projects. This has tended to slow down progress in some districts. It is further observed that the level of gender integration in the different District programmes seems to depend on the commitment and support of the PMU, the level of awareness, skills and commitment of the implementing staff, and the extent to which they are supported and guided in planning and implementation. This also points to the need for capacity building at all levels and backstopping during the next phase of the programme.

The credit scheme is considered an important component in strengthening the economic status of men and women in the ASAL areas. While it has so far benefited both gender, the majority (65%) of the beneficiaries for both the loans and the training are men, even in a district like Laikipia where there is a high proportion of female headed households. It is also true that women in the ASAL areas play a major role in agriculture and food processing, have less access to production resources and few opportunities for off-farm employment, compared to men. In view of this, the



credit scheme needs to develop legibility criteria and procedures that enable more women to access credit and management skills training in order to increase agricultural production and income generation. Gender neutral criteria and procedures would marginalise poor women even further.

Cultural values of the communities, illiteracy and lack of exposure, have all contributed to women's poor self-image and lack of confidence. Their heavy workload at home also lowers their participation in extension activities and decision-making forums. Women groups and other women's organizations provide an important forum for improving the confidence and self image of women preparing them to participate in decision-making and to lobby for their rights. They have also proved useful in assisting women to save and purchase important household items including house construction materials and construction of water tanks. Support to women groups is therefore considered an important part of the gender strategy in the next phase, empowering women to participate more actively in the development process.

Use of participatory methods and informal communication channels provide more scope and stimulate women to participate in development activities. Extension staff need to be well equipped with the skills and tools that increase participation of different target groups and increase women's confidence.

#### Recommendations on a Gender Strategy

As the programmes have introduced a gender differentiated approach in the districts and raised awareness among the key actors, they should now embark on developing a comprehensive gender strategy for promoting gender equality and strengthening the capacity of the actors to implement the strategy. Such a strategy should include:

- A clear vision and long-term objective for addressing gender in the programmes.
- Key areas and concerns for attention and action in the next phase. These should be selected by individual programmes based on analysis in specific districts. Some of these have been identified in the gender workshop held as part of this review.
- Outputs and indicators both quantitative and qualitative for monitoring progress and effects of gender interventions.
- Specific activities and measures to ensure a gender perspective in all sectors, activities and project components e.g. affirmative action at the institutional and community level to ensure increased participation of women at different levels.
- Gender sensitisation programmes for community groups and other development actors.
- Collection of gender dis-aggregated data through participatory methods such as PRA, studies and action research on specific issues such as the situation of female headed households with regard to resources, effect of credit on household expenditure, participation of women in community decision-making etc.
- Programme for capacity building on participatory methods and gender tools.

The gender strategy should support mainstreaming and not aim at developing a separate development line for women. However, considering the special constraints and disadvantaged position of women relative to men, there is need to support women's specific activities and to create conditions that enable women to participate on equal footing with men. In view of this, the gender strategy should include the formation and strengthening of women's organizations, creating conditions for women's economic empowerment and addressing problems that hinder women's full



participation. The gender strategy should be a product of team work and should be reviewed from time to time.

#### *Recommendations on Gender Advisors*

It is recommended that: Gender Advisors should continue to support activities in the districts and should play a more central role of facilitating, conceptualising together with the PMU and other development partners, providing practical guidance in all stages of the programme and creating a conducive environment for networking with other agencies. The gender advisors should also participate in the screening and selection of projects and should advise on technologies and methods used. In order to enable the gender advisors perform these varied tasks, there is need for capacity building through training and backstopping. Regular review meetings between the programmes and support from the gender specialist at the Embassy should be continued.

#### *Recommendations on Capacity Building*

In order to strengthen the capacity of the districts to implement and sustain the gender strategies, the Review Team recommends that an assessment of existing capacity be carried out and a plan for gender capacity building for the partners at the district and divisional levels, be formulated. This would include training sessions and on the job training on aspects such as gender inclusion in PRA, application of gender analysis tools, development of awareness programmes, communication and facilitation skills etc.

#### *Recommendations on Implementing Partners*

The programmes work with some NGOs and private consultants in the implementation of some of the projects. It is recommended that in future, criteria for selection of these partners include their capacity for gender responsive development and that the technologies, methods and legibility criteria used by these partners, be assessed regularly to ensure consistency with the programme gender strategy.

#### *Recommendations on Implementing Staff*

As part of the programme strategy for increasing participation and improving the position of women, the programme should make an effort to increase the number of female extension workers attached to the programme as contact officers, liaison officers or transect co-ordinators etc. so as to develop their capacity along with their male counterparts and also to better reach women and girls. Participation of women in the programme steering committees should also be increased.

#### *Recommendations on Co-ordination and Backstopping*

In order to facilitate joint activities such as training on specific aspects, technical support in developing strategies and methods, carrying out studies and facilitating exchange meetings, central co-ordination will be needed. The facilitation has in the past been provided by both the Embassy and SNV. It is recommended that in the next phase short-term expertise be contracted to provide this facilitation and backstopping when and as required. As the Embassy Sector Specialist has overall monitoring responsibility for gender, they would organise and monitor the implementation of these joint activities.



### 4.3 Monitoring and Evaluation

#### 4.3.1 Conclusions

Before 1994 there were a number of constraints that required a change in the M&E systems of the four programmes. A programme was not able to determine its achievements and effects, and this undermined the process of planning. Furthermore, feedback mechanisms were ad-hoc which made decision making on certain issues impossible. Moreover, targets were not set for all projects which made control difficult.

After 1994, the donor supported an initiative by the Kajiado Programme to improve the M&E component by introducing the Logical Framework Planning (LFP). From the programme's point of view, the improvement aimed at ensuring effective and efficient control of the programme activities, as well as showing the level of achievements in the field. The donor was interested in introducing result-oriented management in projects. In three of the four programmes staff have been trained on the improved planning, monitoring and evaluation process. However, with the exception of Keiyo Marakwet, involvement of local institutions, like front line staff, project management committees, and local communities in monitoring and evaluation has not been successful. At district level, monitoring and evaluation was understood much better.

The objective was to develop a M&E system based on activity targets and objectively verifiable indicators. The logical framework approach has also been used in the development of annual plans in all programmes. The system seems better in place in Kajiado and Keiyo Marakwet than in the other two districts.

Financial data in three out of four programmes are managed through PAM. Progress of activities is monitored separately. The EXACT software used by the Kajiado programme can handle activities as a cost centre, providing a great advantage over PAM software. In two cases the appearance of substantial variance between budget and expenditure was used as a measure of checking. None of these three programmes with PAM uses a data base in which both financial and progress data are integrated.

Extensive monitoring of activities requires a lot of time. In a number of cases this meant that less time was available for field visits to individual projects.

Although monitoring of finances and activities generally were well arranged, assessing effects, let alone impact was much more difficult. Keiyo Marakwet and Laikipia mentioned that it was too early to measure effects and impact. But in the other two programmes it also did not take place. Measuring effects of projects should be seen as an integral part of the programme, but measuring impact is such a difficult and time-consuming task, requiring extensive and detailed research, that it could more be seen as something for social scientists than for programme staff, implementors and local communities.

#### 4.3.2 Recommendations

- It is wise to continue with the logical framework approach, now that it is starting to be in place or is just in place in the various programmes.
- It is suggested that all four programmes use the method of variance between budget and expenditure for detecting problems.

- Financial monitoring should be integrated with progress of activities, so that a financial overview of projects and sectors is produced faster and easier and, furthermore, that it is more difficult to put expenditures in categories at one's whim. Allocating expenditures is now done in a different way in the four districts, and differently at different times in the same district.
- It would be useful if the programmes try to report on effects of projects, something which up till now hardly takes place. Whenever new activities of some importance are started in a new sector and/or a new area, a simple baseline study is always necessary to be able to measure effects later on.
- It is recommended to make better use of the baseline and other information collected in the past, and to improve the institutional memory, by storing data by sector and area. Effect measurement becomes more realistic if information is added about other initiatives and developments in a particular area and/or sector.
- Measuring of impact is so complex that it should be done by (external) socio-economic scientists through overview surveys on a regular basis (frequency to be determined). It is not realistic to demand from the programme staff, implementors or local communities, that they spend their time on that. Moreover, if they would, good results are not likely to be expected.



## **5 ASSESSMENT OF ASAL PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES, APPROACH AND STRATEGY**

### **5.0 Introduction**

In this chapter an assessment is made of the ASAL programme objectives and their relevance in particular. It will also be assessed whether programme approaches and strategies have been well articulated and supportive of the programme objectives. This chapter to a large extent contains the conclusions and views based on analyses in the previous chapters. In principle, at the end of each (sub)section the team draws conclusions and/or makes recommendations that it finds useful for the future development of the programmes.

A general point that needs to be made here is that confusion exists on the distinction between objectives, approaches and strategies. The most obvious example relates to community participation. It is termed an objective - and a very important one at that - in the sense that ASAL programmes will strive to increase community participation especially in planning (and implementation) of projects. The people should have a stronger say in the kind of activities to be undertaken in their communities. It is seen as an approach, a kind of methodology, to contribute to successful implementation of projects. It is at the same time looked upon as a strategy; for example, to improve sustainability of projects by cost sharing and establishing a fund for operation and maintenance.

### **5.1 Objectives**

Basically, until the present day, the objectives formulated at the start of the ASAL programmes have remained the same. These objectives consist of three elements:

- (i) to raise the standard of living of the population through a more efficient use of the available natural resources in a sustainable way;
- (ii) to support decentralised planning and implementation of development activities and strengthening of the capacity of the government machinery in the district to do so effectively and efficiently;
- (iii) to promote a participatory approach involving communities in prioritising, planning and implementation of development activities.

The 1993 Review Team concluded that the objectives are still valid but had insufficiently been made operational. Further operationalisation of objectives should allow for priority setting between objectives and target programme activities better to support the broad programme objectives.

This (the 1997) Review Team also is of the opinion that the objectives are still valid. We would suggest that in the PlanOps and Annual Plans as much as possible a systematic distinction be made between objectives, approaches and strategies.

Though the Review Team acknowledges the validity of the objectives, it has come to the conclusion that in the present situation - and we refer here especially to the situation regarding the government machinery both at national level as well as in the districts - not all of them can be pursued fruitfully. This observation relates specifically to objective (ii).

Since 1993, and especially in the last few years, considerable progress has been made in making objectives operational, although speed and level differed between programmes. It seems that the introduction of a planning tool like logical framework



has helped in this respect.

*Objective (i).*

The objective to increase the standard of living of the population in the ASAL areas by better utilisation of natural resources in a sustained way, is still a very valid one and should guide future programme activities as well. The translation of this objective into more emphasis on the productive sector is accepted by the Review Team as long as the aspect of human resource development is not overlooked. Also in natural resource management<sup>14</sup>, it is people that have to understand in order to be willing and able to co-operate in implementation. In view of the tremendous problems faced by the youth, adequate attention should be given to them.

The Review Team strongly endorses this objective. It would also like to issue a warning for too high expectations or ambitions. Clearly the ASAL programmes have generated effects in the past, however, many developments external to the programme tended to frustrate the positive effects of programme activities (and will continue to do so). There is nothing wrong in having ambitions but one has to be realistic about them at the same time. One has to be careful that ambitions will become the reason to enforce activities upon people in an unbalanced or drastic way. In this respect reference is made to risks existing at three levels as described in § 4.2.2.

*Objective (ii)*

The Review Team is of the opinion that under the prevailing circumstances, this objective can hardly, if at all, be fruitfully pursued by the programmes. This issue is further dealt with below - under various headings - since the Review Team sees this more as a matter of strategy. The Review Team emphasises that moving away from the government is, in principle, temporary. As soon as serious efforts to reform government are actually being made including improvements in decentralisation of authority and budgets to the districts are implemented, the proposed move away from the government should be reconsidered.

*Objective (iii)*

The Review Team strongly endorses this objective. Decisions should be made at the lowest possible level in society. What can be left to individuals should be left to individuals, what can be left to communities has to be done by communities and so on. The criterion being that no decision made at a particular level should substantially affect people that have not taken part in making that decision. Participation can be direct or through elected representatives.

Community participation is, in principle, always required. It is the kind of decision that determines at what level. Peoples participation needs always to be part of the development process. No sector is excluded from that principle. Top down elements cannot always be avoided though, but should be handled with utmost care and delicacy. Again, reference is made to § 4.2.2.

In the view of the team, the question to be addressed by the programmes is how to optimise the participation of the people. In the team's view this relates more to approach and strategy and will, therefore, be dealt with below.

## **5.2 Approach and Strategy**

The 1993 mission commented that a comprehensive strategy for the programmes reviewed was still lacking. This Review Team would like to emphasise the

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<sup>14</sup> Natural resource management is taken to be the implementation of land use plans, including zonation, resource mapping and conservation.



importance of sound strategies. If the process approach is to be maintained, and it is the team's view it should, a comprehensive strategy serves to guide flexible programme development. With increased freedom to choose partners to co-operate with, the opportunistic element, however, can be reduced significantly. This should also lead to tighter management of resources.

The PlanOps and the Annual Plans show that the recommendations of the 1993 mission have been taken serious. Much more attention is being paid to strategy development though there are variations between districts.

According to the 1993 review mission, ASAL programme support should emphasise productive sectors with a heavy focus on land use planning. With a substantial increase in budgets, this strategy was supposed to generate the impact the mission found so far lacking.

This Review Team supports the view that emphasising support to productive sector activities in a sustainable way, is an essential element in the strategy to reduce poverty. Sustainability is understood to mean environmental and social-political sustainability as well as sustainability of projects by peoples' participation. On both counts - emphasis on the productive sector and sustainability - the programmes have generally responded well to the 1993 recommendations.

The 1993 review mission further observed on approach (and strategy) of the programmes:

- (i) that there was a tendency to concentrate too much on the bottom-up approach;
- (ii) that gender issues had not fully been incorporated in the programme strategy;
- (iii) that the relationships between some sectors did not always lead to adequate co-ordination of activities: water/health and productive sectors/environment are singled out;
- (iv) that relationships between ASAL and non-ASAL areas are not clearly incorporated in problem analysis and, therefore, in the strategic framework.

These issues are dealt with in some detail in the chapter reviewing progress of the programmes in each of the districts (and more detailed in the district reports). In this section some general conclusions are drawn and recommendations made.

### *Community Participation.*

In the Review Team's view, community participation is to be seen as people's capacity to take responsibility for shaping their own future as individuals as well as members of the community. In practical terms it means that people should be able to express their needs, formulate ways to address them and undertake organised action accordingly.

The conclusions to be drawn from projects' performance are that projects carried out by the communities and thus addressing urgent needs perform well, others perform less. Relatively little interest is shown by communities in a range of resource conservation projects for which community support is not (easily) forthcoming.

Participation of the target communities in all phases of the project cycle should remain an important element in the ASAL programmes. It is acknowledged, however, that not all initiatives for development activities will come or ought to come from individuals or communities but if an activity affects them, (the true representatives of) the communities will at least have to consent. If their co-operation is required one



way or the other they will have to support the initiative<sup>15</sup>. Choice of sectors and projects can be arrived at in two ways. One is following the priorities of the communities. The second is based on analysis of problems and potentials of the area and its people. They are not mutually exclusive but difficult to combine in one programme, as experience since 1993 suggests.

It has been observed that the way ASAL programmes function still contain elements that tend to perpetuate dependency of the beneficiaries. Sharing costs, providing labour and materials have gone some way to make communities responsible. This, however, is not sufficient. Something rather fundamental has to change in the relationship between the people, whether organised in community groups or as individuals, on the one hand and on the other hand the government or other development 'agents'. People have to be made aware that their development as individual households or at the community level is entirely their own business. The widespread attitude that one should go to the government or to NGOs / donors to get things, has to be seriously discouraged. The government can be addressed by the community to create the conditions so that they can successfully undertake their own activities. Communities should be made aware that the government has only a very limited role to play. NGOs and donors should assist communities to create this kind of awareness if necessary and target assistance primarily at those communities that show some initiative to help themselves.

It is important, according to the Review Team, in dealing with target communities and agencies planning and implementing activities supported by ASAL, to drive home this point that development is an individual and communal responsibility that cannot be delegated to the government or any other institution.

The government machinery in Kenya - and the provincial administration (OP, PC, DC, DO, Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs) in particular - is not the most appropriate vehicle to empower the people. By empowerment we mean that people can pursue their own interests, in the way they choose by mobilising their own resources. Especially when it comes to making people aware of their civic rights the GoK doesn't seem to be a natural partner. In the current situation it cannot be expected that the government is the partner to collaborate with to create this kind of awareness and 'development climate'. Creating that kind of awareness can be done only by NGOs (and churches), because by the very nature of that kind of activity, existing power structures will be challenged. This does not mean that community involvement and government do not match at all. Actual practice shows that at the level of planning, implementation, contribution to and management of community based projects, government and communities can co-operate. Unfortunately it is the exception rather than the rule.

Summarising the observations and views above the team recommends that ASAL programmes systematically support the building and strengthening of CBOs (and NGOs where applicable). CBOs should be organised around a specific activity or project. This support should include elements of wider awareness raising and civic education. Environmental and gender issues are of great importance in this respect. Support to CBOs should heavily emphasise the process to make decision-making procedures transparent and to make community leaders accountable to their communities.

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<sup>15</sup> It is sometimes too easily assumed that local people are ignorant or have only a limited understanding of their environment, and even if, in principle, we acknowledge the fact that indigenous knowledge of members of the target group can be useful in managing their own environment, in practice we do not always adhere to the principle in our drive to create impact.



### *Decentralised Decision Making*

Decentralisation of decision making has formally been a strategy of the GoK since 1983: the District Focus for Rural Development policy. The DFRD policy is, in principle, widely accepted in the districts as a useful strategy. ASAL programmes have been, as much as possible, supportive to decentralised decision making. However, in actual practice the system has hardly worked and has been misused for advancing political interests. Little authority or funds were delegated to districts. ASAL programmes, nevertheless, had to reach the grassroot level. Especially the Keiyo Marakwet programme has been quite innovative in this respect. Other programmes have also been investing in building capacity with government departments, particularly at divisional level, and NGOs.

It is the team's recommendation that the ASAL programmes should concentrate capacity building efforts on CBOs, as mentioned in the previous paragraphs, and on those government departments and NGOs to which a project is contracted. Projects will be contracted to organisations that can be expected to work according to a participatory approach.

### *Planning and Co-ordination at District Level*

Priority setting in terms of sectors and projects - which is an essential part of the district planning exercise - is dominated by advancing the political interests of the ruling party based on a strong client oriented network and usually not unrelated to private interests of power brokers in the district. ASAL programmes have been under constant pressure of district and local 'politics'. And not the kind of politics that can be associated with normal democratic procedures. It has to a large extent proved to be impossible - as an essential part of the government district planning exercise - to increase the rationality in priority setting of sectors, projects, activities at district and divisional level. The main reason is political pressure and interference.

Nevertheless, overall planning by the ASAL programme should be carried out in consultation with government at district level to avoid conflicts and overlap. The Review Team acknowledges that planning at district level should in principle be co-ordinated through the District Development Plan. Whatever activities will be developed under ASAL aegis, they will have to be approved by the DDC. It is the team's view that by ending the joint responsibility for the ASAL programme, the programme management will be in a much better position to resist political pressures. By being formally detached from the joint responsibility, the programme will at least be in a position to not support projects that do not fit objectives and strategies without creating friction or other frustrations.

Co-ordination between related activities and projects does require constant attention. The PMUs are aware of that but have, in practice, not always been able to find the channels to achieve the required co-ordination. It is acknowledged by the team that in a multi-sectoral programme, involving a variety of implementing partners, this is a complicated task. The Review Team observes moreover that co-ordination of development activities and projects district wide is not (and cannot be) an explicit objective of the ASAL programmes. This essentially is the task of the DDC/DEC and the District Planning Unit. The ASAL programme ideally fits in well in the district development plan.

Improved co-ordination in ASAL supported activities, points to the reduction of the number of sectors and the number of implementing partners. Moreover, the strategy to make land use planning cum natural resource management central in ASAL planning in itself contributes to improved co-ordination. Reduction of the number of sectors covered by the ASAL programme does not mean that the team thinks the left



out sectors are less important. They are not. But one programme supported by one donor does not necessarily need to cover all important sectors. Moreover, there are other - and may be more efficient - ways to deal with some sectors (see also chapter 7).

In summary the Review Team recommends that planning of the ASAL programme takes place in consultation with the district planning authorities. Improved co-ordination within the ASAL programme can be achieved by reducing the number of sectors and by using land use planning cum natural resource management as the programme umbrella (the unifying strategy).

### *Co-operation with and Institutional Support of the Government*

The government machinery taken broadly has, to a large extent, failed to deliver (see also section 3.3). This has led to the situation that most ASAL programme advisors have increasingly been pressing for project implementation outside the government structure. Laikipia being the prime mover of that approach.

Planning and implementation of projects should be carried out in co-operation with those institutions that have, in principle, demonstrated to be able to deliver. These can be CBOs, NGOs, other private organisations/consultants and those government departments that have the required capabilities.

It is the view of the Review Team that the developments within the GoK itself, as well as in relation to the ASAL programmes, should be taken to their logical conclusion. In view of the current political environment, the present state of the government machinery in the districts, as well as the objectives of the CSR programme, the objective that ASAL plans with and implements preferably through government departments should be modified. In general the conditions are simply not there for a fruitful 'joint venture' regarding some aspects of planning, especially the prioritisation of sectors and projects, and implementation of projects.

Limiting the role of government in implementing projects is fully in line with and actually supports the Civil Service Reform Programme. One of the core policies of that programme is to reduce the implementation capacity of government departments. Government should limit its activities to those that cannot or are not as effectively and efficiently carried out by the private - profit and not-for profit - sector. All other activities should gradually be handed over to the private sector.

By the same token, the objective to strengthen the government departments operating in the district, in planning and implementation capabilities, should be given a different interpretation. Strengthening of government machinery should be limited to those departments with which the ASAL programmes actively co-operate. It should target primarily the divisional level but not by-pass the district level. A rift between the two levels can be easily created and may frustrate the entire activity. The scope of strengthening of GoK agencies should be limited in principle to project management support. This includes project planning, budgeting and monitoring progress. It is well known (see also chapter 3) that massive waste of public resources is caused by bad project preparation and management. On the other hand management support should be broadened to include the private (not-for profit) sector, NGOs and CBOs.

In summary, the Review Team recommends that the joint responsibility of the GoK and the donor for the ASAL programmes be ended. The team likes to emphasise that this situation is in principle temporary and does not mean co-operation with the government is terminated. Institutional support should be limited in scope but cover in principle all co-operating partners. Despite the limitation in scope it is expected that better project planning and management will lead to reduction in waste of public resources.



### *Process Approach*

Another prominent feature in the ASAL programmes is the so-called process approach allowing the programme management to be flexible in the sectors to support, the type of support provided, the departments and other parties (including community organisations) to co-operate with and so on. This type of programme approach makes rather heavy demands on the management. Flexibility, as an essential feature of the programmes, has, under the prevailing conditions, contributed to relevance, effectiveness and - to some extent - efficiency of the programmes.

The review has observed, though not in the same intensity, a tendency of the ASAL PMUs to use the programme approach as an excuse for less than careful planning. Also a not too consequent strategy development has been justified with an appeal to process approach. Although - as has been mentioned in previous sections - significant progress has been made on both counts, the balance is delicate.

The Review Team recommends that more uniform direction should be given to programme development (strategies, approaches) of the individual programmes. Among others, this could be done by more frequent discussions between the RNE and the programme management, but other centralised options are thinkable, depending on capacity available at the Embassy (see also the recommendation of § 4.2.2).

### *High-Input/Low-Input Strategy*

Like the terminology top-down/bottom-up, the dichotomy high-input/low-input should be eliminated from the ASAL vocabulary. Like other polarity constructs, also this one explains very little. It has tended to confuse rather than clarify the issue. It will, to a large extent, be the absorptive capacity of the community and its organisations (at whatever level) that determines what activities it can plan and/or implement. The suggestion that by just increasing budgets and forcing more resources into a community positive impact will be increased is a dangerous illusion. The disastrous effects of over-resourcing communities quantitatively as well as qualitatively, are well recorded. Also the dangers of over-funding are well known. Spending pressure leads to inefficient and sometimes ineffective and un-sustainable use of resources.

The Review Team is, therefore, of the opinion that it is the capacity to absorb inputs without strengthening dependency, that should determine the level of input into a programme. It is admitted that this principle is hard to operationalise (as are most of the development objectives, approaches and strategies).

The team recommends that management capacity and absorptive capacity are considered as serious limitations for the size of the programmes. Pushing the programmes beyond those limits is counter-productive.

### *Multi-sectoral strategy.*

Right from the start ASAL programmes have been multi-sectoral. In a sense they even tried to be omni-sectoral. As a strategy it has not really been justified in substantive terms. One of the development trends of the day was integrated rural development.

As far as can be reconstructed, basically the idea has been that all government departments at district level needed support. Programmes were oiling the government



machinery in the district, so on what grounds could a department be excluded if it contributed to the objective of reducing poverty, an objective featuring in every departmental plan. In practice departments were 'excluded' mainly because they did not come-up with viable proposals or proved to be completely insensitive to a participatory approach.

The Review Team is of the opinion that this matter ought to be approached differently. Certainly, an integrated approach is important. However, integration should take place through the district development plan, prepared by the district development office(r) and, therefore, not necessarily at the level of the ASAL programme. What is important is that a cluster is defined of activities that relate to each other and lend themselves to a similar approach. Moreover, the size and diversity of the programme should remain manageable. Finally, resources of the programme should not be spread thinly in order to increase the opportunity to create impact.

The Review Team, therefore, recommends that the ASAL programmes concentrate on the sectors water, livestock and agriculture, with land use planning or natural resources management as the umbrella strategy. Firstly, these sectors comprise the bulk of the programmes anyway. And secondly, (most) projects in these sectors, directly strengthening the economic position of the households, and do get a strong community support. The natural resource base of activities in these sectors and the need for sustainability of development have indicated the need for the unifying umbrella strategy of land-use planning and natural resource management.

Exclusion of other sectors is recommended on the basis of four considerations:

- (i) prevent the programme resources of spreading thin, thereby enhancing efficiency and increasing impact;
- (ii) the thus excluded social sectors education, health, infrastructure are government sectors 'par excellence'; these can better be prepared and managed in collaboration with the respective ministries from the Nairobi level<sup>16</sup>;
- (iii) increasing the economic position of households enables them to contribute to social sector development at community level (in accordance with their own priorities), and
- (iv) the complexity of the programme will be decreased, making it easier to manage effectively.

### *Programme Funding*

An essential element of the approach has been complementarity of funds. Development activities in the districts should not become dependent on ASAL contributions<sup>17</sup>.

The conclusion that cannot be escaped from is that currently the availability of ASAL funds provides the GoK with the opportunity to reduce its development vote for the districts to minimal amounts. Development funds for the district basically come from foreign sources. ASAL being a 'joint venture' of the donor and the district government, leads to a situation in which ASAL funds are being seen as a substitute for GoK development funds. Even the day-to-day running of the government in

<sup>16</sup> Implementation can still be done under the umbrella of or in collaboration with the ASAL programme. An example in this can be the credit scheme and the Basic Education Support Programme.

<sup>17</sup> The wording used in various policy documents and by officers interviewed is symptomatic in this respect. The ASAL programme is not supporting GoK activities in the district, no the discussion is about the lack of input and support of the GoK to the ASAL programme.



districts is becoming more and more dependent on ASAL (financial) inputs. Vital government functions have become dependent on ASAL inputs and civil servants in the district make no secret of it.

The Review Team recommends that in supporting government projects or programmes (and for the rest communities through CBOs or NGOs), ASAL funds should be used to match GoK funds (and thus avoid substitution) and be put in only if - to the extent possible - funding for the programme or project is secured and formalised in a contract. Such an approach is hoped to have a number of beneficial effects in addition to reduced dependency of district development efforts on donor funds: (i) a more responsible use of funds, (ii) an incentive to the government to provide funds for projects if its known that matching funds are available and (iii) a better insight in government financial system.

### *Gender Issues.*

See § 4.2.3 for the gender issues.

## **5.3 Effects & Impact**

According to the 1993 review mission the impact of the ASAL programmes could, and should, be improved in view of the magnitude of the problems in the ASAL districts. Higher impact could, and should, be achieved through increasing support by the ASAL programmes to the productive sectors, with a focus on land use to arrest further degradation of the natural resource base of the population in the ASAL districts.

In assessing the impact of the ASAL programmes one would have to realise that they have operated under adverse conditions. To mention a few that emerged from the previous chapters:

- a government by and large failing to provide essential services,
- reduced GoK allocations to the districts,
- adverse economic conditions,
- increased costs to households due to cost sharing,
- recurrent droughts, insecurity (ethnic clashes, cattle raids),
- rapid population growth.

It would be quite unrealistic to expect structural and tangible increase in incomes, employment and a reduction in natural resource degradation under such circumstances.

Moreover, one ought to consider that much of the ASAL programme funds have been spent on fairly intangible activities as increasing community participation, community awareness, and strengthening institutions. One ought also to be aware that part of the expenditure on projects has been substituting faltering government funds.

It has been indicated, a.o. in the district reports, that measuring impact is methodologically very difficult and very costly. This holds for sectoral programmes but even more so for multi-sectoral programmes. To assess the usefulness of a programme, it would be sufficient if project effects would be known better than they currently are, and whether these effects sustain in the long run. In that case one can safely assume that the activity addresses a real need and is embedded institutionally well enough to survive. If the project achievement is linked to the programme objectives, the activity can be said to be effective.

Using this as a frame of reference, the overall conclusion about the performance of

ASAL programmes can be that they have achieved an acceptable level of effectiveness. The weak point of this assessment is that no real attempt has been made to measure sustainability of project results. The strong impression from the field work is, however, that at least the conditions for sustainability of project results are quite favourable. Fostering community ownership by various means is the most important contribution in this respect.

It is very clear that the results have been most convincing for projects that do address people's needs rather directly. Water projects and livestock projects usually score high in this respect. These projects meet targets and have the effect to improve living conditions of households in the short run. Many of the projects in the agricultural sector also meet targets because they improve the economic situation of households in the short run.

Projects in education and health score, on average, slightly less in terms of completion and effects, but frustrations were mentioned on several occasions. In terms of expenditure these sectors are in most districts not very important and, with the exception of the close connection between health and domestic water, are rather the "stand alone" sort of projects.

Projects supporting income generating activities (Jua Kali/women groups/co-operatives) show a very mixed picture. The pattern is that activities that could produce tangible benefits to those participating are doing well. Others, where this is less clear, do not.

Infrastructural projects also meet targets but they usually have little community participation. Although they are economically speaking of great importance they do not fit well in the participatory approach of ASAL programmes.

As a result of the recommendations of the 1993 evaluation mission, the programme budgets have increased and the sectoral balance has changed in favour of the productive sector with indeed - in some districts more than others - a focus on land use planning. So far land use planning has hardly - if at all - gone beyond the planning stage (resource mapping, zonation). An institutional structure that supports the implementation of the land use plan is being built or has been built, with Keiyo Marakwet as the extreme case where the entire programme will be planned and implemented through that structure. Since no implementation has been going on, no results can be recorded in that respect.



## **6 MANAGEMENT**

### **6.0 Introduction**

All four programmes faced management problems in recent years; among the programmes Laikipia has faced comparatively few. In this chapter the main management issue as reported to the team will be outlined and recommendations will be made to overcome them. It is the team's view that the importance of the size, composition and structure of the programme management has been somewhat underrated, especially in view of the growth of the programmes since 1993. Growth in size as well as in complexity.

The complexity of the programmes, the large number of diverse projects, the required flexibility, the complex and rather non-transparent government procedures, all have contributed to a situation where the programmes are becoming less and less controllable and manageable. In view of the highly non-transparent GoK procedures misuse of resources is bound to arise. Certainly in a situation where civil servants see their salaries eroding, where their household expenditures (for health and education for instance) are increasing, and where corruption has become endemic. Thus, during the history of the ASAL programmes financial crises have emerged periodically. Some have been so serious that programmes have been temporarily suspended.

Such a complicated programme requires at least clear-cut responsibilities of the management that match and complement each other, and a good management information system.

The first conclusion can be rather straightforward, the burden put on the programme management is under the present circumstances too heavy. This conclusion is more detailed in the following consecutive paragraphs.

### **6.1 The 'Two-Window' System and Financial Management**

The 'two-window' management system has not been very helpful in securing sound financial management. The following observations are made in that respect.

The programme officer (appointed by the MLRRWD) and the programme advisor (appointed by the donor) are co-signatories to the project account fed through direct payment by the donor. The programme advisor, however, is not a co-signatory to the GoK funds. Due to complexities and lack of transparencies in the Kenyan financial system, the Programme Officer has little insight in what is happening with the GoK funds<sup>18</sup>. Formally, the ASAL programme depends for financial control on the GoK system and procedures.

There is a shared responsibility for programme management and programme (activity) development, preparation of a plan of operations and annual plans. The contradictions of these two windows and the lack of transparency of the GoK administrative system are particularly evident with respect to financial procedures. Formally the ASAL programme depends for financial control on the GoK system and procedures. The result has been inefficient use of funds as well as misappropriation of funds.

The Programme Officers have in various cases been blamed for the mismanagement of funds. Since the Programme Adviser does not know and or has no insight in GoK

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<sup>18</sup>The review team has noticed that even some experienced Kenyan civil servants are defeated by the intricacies of the system.



finances and procedures, it is argued that he is usually manipulated by the Programme Officer, who then turns around and seeks rent by double billing activities or colluding with contractors. This argument is not only found within Dutch ASALs. It has been made in programmes of as varied donors as USAID, GTZ, DANIDA, IFAD and others. Whether it is true or not, the point is simply that donors and GoK, who set up this two-window management system, made a structural mistake for such a system lends itself to endless wrangles and creates structural opportunities for rent seeking. Only very detailed control exercised continuously in detail for all activities, and related to a specific person (e.g. the PA) can prevent this situation from escalating (see § 4.2.1).

Formally blaming only the Programme Officer is difficult to maintain for it is the Dutch advisers who, ultimately, are responsible for the (Dutch) funds. It is illustrative that where some donors have taken some programme officers to court, the cases have been dismissed on the basis that in a two window management system both signatories are responsible.

The Review Team was, in some cases, confronted with the fact that when it reported to the districts (very) high expenditures on operational costs i.e. costs not accounted to a particular project, it was mentioned that certainly some of those expenditures could not be considered as programme overhead. This points to rather flexible accounting practice<sup>19</sup>. To what extent this practice is forced by the system or by the use made of the system has not been looked into in any detail. This matter should be looked into if the external audit recently carried out has not addressed this issue.

One programme adviser argued that it was not his responsibility to check all the financial documents. In some sense this is a very true argument but it underlines the structural problem of the financial management system in force.

A real issue then on management is whether the programme advisers were hired with considerations about their competence and interest in (financial) management in addition to their competence in development.

In view of the assessment made above, the Review Team recommends that ASAL programmes shall not be managed through a two-window system. This becomes feasible if the ASAL programmes cease to be joint ventures between the Dutch and Kenyan governments.

In the team's view the programme management is directly or indirectly recruited by the donor. The programme management is accountable to the donor. The GoK will be informed about budgets and actual expenditures.

Financial management of the programmes, the team recommends, ought to be strengthened urgently either by enhancing the capacity of the advisors or by adding capacity.

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<sup>19</sup> An example of 'flexible' accounting (e.g. considerable systematic differences between districts) was given in chapter 4 of the West Pokot District report: "The programme officers in West Pokot have always tried as much as possible to put 'general support' expenses under the category of the project for which the expenses were actually made (unlike some other ASAL programmes, which makes comparison difficult)". Another one in a footnote in the same report in chapter 7, § 7.1: "These figures are a result of the review team's attempt to allocate detailed expenditure figures for 1993-1996 to (sub-)sectors. In response, the ASAL programme management provided slightly different figures, for the years 1994-96 - so excluding 1993 - in which every year shows a different 'organisation' of the expenditure data. Allocation to sectors obviously is not straightforward. To allow a comparison between the two sectoral distributions, we will give both classifications.



## 6.2 The Programme Management Unit

Since the onset of Dutch ASALs, the central management characteristic of those appointed as Programme Advisers, has been their rather high level of independence. They have been reluctant to accept central co-ordination. This management practice was structurally supported by the process approach. The Review Team recommends a clear co-ordinating role by or on behalf of the RNE (see below).

Programme advisers developed 'political' management skills in deciding which ministries, partners, et cetera could get programme support. With the increase in the size and complexity of the programmes managing resources became increasingly demanding, even where the PMUs increased in size and where they began to contract out. The extension to the PMUs enhanced professional competence, however, rather than managerial capacity. The Review Team has asked some detailed management questions like, for example, what is the return by the ARU in Laikipia, what is the 'locus standi' of TACs in Keiyo Marakwet, who really are the beneficiaries of credit in all the districts? The programmes were not able to provide hard data.

In the next paragraph management information will be discussed in more detail.

The PMUs have been extended in some form since 1993. Some additions to the PMUs have been strongly advocated by sector specialists at the RNE. Additions were the gender advisers, community mobilisation advisers, and land use planners, among others. The question is why such specialists have been attached to the PMU and not just as real advisers to assist planning and implementation. If, as the programmes argue, PMUs are essentially co-ordinating and planning units, then there is no logical reason why there are 'sectoral specialists' attached to them.

When the PMU consists of a strong Programme Advisor and a number of specialists hired by him<sup>20</sup>, there is the risk in the present set-up that the Programme Officer will be marginalised. Some Programme Officers have also been 'political' managers in the sense that they manipulate the Programme Advisers, particularly with respect to bending activities to suit particular political dictates, be they driven by local level, national or ministerial politics.

Very few of the Programme Officers, like the Programme Advisers, have had formal management training before joining the programmes. Some of them have stayed in the same district for extended periods that they have become specialists on the districts.

The team recommends to maintain consistency with the recommendation of the previous paragraph to appoint one Programme Manager to be responsible for the management of the programme. The Programme Manager should be assisted by a financial manager. These two functions make up the PMU. The Programme Manager will be assisted by advisors and support staff as required.

Responsibilities should not only be clearly defined and formalised in job descriptions but should also be realistic and complementary.

## 6.3 Management Information and Monitoring

For a detailed analysis of the monitoring and evaluation system and practices in the various programmes see the monitoring and evaluation sections in the district reports.

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<sup>20</sup> Current nor past programmes in Kenya have known female programme advisors.



The management information system (MIS) and monitoring system are closely related. Monitoring is done at two levels. The planning sequence of projects consists of:

- (i) effects to be achieved (these should be programme objectives made operational),
- (ii) project output to bring about those effects,
- (iii) activities to be undertaken to produce required output, and
- (iv) inputs needed to undertake the planned activities.

The implementation sequence is just the other way around.

The MIS records the last three steps of the planning sequence as well as the first three steps of the implementation sequence. Thus, the MIS allows for the confrontation of planning and realisation. This information system allows for routine monitoring that stops at the completion of the project. Its main function is to signal to the programme management whether progress is as planned. In order to serve the management, information must be timely. Simplicity is thus essential.

The other function is to allow judgement about the efficiency of the activity. It answers the question whether the output produced justified the inputs. Analysing output and input data over a period of time and between similar activities allows for bench-marking and thus such a judgement.

The second level of monitoring is tracking the effects of the project. This level of monitoring gives information on whether a project actually contributes to the programme objectives.

The management information and monitoring systems that have been and are being developed in the various ASAL programmes prove still to be insufficient to (fully) perform the functions as described above. One of the problems under the current (Dutch) system of financial administration is that it aggregates types of costs incurred for different activities thus making it impossible to relate costs to output.

It is not entirely clear to the Review Team to what extent each of the following points contribute but their mix is the reason for the still unsatisfactory state management information and monitoring:

- (i) the project administration system known as PAM is not capable to produce the required data to serve as a management information system, or whether:
- (ii) the programme management is not sufficiently prepared to retrieve the required (financial) management information from the system, or whether:
- (iii) the system is not collecting sufficiently accurate data and feed them in the system.

It is, however, clear that if a workable integrated system would have been in operation, the PMUs would have run into less managerial problems than they actually have (the financial ones included). This point certainly merits attention in the team's view.

Much progress still needs to be made in second level monitoring, that is monitoring the effects of projects. For example, gender specific monitoring is limited to the participation of women. Whether participation has actually resulted in increased access to and control of resources (the effect to be achieved), is hardly, if at all, addressed. As has been mentioned earlier, determining project effects is a rather difficult task (see also chapters 4 and 7 in the district reports for Keiyo Marakwet and West Pokot).



Designing a good system is one thing, feeding it timely with correct information is another. The experience (also elsewhere) shows that organising correct data input is critical and more complicated than designing a system on paper. An unreliable monitoring system leads to the wrong management decisions and policy conclusions. The experience shows - predictably - that involving 'recipient' communities in monitoring is effective. They are interested to get the result planned for and are therefore willing to accurately record it. In this respect will the future experience of Keiyo Marakwet be of interest.

In all ASAL districts, planning is based on the logical framework methodology. To make monitoring a useful management tool it must be able to fit in that framework.<sup>21</sup> Experience in the districts shows that officers at various levels find it hard to grasp the methodology and to make it operational.

More details are given in the M&E sections in the district reports in Part One. More specific overall recommendations are closely linked to the future of the ASAL programmes, which depends on the acceptance of the recommendations made in this report. Since this is to be seen in the future, it is not possible to give such recommendations. Some general observations are made though that can be used as future building stones:

- Review or evaluation procedures seem to be rather complex involving many committees, meetings, et cetera. The time and energy of the many staff involved could partly be more productively devoted to other necessary activities. If projects would be planned better and monitoring data more accurate and timely, probably less time would have to be spent on review meetings which in turn would free time to improve planning even further.
- The team recommends that much more emphasis should be given to the development and implementation of the management information system (including first level or routine monitoring) and the second level monitoring system. The first step to be taken is the integration of data on financial outlays and physical progress. Special attention should be given to the aspect of reliability of data fed into the system. As with any system, also for monitoring systems it holds: 'garbage in, garbage out'.
- Involving benefiting communities certainly is an effective way to increase reliability of information going into the system. They should, therefore, be systematically involved.
- Unannounced value for money audits should be carried out occasionally and randomly.
- Building capacity with programme partners - whether government or private - is another priority in the team's view.
- In order to achieve an operational monitoring system it should be kept as simple as possible. No more information should be gathered than will be used by the programme management or will be used by the donor to allow assessment of the programmes' outputs and contribution to the agreed objectives. The team recommends to concentrate on a number of key project performance indicators.
- The importance of first level monitoring for gender is limited. Participation of women on various committees, et cetera can be recorded on a regular basis. Use of so-called extractive PRAs could be made to record progress on real participation of women in decision making and, therefore, their access to and control over resources. Changes, being rather fundamental, are relatively slow and the kind of information needed is different from what is to be produced by regular project progress monitoring.
- The Review Team also recommends that ambitions to monitor effects should

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<sup>21</sup> Although the logical framework is a useful tool it should not become an article of faith. Any system that informs the management on planned as well as actual inputs, activities and outputs is good enough.



be set at realistic levels. Developing indicators but especially making a system produce reliable information requires rather heavy investments. The Review Team recommends that cost and benefits should be balanced.

- Evaluation of (parts of) the programme should be initiated (i) if the monitoring data show unacceptable deviations from intended effects, and (ii) periodically in order to assess whether in addition to the intended effects the programme also generated other effects, foreseen or not foreseen.

#### **6.4 Communication, Reporting and Management Relations between the RNE and the Programmes**

The Programme Officer reports to his parent ministry, the advisor to the Embassy. In case the project is contracted out to SNV the advisor reports via SNV's country director to the RNE. Inevitably - as experience does not fail to show - the loyalties of the programme officer and the programme adviser are divided. The officer leaning towards the government side, the adviser to the donor. Especially in cases where policies differ this leads to conflicts if not within the PMU then between the advisor and one or more departments. The transect area approach in Keiyo Marakwet is a case in point.

Clearly the situation becomes even more complex if the programme is implemented by SNV because then the programme advisor should also heed the policy emphases, approaches and changes therein coming from SNV. SNV has strong convictions in that respect.

The management issues related to the ASAL programmes between the Embassy, the Programme Advisors and the SNV country director are with the potential for strain, basically because formal positions are clear but not the ones that apply to the practice. SNV does not operate on a level playing field with other private agencies implementing DGIS funded projects, neither is SNV to be considered as an implementing arm of DGIS in line with the other so-called 'eigen beheer' projects. Especially in a situation where similar projects are carried out by two different sorts of implementors, this is bound to create confusion. The result of this situation is that too much time and energy is spent to clear confusion and resolve conflicts by all parties involved. Time and energy that could have been prevented by clarity in responsibilities and lines of communication.

The team recommends that the RNE should really delegate authority to manage the programme to the implementor on the basis of agreed plans of operations and annual plans both including budgets. The Embassy should monitor and assess the implementation of the programmes on the basis of expenditure, output and effect data. This requires that plans of operations and annual plans provide the indicators on which the Embassy can actually assess whether it gets delivered as agreed. The way in which the programme management organises the process to convert inputs into outputs that are expected to generate the desired effects, is the responsibility of the programme management. This management approach (contract management) requires that the principal (RNE) has confidence that the agent (PMU) will do its job well. The Embassy only interferes in programme affairs when contractual obligations are not met by the implementing agent. This management approach would relieve the RNE staff from day-to-day management activities it undertakes at present thereby freeing time it can devote to strengthen its co-ordinating function (see below).

#### **6.5 Co-ordination between ASAL Programmes**

With regard to co-ordination between the four ASAL programmes, in the view of the



team, clearly two tasks remain with the RNE<sup>22</sup>. Firstly the RNE should carry out - or contract a consultant to do so - comparative analyses on the information produced in the monitoring reports and disseminate those to the PMUs. This information is important for the PMUs to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of supported projects.

Secondly the RNE should be instrumental in initiating and co-ordinating sharing of experiences between programmes. The way this function could be institutionalised is discussed in the final chapter of this report.

## **6.6 Contracting Out**

Recent experience - particularly in Laikipia - shows that a management mode based on contracting out planning and implementation of projects/programmes, makes the ASAL programme much better manageable. Therefore, the Review Team recommends that contracting out larger projects and smaller projects bundled into sub-sector programmes. One of the critical issues will be monitoring implementation of the contract. In the foreseeable future the ASAL programme management is assumed to play a very significant role here. It is unlikely that many of the implementing partners do have well-developed monitoring systems (see the section on management information and monitoring above).

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<sup>22</sup> Responsibilities within the Embassy were not clear. Although not part of the ToR the review team suggests the Embassy clarifies the position of the diplomats and the sector specialists in relation to the ASAL programmes. Verbal information received stated that such a clear position is now available and will be communicated.

## **7 ASAL: THE INSTITUTIONAL SET UP**

### **7.0 Introduction.**

In the previous chapters many conclusions have been drawn and recommendations made. In the team's view, these will need to be embedded in a somewhat different institutional arrangement to become fully effective. The institutional set-up of the ASAL programmes should address the issues as they have emerged during the review, accommodate the conclusions and recommendations and safeguard the considerable achievements of the programmes as they perform at the moment.

The new organisational set up of ASAL programmes should:

- keep on addressing the central objective to reduce poverty in the ASAL areas in a sustainable way;
- be based on community participation and even stronger emphasise community self-help and building capacity for planning and implementation of activities at grassroot level (capacity building with CBOs and NGOs as a specific key strategy);
- continue to focus on landuse planning and the consecutive natural resource management as an essential programme strategy;
- maintain its fairly high level of achievement measured in terms of project results;
- be multi-sectoral, but not necessarily spread resources thinly over (almost) all sectors;
- be placed at a sufficient distance from the government and allow much more freedom to the programmes to choose co-operating partners and apply tailor-made procedures;
- be characterised by clear responsibilities of the programme management, the RNE, and other stakeholders;
- secure manageability with an emphasis on financial management.

No organisational model can be thought off that has only advantages and no disadvantages. Any organisational model is, therefore, a compromise between the various demands made on it.

### **7.1 Outline of the Institutional Set-up.**

The analysis carried out and the conclusions reached in the previous chapters point, in the team's view in the direction of the following arrangement:

- (i) Four district programmes characterised by:
  - dropping the idea of a joint venture between the GoK and the donor;
  - programmes strongly based on community participation;
  - concentration on three sectors: water, livestock and agriculture (crops) that appear to have priority with the communities; and
  - contracting out projects / programmes to suitable partners (incl. government departments).
- (ii) A technical assistance programme in the field of land-use planning/natural resource management contracted out to a suitable party.
- (iii) Centrally co-ordinated sectoral programmes such as the credit (micro/small business), education, health programme, et cetera, contracted to a suitable party.

The relationships between these various programmes can be seen as follows.



The basic programme remains the district based ASAL programme. It plans, funds, monitors and evaluates projects, implemented by district based organisations government or private. Land use planning - as has been discussed in previous chapters - requires co-ordinated activities and initiatives from outside the district as well as policy measures at national level. Some important tasks need to be implemented at a central level. Planning and implementation of actual activities are an integral part of the district based programmes.

Some activities - like the credit programme -, lend themselves for a unified approach and do not really require a strong community input. Support programmes in rural infrastructure, education and health, also lend themselves to a fairly unified approach, could benefit from central co-ordination and have to be planned and implemented through - or at least with substantial collaboration of - the ministries concerned. These are public sector activities 'par excellence'.

ASAL programmes will play a facilitating role here.

The basic rationale for recommending this institutional arrangement is:

- (i) that any solution trying to address the requirements mentioned at the top of this section into a single programme, seems to have major disadvantages. The approaches and strategies to be used to achieve (optimal) results if the kind of programmes distinguished are quite different;
- (ii) that alternatives such as either continuing with the current programmes though with a few managerial modifications and giving up the 'joint venture' with the GoK, or a complete centralised programme though implemented in the districts, would be neither effective nor efficient.

All alternatives have been looked into (also using the experiences of other ASAL donors over the past 20 years) and evaluated and the proposed solution seems to offer the option that will serve the agreed objectives best.

## **7.2 District based ASAL Programmes.**

The district based ASAL programmes will be characterised by a relative high degree of independence from the government and by contracting out of activities to co-operating partners. Referring to the current ASAL Laikipia programme, the team proposes to see this characteristic - that makes it distinct from the other programmes - strengthened.

This implies, essentially, breaking with the traditional ASAL institutional set-up as is by and large still operational in West Pokot. The programme should be managed as a private organisation, planning its activities in co-operation with government and non-government partners and contracting out all project implementation.

The justification for formally moving away from the government at district level is already provided in chapter 5. To summarise briefly:

- to provide a stimulus to the Civil Service Reform Programme that aims at privatising most of the implementing activities of government departments.
- to release the management from the two window system - virtually condemned by everybody<sup>23</sup>;
- to reduce political influence and the burden to be more or less forced to work

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<sup>23</sup> Except of course those who personally benefited from it.



- with incompetent and corrupt officers;
- to increase flexibility in choosing partners with whom to co-operate;
- to reduce the mutual dependency which is not in the interest of both parties.

The proposed institutional set-up, of course, does not mean that the programme management should not work with departments, it should and will. Government units and the programme management can develop plans and have them implemented on the basis of agreement about the merit of the programme (and formalised in a contract), not because of dependency or because parties are tied to each other. The government is to be seen as one of the co-operating partners, not **the** partner. The management, selects those partners that are best capable to help achieving the programmes objectives.

In most of the other aspects the rationale for continuing with a kind of ASAL programme as it has evolved during its existence, and especially since 1993, is fairly obvious. Generally speaking, the ASAL programmes have performed well in meeting project targets especially in sectors strongly dominated by projects fully supported by communities. These projects serve the prime interests as perceived by the communities themselves. In West Pokot and Keiyo Marakwet it also became evident that the programmes have had a positive impact on the standard of living of communities involved in its interventions.

The programmes have invested much over the years and built up a fairly strong track record in community mobilisation and organisation. This foundation - also consisting of the good reputation the programmes have with the communities - can and should be used to assist the communities further in (economically) improving their situation as well as the situation of the individual households (for more information on this point see the district reports).

#### *External Management Relations.*

At the central level the parent ministry could be the Ministry of Planning and National Development. The relation should be formal, not crucial. Different arrangements like for the EU financed Community Development Trust Fund can be looked into.

Delegation of responsibilities and authority should be considerable. The RNE should manage the programmes 'at a distance' (see chapter 6).

#### *Mode of Implementation.*

It is the Review Team's view that these type of programmes lend themselves more to 'eigen beheer' mode of implementation or contracting to SNV than to contracting out to a private consultant. The main reason is that effects, and certainly impact, of ASAL programmes are hard to measure. Much of what ASAL programmes 'produce' is of a rather intangible nature: awareness, capacity to organise and plan, changing gender roles, confidence, stand up for their interests and so on. These are 'products' hard to measure and thus to put in contract terms. The relation between the principal (financier) and implementing agent, in this case, is to be built to a large extent on mutual understanding and trust.

It is recommended that one implementation mode be selected and not both, as is the case at present. The main argument is to avoid confusion about responsibilities and authority. A secondary argument is that a choice for either one or the other makes it possible to manage the programmes more efficiently and reduce the demands on RNE staff in this respect.



If implemented in 'eigen beheer', the management construction would have to be - in the view of the Review Team - one co-ordinating office (not necessarily based in Nairobi) providing planning and management support and a PMU in each of the districts. If contracted out to SNV, the country director will be responsible for implementation and the country office will perform roughly the functions performed by the central unit in the 'eigen beheer' alternative.

In order to keep the central unit small and not overburden SNV's country office, they should both be entitled to the advice and support of the sector specialists at the RNEs in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.

The Review Team does not have any strong feelings in favour or against one of the alternatives. They provide both workable structures in the team's view. The decision could depend on which of the two alternatives makes the best possible use of (management) resources provided in each of the alternatives.

#### *The Project Management Unit.*

The Project Management Unit will be factually and formally dissociated from the GoK and controlled by donor personnel. The PMU shall consist of a full time programme manager and financial manager plus some support staff. All other expertise shall be hired on contract basis if and when required<sup>24</sup>.

The PMU will be responsible for preparing Plans of Operations, Annual Plans, both including budgets. The PMU will also be responsible for the implementation of the plans and the periodic reporting including financial reports.

The Plans of Operations - preferably based on district plans - shall be submitted for approval to the DDC and the donor. Progress reports shall also be submitted to DDC for information and donor for approval. Financial reports are submitted to the donor for approval.

The PMU will be responsible for strategy and programme development. It will, therefore, liaise with the district planning unit - or whatever institutions are actually taking responsibility for district planning - to make sure the programme fits in the district development plan.

The PMU will be charged with the task to select partners for co-operation. It will support partners in planning projects when required. Projects, or clusters of related projects, are contracted out to the party most capable to deliver the desired result. After the contract has been signed, inputs by the PMU will be limited to support as specified in the contract. Also commissioning projects to government departments will be strictly on contractual basis. The practice of open ended co-operation with partners making a heavy demand on the PMU should be avoided.

The PMU will monitor the implementation of the contract.

### **7.3 Technical Assistance Programme LUP/NRM.**

The Review Team recommends to establish a technical assistance programme for land use planning cum natural resource management.

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<sup>24</sup> Only if and when it proves to be more cost effective to hire additional capacity on a full-time or part-time basis this of course should be done.



The reasons for adding the LUP/NRM technical assistance component are, in the view of the Review Team:

- (i) LUP/NRM requires an approach different from the strong bottom-up community based ASAL approach. In the LUP approach, initiatives from outside the communities have to be merged with other interests, (indigenous) knowledge and current practices of the communities. Initiatives in the field of research, leading to technological innovations, successful and relevant experiences in resource utilisation from other parts of the world have to be confronted with local realities and consensus must be built on what activities to undertake in order to make communities participate.
- (ii) Implementing a land use plan will require also measures and activities on which local level communities (or a single PMU) should not decide because the effects of such measures are beyond - and are actually meant to go beyond - the community scale (level). Measures will have to be taken that may not be in the (short-term) interest of some communities to serve the interest of a (much) larger community elsewhere<sup>25</sup>. Moreover, addressing issues surmounting the community level, it could well be that also issues surpassing district boundaries need to be addressed, therefore demanding co-ordination at a national level. This is less difficult to achieve by a technical assistance 'unit' operating at a more central level, than national co-ordination direct from the district level.
- (iii) An intended benefit of co-ordinated technical assistance to programme development and implementation (in the districts) should be to exclude the risk of inventing the wheel twice. Ideas, innovations generated at the central unit can be used more efficiently. Experiences come together at the central unit and can benefit all districts. For a programme of this kind this is of greater importance than in the strongly community based programmes.<sup>26</sup> Programmes can learn from each others' successes and failures.
- (iv) Finally there is the issue of the political clout needed for some measures to be implemented. A single ASAL programme, in certain cases, cannot possibly be charged with that kind of responsibility. It is expected that for the many substantial measures required for resource use to become sustainable, national political backing will be required. A centrally operating technical assistance 'unit' is strategically and tactically in a better position to solicit that support without compromising one of the fundamental strengths of the ASAL programmes, its community base. (See, however, chapter 4 for the importance of striking a proper balance and the considerable risks involved).

The Review Team recommends this technical assistance programme to be commissioned (contracted out) to a capable party, further developing and implementing it. Further development is to be based on analysis of the considerable achievements made in preparing the ground in Keiyo, Marakwet, Laikipia and Kajiado, and the recommendations of the 1997 back-stopping mission. The investments made until now should be optimally used.

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<sup>25</sup> In this case adequate measures need to be taken to compensate a community or individuals if costs are incurred or damage inflicted on them. Also if they forego revenue from current activities or when future options to generate benefits are reduced they need to be compensated.

<sup>26</sup> It is not meant to say that sharing experiences between other ASAL programmes is not useful. The focus should however be more on sharing experiences between different communities and partners implementing ASAL activities.



## 7.4 Sectoral Programmes

As has been argued in § 7.1, there are a number of programmes that can, in the team's view, be better organised on a sectoral and centrally planned basis. Such a decision has already been made for the credit programme. There is also the support programme for basic education.

The team wants to emphasise the importance of the credit programme. An identification mission (initiated by the donor) is completed or is about to be completed which will result in establishment of a Trust with a Board of Trustees responsible for the management of the credit programme. The programme will serve all four districts. There is no point in discussing this sectoral programme here any further, since developments appear to be in line with the thinking of the Review Team.

There are two points the Review Team would like to make here:

- (i) An evaluation of the credit programme is due in the team's view. What are the effects of the programme? And, more specifically, has the programme created sustainable (self)employment? Who have been the beneficiaries? These are some of the questions that need to be answered.
- (ii) Some of the training, counselling and awareness raising about the potential of becoming a self employed trader or business (wo)men, supported by the ASAL programmes outside the credit scheme, did not seem to be successful. One explanation could be insufficient expertise on the part of the project implementing institution. Another is that training/counselling is not being complemented by a credit facility plus complementary (follow-up) services.

The Review Team recommends that the Board of Trustees, to be established for the credit programme, looks into the possibility of integrating into the credit programme some of the activities until now supported by ASAL as separate activities. This would make the programme more of a micro- or small business development programme.

Other sectoral programmes could be added if the donor decides to do so. Sectors that qualify are rural (road) infrastructure and health. If the donor is looking for impact on the local and regional economies in the ASAL areas, road infrastructure seems the obvious choice. Many studies confirm that the economic return on investment in (rural) infrastructure is usually high. Supporting sectoral programmes in health (and education) are justified by reducing human suffering and human resource development. In case a health sector programme would be added it is the team's view that reproductive health should be the focus.

The programmes should be managed centrally and implemented in the four districts in which ASAL programmes function. In the team's view the PMU of the ASAL programme should be facilitating the planning and implementation of these programmes. The PMU should assist in securing co-ordination of the sectoral programmes with other activities in the district development plan.

In the team's opinion, the responsibility for the planning and the strategic decision making on the sectoral programmes should rest either with the ministry / department concerned or - in view of the arguments put forward against giving decision-making power over donor funds to the GoK -, with the RNE; but not with the ASAL PMU.

It should not be excluded to include other ASAL districts as well in the future.

Royal Netherlands Embassy

Ministry of Land Reclamation,  
Regional and Water Development

# **REVIEW OF THE ASAL PROGRAMMES**

**PART THREE**

**ToR, DATA  
COLLECTION &  
SEPARATE REPORTS**

ETC East Africa, November, 1997



- I     TERMS OF REFERENCE**
- II    FIELD DATA COLLECTION**
- III   MACRO-ECONOMIC AND SECTORAL DEVELOPMENT  
AND POLICIES AND POVERTY IN KENYA**
- IV    LAND USE PLANNING BACKSTOPPING REPORT**
- V     WILDLIFE USE REPORT**

## **I    TERMS OF REFERENCE**



## TERMS OF REFERENCE REVIEW ASAL PROGRAMMES 1997

21 April 1997

### **1**      *Introduction*

The Netherlands Government finances through its bilateral programme in Kenya four programmes in Arid and Semi Arid Lands (ASAL) districts: West Pokot, Keiyo & Marakwet, Kajiado and Laikipia. The overall objective of these programmes is to improve the standards of living of the district small scale farmers/pastoralists' population through investments in the social and productive sectors in a sustainable, environmental sound way, taking into account the need for improving the gender balance.

Clear differences exist between the four programmes, which are partly caused by the underlying policy of adopting a process approach that provides room for tailoring programmes to district-characteristics and needs. Also the history of the programmes differs. The first ASAL programmes - West Pokot and Keiyo & Marakwet - were established in 1982. ASAL Kajiado followed in 1987. ASAL Laikipia is the youngest of the four and started in July 1993. Notwithstanding the differences in the actual activities of the programmes the central objective is the same.

In 1993 the ASAL programmes in West Pokot, Keiyo & Marakwet and Kajiado were evaluated (evaluation report January 1994). The evaluation came up with recommendations targeted towards obtaining increased impact of ASAL programmes and have been incorporated in the formulation of the next phases of the ASAL programmes for West Pokot, Keiyo Marakwet and Kajiado. Because the plan of operations for ASAL Laikipia had already been finalized, ASAL Laikipia was requested to take into account relevant recommendations of the ASAL evaluation in subsequent annual work plans.

In accordance with arrangements made between the Government of Kenya (GoK) and the Government of the Netherlands (GoN) a review of the ASAL programmes should be held in 1997. ETC East Africa will be in charge of the execution of the review.

### **2**      *Purpose of the review*

The review of the ASAL programmes in West Pokot, Kajiado, Keiyo & Marakwet and Laikipia will serve two purposes. Firstly, it will serve as an analysis of results and progress made with the current strategies and approaches to reach the programmes' objectives (part 1). Secondly, the future perspective of the ASAL programmes in the changing policy context will be studied (part 2). The entire review should result in a comprehensive picture of the performance of ASAL programmes now and the perspectives for (the role of) ASAL programmes in the future.

### **3      *Organisation and timing of the review***

ETC East Africa b.v. will be in charge of the execution of the entire review exercise. Both the MLRRWD and the RNE can attach resource persons to the ETC team if considered necessary. ETC remains to be solely responsible for the end-result.

Part 1 of the review is principally project-(micro)oriented, while part 2 is policy context-(macro)oriented. The different nature of the two review parts, leads to a different choice for the review modality. For the proper execution of part 1 of the review input from the ASAL programmes themselves is essential. Coordination and supervision will remain the responsibility of ETC. Part 2 will be more academic and external, although all parties involved will have a role as reference group and as source of information and advice.

The review will start in April 1997 with part 1. Information gathered by the programmes management on the basis of a questionnaire prepared by ETC will be the main source of information, complemented with information resulting from field visits and comparative in-depth studies on certain selected themes, sectors or issues (education, health, land use planning, a.o.). The issues and ToR for these studies should be determined through consultations between ETC and the RNE. The preliminary findings of part 1 of the review should be presented in a workshop involving all parties. As a follow-up and before finalization of the report the PMU's should be provided an opportunity to give feedback on certain issues, possibly on the basis of exchange-visits.

Part 2 will start some time after part 1 has taken off and will consist of desk studies and interviews to set the scene for some fieldwork to arrive at a comprehensive end result. In order to arrive at a balanced and comprehensive end result of the entire review operation, part 1 and 2 of the review will be executed synchronously with part 1 for approximately 2 months.

The execution of the entire review exercise will be the responsibility of ETC East Africa B.V. ETC is allowed to contract experts not belonging to the regular ETC consultants pool, if deemed necessary. In the case of an in-depth study on land-use planning RNE will directly contract a non-ETC consultant, because of the fact that ETC is the consultant implementing the Land Use Planning activities in some of the ASALs.

The review should be completed not later than September 1997, because that would allow the PMUs to incorporate recommendations into the formulation of the work plans and budgets for 1998/next phase.

### **4      *Objectives of the review***

#### **4.1      *Review of progress made during the current phase.***

Part 1 of the review should:

- (a) Look into results, effects and progress made in ASAL programmes against the background of the PlanOps, annual plans and the recommendations of the review of 1993 - effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. The review should focus on the period 1993-1997. This should be done per programme (taking into account the



district specific environment), complemented by some comparative in-depth studies on themes and/or sectors (land use planning a.o.). Impact should be measured both at sectoral and strategy level.

- (b) Strengthen monitoring and evaluation capacities in the ASAL programmes in order to be able to better quantify and qualify progress made.
- (c) Include an analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the ASAL programmes in order to arrive at some observations and recommendations relevant to part 2 of the review. This should be done per programme and complemented by some future-oriented analyses to arrive at recommendations on the future directions and programme priorities, with special attention for health - reproductive health -, basic education, peace and reconciliation and possible linkages in these fields. The ToR for these complementary studies should be drafted in cooperation with the RNE.

**ad (a)**

With regard to the impact analysis the following should be taken into account:

The central objective of the ASAL programmes is:

*Sustainable and equitable improvement of quality of life for pastoralists and small scale farmers.*

For realizing this objective several strategies are adopted. The following four strategies can be distinguished:

- 1 Investing in economic and social sectors through delivery of services;
- 2 Building capacity at different levels;
- 3 Empowering people and communities;
- 4 Advocacy on behalf of the target groups.

Based on the required (optimal) strategy-mix, activities are identified. The main question is whether the implementation of these activities is resulting in sizable and sustainable effects and whether the balance between the strategies (in connection to the activities) is justifiable. Clustering activities along sectoral lines would be useful in this regard. Inputs and outputs should be analyzed and some comparative studies could be done, resulting in a picture of sectoral impact generated (value for money). In addition, the sectoral balance should be analyzed. The review should indicate whether the balance is justifiable or do suggestions for change. Usage of existing base-line studies to be able to measure impact is part of this exercise. Effect indicators such as income, production, employment, nutritional status, educational levels, etc. could be used.

As far as strategies in relation to activities are concerned, some questions arise:

- ad 1 Is the division between investments in the social and economic/productive sector adequate in the light of generated impact? Does the introduction of innovative activities have the envisaged catalytic effect/is investing in research and development having enough impact? Are the activities well chosen in the light of existing

needs/identified bottlenecks in development? How were priorities set? Has there been enough attention given to environmental and gender impact? What are the experiences with high input (money- and expertise-wise) versus low input approaches? Have sectoral versus integrated (multi-sectoral) approaches had different impacts? Is there a need for a more sectoral focus?

- ad 2 What impact can be seen from building and strengthening of institutional capacities (both in the area of planning and implementation) of various partners (target groups, government institutions, NGO's, intermediaries and private institutions)? Has a more rational and democratic decision making process developed at different levels? Have women become more actively involved in decision-making? Have environmental/natural resource issues received increased attention?
- ad 3 What impact can be found from investing in empowering of / awareness creation among communities and individuals? Has empowerment led to increased wealth, increased equality, more democratic decision making, increased attention to environmental effects?
- ad 4 Have the programmes invested in advocacy on behalf of the target groups (especially on issues like land use, good governance, gender, other issues effecting the environment of the target groups)? Which channels/means of communication were used?

**ad (b)**

With respect to the aim of strengthening monitoring and evaluation capacity the review should look into existing data-collection and analysis practices and develop proposals for improvement. ETC should deliver tools and criteria for improvement (including the development of gender specific indicators - quantitative and qualitative - for measuring impact). The follow-up to these recommendations lies with the ASAL PMU's (if necessary with some external expertise).

**ad (c)**

In addition some more general issues need attention, also in relation to part 2 of the review:

- 1 Institutional set-up of the projects. Do the projects fit in the current thinking on District Focus of Developments? How is the cooperation with the MLRRWD at different levels? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the partnership with the MLRRWD? Are there possibilities for improvement or alternatives? What should be done if districts are split up during the implementation of the programme?
- 2 PMU. Is the set-up of the Programme Management Unit suitable for the purpose of coordinating and supervising a multi-partner, multi-sectoral Programme? Is the PMU reflecting the various client groups that should be served by the Programmes? What are the options for improving the functioning of the PMU?
- 3 District decision-making. What is the reality with regard to district decision making processes in relation to participatory development? What is the role and influence of the ASAL-programmes in planning and decision making? Is the analysis underlying



decision making with regard to allocation of ASAL funds transparent and rational? Is ASAL bringing the various Ministries nearer to each other and enhancing dialogue, coordination and cooperation? Is there direct competition between the Ministries for ASAL resources, having negative consequences for cooperation and coordination?

- 4 Additional. (How) Is the financial and personnel input of GoK affected by the fact that an ASAL programme is being implemented in a certain district? Should there be a conditionality when providing ASAL support through district GoK structures?
- 5 Target groups. Is strict adherence to the original target groups - pastoralists and small scale farmers - correct in light of creating maximum impact, taking into account recent and future trends (population growth, urbanisation, migration)?
- 6 Partners. Which role in ASAL development can be distinguished for different partners (GoK, NGO's, private, others) and how are partnerships being supported by the projects?
- 7 Approach. What approach (low-financial and expertise input versus high-input) has been proven most successful and are there differences between sectors (activity clusters)? Have there been differences in impact between activities (clusters) based on participatory and less participatory approaches? What are the similarities and differences between the four ASAL programmes with regard to the role of community participation? What effect can be found of the different approaches?

#### **4.2 PART 2 Review of the changing context in which ASAL programmes operate.**

Part 2 of the review should answer the question what the future role of ASAL programmes could be in the light of:

- (a) the changing context in Kenya;
- (b) new accents and approaches in the Netherlands policy for Development Cooperation.

The review should look into the policy context in the various districts and should provide scenario's for the future (at district and above district-level).

##### **(a) The changing context in Kenya**

Developments in Kenya over the years - especially the continuing high population growth - complemented by effects of natural and man-made disasters, have resulted in conflicts over scarce resources as land, water, capital etc. What are the trends in these national developments? What are the effects of these changes at the various levels: national, district, community and household? What role plays ASAL and could ASAL play in counteracting and preventing the negative effects related to the changes? Recently a new National Development Plan has been published. How is this new agenda for development reflected in the ASAL Programmes? Is there a need for incorporating certain policy issues in the future ASAL Programmes?

In addition, structural adjustments policies have their impact at all levels and all sectors in the economy. What have been the effects of liberalisation, privatisation, rationalisation of the role of the government on the quality of life for Kenyans in ASAL areas? Has decision making become more democratic? What has been the effect on the market (both supply and demand side)? What has been the effect on marketing and communication? What has been the result of the policy changes on the various actors (GoK, NGOs, private enterprises, farmers)? Is the current institutional set-up of the ASAL programmes still realistic in the light of the changing role of the GoK? What is the effect of the process of Civil Service Reform on ASAL Programmes? What new possibilities arise for partnerships with the ASAL programmes? Has there been given adequate attention to social repercussions (especially on vulnerable groups)? Is the current focus on small scale farmers and pastoralists still justified, or are investments in urban areas necessary for enhancing district development? What is the impact of increased attention given to gender and to environment?

#### **(b) The Netherlands policy for development cooperation**

Being under continuous review, the Netherlands policy for Development Cooperation has adopted new approaches and accents. While poverty alleviation and sustainability remain key, good governance, democratisation, decentralisation, reproductive health and a more sector-oriented approach have entered the frontline of the Netherlands agenda for development. A few questions arise from this agenda. Would a more sector-oriented approach (in contrast to the integrated approach) be beneficial for ASAL areas? Is the balance between investments in the productive and social sectors well chosen? Would the impact benefit from integrating the current 4 ASAL programmes into one flexible multi-purpose integrated programme or would it be preferable to continue with four separate ASAL projects? Or would a combination (sector-programmes with one or four multi-sectoral integrated programmes) be more effective/efficient and sustainable? What is the role and could be the role of ASAL programmes in promoting/supporting decentralisation, good governance and democratisation?

### **5 Time Schedule**

#### **5.1 Part 1**

As presented with the letter of ETC from 14 April 1997 (ref:stm/asal/eval/523).

#### **5.2 Part 2**

As presented with the letter of ETC from 14 April 1997 (ref:stm/asal/eval/523).

### **6 Members of the Review**

#### **6.1 Part 1**

As presented by fax from ETC from 17 April 1997 (ref: stm/asal/eval/562)

#### **6.2 Part 2**

As presented by fax from ETC from 17 April 1997 (ref: stm/asal/eval/562)

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## **II FIELD DATA COLLECTION**

# FIELD DATA COLLECTION

## 1 HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS

### *Methodology for the Household Surveys*

The decision was made to use household surveys as part of the 1997 ASAL evaluation to obtain data of a more quantifiable nature. The questionnaire was designed to help determine impact as specified in the Terms of Reference. Questionnaires for each district are a little different to capture the unique nature which characterises each district and measure the range of ASAL activities.

Every effort was made to reduce bias in sampling design and response. Enumerators were chosen based on prior survey experience and expertise in the local language. The questionnaires were pre-tested in each district to reduce error. Samples were chosen at random in most districts by obtaining a list of households in the village. Random sampling was easier in Keiyo Marakwet (with the exception of Transect P) and in West Pokot. In Laikipia, random sampling was done where possible, using a systematic numbering method of households. Kajiado, with its long distances between group ranches and Maasai manyattas, random selection was more difficult. The benefits of random sampling, in purely statistical terms, is that findings from the survey can be applied back to the specific population as a whole.

To help gauge the impact of ASAL programmes, households were chosen based on intervention versus non-intervention by program activities. This comparison was not possible in Keiyo Marakwet as the transect approach is so new. In Laikipia, with its community based programmes, the sample was split into high-intervention versus low-intervention areas.

The areas for sampling in all districts were chosen by the programmes based on their knowledge of activity levels in the numerous locations. In certain cases, an area was chosen for analysis based on a special request by the programme. This was the case for including Magadi, a very unique area, in the Kajiado sample. Every effort was made to include areas representative of the district, but the question is "If ASAL is active in an area, does that area represent the district?" The answer is probably no, but it is not possible to begin to determine program impact without going to those areas where the program is active.

In addition to comparison by level of programme intervention, also certain indicators were analysed historically, using data collected by Dr. Ton Dietz in the 1980's. This was done for West Pokot and two areas in Keiyo Marakwet Districts where existing data are available.

Household surveys are a useful tool which can supplement information gathered by other techniques, in this case being the SWOT studies, PRAs and the activity Matrix. The benefits of the household surveys are: the data are quantifiable, the findings may be less biased due to random selection of respondents, and a comparison between project beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries is possible. Surveys are by no means infallible and inconsistencies can, and do, arise, but used in the proper context and in conjunction with other tools, they are very useful for diagnostic analysis and for the measurement of programme effect.

### **Schedule of Household Survey Activities**

*Initial Team Visits: April 23-April 30*



Enumerator Training: May 12 to May 15, 1997

- Mock Interviews
- Questionnaire Completion
- Pre-Test Questionnaires in Kajiado
- Sample Selection

### Kajiado

pre-test: May 14  
-May 26: Survey Began

Areas Surveyed:

#### Intervention

Olobelbel Location:

- Pilewa Sub-location (21 HHS)
- Ollomunyi Sub-location (15 HHS)

Olontulugum Location:

- Kikurro Sub-location (10 HHS)
- Olgirra Sub-location (11 HHS)

#### Non-Intervention

Kenyawawa Location:

- Masimba Sub-location: (31 HHS)

Magadi Location:

- Olkeri Sub-location (10 HHS)
- Magadi Sub-location (20 HHS)

#### Problems encountered in Kajiado:

20 Questionnaires had to be redone due to inconsistency in responses and in completion.

### *Keiyo Marakwet*

May 28-29: pre-test with enumerators in Transect H and outside  
-June 3: Survey began  
-Transect E, Transect H, Transect M and Transect P (160 Households)

#### Problems Encountered in Keiyo-Marakwet:

One enumerator had to be replaced with a new one mid-survey due to sloppy completion.

### *West Pokot*

June 3-5: Pre-tested Questionnaires checked  
June 9: Survey Began

Areas Surveyed:

#### Intervention

Chepkobegh Location:

- Chepkobegh Sub-location (27 HHS)

Kipkomo Location:

- Chepareria Sub-location (27 HHS)

- Chelobai Sublocation (5 HHS)

#### Non-Intervention

Kapenguria Location:

- Kongelai Sub-location: (30 HHS)

Kipkomo Location

- Ywaleteke Sub-location (29 HHS)

- Chepareria Sublocation (1)
- Chelobai Sublocation (1)

### Problems Encountered in West Pokot:

Fifteen Questionnaires had to be redone due to inconsistency in responses and in completion.

### *Laikipia*

June 9-11: pre-test Questionnaires

June 16-June 28: Survey Period

### Areas Surveyed:

#### High-Intervention

Salama Location (19 HHS)  
Makurian Location (24 HHS)  
Ngobit Location (7 HHS)  
Sirima (7 HHS)  
Wyumererie (9 HHS)

#### Low-Intervention

Ewaso Location (20)  
Sipili Location: (19 HHS)  
Ngobit Location:  
Wamura and Exerok  
Sub-locations (21 HHS)

## **2 Participatory Rural Appraisals**

The PRA in this exercise was designed to provide qualitative information, that would complement data gathered through other methods, particularly the HHS.

With the focus being on the processes and procedures necessary for community participation, information was sought at policy, operation strategy, and implementation level, to determine the extent to which community members were targeted and reached by programme interventions. As such, the methodology used involved review of the operation documents, and discussion with the PMU, with implementing agencies and field visits to project and non-project areas.

In all districts the assignment ended with a feedback session to present and discuss the findings. No gender PRA was done in West Pokot District, due to closure of the programme.

### *Keiyo Marakwet Districts (30 June - 9 July)*

Discussions were held with PMU members, Transect co-ordinators and some of their assistants, and with some district level staff in agriculture and livestock in both Keiyo and Marakwet Districts. One officer from the water department joined the team during a field visit.

Project visits were concentrated in Transect H in Keiyo District and Transect P in Marakwet District. Three piped water projects were visited as well as the Kimiter furrow in Marakwet District. Two Farmers were visited in Transect H and discussions with members of three community groups in Biretwo, a non-transect area neighbouring Transect H. Other projects, farmers dealing with production and processing of various commodities were visited.

### *Laikipia District (20 - 30 July)*

ASAL's activities in Laikipia are spread throughout the district. The PRA exercise involved discussions with members of the PMU, various HoDs, with a member of the OSILIGI community organisation and a staff member of the Laikipia Development Fund. Efforts were made to meet and discuss with divisional teams in three of the



divisions visited as they play a key role in the implementation.

Field visits included four water projects, two women group activities and pig keeping projects. Discussions with household members were held at random.

#### *Kajiado District (4 - 13 August)*

In addition to the discussions with the various departmental staff, the PMU, and NGO staff (ITDG), project visits were chosen in three key sectors: agriculture, livestock and water. Two agriculture activities were reviewed, i.e. an individual farm and women group activity. Four public and two private water pans were visited and discussed. Two zero grazing farmers and five farmers with shallow wells were visited. The Emboloi Livestock Co-operative in Isinya area was also discussed. Livestock and water projects were closely inter-linked as in all cases water projects were implemented to supply domestic and livestock water.

### **3 SWOT**

The Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats analyses were executed in the four districts. The participants were chosen by the districts, after advice of the review team to select 30 - 40 participants., including HoDs, NGO representatives, community leaders and private companies. Mostly only HoDs and PMU attended, with little participation from the NGO or the private sector.

Keiyo Marakwet	26 - 30 May
West Pokot	19 - 23 June
Laikipia	30 June - 4 July
Kajiado	7 - 11 July

The topics for discussion resolved what the team had identified as key issues with the RNE and SNV. The larger group was broken into smaller groups of 5 - 6 people to identify the S, W, O, and Ts. The smaller group outcomes were all discussed with the larger group and agreed as a forum on the outcome. This was recorded by the team.

### **4 MATRIX**

Matrices were made to establish performance of the districts by sector over the review period. The Matrix data were accumulated on sheets. These sheets were provided by the review team, but were modified depending on the individual programme requests and ideas. The data were mostly compiled by the Heads of Department and then submitted to a representative of the PMU, e.g. the Programme officers or the M&E officer who was to collect and pass the information on to the team.

Kajiado	26 -30 May
Keiyo Marakwet	2 - 6 June
West Pokot	9 - 13 June
Laikipia	16 - 30 June

The information thus collected was again checked with the HoDs and the PMUs. The data on finances were generally poor, so the financial information of the Programmes had to be used also. Discrepancies remained after several cross-checks in various cases probably because costs sometimes are rather arbitrarily assigned to sectors or cost codes.

## **5 M&E**

Discussions took place in the district predominantly with the PMU members during the following periods:

Kajiado	26 -30 May
Keiyo Marakwet	2 - 6 June
West Pokot	9 - 13 June
Laikipia	16 - 20 June

## **6 GENDER**

Field work was done during the following periods:

Keiyo Marakwet	7 - 11 July
Kajiado	21 - 25 July
Laikipia	8 - 12 September

No gender assessment on the basis of field work was done in West Pokot District, due to closure of the programme.

In Nanyuki, a gender workshop was held between 15 - 19 September, where consensus was reached among participants from all four districts in the presence of the gender specialist of the RNE.



### **III MACRO-ECONOMIC AND SECTORAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLICIES AND POVERTY IN KENYA**

**NEI**



**Netherlands  
Economic  
Institute**

**Macroeconomic and Sectoral  
Development and Policies  
and poverty in Kenya**



AA3863 JN/NR 27-11-1997

## **Macroeconomic and Sectoral Development and Policies and poverty in Kenya**

**Review of the ASAL programmes in Kenya funded by the Netherlands  
Government.**

**Division of Macro and Sector Policies  
Netherlands Economic Institute  
J. Nijzink**

**Nairobi/Rotterdam, November 1997**

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### Annex



## 0 Introduction

This report covers the field of macroeconomic and sectoral development in relation to poverty in Kenya. In the first chapter a brief description of the poverty situation is given. This chapter, since this report provides the macro background for the review of the ASAL programmes, provides some information on poverty in ASAL areas well.

The basic thesis is that sustained high level growth is a prerequisite for the country to be able to address the poverty problem. In chapter 2 therefore the growth performance of the Kenyan economy is outlined and it highlights a few developments which have led to a disappointing low and inequitable growth since the late seventies/early eighties.

Two ingredients indispensable for sustained poverty reduction are access to basic health and education for the poor. Developments in these fields are discussed in chapter three.

In chapters 2 and 3 actual developments as well as policies are discussed and, of course, their relationships as well as how they have affected poverty.

In the fourth chapter, some other factors that have influenced poverty in Kenya are discussed: access to land and livestock; rural infrastructure and credit

In chapter five, attention is paid to issues of governance such as accountability, transparency and corruption and for the issue of decentralisation of (decision making) power by the government, the District Focus policy is taken up as the case in point.

Finally in chapter 6 the previous discussion is brought to a conclusion.

# 1 Poverty in Kenya

## 1.1 The general poverty situation

Poverty is the major social problem in Kenya. Poverty is widespread and deep. To illustrate, some of the most recent estimates of poverty are summarised in the following table:

Table 1.1 Poverty in Kenya

	World Bank			Mukui		Economic Survey '97
	Rural		Urban	Rural		Rural
	1981/82	1992	1992	1981/82	1992	1994
Food poverty population						
Percentage of population poor	34.5	37.4		65.5	71.8	47.2
Depth of poverty	29.0	37.0		23.4	34.0	18.9
Absolute poverty population						
Percentage of population poor	47.9	46.4	29.3	47.9	46.3	46.7
Depth of poverty	30.0	40.0	30.7	14.9	18.4	18.0
Relative poverty (WB)/Hard core poverty (Mukui)						
Percentage of population poor	11.4	20.0	24.8	34.5	37.4	29.2
Depth of poverty	21.0	39.0	36.0	9.5	13.7	10.2

Source: World Bank, '95; Mukui, '96; Economic Survey 1997.

Note: The World Bank study and Mukui's study use different concepts. The figures should therefore not be compared. For various concepts and definitions of poverty see annex 1.

The differences between the 1992 and 1994 figures are partly of a statistical nature and are very sensitive to short time fluctuations; however to which extent can not be assessed.

The difference between the figures of '92 and '94 could point at a real improvement since the particular bad year '92: drought, insecurity, ethnic clashes, unstable and rapidly rising food prices.

According to UNDP 52% of all Kenyans live in absolute poverty. Whatever the correct national figures may be, poverty is unacceptably high and increasing. If the incidence has not increased in percentage terms, the depth of poverty certainly has, as has the severity of poverty.<sup>1</sup>

In the first half of 1994 a Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) has been carried out in a number of districts. With the exception of the two ASAL districts in the PPA, the results are in accordance with those of the above cited studies. Both ASAL areas have been severely affected by drought in 1993/94 and therefore have a

<sup>1</sup> Mukui, John Thinguri, Kenya: The state of rural poverty, September 1996.



poverty situation worse than average. The PPA reveals also that many people feel that poverty has worsened over the 10-15 years prior to the assessment. A second PPA took place in November/December 1996. Three quarters of the household heads involved perceived that the poverty situation has worsened over the last five years.<sup>2</sup>

## 1.2 Poverty in Dutch supported ASAL districts.

For the districts supported by the Netherlands funded ASAL programmes, the absolute poverty figures are provided in the following table:

Table 1.2 Absolute poverty in ASAL districts.

	incidence			depth		
	1981/82	1992	1994	1981/82	1992	1994
Kajiado	42.6	25.1	22.5	14.2	8.6	8.3
Laikipia	47.7	34.4	45.6	14.4	13.7	18.4
West Pokot	62.5	65.2	48.5	26.4	35.4	20.1
Elgeyo Marakwet		52.4	27.2		21.0	7.5
Total rural	47.9	46.3	46.7	14.9	18.4	18.0

Source: Mukui, 1996, Economic Survey 1997

Note: The 1981/82 figures for Kajiado include Narok, for West Pokot and Elgeyo Marakwet combined figures are given on the West Pokot line; the reasons are statistical.

The large differences in the figures of '92 and '94 especially for Elgeyo Marakwet and to a lesser extent West Pokot and Laikipia must to a considerable extent be of a statistical nature and do not reflect structural changes in the poverty situation. See also note at table 1.1

The figures in table 1.2 suggest clearly that Kajiado, and to a somewhat lesser extent Laikipia, have experienced an improvement of the poverty situation in terms of incidence as well as depth of poverty. Regarding the development of poverty in Kajiado the observation has to be made that part of the poverty problem is 'exported' out of the district, notably to Nairobi.<sup>3</sup> The situation in West Pokot has most likely worsened on both aspects of poverty. In Elgeyo Marakwet, the situation seems roughly speaking to have neither improved nor worsened but at a level that compares unfavourably with the situation in rural Kenya as a whole.

In table 1.3 information is provided about the number of people that are estimated to be food poor, poor in absolute terms and belong to the hard core of poverty.

<sup>2</sup> The results of the '96 PPA still have to be published; this statement has therefore no formal status though it is undoubtedly correct.

<sup>3</sup> Whether a similar observation is valid for Laikipia cannot be assessed at the moment.

Table 1.3. Number of poor people (\*'000).

	Food poverty		Absolute poverty		Hard core poverty	
	1994	1997	1994	1997	1994	1997
Kajiado	82.3	96.5	61.2	71.8	39.7	46.6
Laikipia	114.6	130.9	111.6	127.4	74.2	84.8
West Pokot	106.9	124.0	120.7	140.0	76.8	89.1
Elgeyo Marakwt	88.0	97.0	70.0	76.8	33.0	36.3
Total rural	10,500.0	11,500.0	10,400.0	11,300.0	6,500.0	7,200.0

Source: Economic Survey 1997

Note: Figures have been rounded. The figures for 1997 are estimates.

None of the people interviewed during the mission was willing to support the statement that in the last 5-10 years poverty has been reduced. On the contrary most of them had the impression that the poverty situation in general has continued to worsen, incidence as well as depth.

### 1.3 Who are the rural poor?

The highest prevalence of (hardcore) poverty is to be found among the households of subsistence farmers. Poverty is also high among smallholder foodcrop farmers' households, pastoralists and those (self) employed in the informal sector. It does not come as a surprise moreover that poverty is higher among households of which the household head did not receive education than households whose head received primary or secondary education. Poverty is also higher with older people; poverty increases with household size.

#### *Poverty and gender*

The incidence of poverty is higher in female than in male headed households, the situation being worst in case of an unmarried female household head. According to the 1994 PPA study, close to 60% of the male headed households were seen as either poor or very poor compared with close to 80% of the female headed households. The poverty situation is worst in the two ASAL districts in the PPA, where respectively 96% and 100% of the female headed households were considered to be either poor or very poor.



## 2 Macroeconomic growth: trends and issues

### 2.1 Introduction

The factors causing poverty are many. They form a complex system in which many factors interact at various levels. Some of the major factors that have been identified as contributing to poverty in Kenya are: inadequate access to income/ lack of (self)employment opportunities, inadequate access to assets such as land, inadequate access to social services, inadequate access to food, lack of (investment in) infrastructure to foster rural development, depletion of natural resources, high population growth, weak (development oriented) institutions, lack of good governance, political instability and natural disasters (droughts, floods).<sup>4</sup>

Experience of the '70s and 80's shows that rapid and sustainable progress in reducing poverty has been achieved in a number of developing countries by a strategy that combines the following elements:

- ▲ broad-based and equitable economic growth that
- ▲ makes use of the poor's most abundant resource - labour;
- ▲ provision of basic social services to the poor.

### 2.2 Growth, employment and income distribution: a summary.

The rapid growth recorded in Kenya from independence came to an end in the early seventies with the first oil crisis (1973) worsening a decline in the terms of trade that had set in a few years earlier. A steep increase in the oil price, other import prices going up by some 30% and drastic reduction in export volumes led to a slow down of GDP (to less than 2% p.a.), to an increase in inflation and to an increase in internal and external borrowing by the government. Moreover the (fairly) successful growth strategies in agriculture based on smallholder development and in the industrial sector based on import substitution reached their limits by the end of the seventies.

Throughout the 80's and into the '90s, economic growth has been disappointing. It is too early to assess whether the recovery in the years 1994-1996<sup>5</sup> from the very poor growth performance in the period 1991-1993 marks the cautious beginning of a period of continued, though modest, growth.

<sup>4</sup> In what follows no attention will be paid to floods and periodic droughts. The focus will rather be on structural and policy issues.

<sup>5</sup> Figures are provisional.

Table 2.1 Some economic indicators

	1975-80	1980-84	1985-91	1992-94
Growth of GDP % p.a.	5.6	2.1	5.0	1.1
Agriculture % p.a.	2.6	2.8	3.5	-0.5
Manuf.industr. % p.a.	7.6	3.7	5.4	1.2
Gross investment/GDP	28.8	23.8	20.0	12.7
Growth of exports % p.a.	0.5	-3.4	4.8	8.3
Growth of imports % p.a.	10.4	2.5	7.8	19.8

Source: World Bank, 1995

As can be seen in table 2.1, growth of GDP has, on average, hardly been able to keep up with the population growth of about 3.5 %, resulting in a stagnant income per head since the late seventies. During the 80's growth of GDP per capita has on average been slightly positive (0.4 % p.a.). In the period 1991 - 1995 it has on average been negative (- 0.3 %).

With a labour force growing at something like 4% per year and formal employment growing at less than 3%, the number of 'working poor' as well as 'unemployed' has increased quite dramatically. In absolute numbers, the labour force has been growing annually with between 400.000 to (close to) 500.000 persons. Formal employment increased on average by about 100.000 per year. The rate of employment growth has even slowed down in recent years. Employment growth reached an average of about 3.5% p.a. in the eighties but dropped to less than 2% in the period 1990-95.

Those who are employed have witnessed erosion of their average real wages. In the private sector by some 30%, in the public sector the real wages have been reduced to less than half over the past 12 to 15 years

The inequality of the income distribution is an important (intermediary) cause of poverty. It has become even more skewed than it already was in the seventies. Kenya has one of the most skewed income distributions of all the low-income countries. The 40% of the income earners at the bottom of the scale receive less than 10% of the total income, the top 10% of the income earners do receive around 50% of the total income.

The distribution of rural incomes is also highly skewed and increasingly so:

Table 2.2 Income distribution

Percentage of household incomes	% of total rural income	
	1982	1992
Bottom 40%	13%	10.5%
Top 20%	57%	60.0%

Source: World Bank, 1995



Low and unequitable growth could well be the major cause of increasing poverty over the last 15 years.

## 2.3 Population growth

Income per capita has been declining in the nineties and showed hardly any increase in the eighties. One reason is the low growth of GDP, the other one the high rate of population growth.

Table 2.3 Population indicators

	1979	1989	1995 (est.)	2001 (proj.)
Total population (million)	16.2	23.2	27.5	32.0
Growth rate (% p.a.)	3.9	3.4	2.9	2.5
Popul. density (per sq.km)	26.0	37.0	43.0	50.0
Urban population (million)	2.3	3.9	5.3	7.4
Fertility rate	7.8	6.7	5.4	4.8

Source: GoK, National Development Plan 1997-2002.

Kenya has clearly started on its demographic transition<sup>6</sup>. Reduced fertility has had, and will continue to have, an impact on the incidence and severity of poverty. The situation would have been worse than it currently is would the fertility not have dropped, for poverty increases with household size. It is an established fact, however, that the reduction of fertility is strongly biased in favour of better educated and better off women.

Just after the turn of the millenium, it is estimated that about a quarter of the Kenyan population will live in urban areas.

Despite the start of the demographic transition, Kenya will face tremendous problems in educating the young and providing employment for the still rapidly growing labour force. The magnitude of these problems is illustrated by the fact that well over half of Kenya's population is under the age of 20 years. The population 'pyramid' in Kenya has very much the shape of two hyperbola (who are mirror images of each other).

A factor that is going to affect the age distribution of the population considerably in the coming decades is the AIDS epidemic sweeping the African continent. It is estimated that currently about one million Kenyans, of which between 60,000 and 80,000 are children under 5, are infected with HIV. An estimated close to 200,000 people have already died of AIDS. The number of AIDS dead will have reached 1 million before the turn of the century; by the year 2005 the death toll will exceed 1.6 million.

<sup>6</sup> Population figures are not undisputed and should therefore be treated with caution. The estimates about declining fertility and growth rates could well be too optimistic.

### *The cost of AIDS*

The prevalence of AIDS is highest in the 20-49 age bracket, people in their economically (most) productive years. It is estimated that the cumulative economic impact of the epidemic could be as high as 15% of GDP by the year 2000; a real cost to society. But also the epidemic is, and will increasingly become, a burden on the health system and the social fabric of the country. A large share of hospital beds is occupied by AIDS victims, hospital beds that would otherwise have been available to patients with more 'conventional' and curable diseases.

To the cost of the AIDS should also be added diversion of labour and savings to care, funeral expenses and costs of extended family assistance (widow inheritance, taking in of orphans etc.).

## **2.4 Some of the factors causing low economic growth**

### **2.4.1 Introduction**

#### *Exogenous causes*

A number of exogenous causes can be mentioned that made growth stall over the period covering the eighties and the early nineties. There were two major droughts, one in 1984 causing a drop in agricultural GDP by 3.5% and one in '92/'93 when agricultural output fell by 6%. The terms of trade which developed favourably till the mid '80s declined sharply by almost 40% during 1987-1992.

In the next pages we will discuss a number of important macroeconomic issues related to growth and the policies that have addressed the issues. The policy packet was one of stabilization and structural adjustment. The main focus will be on structural adjustment since these policies relate strongest to the main issues of growth and poverty, although it is acknowledged that a stable macroeconomic environment is of course important for adjustment policies to generate the desired growth.

### **2.4.2 Structural economic problems - trends and policies**

Usually a distinction is made between stabilisation policies associated with the International Monetary Fund and structural adjustment policies associated with the World Bank. In policy practice in Sub-saharan Africa the distinction is blurred and rather a matter of emphasis than a matter of essential differences.

Stabilisation policies aim at correcting economic imbalances in the short run. The three common elements in the IMF's stabilisation package are:

- (i) demand restraint with a heavy emphasis on reduction of public (consumptive) expenditures, credit control and wage restraint;
- (ii) exchange rate reform and devaluation, commonly known as 'switching policies';
- (iii) supply policies focusing on financial reform and trade liberalisation (which have a long term character).



WB structural adjustment policies consist of the same three elements, but the emphasis is heavily on the long term supply policies. Important elements of the WB policy package are: fiscal policy (reduction of government deficit), trade (liberalisation) policies, sectoral policies (industry, energy, agriculture), civil service reform and public enterprise reform.

Structural adjustment/stabilisation policy sequence in Kenya can be briefly characterised as follows:

- ▲ A wide range of policy reforms was adopted in the eighties under the Structural Adjustment Programme. During the SAPs a shift in policy focus can be noticed from the general macro-economic policies to more sector specific operations. The main reason being that the World Bank review of the SAPs in 1985 found the results disappointing. Some of the main causes of the disappointing results were the government's lax or even non-implementation of the policies, the complexities of the policies making them less viable and little involvement of the private sector. But also in the second half of the decade, implementation of the policies was marred by laxity and occasional policy reversals, leading to suspension of donor aid in 1991. It is only since 1993 that policy reforms and economic liberalisation seem to be taken serious by the government. Stabilisation policies have, in the period since 1993, been implemented. Tight monetary policies have brought inflation down, fiscal deficits have been reduced. Interest rates and exchange rates are market determined.

#### *Distorted economic structure*

In the seventies the structure of the manufacturing sector became very distorted as a result of the policy of import substitution behind high tariff walls.

Investment in manufacturing dropped in real terms to less than half in the period 1977 - 1985 as a result of the collapse of the East African Community, the limits of the import substitution policy and the increasing insecurity of the Asian community in Kenya controlling private sector manufacturing to a large extent.

Distortion of the economic structure was aggravated by various controls in such fields as foreign exchange transactions, export taxes and controls, import licensing and controls, domestic retail and producer prices, domestic rates of interest, selective restrictions on (bank) borrowing and the labour market. Increasing government intervention in, and government control over, the economy made the economy less adaptable to any exogenous shocks (such as import price increases). It produced the wrong market signals and moreover increased the opportunities for rent seeking behaviour and outright corruption. Opportunities that have amply been used.

Restrictions on private trade and processing (trade and processing being controlled by parastatals), maize market control by the NCPB, restrictions of maize movements and controlled prices for basic commodities were the main factors distorting the working of agricultural markets.

#### *Policy response*



The policy response to this situation was import liberalisation, exchange rate decontrol and management, liberalisation of domestic prices and trade and improving the legal and regulatory framework.

What has been achieved regarding price incentives and regulation of the private sector can be summarised as follows:

- ▲ The structure of price incentives (markets giving the right price signals) seems reasonably undistorted due to dismantling of import and foreign exchange licensing, price and interest rate decontrol. However, disincentives continue to be present due to the (still large) parastatal sector in both marketing and production/processing. In the short run, some strong negative effects have been recorded on domestic industries due to cheap imported consumer goods. The sectors most affected have been textiles, footwear, motor assembly and food products. The problem has been aggravated by illegal imports demonstrating institutional weakness allowing for corrupt practices.
- ▲ For private sector activities to develop, a legal and regulatory framework is required that provides clarity/transparency, certainty and impartiality. Although some efforts have been made to improve the legal infrastructure, they did not meet these requirements and/or are poorly enforced. Evidence: existence of market power, extensive vertical integration and a highly concentrated wholesale system. Thus, an estimated 60% of sales takes place in markets with very limited competition; many times one single parastatal controls all the sales. More evidence: small enterprises pay close to 10% of their turnover for licences (the bigger the firm the lower the percentage) including agent fees and bribes.

Although in recent years progress can be recorded in market liberalisation, the environment has not been (and still not is) conducive to robust private economic activity and for the development of new sources of growth. This holds also for the activities important to the poor: small holder agriculture, pastoralism, small enterprises and jua kali activities.

#### *Over-extension of the public sector.*

Already by the early '80s the public sector had become over-extended, having a negative impact on the performance of the economy. The urge to 'Kenyanise' industry and the desire for rapid industrialization did create massive public ownership of enterprises, not only in traditional sectors such as utilities, but also in manufacturing. A large number of (highly) inefficient public enterprises proved to be a drain on public resources. For example, in the early nineties direct and indirect subsidies to parastatal sector amounted to 5.5% of GDP compared to e.g. 2% for the Health sector.

Had the parastatal sector worked as efficient as the private sector, the rate of growth of GDP would have been roughly 2 percent points higher.<sup>7</sup> Over-extension of the public sector is also reflected in other indicators of economic (in)efficiency. From being a net provider of investment funds by running a recurrent budget surplus, the government has become a user of private savings to finance its

<sup>7</sup> Estimate of a World Bank mission in 1994.



investment and consumption. And what is even more worrying, in the period 1991-1995 government consumption grew at the expense of government investment.

The growth of employment of people on the government payroll (directly or indirectly) starting in the late sixties already, continued throughout the next almost three decades. Between the early seventies and the early nineties, civil service employment (excluding teachers and employees of the parastatal sector) rose from under 70.000 to close to 300.000. The implication is that about 70-80% of the government's recurrent budget is spent on wages, leaving insufficient means for operations and maintenance.

With the heavily eroded real wages and salaries, the result was, and is, a costly, demoralised and inefficient civil service that hardly contributes to the development of the country.

As a combined result of an ill motivated civil service and a lack of financial resources, many essential public services are of a poor and ever declining quality. Particularly services important to the poor such as basic health and primary education, agricultural research and extension, water supply and rural roads suffered from a lack of adequate funds to operate them and to make the urgently required investments.

#### *Policy response*

The policy response to address these two issues has been a programme of privatisation and restructuring of parastatals and a civil service reform programme. Privatisation and reform of parastatals are two measures to redress the drain on public resources which the parastatal sector has actually been. According to the plans, the government would privatise over 200 so-called non strategic public enterprises and reform the strategic ones. Divestiture of public enterprises does indeed take place. But to quote a representative of a joint IMF/World Bank mission in 1995, they were 'not impressed by the pace and lack of transparency.' Also in the local press many irregularities in the privatisation of parastatals have been exposed. These reports are confirmed to the mission by people who have an intimate knowledge of the privatisation process.

In the short run, it has led to reduced employment in the parastatals, adding people to the ranks of the poor and un(der)employed.

The Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) aims at reducing the size of the civil service, making it more effective and efficient, and contain its cost. With the exception of the voluntary early retirement scheme (VERS) which has achieved a reduction of personnel by over 30.000, little progress can be reported.<sup>8</sup> No follow-up has been given to the recommendations of the MTR (donor) mission. The findings and recommendations can be briefly summarised as follows:

- ▲ The government has not been able to realize tangible improvements in civil service performance. The CSRP has not gained momentum and is unlikely to do so unless put in a realistic budget framework;

<sup>8</sup> For details see the mid-term review report, march 1997



- ▲ The prevailing view is that CSRP is forced upon the ministries as a cost containment measure and is more about staff retrenchment (VERS) rather than about improvements in (efficiency in) service delivery;
- ▲ The crux of future reform is that it has to deal with two issues. The ability to pay civil servants a minimum living wage and the need to secure sufficient funds in ministerial budgets for O&M.
- ▲ Ministerial reforms have to be put into a financial framework. Moreover, ministries have to be given incentives to embark upon a programme to reduce staff and increase efficiency. Efficiency gains should be retained within the ministry and not automatically flow back to the Treasury.
- ▲ Ministerial rationalization should be 'owned' by ministries, it should be their programme and not something that is forced upon them in bits and pieces by CSR Secretariat/DPM/OP.

In the short run reduced employment in the civil service - especially when the phase of voluntary retirement must necessarily be followed by a phase of targeted retirement - may again add people to the ranks of the poor and the unemployed. To which extent this will be the case depends to a large extent on the conditions under which redundant staff will be retired. If retirement is complemented by training programmes, financial compensations and a credit programme to allow retirees to set up their own private small enterprises, the damage can be greatly limited. Donors may feel that they have a specific contribution to make here.

In the long run when the means freed by donor contributions, will be allocated to uses to increase society's productive potential and will be targeted at the needs of the poor, the latter stand to benefit eventually.

### *Government budget*

The Government of Kenya has not been able to live within its means. Expenditure control is more the problem than insufficient revenue, although knowledgeable Kenyan professionals have asserted that there is still significant scope for raising revenue, especially by broadening the tax base. The basic reasons for lack of expenditure control are political unwillingness to do so and the rigidities in the composition of the budget (growth of the wage bill and interest payments); taking a long term view these reasons are obviously related.

Table 2.4 Central government budget (percentage of GDP and [...] percentage of total government expenditure).

	1986-91	1993/94	1995/96	1991-96
Total revenue	23.1	27.5	29.2	27.0
Expenditure and net lending: of which	29.9	35.0	30.6	31.9
Development and lending	6.3 [21.2]	6.6 [18.7]	5.9 [19.2]	6.2 [19.5]
Total recurrent	24.4 [81.3]	28.4 [81.3]	24.6 [80.3]	25.5 [80.2]
Wages and salaries	8.1 [27.2]	8.4 [24.1]	9.2 [30.1]	9.1 [28.5]
Interest	5.7 [19.1]	12.5 [35.6]	7.5 [24.4]	8.9 [27.9]
Subsidies and transfers	4.1 [13.8]	1.8 [5.2]	1.0 [3.3]	1.5 [4.7]
Operations & maintenance	6.4 [21.4]	5.7 [16.3]	6.9 [22.5]	6.1 [19.0]

Source: Economic Surveys, IMF, WB staff estimates



The share of wages in government expenditure is on the increase since the late seventies. The peak was achieved in 1993/94. Also interest payments show a long-term tendency to increase; although the movements are much more volatile. The share of government expenditure for O&M is more or less the mirror images of wages - it declines structurally. Only in the two most recent years does the trend seem to be reversed.

Funds for O&M are frequently used by the underpaid and demoralised civil servants to supplement their salaries, reducing further the efficiency of government spending.

Domestic borrowing to finance government deficit has resulted in high inflation rates - hurting the poor most-, and crowding out the private sector. Increase in credit to the public sector reduces the availability of credit to the private sector. The increased debt and the resulting domestic interest burden has reduced the means available for expenditures on essential services, again hurting the poor.

Heavy government borrowing to finance the deficit, has produced very high interest rates making it rather unattractive for private sector entrepreneurs to borrow money to finance investments. The rates of return need to be unrealistically high to make borrowing for investment a viable proposition.

#### *Investment and savings*

A high level of domestic investments, both in the private and public sector, is an essential prerequisite for economic growth. In order to finance these investments, a corresponding high level of domestic savings is required as well. Throughout the eighties till the early nineties, there has been a downward trend in both investments and savings: fixed investment as a share of GDP declined continuously to reach a level of 17% in 1992/93. Domestic savings decreased from 24% to 15% over the same period. Only recently - since 1993 a reversal can be noticed: fixed investment as a share of GDP increased from 17% in the years 92/93 to 21% in the years 95/96. Domestic savings however remain stagnant as a source of funding domestic investment at a level of 16% of GDP. During the nineties reliance on foreign resources to fund investment has increased, continuing a situation that exists since the seventies. It seems that external financial assistance has been a substitute for domestic savings, rather than a complement to finance ambitious investment plans.

Also, government investment has decreased over time. But this observation is less relevant to assess the contribution the government is making to the growth of the economy than the observation that government investment is ineffective and inefficient. The first reason is that the cost of government investment exceeds, by far, the value to society created by that investment. Reasons for this 'overpricing' are many:

- ▲ little incentive to find least-cost solutions for public agencies;
- ▲ poor or inappropriate project design;
- ▲ weak implementation and supervision (procedures);
- ▲ tied aid make some donor programmes costly;
- ▲ delays in implementation causing cost increases;
- ▲ corruption adds to costs (bribes, high cost bidder);



- ▲ overpricing by contractors through collusion, lack of competition and protection against non-payment by government<sup>9</sup>;
- ▲ political patronage leads to projects implemented at inappropriate locations.

Two other reasons for ineffectiveness and inefficiency of government projects are:

- ▲ lack of adequate appraisal of projects; projects are started without a clear idea of costs and benefits, without a timetable for implementation and without the provision of an adequate recurrent budget to run the project;
- ▲ when projects are physically incomplete, they cannot generate social or economic returns and will therefore not contribute to national economic development.

A review of the financial completion of projects in a number of ministries reveals very low completion rates. When the completion rate is measured as the cost of completed projects as a percentage of the total cost of the project portfolio, the median (average) is 2%.

Mention was already made of another important factor, shortage of funds available for operation and maintenance of the projects, to actually run the projects.

#### *Policy response*

The policy response should have been - as agreed with IMF and the World Bank - budget rationalisation and adequate planning of projects. In his annual reports the (office of the) Auditor-General is drawing attention to these cases. No noticeable action results from these findings. It is particularly this inaction by the government on budget rationalization, on accountability and transparency and on corruption, that has brought the IMF/World Bank for a second time to the point of suspending its aid package to Kenya. The first time was, as mentioned already, 1991; the second, July 1997.

Only recently the budgetary gap has been reduced, essentially by raising revenue. The underlying trends of ineffectiveness and inefficiency as discussed above have not been really addressed. It is well established that government expenditure in Kenya does not serve to enhance productivity in the economy. A few obvious examples are the inadequacy of the public sector to secure a reasonably undisturbed supply of electricity. Another is the rapid decline of the transport infrastructure. These inadequate services inflict high costs on the private sector reducing its capacity to compete internationally, to grow and to create employment. Foreign investors are also not attracted by such a sorry state of economic infrastructure.

Summing up, the macroeconomic issues discussed above bear a direct relationship to the growth of national income (GDP) and employment. These issues also help to explain the increasingly skewed income distribution. The overall assessment of the

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<sup>9</sup> The amount of pending bills has increased continuously from 1990 (June) till February 1996 when it reached a level of over 7 billion Kshs. In the second half of '96 the level has been between 4.5 and 5.1 billion Kshs, which is equivalent to between 4.4% and 4.7% of the total stock of debt.



structural adjustment policies as (non)implemented by the Kenyan government is aptly given by the following two quotations:

The critical policy failure underlying economic stagnation was poor economic management, particularly in the public sector, which resulted in macroeconomic instability, and an inefficient and inequitable use of public resources.' (World Bank, 1995)

Or as a Swedish study (1996) puts it: 'Apart from outright wrong policies in some cases and policy vacillation in other instances, coupled with a lack of strong commitment in implementation of the required reforms, highlevel mismanagement of public resources made it impossible for the economy to maximise the benefits from the limited resources available'.

In the next section we will discuss social services, the availability of which has a direct relationship with the well-being of the population but should also be seen as an investment in human resources, developing the human capital of the society. An investment which is also an important condition on which economic development critically depends, as experience elsewhere shows.

### 3 Social Services: Education and Health

For people to realise their (productive) potential, good health and adequate education are essential prerequisites. In the rural areas and more so in the ASAL areas, access to health and educational facilities are limited. The opportunity to make use of existing facilities is also determined by income. With a relatively high incidence of poverty in the rural areas, less use can be made of existing facilities and thus the existing gap between poor and non-poor will not only be continued, it will also deepen. This is precisely what seems to have happened in the past 15 years or so.

In the beginning of the eighties, Kenya's social indicators compared favourably to those of most Sub-saharan countries. Despite the low income growth in the eighties social indicators have shown progress throughout the eighties as can be deduced from table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Social indicators: education and health

	Early eighties	Late eighties/ early nineties
Gross primary school enrolment	109	105
Male	114	106
Female	101	104
Gross secondary school enrolment	19	31
Male	23	35
Female	15	27
Infant mortality	77	67
Under 5 mortality	150	96
Life expectancy		
Male	55	57
Female	59	61
Child nutrition		
Stunting	36	34
Wasting	5	7

Source: World Bank, 1995

Almost all indicators have improved between the early '80s and the early 90's. A number of complementary observations need to be made, however.

The rate of child undernutrition - an important indicator for a society's well-being - is measured by stunting and wasting. Data of the Child Nutrition Survey of 1987 show an improvement of both indicators. The % stunting dropped from 36 to 32. So in the period 1987 to 1993, the percentage has actually increased from 32 to 34 inverting the trend. For wasting, the % went down from 5 in '82 to 4.5 in '87 and has increased since then to 7%.



Stunting, wasting, infant mortality and under 5 mortality are all significantly higher in rural compared with urban areas. These figures are also higher for children with less educated mothers. The relative low enrolment of females from poor rural families in primary education of a rather low quality, therefore contributes to the accumulation of poverty and related problems in one section of society and tends to perpetuate these problems.<sup>10</sup>

### *Education*

Most recent (gross) enrolment figures lead to the conclusion that the participation in primary education is going down in recent years. In the period 1992- 1996 enrolment of boys has in absolute numbers increased by less than 3% and of girls by just over 3%. The population in that age group must have increased by at least some 12% implying reduced enrolment rates.

Enrolment in secondary education in absolute numbers indicate that after a significant drop in 1993, enrolment for boys has not fully reached the '92 level in 1996. For girls the situation looks better, with an increase in absolute numbers of at least 5% but most likely the figure will be higher.

So the conclusion is justified that for boys participation in secondary education has dropped considerably. For girls less so, but also for them participation is less than five years ago.

Average enrolment figures do conceal marked differences. Enrolment in primary education shows no bias against girls or rural youth. However, net enrolment of children from households in the bottom decile (of the expenditure distribution) was 63% compared to 76% for children from households in the top decile. Another problem on which no desegregated data are readily available is grade repetition and drop out. Less than half (45%) of the pupils enrolled in standard 1 in 1985, enrolled in standard 8 seven years later. There are strong reasons to believe that this problem is more common to children from households in the lower expenditure brackets.

Enrolment in secondary education is much lower than in primary education. Data suggest that only some 40% of pupils completing standard eight (with a KCPE certificate) enter into form 1. There is a slight bias in favour of males, but the real difference is between rural and urban areas, and between poor and non-poor. Net average enrolment in urban areas is over 20%, in rural areas it is 10%. The difference between the expenditure deciles is even more dramatic. Enrolment in the top two deciles is over one fifth, taking urban and rural together (urban 25%, rural 19%), and in the bottom deciles enrolment is almost negligible (about 3%).

The observation is made by many that the quality of education has deteriorated over the past ten years or so. A large number of the school buildings is incomplete or on the verge of collapsing. Essentials such as books, desks, water, toilet facilities are lacking, teachers are often ill motivated, demoralised and frequently absent. This situation refers to government primary schools in the first place.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Better educated women tend to have smaller families; poverty increases with family size. Low enrolment of rural women in primary education also contributes in this way to sustained poverty and undernutrition.

<sup>11</sup> Situation is worst in so-called Harambee schools.



### *Health*

By Sub-Saharan standards the health facility statistics for Kenya certainly do not look bad: one health facility per 13.000 people, 1000 people per hospital bed, 10.000 people per doctor and 1000 people per nurse.

However, the quality of services offered is much less convincing at least in the government facilities: ill motivated medical personnel, frequently not available at all, rude behaviour by medical personnel and lack of drugs.

Facilities are spread unevenly over the country. Unfortunately there are no recent data available but the fact that some 40% of the population is within 8 km of a health facility and given the concentration of people in some cities and regions tells that in the less densely populated areas the distance to the nearest facility must be quite large.

Looking at the distribution of the government recurrent expenditure regarding preventive and curative healthcare, we see that close to 70% is allocated to Kenyatta National Hospital (10%), the provincial hospitals (15 %) and the district hospitals (just over 40 %). Preventive and promotive health care gets allocated 8%. Rural health services just over 13%; rural health centres provide the services on which the vast majority of the rural population ( roughly 80% of the total population) rely. Health training ( almost 6%) and medical supplies (less than 1%) makes up for the remainder. Hospitals are, due to the distance, not easily accessible for the rural population. In the provision of health services, there is a clear bias towards urban, curative health care.

### *Policy issues*

The policy issues in the field of social services under structural adjustment are expenditure cuts and cost sharing. Although these measures could be considered necessary from the point of view of sustainable economic management, they have had a negative impact on the poor sections of the society.

### *Government expenditure*

#### **Education.**

Real government expenditure per student in primary education was in 1992 significantly lower than it was 10 years earlier, it declined by 15 %. Expenditure on secondary education per student on the other hand increased by some 10% over the same period. Poor families generally go out of their way to keep their children in primary school. Poor families, being larger on average, do get as a group a larger share of the government subsidy. Per student, however, the amount of subsidy is the same for students from poor families and from non-poor families.

Secondary education is primarily for the urban elite. Subsidies in secondary and university education are highly regressive with larger subsidies accruing to the non-poor compared to the poor. Looking at the subsidy per student in primary, secondary and university level the following picture emerges:



Table 3.2 Educational subsidies

	Primary	Secondary	University
Subsidy per student (Ksh)	1370-1520	3800-4170	42000-73000 <sup>2</sup>

Source: World Bank, 1995.

The priority of the government in the field of education policy can, therefore, be seriously questioned. This is a clear example of the composition of public expenditure that has a negative distributional impact.

### Health

Real government expenditures on health show a declining trend; expenditures declined by 13% in the period 1982-92. With an estimated increase in population during that period of some 40%, expenditure per head of population has decreased dramatically.

Health centres and dispensaries are relatively more frequently visited by the poor than hospitals. The lowest subsidy per visit is for health centres and dispensaries. From the following table it can be inferred how health subsidies are targeted:

Table 3.3 Share of health subsidy to poor &amp; non-poor in rural Kenya

	All health	Hospitals	Health centres	Dispensaries
Poorest 40%	32%	29%	47%	38%
Richest 40%	46%	48%	30%	39%
Poorest 20%	14%	13%	24%	19%
Richest 20%	24%	27%	14%	19%

Source: World Bank, 1995

Also, there is room here for seriously questioning the expenditure policy of the government in the health sector.

### Cost sharing/cost recovery

#### Education

Government contribution to primary education is by and large restricted to teachers salaries: 90%- 95% of government expenditure on primary education; for secondary education these figures are 85%-95%. The relatively small share of capital expenditure is targeted towards ASAL districts.

That poor households spend less on education (per student) than non-poor households reflects the inability to pay, but for some (poor) sections of society - notably pastoralists - it also signals the conviction that education does not bring any useful returns.

<sup>12</sup> Assuming that students loans are fully recovered.

Table 3.4 Household contributions to education

	Fees	Uniforms/Books	Harambee	Total
Primary: All	239	380	163	782
Poor	60	221	85	365
Non-poor	367	496	219	1082
Secondary: All	6595	982	429	8006
Poor	3625	503	172	4301
Non-poor	7610	1148	520	9278
University: All	3686	571	167	4424
Poor	3973	255	0	4228
Non-poor	3548	723	246	4518

Source: World Bank, 1995

The PPA (1994) indicates that one or more children dropped out of school in one third to two thirds of the families interviewed. The main reason for children dropping out is lack of money. The evidence seems also to suggest that the incidence of dropping out is higher in drier (ASAL) areas and that pupils in those areas leave school for several months a year due to lack of money or because they are needed to assist with the (economic) household affairs.

The 1996 PPA shows that 80% of the poor households in the sample reported primary education is available to them, but only 23% thinks it is affordable. Close to 50% hold the opinion that the quality of primary education has deteriorated over the past 5-10 years.

### Health

For health services user charges have been introduced in 1989 for hospitals and health centres. Services of dispensaries remain free of charge. Some categories of patients are exempted from payment: civil servants in lower job groups, children under 5 and those who cannot afford to pay (at the discretion of the person administering the treatment). Patients are not charged for all services. Examples of free services: outpatient services for family-planning; ante-natal and post-natal services, STD clinic services, services in the treatment of tuberculosis, leprosy and AIDS.

Total revenue generated by user charges for hospitals amounted to close to 40% of non-staff expenditure; for health centres the figure is 20%.

Of the (poor) households in the '96 PPA, close to 60 % reported that health services are available in their community, but only a quarter of the households confirmed them as being affordable. Well over 60% of the households hold the opinion that the quality of the services has deteriorated.



## 4 Some other factors determining poverty

### 4.1 Access agricultural assets.

#### *Land*

As was mentioned earlier the successful growth strategy from independence and throughout the seventies was based on smallholder development. The extension of smallholder coffee and tea, the spread of hybrid maize varieties to smallholders and redistribution of land from large to small farmers were the basic ingredients of a strategy leading a growth of agricultural output of 5% p.a.

Kenya is a land-scarce economy. Only 20% of the land is considered to be high and medium potential. The total arable area is estimated at 40%.

On one hand the average size of the holdings continuously declines and on the other a concentration of (agricultural) land in fewer hands takes place.

Just over 10% of the rural households are landless with another 15% of the rural households having very little land. However, in the Rift Valley province where the Dutch supported ASAL districts are located, some 17%-18% of the households are landless. More than a quarter of the rural households hold less than 2 acres; the average holding has over the past ten years decreased from around 5 to less than 4 acres. The number of smallholder households has increased from 1.7 million in the mid '70s to 2.7 million in the mid '80s to the 3.5 - 4 million at present. Smallholder agriculture is, thus, the dominant mode of production. These smallholders produce 75% of the agricultural output and provide over 85% of agricultural employment.

It can be concluded that the pressure on agricultural land is high and increasing, and that the high pressure on high (and medium) potential land spills over to the neighbouring semi-arid areas which are environmentally fragile. By using techniques similar to those in high and medium potential areas, frequently supported by extension services, the migrants from the high potential areas have contributed to degradation of the soils threatening future farming.

Pressure on the land has also contributed to rural-urban migration.

The introduction of new technologies and adaptation to the conditions prevailing on the farmers fields and in semi-arid conditions did not keep pace with these developments.

This caused the contribution of agriculture to GDP to decline: from 37% in the period 1964-74 to 26% in the period 1990-95. Agriculture as a source of rural household income decreases, more so for the poor households than the non-poor. More rural people, especially the poor, had to turn to wage labour and self employment (jua kali).

People expelled from the high potential areas occupy the best quality land in the semi-arid areas reducing especially the area of dry season grazing for the

pastoralists. This has led to various conflicts over land, frequently with strong tribal overtones.<sup>13</sup>

On the other hand, there is the large farm sector consisting of 800-1000 farms with a modal size of 1250- 2500 acres generally in well endowed areas. These large - usually mixed - farms employ only a fraction of the labour used in smallholder farming.

The large scale sector has been favoured vis-a-vis the smallholder sector by government policies in various ways thus reducing incentives for efficient resource use. Some of these policy measures are: financial subsidies to the large scale sector and high import duties on machinery/equipment used in the smallholder sector. This has, for example, led to the situation that although in maize farming the domestic resource cost<sup>14</sup> of large and small scale farming are the same, large scale maize farming is financially profitable and smallholder maize farming is not.

The labour input in smallholder maize farming is roughly three times as high as that in the large scale sector.

Information on the landmarket and landtransfers is scarce and patchy. The general impression is that land is being transferred from large to small farms, but that the pace at which it happens is very slow. There are many institutional - legal, informational, credit etc. - obstacles that explain the slow transfer of land. If the policy of favouring large farmers would be terminated and a number of these farms cease to be financially profitable, the willingness to sell land to smallholders will most likely increase.

Transfer of land to smallholders will tend to raise the productivity of land, especially in dairy farming and will greatly contribute to creation of rural employment.

### *Livestock*

Looking at the ownership of livestock, we also see a reduction in the average head of cattle per household as well as in the number of sheep and goats.

Table 4.1 Ownership of livestock.

	1981/82 Average	1992 Average	1992 Poor	1992 Non-poor
Cattle per household	3.7	3.4	3.0	3.8
Sheep & goats per household	4.3	3.6	2.8	4.2

Source: World Bank, 1995

<sup>13</sup> See also overall report (part II) of the ASAL review for a political review of the land issue.  
<sup>14</sup> Domestic resource cost is the real cost incurred to produce 1 \$ of output.



Research indicates that in the dairy sector (open grazing) the domestic resource costs of smallholders is less than half compared to the large scale sector. The financial profitability is, however, only 20% higher in the smallholder sector. Moreover, the smallholder sector uses well over 80 mandays per acre per year, whereas the labour input in the large scale dairy farming is very low.

### *Rural household incomes*

What are the consequences of the reduction in agricultural assets of the rural population in terms of sources of rural household income? The changes in the sources of rural household incomes are summarised in the following table.

Table 4.2 Sources of rural household incomes.

Sources of household income (% shares of total)	Average		Poor		Non-poor	
	1981/82	1992	1981/82	1992	1981/82	1992
Farm enterprises	58	50	63	45	56	52
Non-farm enterprises	10	20	10	25	11	19
Wages/salaries	23	22	17	22	25	21
Other(transfers)	9	8	10	9	8	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: World Bank, 1995

In summary the economic dynamics of rural development seem to be characterised by:

- (i) decreasing average holdings of land and numbers of livestock
- (ii) limited possibility to increase (small-holder) productivity by (agricultural/livestock) technology, marketing- and other rural infrastructure (including water), (conservation of) the resource base
- (iii) ineffective land redistribution policies

As a result increasing numbers of rural people will have to find a livelihood outside agriculture. This unavoidable process can be slowed down by policies that relax the constraints mentioned under (i) and (ii) above and that create (institutional) conditions to facilitate lands transfer from large farms to small ones.<sup>15</sup>

The dynamics are also a major cause of rural-urban migration. The possibilities to find off-farm employment in the rural areas are limited. The sheer magnitude of the number of (informal) jobs in towns and cities attracts people from the rural areas.

In the analyses of rural poverty, an element which relates to the urban-rural link seems to be missing. Increased urban poverty has an impact on rural poverty as

<sup>15</sup> As far as involvement of ASAL programmes in productive activities is concerned, the focus is on relaxing constraint (ii).

well. Many of the urban workers remit money to their relatives in the rural areas. Increased poverty in urban areas will reduce these remittances.

A very important sector in terms of providing employment is the so called jua kali sector. At the end of this chapter a brief section will be devoted to the contribution the jua kali sector could make to the unemployment problem.

## 4.2 Rural infrastructure

The importance of a well developed rural infrastructure can be illustrated by the fact that the pastoralists have hardly been able to benefit from the meat price boom of recent years. Unavailability of market information, inadequate marketing channels and a poor road infrastructure allowed livestock traders based in urban areas to reap most of the benefits.

This example also shows that infrastructure in the traditional sense alone is not sufficient for the development of pastoralist communities. Required is an adequate road (or rail) infrastructure, marketing infrastructure, communication infrastructure and education- and training infrastructure.

### *Roads*

A good rural roads network well connected to the (inter)national road system is a necessary, though of course by no means a sufficient, condition for development of the rural areas. This holds for agricultural as well as non-agricultural activities. Access to markets is essential for rural activities to develop on a commercial basis. Various empirical studies support this statement.<sup>16</sup>

Rural road densities are high in the high and medium potential areas. In provinces like Central, Nyanza and Western, the density is 400-500 meters of secondary, minor and rural access roads per square kilometre, compared to the national average of 85 meters per square kilometre. These figures relate to classified roads, which are the responsibility of the central ministries. It is believed that the network of unclassified roads, nominally maintained by local governments, has almost as many kilometres.

The size and design of the network is not the (real) problem, it is its deteriorating condition. The ministry should, in order to maintain e.g. the gravel roads in an acceptable condition (total: 25.000 km), regravell 4000 km of road each year. In recent years it did on average less than 150 km.

Although the result is hardly convincing, the ministry spends most of its budget on paved (tarmac) roads. However the amounts available are inadequate and largely pre-empted by the payment of wages and salaries. Substandard work occurs frequently. These issues were discussed in ch. 2 already.

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<sup>16</sup> No studies are known for Kenya. Usually the effect of (re)construction or improvement in rural roads is measured in terms of increased agricultural output.



The Rural Access Roads Programme ( building new roads), in 1986 succeeded by the Minor Roads Programme (improvement and maintenance) used labour intensive techniques. Thus making use of the countries most plentiful resource: (unskilled) labour. As mentioned in ch. 2, this is one of the strategies of countries that have been able to reduce poverty substantially.

### *Water*

Like health and education provision of water has two sides. On the one hand availability of (clean) water has an immediate impact on the well-being of the population, especially the health situation, on the other hand it is essential for activities in both agriculture/livestock as well as off-farm enterprises. It is quite obvious that in ASAL areas lack of water is one of the major factors responsible for slow development. Because of its scarcity water is a major source of social and political tension.

A recent survey carried out in Kajiado and Mandera districts confirms that 88% and 79 % of pastoralists respectively, rate scarcity of water as their main problem.

The state of affairs in the water sector is hard to assess. In the high and medium potential areas the coverage doesn't seem to be bad, but the reliability and quality are not particularly good. Frequent breakdowns and massive loss of water in the piped systems are the rule rather than the exception. Again this is a sign of lack of means for O&M of the responsible ministry as well as practices that make government spending ineffective and inefficient.

From the 'poverty profiles' it can be derived that the percentage of rural households within 1 km of water in the wet season has increased from 57 % in '82 to 82% in '92. Since the percentage of households living within 1-3 km from their water source has decreased, it means that households living already at a reasonable distance from a water source have come closer. The relative small percentage of households living more than 3 km from their water supply have not seen an improvement in that situation. In drier parts of the country (ASAL areas) in the dry season, water has to be fetched from sources at a distance of 5-15 km. Women spend in these circumstances 5-6 hours per day fetching two buckets of water.

Of the bottom 40% of the households on the income ladder, slightly under 40 % had access to water from a protected source. For the top 20% of households on that ladder, the percentage is close to 60%.

In addition to government water schemes, Kenya has a long tradition in community and self-help water schemes. Experience with community managed water schemes seems to suggest that in those schemes a more efficient use of resources is being made than in government water supply schemes.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> This statement does not only hold for water projects but is generally valid for all community managed projects.



### 4.3 Credit

#### *Agricultural credit*

Credit is widely recognised to be a critical factor in the development of the agricultural sector. Credit to the agricultural sector is provided by various institutions: commercial banks, non-bank financial institutions, processing and marketing parastatals, co-operatives, Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), NGO's and informal sources. In comparison to most other Sub-Saharan countries Kenya has a well developed rural financial infrastructure. Despite the multitude of credit institutions for small farmers outside the high potential areas, it is often very difficult to secure credit. Agricultural lending has been, and still is, biased in favour of:

- ▲ large scale farmers
- ▲ high potential areas
- ▲ those with land title deeds and other collateral
- ▲ cash crop farmers

The AFC is a case in point. It has provided (long term) loans at very low interest rates to large and medium scale farmers. With less than 5 acres, no loan can be secured from AFC. The performance of the AFC has been dismal. The AFC has been used in the political arena. This can be illustrated best by the arrears allowed. Out of a portfolio of about 3.5 billion Ksh, about 2.2 billion is in arrears. The repayment rate of large farmers is estimated to be 50%. No or late repayment is tolerated on grounds of (buying) political loyalty.

Small scale farmers in ASAL areas growing foodcrops face difficulties to secure a loan from a formal credit institution to improve the productivity of their farm operations. To a large extent they will have to rely on credit from NGO's or informal sources. The latter imply usually very high interest rates.

#### *Informal sector and small scale enterprise (I/SSE) credit*

As for agriculture, limited access to credit is generally believed to be a major constraint facing the I/SSE sector. However, as emerges from various studies, the credit constraint frequently signals other problems such as difficulties in marketing, inappropriate technology being used and inadequate costing of product(s) etc.

Nevertheless, relaxing the credit constraint has an impact. A recent study (commissioned) by GTZ indicates that borrowers under the Kenya Industrial Estates Informal Sector Programme achieved on average a real annual growth in assets of 12%, in income of 17% and in employment of 50%. Another source (GEMINI baseline survey) reveals that I/SSE's who have benefitted from a formal credit programme grow on average over 40% faster than I/SSE's that had no access to such a programme. The highest growth was recorded by I/SSE's that benefitted from multiple forms of assistance.

The well developed financial infrastructure serving the I/SSE business community consists of a number of types of institutions:

- ▲ commercial banks only two of which - Barclays and KCB - operate programmes targeted at the I/SSE sector
- ▲ non-bank financial institutions, insurance companies, building societies, savings and credit co-operative societies etc.



- ▲ development finance institutions (DFI's), the most relevant being KIE and SEFCO
- ▲ NGO's; the major six in terms of lending to the I/SSE are K-REP, NCCCK, PEA Chogoria, PRIDE, KWFT and Tototo Home Industries with a total loan portfolio of over 200 million Ksh (1994) and over 18,000 clients.
- ▲ GoK; Joint Loan Board Scheme and Rural Enterprise Fund.
- ▲ Rotating savings and credit associations; it is estimated that some 10,000 of these savings and credit groups in Kenya provide credit to thousands of micro enterprises.

It is estimated that GoK, NGO's, DFI's and the commercial banks together run some 75 credit programmes, especially for I/SSE's. None of these credit schemes run on a full commercial basis. Many have an advise and training component attached to them (compulsary or voluntary). The overheads associated with providing and monitoring these small loans are very high. These two factors make donor support for these loan schemes indispensable for the time being.

Some of the major problems in the current situation are:

- ▲ GoK loan schemes prioritize political interests ('vote catching') over development purposes.
- ▲ A large unmet demand for credit which is roughly estimated to be of at least the size of the actual outstanding loans to the sector.
- ▲ Unsustainability of the current lending programmes; many programmes (also the ones by the commercial banks) depend heavily on donor contributions
- ▲ Many NGO's<sup>18</sup> that have entered the field of lending confuse social and economic considerations, caring more for the well being of their clients than repayment of loans (frequently carrying too low an interest rate).

#### 4.4 Jua Kali

What are now called micro-enterprises caught the attention of development economists around 1970, as the 'informal sector'. In Kenya the informal sector was at the centre of analysis and employment oriented strategy proposed by the ILO mission to Kenya in the early seventies as part of the World Employment Programme. Since then the sector got public recognition, especially as an important source of employment and income. The sector got to be referred to as Jua kali since the mid eighties.

No attempt is made to select a definition from the many definitions of what constitutes the informal sector. The scale is small, the markets are unregulated and competitive, the technology is labour intensive and adapted to local circumstances, use is made of indigenous resources, the products made and/or traded and the services rendered are many: shoe polishing, watch repairing, selling of curios, production of metal doors and window frames, shoes, wood carvings, jambes, lamps, all sorts of customised tools etc.

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<sup>18</sup> This excludes the NGO's established as credit institutions in the first place such as K-REP, PRIDE and KWFT.



The jua kali sector is in terms of employment and income of great importance. It is estimated that in 1993 the sector accounted for not less than 50% of total employment in Kenya. It has been estimated that the jua kali sector accounts for about 60% of the newly created jobs. 'In this light, the jua kali sector can be considered the saving grace for hundreds of thousands of Kenyans, for whom life is a constant struggle to earn daily bread, for themselves and for their families.'<sup>19</sup>

For a long time the informal sector was perceived as an urban phenomenon. It is not. Over three-quarter of employment in small scale and micro enterprises is found in rural areas. Looking at employment from the household side it can be concluded that rural households depend for their livelihood on many sources: subsistence agriculture, food crops, jua kali activities and remittances.

The first public recognition of the importance of the informal sector came with Sessional paper no. 10 of 1973 on employment and the 1974-78 Development Plan. High rates of employment growth for the sector were projected. Very few measures in support of the sector were undertaken. Also, the 1979-83 Development Plan which had poverty alleviation as its main theme promised support to the jua kali sector. Again the jua kali producers were let down. Instead of support, the police continued to harass the jua kali producers and traders.

The sessional papers of 1985 (no. 2 on unemployment) and 1986 (no. 1 on economic management for renewed growth) promised 'to remove any remaining barriers to informal sector activities, giving it room to grow...'. There was also the promise of 'more active steps such as ways to provide credit, technical and marketing assistance...'. A special task force was to be established to review all policies related to the informal sector and in particular 'current local authority by-laws and other regulations governing the informal sector activities, to create a healthy legal and regulatory climate for informal sector activities....' The progress being made in this respect can be adequately assessed from the following statement taken from sessional paper no.1 of 1994 (on recovery and sustainable development): '... (the Government) is undertaking a comprehensive review of pertinent regulatory Acts and all licensing requirements and will introduce amendments to remove impediments to small scale enterprise development.'

Jua kali entrepreneurs still have insufficient access to credit and are in need of marketing assistance as well as assistance in other business skills. They need better and secure places to operate from. They are, however, still harassed by the police and their sheds are still being demolished.

The positive developments in the sector are achieved despite government intervention and thanks to the support of domestic and international NGOs.

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<sup>19</sup> Undugu's Biennial Report 1992-93.



## 5 Governance and district focus for rural development

### 5.1 Governance

Governance may be defined as the way in which power is exercised by the government in the management of a country's resources for development. No consensus really exist about which elements in the way government exercises power constitute good governance, less so on how to achieve it. However, two elements are mentioned as being important in this respect: transparency and accountability.

#### *Transparency*

An important element in securing transparency in the dealings of government is availability of information and accessibility to its sources. By the Official Secrets Act (a colonial legacy), access to information is a privilege rather than a right. Confidentiality is the rule, openness the exception.

Not only is information refused to the general public through the media, even members of the Parliamentary Accounts Committee, the Controller and the Auditor-General are denied information they ask for in executing their duties.

Transparency can be increased without making additional resources available. It requires a fundamental change in the attitude of civil servants and their political bosses.

#### *Accountability*

Public officials - elected or appointed (the President, members of the Cabinet etc.) - and officers in positions of trust should, as a matter of principle, be held to account for their actions and be sanctioned if not performing according to established norms and standards. Democratic elections are one of the means by which a government can be held accountable to its voters. But also in the civil service and parastatals a system of checks and balances should be operational to avoid uncontrolled exercising of discretionary powers.

Central to accountability are institutionalised rules and procedures that guarantee predictability, consistency and stability in the policy environment. This set of rules and regulations is embodied in a legal framework. A framework that essentially rests on the country's Constitution.

The urgently required review of the legal system and the Constitution shows hardly any progress, though long overdue. The sincerity of the government in implementing the promised democratic reforms is currently widely questioned.

Formal rules of the political game and the regulations governing the public sector are very important. However, a political culture that considers that rules exist to be evaded rather than respected will never produce a system of good governance. Governance in Kenya seems to be characterised by the following elements:

- ▲ failure to make a clear distinction between public and private and therefore a (strong) tendency to allocate public resources for private gain;
- ▲ failure to establish a predictable framework of law and government conducive to development;
- ▲ existence of still too many regulations and licensing arrangements inviting rent seeking behaviour and corruption;
- ▲ policy priorities that are inconsistent with broad-based development resulting in diversion and misallocation of resources;
- ▲ narrow-based and non-transparent decision making leading to favouritism and biased allocation of resources.

### *Corruption*

Corruption can be defined as: The misuse of power or public office for private gain or in the interest of a particular group or class, in a way that constitutes a violation of the law or of accepted standards of conduct.

In 1971 the Duncan Ndegwa Commission (Civil Service Review) reported incidents of corruption. Remarkably enough the Commission opened the door to conflicts of interest by recommending that civil servants could own and operate private businesses.

The Waruhiu Commission (also on civil service review) reports: '....there has been gross neglect of public duty and misuse of official positions and official information in furtherance of civil servants' personal interests.' Reporting on the conflict of interest arising from civil servants engaging in private business, the Commission states: '...received overwhelming evidence to the effect that some civil servants utilize government facilities in order to benefit themselves.'

Neither report led to any action to curb the evils.

As a result of unwillingness of the government to address corrupt practices the so called Clarion report (1994) produced a wealth of evidence to support its conclusion that corruption is rampant and endemic to the entire public sector and at all levels.

The conclusions of Clarion report are:

1. Corruption permeates the entire social fabric of this country and poses problems of monumental proportions to the social, political and economic future of the nation;
2. There is no co-ordinated programme put in place by the government, political parties, or civil society to combat the problem with the view to eradicating it altogether.
3. Corruption exists and is practised in both the public and the private sectors with the former recording frequent and monumental incidences of corruption that place a heavy burden on the Kenyan people;
4. The majority of the Kenyans do recognize and resent the adverse effects of corruption but appear to have resigned themselves to the phenomenon. This resignation stems from a sense of betrayal and lack of care by the Government;



- 5 Unless the effects of corruption on the day to day lives of the Kenyans and its impact on future generations are highlighted, the public could easily internalize the phenomenon of corruption and come to accept it as a way of life thus making efforts to eradicate it futile;
6. Any reforms of the economic and political system should take into account the need to formulate concrete programmes aimed at eradicating corruption in Kenya.
7. There is an urgent need to formulate such comprehensive programmes.

The endemic nature of corruption negates all principles of good governance. It is also obvious that claims by the Government that it has insufficient funds to address the poverty problem cannot be taken serious in the face of massive misuse of public funds by the same Government.

## 5.2 District Focus for Rural Development

The District Focus for Rural Development strategy was officially launched in 1983. It was designed to address issues such as the highly centralised administrative system (the Provincial Administration, a colonial legacy) and the conflict between the vertical integrated line ministries and the need for horizontal co-ordination at the district level.

The objectives of the DFRD were:

- ▲ Decentralisation of planning functions in the country;
- ▲ Facilitate participation of the people at the grassroots in project identification, design and management;
- ▲ Improve efficiency in project implementation;
- ▲ Promote more equitable allocation of resources among regions.

The District Focus policy emphasises district planning, horizontal integration, enlarged district responsibilities and increased district authority. Implications for the ministries are that their programmes and budgets are to be based on the district's own plans and priorities. Ministerial budgets are to be disaggregated by district, and the ministry should guarantee funding of district specific projects within a given budget ceiling. The authority of the district in financial management, procurement and project implementation will be increased, thus reducing delays.

Although an exercise in decentralisation, the DFRD implies increased control by the Office of the President (and the Ministry of Finance) over the line ministries at district level through the Provincial Administration and the audit officials. The control mechanism is enhanced authority of the District Treasury, District Tender Board and the District Executive Committee (DEC), all of which are responsible to the DC. A centralization of power in the offices of the President and the Vice-President is the result. With the DFRD the political control mechanism, which the Provincial Administration is, with its hierarchy of PC, DC, chiefs and assistant chiefs, has been strengthened giving a firmer grip by the centre over the country.

The objectives have thus not been achieved. The main reason clearly has been and still is the lack of commitment by the government to effective decentralization of decision making powers and budgets to the districts. The districts control only an insignificant share of the total government budget and many of the projects are still initiated at the centre rather than in the districts.

The DFRD has been used as a political instrument favouring allocations to districts in Rift Valley province, president Moi's main political power base, in the absence of clear allocative criteria such as population, size of the area, incidence of poverty etc. President Moi and some of his senior ministers even stated on various occasions that those areas that voted for opposition parties would not have access to development resources.

Participation of the people at the grassroots level in prioritising, planning and implementation of projects has, as a consequence, developed at a very slow pace. It seems that mainly through the efforts of domestic and international NGOs and some donors in the development process at sub-national level, participation of the people is taking root. Evidence is rather plentiful that projects really owned by the community usually perform much better than projects that are brought to the community by the government (or a donor).



## 6 Summing up: anti poverty policies

### 6.1 Introduction

There can be little doubt that, even though data are not comprehensive, poverty in Kenya has increased since the beginning of the stabilisation and structural adjustment policies. Kenya was, with Sudan, the first Sub-Saharan country to receive loans of both IMF (short term stabilisation) and the World Bank (structural adjustment) in 1980.

Some critics of the IMF and WB policy prescriptions maintain that these must necessarily have led to an increase in poverty. Others have a more balanced view and argue that especially in the short run, there are likely to be adverse effects on the poor of stabilisation and structural adjustment policies, but in the longer run they could be better off.

This is not the place to go into this discussion. The general conclusion that can be derived from the debate is that demand reducing policies (reduced government expenditure) have a fairly strong negative impact in the short run. These policies affect the urban population more negatively than the rural population. Effects of policies directed at the supply side and the so called switching policies are ambiguous, depend to a considerable extent on the economic structure of the country and usually only become visible in the long run.

Kenya, like most other Sub-Saharan countries, has faced increased poverty. This experience well documented in the monumental UNICEF study 'Adjustment with a human face' has led the Bretton Woods institutions to pay more attention in its policies to the social aspect of adjustment programmes to protect the poor. Since '87 the World Bank's staff guidelines have required Policy Framework Papers for low-income countries to include 'a brief description and assessment .... of the social impact of the government's intended adjustment program', and all the President's Reports supporting structural adjustment to pay particular attention to '...the short term impact of the adjustment program on the urban and the rural poor, and measures proposed to alleviate negative effects.'

A joint WB/IMF study (1989) says that 'given the time and effort required to turn deeply troubled economies around, it would be morally, politically and economically unacceptable to wait for resumed growth alone to reduce poverty.'

Experience in (intensively) adjusting countries shows differences in the mode of implementation of structural adjustment programmes, as well as the differences in the outcomes. This suggests that countries - although bound by agreements with IMF and/or WB - do have policy options. For example Ghana, though one of the intensively adjusting countries<sup>20</sup>, increased its expenditure in the social sectors, health and education.

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<sup>20</sup> According to the World Bank definition.



## 6.2 Anti poverty policies in Kenya

The strategy to combat poverty in Kenya has since the first sessional paper of 1965 been based on rapid economic growth in the modern sector. Looking at the consecutive five year development plans and the relevant sessional papers, the conclusion can be that policy objectives are sufficiently geared toward improving the economic fate of the poor Kenyans. The focus of the development plans may have shifted in time but the central tenet has been growth to reduce poverty. The third development plan (74-78) focused on equity and employment generation.<sup>21</sup> The fourth development plan (79-84) embraced the basic needs approach to take on unemployment, inequality and poverty.

The sessional papers no.1 of 1986 introduced, and sessional paper no.1 of 1994 accelerated, policies focused on promotion of economic growth and poverty alleviation to be brought about essentially by private sector investment and growth. At the meeting of the consultative group in Paris in 1994 and later at the World Summit for Social Development (Copenhagen, 1995) papers were presented outlining the measures for an anti-poverty strategy.

However, as can be inferred from the previous chapters, there is an enormous discrepancy between policies on paper and actual implementation. The previous chapters also clearly indicate why the government failed to implement its policies. The opening sentence of the 1996-1998 Policy Framework Paper is 'Kenya faces a major challenge in reducing unemployment and poverty.' The first paragraph continues to read: 'To achieve significant reductions in unemployment and poverty, the economy will have to grow on average by over 6% a year for several years. It will also be imperative that the Government places increased emphasis on social services and adequately targeted interventions in favour of the poor.'

The PFP then continues to outline the policy objectives and strategies for the period 1996-98, pages filled with the, by now, very familiar rhetoric. The Governments strategy will be to: ' (a) maintain macroeconomic stability by strengthening monetary and public sector finance management, and by consolidating fiscal discipline; (b) improve efficiency of the public sector by accelerating and streamlining reform in the civil service and public enterprises, and improving the delivery of infrastructural services; (c) enhance external and domestic competitiveness of the economy through further liberalisation of markets; (d) address the social aspects of development particularly through targeted poverty interventions and increased access of the poor to social services; and (e) to eliminate corruption'. And further: 'The Government intends to move ....towards the provision of an enabling environment for private sector development with emphasis on policies which are environmentally friendly and which encourage labour-using growth.'

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<sup>21</sup> This development plan is to be seen as the policy response of the GoK to the report of the ILO mission prepared as part of the World Employment Programme. The pioneering mission report was published in 1972 and titled Employment, Incomes and Equality - A strategy for increasing productive employment in Kenya.



As targeted poverty interventions are listed:

- ▲ expansion of the intensive rehabilitation and maintenance of minor roads; flexibility will be built into the scheme to enhance it during the drought years;
- ▲ development of community-based modalities for providing support to the rehabilitation and maintenance of water projects;
- ▲ special attention will be given to the poor in arid areas by rehabilitation of stock routes, improvements in drought management and relief, and by immunisation and school health and feeding programmes.
- ▲ licensing a larger number of water kiosks in urban areas and supporting community based initiatives in waste removal and sanitation; the shelter problem will be addressed by encouraging access to low cost housing through co-operative societies;
- ▲ encouraging of donors to expand micro-enterprise (credit) schemes
- ▲ expansion of the jua kali scheme including a review of laws and regulations inhibiting the sector and undertaking appropriate amendments.

Extrapolating from past experience there is no room for the belief that the strategies outlined in the PFP 96-98 will be implemented. Looking at the evidence currently available unfortunately only support for this view can be found.

The donors' Mid-Term review of the Civil Service Reform Programme concludes in March 1997 that hardly any progress in implementation can be recorded, with the exception of the Voluntary Early Retirement Scheme (VERS) and that a realistic financial macro framework is lacking.

The Public expenditure review, a joint exercise of the Government of Kenya and the World Bank, carried out recently concludes that present trends in public expenditure management are fundamentally inconsistent with the objectives of achieving high and sustained growth of the economy and reducing levels of poverty. It also concludes that the performance of the public sector is a constraint to the growth prospects of the private sector and, thus, overall economic growth. This could also jeopardize the continued maintenance of macroeconomic stability.

The Social Dimensions Programme launched as an instrument to cushion some of the (assumed) negative effects on the poor and vulnerable of structural adjustment measures, is rather used as an instrument to reward political loyalty and to buy votes. This is the view of many observers brought to the attention of the ASAL review mission.

Finally the suspension of the ESAF loan by IMF recently on the grounds that hardly any progress is being made by the Government to combat corruption is the last piece of evidence.

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## **IV LAND USE PLANNING BACKSTOPPING REPORT**

# **LAND USE PLANNING FOR ASAL DISTRICTS IN KENYA**

**Report of the second backstop mission**

**12 - 26 May 1997**

Utrecht, Nairobi  
August 1997



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Annex 4	ASAL, Development Constraints and Perspectives and Policy (background paper for the concluding seminar of the 1993 ASAL evaluation) <sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>) Chapter 2 of the 'Preparatory Document to Seminar' of the Joint Kenyan Netherlands Programme Review of the District Integrated Development Programmes in West Pokot, Elgeyo Marakwet and Kajiado; October, 1993.



## ABBREVIATIONS

AEZ	Agro Ecological Zone
ARU	Applied Research Unit
ASAL	Arid and Semi Arid Lands
ASC	ASAL Steering Committee
CAP	Community Action Plan
CT	Core Team (Kajiado)
DDC	District Development Committee
DDO	District Development Officer
DEC	District Executive Committee
DEMC	District Environmental Management Committee
DFRDS	District Focus for Rural Development Strategy
DPU	District Planning Unit
DRSDS	Department of Resource Surveys and Remote Sensing
DWG	District Working Group
EAP	Environmental Action Plan
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIS	Geographical Information System
GOK	Government of Kenya
GON	Government of the Netherlands
KARI	Kenyan Agricultural Research Institute
KSS	Kenyan Soil Survey
KWS	Kenyan Wildlife Service
LUP	Land use planning
LUPA	Land Use Planning Advisor
LUPC	Land Use Planning Coordinator
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MALDM	Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development
MLRRWD	Ministry of Land Reclamation, Regional & Water Development
OOP	Objective Oriented Planning
PA	Programme Advisor
PMC	Project Management Committee (in TAA)
PMU	Programme Management Unit
PO	Programme Officer
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
RNE	Royal Netherlands Embassy
RRA	Rapid Rural Appraisal
SNV	Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers
TA	Transect Area
TAA	Transect Area Approach
TAC	Transect Area Committee
TAPC	Transect Area Planning Committee

## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 General

In view of the trend of increasing resource degradation in the ASALs, the 1993 joint Kenyan- Dutch ASAL evaluation mission recommended to give high priority on this issue in the project phase 1994 - 1997. Land use planning would be one of the strategies to be adopted in the ASAL Programmes to cope with the resource degradation. Since 1994, several initiatives have been taken by the four Dutch funded ASAL programmes to incorporate land use planning in the programmes. Because of the different nature of the resource degradation, also the adopted approaches differed per district.

In 1995 a land use planning backstop mission was fielded to review the land use planning initiatives. One of the recommendations was to give priority in a first stage to local level land use planning as compared to district level land use planning.

The present backstop mission is considered as a follow-up of the 1995 one and has the objective to review the progress made in the land use planning exercises in the four districts (see annex 1 for TOR).

The mission took place between 12 and 26 May 1997 and consisted of:

- Mr Situma Mwachabe, Assistant Director, Land Use of the MLRRWD and
- Mr Pieter Jan Zijlstra of Consultants for Development Programmes, the Netherlands.

At the start, the mission was briefed by the Director Land Reclamation (ASAL) of the MLRRWD, Mr E.C. Chesinya and First Secretary of the RNE, Mr P.L. Gooren. In the period 12 - 26 May the mission visited the four ASAL Programmes, had discussions with the PMUs, representatives of relevant departments and institutes and visited the ongoing land use activities. The mission had a wrap-up meeting in Nairobi at 27 May with the Director Land Reclamation of the MLRRWD, representatives of the RNE and ETC-Consultants.

### 1.2 Organisation of this report

The report can be divided in three major parts:

- Chapter 2 deals with the relevance of resource management in ASAL and the role land use planning. During the mission it appeared that still no consensus exists among the main actors in the ASAL programmes on the importance of resource management. For this reason a chapter on resource management as a focal issue in the planning process has been included.
- Chapter 3 presents the state of affairs in land use planning in the four programmes as assessed by the mission and contains the district specific conclusions and recommendations.
- Specific issues which most of the programmes have in common are described and analyzed more in detail in chapter 4. This chapter deals with constraints encountered such as institutional and legal issues, the development of strategies on the livestock production system, the way land use planning is incorporated in the programmes (activity or strategy).



## 2. RELEVANCE OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN ASAL AND THE ROLE OF LAND USE PLANNING

### 2.1 Introduction

One of the findings of the mission is that there is still no consensus among members of PMUs, key persons in the districts and the donor agencies (SNV, RNE) on the aims and concepts of resource management. Discussion on these subjects held during the 1993 evaluation and 1995 land use planning backstop mission are repeated time and again. The most heard returning comments are: (1) land use planning is a top-down exercise, ignoring the basic needs as expressed by the population; (2) land use planning ignores the importance of the social sector, (3) land use planning only serves an environmental purpose (4) land use planning is not possible within the Kenyan context as land is a too sensitive political issue and (5) the indicators of resource degradation have always been there; resource management is therefore not a major issue as compared to other development constraints (see f.e. Dietz, 1997).

In order to bring these comments and preconceived opinions in the right perspective, an attempt is made in this chapter to discuss the relevance of resource management in ASAL, the merits and limitations of land use planning as a tool in resource management and incorporation of land use planning in the de-centralized planning process in the districts.

Par. 2.2 describes the use of resources in the distinct agro-ecological zones of the ASAL, major trends, constraints and perspectives and the extent of resource degradation. In par. 2.2, the relevance of resource management is explained as well as the way resource management is perceived in the GOK and GON policies. In 2.4 the integration of land use planning in district planning is discussed, while in the concluding paragraph the encountered constraints for successful land use planning are addressed.

### 2.2 Resource use in ASAL; major trends, constraints and perspectives

#### 2.2.1 Land Use Patterns in major Agro Ecological Zones (AEZ)<sup>2</sup>

##### a. AEZ IV (semi humid)

The dominant land use pattern in AEZ IV is the mixed agriculture/livestock farming system with crop production as the main enterprise. Main crops are maize, beans and cotton.

Population growth is high (up to 6.5%) due to in-migration from the high potential areas. As a result the cultivated area has expanded and the total livestock population has decreased. To a certain extent farming systems have been adapted as a consequence of the increasing land pressure: crop intensification and introduction of improved land management practices in some areas. These adaptations however have not sufficiently resulted in sustainable resource use. Main constraints are:

- reduction of the cultivation cycle, resulting in declining soil fertility and soil erosion.
- reduction of communal grazing areas, leading to decrease in livestock numbers and overstocking.
- use of agricultural practices from the high lands not suitable for the semi-humid zone.

##### b. AEZ V (semi arid)

Also in this zone the mixed agriculture/livestock farming system is the main land use pattern but with the livestock enterprise relatively more important than in AEZ IV. The zone is suitable for sorghum and millets, but maize is the dominant crop, resulting in high crop failure rates. The constraints as in AEZ IV are valid for AEZ V.

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<sup>2</sup>) See also Annex 4



c. AEZ VI & VII (arid)

Nomadic livestock keeping is the main enterprise, with agricultural production at a small scale in the 'key production areas' (i.e. small pockets of high potential areas situated in a marginal potential area). The long term trend in livestock production is a declining one as a result of loss of pasture lands to agriculture, settlements and wildlife reserves. A major threat is the loss of key production areas serving as dry season grazing areas (the lifeline of nomadic livestock keeping). As a result the pastoralists are increasingly dependent on sources outside the livestock sector: i.e. mainly shifting cultivation in the dry areas. Moreover pastoralists are increasingly dependent on exchange of animals for grain, leading to a decline of the herd below the 'viable herd sizes', leading again to exchange of animals for grain, etc. The foregoing has resulted in sedentarization of pastoralists. Resource degradation in the form of de-vegetation and declining bio-diversity is most serious in the dry season grazing areas, around settlements and water points.

d. Transitional zone between ASAL and the high potential areas

A special zone is the transition between the highlands and the ASAL; in the Rift Valley, this zone is marked by an escarpment (Keiyo, Marakwet and West Pokot). The land use here is natural or planted forest and woodlands. This zone forms a major water source for drinking water and irrigation. Due to land pressure this zone is increasingly brought under cultivation (often at steep slopes) and is used for grazing areas, leading to de-forestation, soil erosion and depletion of water sources.

The afore mentioned constraints in resource use lead to the following resource conflicts:

- livestock - agriculture: the arable lands in AEZ IV & V, formally used as dry season grazing areas are increasingly brought under cultivation.
- livestock - wildlife: the establishment of wildlife reserves has deprived the pastoralists from important dry season grazing areas.
- agriculture - wildlife: crop damage as a result of wildlife menace is substantial.

### 2.2.2 Perspectives

Improvements in agricultural and livestock production are still possible. According to the ASAL policy document <sup>3</sup>, the production could be doubled predominantly in AEZ IV & V through improved dry land farming and livestock management. The main question here is whether the pace of production increase can cope with the population increase.

In AEZ VI & VII, the perspectives are more pessimistic. By now it is believed that pastoralism is the most optimal production system in those harsh areas. Modern range management techniques can not contribute to improvements in this system. Mobility of the herds is a pre-condition for optimal use of the water and pasture resources in the arid areas.

### 2.2.3 The extent of resource degradation

There is not much quantitative information on the extent of resource degradation in terms of decline in productivity, loss of biological diversity, soil erosion and sedimentation or major changes in hydrological regimes. In the existing literature and documents, resource degradation is mostly described in qualitative terms. See f.e. Mwichabe, 1997 for an overview of present knowledge on the extent of resource degradation.

Experience from the four ASAL Programmes has revealed the following:

- In West Pokot, resource degradation is evident in the escarpment in the southern part of the district and in the elevated areas in the centre and north through de-forestation, subsequent use of the lands for grazing and cultivation leading to soil erosion and affecting the water sources.  
By expanding cultivation in AEZ IV and V in the southern parts and in the key production areas, the pastoralists are deprived from their dry season grazing areas,

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<sup>3</sup>) Development Policy for ASAL, MRDASW, September 1992.



leading to the agriculture - livestock conflict.

- In Keiyo and Marakwet, similar resource problems consist in the escarpment as in West pokot. Moreover, over-stocking in the valley has led to impoverishment of the pastures, leading to widespread gully erosion.
- In Laikipia, resource degradation in the form of serious impoverishment of pastures, even with complete de-vegetation and consequent erosion is visible in the Mukugodo Division.  
Resource degradation is likely to be induced in the former range lands where lands have been divided and allocated to small holders on marginal or non viable units.
- In Kajiado, signs of pasture degradation in the form of disappearance of perennial grasses, intrusion of impalatable species (green desertification) and sometimes complete de-vegetation are evident.

An interesting recent publication is the one of Rainy & Worden who made a statistical analysis of range monitoring data from the Department of Resource Surveys and Remote Sensing in the period 1977-1994. It appears that in the past 20 years the number of (herbivore) wildlife has decreased by 33%; also livestock shows a declining trend (10% in 20 years). Although one has to be careful with interpretation and extrapolation of these trends, especially because of the always fluctuating numbers in wildlife and livestock as a response to changes in weather conditions, the conclusion may be drawn that a serious decline in biomass has happened in the past 20 years, which can certainly be attributed to a large extent to rangelands degradation. Extrapolation of the trends would lead to an extinction of most wildlife species and livestock by the beginning of the next century. In discussing the consequences of range degradation the authors state that the sharp increase in (armed) cattle raids in the northern parts of Kenya "can not be explained simply by invoking the traditional propensity for stock raiding by pastoral people" (...) but "may well be a modern human response to environmental degradation of the region's rangelands that is unprecedented in extent and severity".

#### 2.2.4 Factors contributing to the present status of resource degradation

One of the main and most often mentioned factors contributing to resource degradation is the population growth leading to an increasing land pressure. This is especially true for the AEZ IV and V, where there is an influx of people from the high potential areas, (but also from the dryer zones of AEZ VI & VII). Whereas the national population growth amounts to 3.3%, this figure is estimated to be between 6.5 and 10% in AEZ IV & V, while some of the more remote and dryer areas show a negligible or even negative growth. As employment opportunities in other economic sectors are extremely limited, the growing population continues to be depending on the existing (limited) resources for their livelihood.

While population growth is certainly one of the main factors, the factors related to land tenure and land use policy are equally important:

- the skewed land ownership pattern: the existing land distribution is characterized by a small group of Kenyan elite owning large private holdings and an ever growing group of peasants, that has to earn its living from a relatively small arable area. Population growth in the group of peasants leads to fragmentation of the farms, overuse of resources through decrease in cultivation cycle in the (former) shifting cultivation method and migration of people to (agricultural) marginal areas. On the other hand, there is clear evidence that the resources on the large holdings (especially in the high lands) are under-utilized.
- there is still no comprehensive national land use policy. The present legislation on land use and land tenure is characterized by a large number of laws and amendments scattered over various acts; inherently the implementation or enforcement of these acts is divided over different institutions at different administrative levels.



- the non enforcement of existing legislation towards land use and land tenure as laid down spread in various acts and laws.
- the present land adjudication process is accompanied by a large degree of uncertainty about status of land due to land grabbing practices, political influences, practices of land buying companies and long procedures.

The lack of a comprehensive land use policy and the non enforcement of the present legislation leads to for example:

- the uncontrolled expansion of agricultural lands in AEZ IV and V and sometimes VI, not taking into account the importance of the dry season grazing areas for the pastoralist system and not taking into account the feasibility of lands for agriculture.
- the division of former range lands into units which are marginally or non viable for agriculture.

Another important factor is security; large tracks of lands especially in the northern parts of the country remain underutilized because their inaccessibility due to insecurity.

Other factors contributing to resource degradation are more of technical nature such as the use of agricultural practices from the high potential areas in the ASAL, and the shortening of the cultivation cycle in (the former) shifting cultivation in AEZ IV & V, without taking measures to maintain soil fertility levels.

#### 2.2.5 The effects of resource degradation

The effects of resource degradation are manifold. The first most important one is that it deprives the people from their primary source of living (agriculture and livestock) of which 80% of the national population is depending with even a higher percentage in the predominantly rural areas of the ASAL. A direct national economic effect is that apart from the loss of productivity of the lands, the tourist industry will be affected in the coming years due to the decrease of wildlife numbers and extinction of wildlife species.

The people dropping out of the system and joining the impoverished army of the unemployed in the urban areas and the increase in cattle raids are the most important social effects of resource degradation.

The environmental effects, in terms of loss of arable lands, loss of vegetation loss of biodiversity, are evident.

### 2.3 **The relevance of resource management in ASAL**

#### 2.3.1 Definitions and aims of resource management and land use planning

Resource management means the management of natural resources (soil, water, flora and fauna) in such a way that it leads to an optimal sustainable use; whereas optimal use means: (1) maximum productivity without exploiting the resources and (2) with consent of all stakeholders involved.

Resource (or land) use planning is a tool used in resource management and it involves the entire process of land evaluation, assessment of present use, identification of promising land utilization types and (most important) the decision-making process on resource use with all stakeholders involved.

The aim of land use planning is to create the preconditions to achieve a sustainable, environmentally sound, socially desirable and economically appropriate form of land use (Sombroek & Eger, 1997).

Different levels of land use planning can be distinguished. In the Kenyan (administrative)



context the most relevant levels are <sup>4</sup>:

1. National; At national level the government machinery will be mostly involved in the zoning of the country for different uses (urban, industry, agriculture & livestock, game and forest reserves, etc.). An important task at national level is to formulate the legislation for land use and land tenure in accordance with the appropriate use of the resources and in accordance with the interests of the different stakeholders as can be distinguished at national level.
2. District; At district level, the district government will, within its mandates, be involved in developing of (land use) strategies for specific identified homogeneous zones; it will indicate priority areas for interventions; and it has the task to solve resource conflicts within its mandate.
3. Local (village, farm, catchment, etc). At this level land use planning aims at strengthening the capacity of the local population (the land users) to manage their resources properly (by increased and sustained productivity).

From the analysis in par. 2.2 and the definitions and aims as described above it may be clear that land use planning is not a panacea for the present ongoing resource degradation.

In many areas, especially in AEZ VI & VII, there is hardly scope for maximizing the resource use in a sustainable way. An exception forms the improved use of the resource of wildlife. Further land use planning may contribute here to a non exploitive way of resource use by trying to make agreements between the stakeholders of commonly used resources. More important is however to find/create alternative employment ('getting people out of the system') either in other economic sectors or through creating access in the areas with under-utilized resources (the large private holdings in the range lands and high potential areas). This situation is existing in parts of Kajiado District and the Mukugodo Division in Laikipya.

Within the ASAL programmes, the focus here should be on education to improve the opportunities for alternative employment and on (the political sensitive issue of) family planning.

As stated in par. 2.2.2, there is still scope for production increase in AEZ IV & V. It is estimated that there is still a significant potential of doubling the present level of production. Land use planning here can contribute to a better use of resources for an increased sustainable productivity.

### 2.3.2 Policies on land use

#### GOK Policy

The economic growth rates realized from government investment since independence were impressive (recording an average GDP of 6%) but income and social disparities developed and persisted between the urban, high potential and ASAL communities. Consequently, the government establishment a ministry (MRDASW later expanded to MLRRWD) in 1989 to coordinate the ASAL development process; and which in 1992, put in place a comprehensive "Development policy for ASAL" whose main thrust is ..." integrated and holistic development programmes which must remain flexible enough to take account of new knowledge and technology, special features of natural resources, social condition of each area, people's perceptions and capacities for contribution and involvement, natural resources in each area, the nation's means to develop them on a sustainable basis and the nation's overall requirement and tempo for development". One of the cornerstones of the

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<sup>4</sup>) See "Land Use Planning for ASAL Districts, Report of the backstop mission; July 1995, page 13-17" for definitions, concepts and aims of land use planning at district and local level".



ASAL policy is the provision for natural resource and environmental management in which it is stated that in the ASAL, the scarce natural resources comprise delicate ecosystems which are vulnerable to the impacts of natural and man made disturbances. This makes environmental management a key concern in the development process. The purpose of providing strategies for natural resource and environmental management is to ensure that the various uses to which land and land based resources are put do not precipitate nor accelerate the desertification process and that the biological diversity encumbered and/or endemic in ASAL is either conserved or ameliorated. This has to be achieved through three processes viz:

- Land Use Planning under which land use zoning is necessary to ensure that production systems spontaneously improve the land resources through a systematic effort to restrict and/or promote (in space and time) certain land use patterns to ensure land is put to the best productive use possible with the least damage to ecological linkages and balances. This strategy is urgently needed in the semi-arid areas including Laikipia, Kajiado, Narok and Samburu districts where the zoning policy will resolve the importation of inappropriate agricultural technologies; prevent sub-division of land into units too small to be economic and/or effective for resource management and conservation and facilitate resolution of conflicts related to access to key production areas by agriculture, pastoralism, wildlife, settlements and urbanization. The carrying capacity concept to be applied to ensure that land parcels conform with optimal economic and ecological units.
- Environmental Impact Assessment as an integral activity of the appraisal stage of the project cycle as a means of ensuring that planned project activities do not result into adverse side effects to the natural resources and/or the environment surrounding man and other living creatures. It will be mandatory that all projects and programmes in ASAL are subjected to an environmental impact assessment exercise to determine if they have potential to accelerate processes such as soil and vegetation degradation, sanitation problems in case sedentarization and urbanization are expected, pollution problems.
- Conflict Resolution Mechanisms. The problem of increased intensity of land use by pastoralists and farmers around protected areas requires that an appropriate management strategy is formulated by supporting the Kenya Wildlife Service's approach of rural development and wildlife conservation; particularly for wildlife outside Parks and Reserves as a way of achieving the dual purpose of conserving wildlife populations and natural eco-systems as well as increasing the economic and other benefits from wildlife to the local communities. Also the Government has to grant user rights to the hunter-gatherers in ASAL areas who reside in pockets of protected areas so that they can continue to derive their livelihoods while at the same time participate fully in the preservation of the flora and fauna.

Since 1992, the MLRRWD has made an effort to introduce Natural Resource Management as a central theme in its investments in the rural development of the ASAL through land use planning. At the same time there has been systematic de-centralizing of the action planning process further down to the district level. As a result, initial "District Specific - Environmental Action Plans" (DS-EAP) have been developed by efforts from district, divisional and sometimes locational environment management committees from the 24 ASAL districts. These plans generally summarize the physical and human environments in each district; highlighting the status and trends of development by sectors and possible impacts of such development on the environment. There is an analysis of the key environmental issues, their possible causes and possible points of intervention. These action plans are being refined further through the plans of operations and annual workplans of the respective districts especially where there are DIDPs such as Lamu, Kilifi, Taita-Taveta, Kitui, Tana River, Kajiado, West Pokot, Laikipia, Keiyo and Marakwet.



## GON Policy

The GON policy on sustainable land use as laid down in a Sectoral Policy Paper (1993) stresses the following elements: need for strengthening of community participation, introduction of risk minimizing farming systems and stimulation of off-farm and non-pastoralist activities. The document emphasizes the need for a thorough analysis of the factors which have led to the present environmental situation at national as well as at regional level as a basis for an adequate strategy development in sustainable land use. Since 1993, the RNE in Nairobi is putting this policy into practice among others in the ASAL programmes. Resource management was considered a focal issue in (especially), the ASAL programmes and consequently land use planning was introduced in the four programmes since then.

Recently the RNE issued a policy statement on land use planning (RNE 1997) which concludes that: "Land use planning may help to ensure that districts and programmes formulate the right priorities and spend funds in a focused, cost effective way to achieve optimal land use and district development in a sustainable manner. In this way land use planning is regarded as a central theme in the programmes, not by ignoring or excluding other sectors, but by providing guidance to decision making in all sectors".

### 2.4 Land use planning in the ASAL planning process

#### 2.4.1 ASAL planning process over time

The original concept of the (Dutch funded) ASAL programmes that started in the late '70s (West Pokot and Elgeyo Marakwet) was to contribute to and strengthen the de-centralized planning process in the districts in line with the then recently developed government policy of decentralized planning known as the District Focus for Rural Development Strategy. Planning activities entailed training of Sub DDCs at divisional and locational level (mainly in explaining the district focus planning methodology and in training of project formulation). Moreover the programmes provided assistance to heads of the line departments to improve their planning capabilities, based on the district focus strategy.

"Low input" was another aspect of the original concept, meaning that financial assistance would be limited to 10% of the district's development vote, and technical assistance to one (expatriate) advisor. The concept was based on the philosophy that rural development would take off counting on the (human) resources as available in the districts. By providing advise on a few key issues and through focused investments, this process of district rural development could be accelerated.

In Kajiado which started in the early 80's, the approach was slightly different. From the beginning the programme aimed at setting the development process in motion at grassroot level through the organisation of functional groups.

After more than 10 years experience with the district focus strategy and "low input philosophy", the following conclusions could be drawn:

- The ASAL activities were by and large constituted from the "shopping lists" from the line departments; at best formulated at grass root level following the "district focus" and at best scrutinized by the ASAL programmes according to a developed (sectoral) strategy.
- The type and volume of the activities were mainly based on the implementation capacity of the line departments and not according to a developed strategy or policy based on a thorough problem analysis.
- The activities were sectoral and dispersed all over the district, showing little coherence and integration and therefore also little tangible impact.
- The financial contribution to the districts exceeded the 10% district development



vote manyfold and there are indications that the contribution of central government to the districts decreased because of the presence of the donor.

In recognizing the disadvantages of the followed concept, the programme in Elgeyo Marakwet attempted to improve the bottom up planning through an intensive training campaign based on (the then known) methodology of OOP in all sub-locations of the project area. The methodology contained a situational analysis of development constraints and prospects and formulation of a development strategy. In this way it was expected that communities would come up with project proposals based on the situational analysis and based on the formulated strategies.

The advantage of this methodology was that the long term constraints and perspectives (often related to resource management) were included in the interaction with the people.

The disadvantages were:

- still the activities were spread all over the district and
- the projects/activities as formulated by the community groups were (as could be expected) directed at solving the immediate (short term) needs. The activities were of the service delivery type (water supply, health, education, roads) or belonged to the category of (short term) income generating activities. Understandably projects which will only provide benefits at the longer run will not have priority, especially for the poorer segments of the population.

Although the followed approach is certainly considered an improvement in relation to participatory planning, it is not sufficient to tackle the core problem of resource management. When relying on the wishes (direct needs as formulated by the people) only, one may not expect that, even with intensive sensitization, people give priority to the long term problems.

Activities related to resource management in the (then three) programmes included: water supply (people, livestock and for irrigation), agricultural extension, genetic improvement of cattle and small stock, pasture improvement, soil conservation, re-forestation. As a result of the planning procedure, these activities were dispersed over the district and showed little integration with each other and other sectoral activities.<sup>5</sup>

This led to various questions on the effects of the activities. For example:

1. The programme in Kajiado has a project on water development (construction of pans). The effect on livestock intensities and related grazing patterns is not known.
2. With the genetic improvement of livestock it is often assumed that the farmer/pastoralist automatically will de-stock its local breeds. This assumption is however never shown in reality.

As a general result of the followed approach the programmes have not been able to really (start to) tackle the main issue of resource management in a systematic and integrated manner.

One of the conclusions of the 1993 evaluation was therefore to give a high priority to the main issue in ASAL formulated as "productive development". Land use planning was considered an important tool to set a process of sustainable productive development in motion. The recommendations were endorsed by the MLRRWD and the RNE and in the programme phase after 1993, operationalization of resource management became an important policy issue.

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<sup>5</sup>) An exception forms the catchment area programme as developed in West Pokot, characterized by an integration of sectoral activities (mainly agriculture and forestry); attention to landownership was given through the "unofficial" land adjudication process, where agreements were made on ownership of the lands and its use. Unfortunately no attention was paid to this programme anymore after 1993.



#### 2.4.2 The role of land use planning within the ASAL planning process

Land use planning is compatible with the ongoing process of decentralized planning in the districts, but it adds the following components:

- It takes resource management as the focal issue in the planning process: firstly by giving priority in area selection to those areas where resource problems/conflicts exist and/or where there is a potential for sustainable resource management and secondly by analyzing the short and long term (resource use) constraints with the target groups.<sup>6</sup>
- It requires an integration of sectors in the planning process. However sectoral activities are often the output of the integrated planning process.
- Concentration of activities in selected priority areas. One of the characteristics in area selection is that all stakeholders of (a) common resource(s) should be involved. Depending on the situation this could be a transect or catchment (Keiyo & Marakwet and West Pokot), a group ranch (Kajiado, Laikipya (Mukugodo Division)), the area where stakeholders live using a common major water source (West Pokot) or a key production area (West Pokot).
- It seeks a balance between activities directed at short term and long term benefits, between interventions in the services sector and the productive sector. Probably this is the most complicated aspect of the planning exercise, it requires the skill of negotiated decision-making, of putting conditions to the people's requests and wishes; it is bringing in the element of 'carrot & stick'.

The process of negotiated decision-making is best illustrated with the following two examples:

1. In the programme of Keiyo & Marakwet, a long period was needed to convince target groups, district officers and politicians on the role and necessity of land use planning. The programme is now in a stage where people are organised in an area with common resources (the transect). Functional committees are established (TAC) and after an intensive training and sensitization, activities as formulated and proposed by the people and approved by the TAC are being implemented. In this process of project formulation a considerable portion can be categorized as service delivery (water supply, etc). Now the programme is a stage to put conditions to the TAC's related to the balance between activities belonging to the social sector and productive/environmental sector and to activities directed at long term and short term benefits. The annual plans are scrutinized on this balance but also on the achievements of previous years in this respect.  
In this way the TA approach has the potential to set a process of sustainable development in motion by integrating the long term constraints with short term benefits.
2. In Kajiado, the outcome of a participatory land use planning exercise in one area was the decision that as a first step in the process a dispensary needed to be constructed, being the people's first priority. By starting an activity in the service delivery sector, the 'carrot has been given away' and it will be difficult to ask from the people in a later stage to 'invest' in their environment for the sake of future increased productivity. In this case something went wrong in the 'negotiated decision making' between the stakeholders and the people guiding the local land use planning exercise.

- The planning procedure combines the elements of "top-down" and "bottom up":
  - a. The officers involved in local level land use planning exercises, have, before entering into the dialogue with the stakeholders, acquired a good insight in

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<sup>6</sup>) This component is often called sensitization or awareness raising of the people on the resource issues in their area, pre-assuming that people are not aware of their (environmental) situation. In this way the sensitization campaigns often becomes a top-down exercise.

In most cases the people are very aware of their situation and have ideas, visions how to solve environmental problems. Therefore sensitization campaigns should be much more of a dialogue type of exercise by linking with and building upon the ideas/visions of the land users.

technical/physical aspects of the resource constraints and perspectives in the concerned area. In the dialogue they have to indicate the possibilities and impossibilities of problem solutions. In other words: they determine the degrees of liberty in resource management.

- b. "Seeking the balance" and "putting conditions" to the wishes (direct needs) of the people in the planning of activities is a "two-way" decision making process.
- c. Enforcement of existing legislation or enforcement of by-laws as developed in the planning process is a necessary top-down element.

#### 2.4.3 Limitations and conditions of successful land use planning

The main limitation of the planning tool is the earlier mentioned fact that it only can be successfully applied if the process leads to increased sustainable productivity; in other words there are not many perspectives of using the planning tool in AEZ VI & VII.

A conducive legal environment in terms of a clear legislation and an institutional setting capable to implement and enforce the legislation, is an important factor for successful land use planning.

Security on landownership or access to land for specific purposes should be guaranteed, either through the 'modern system' of privatization of land through land adjudication or through the 'traditional' land tenure systems.

Implementation should be part and parcel of the planning process. The process should be considered a cyclic one, where agreements on land use improvements are directly followed by implementation which is followed again by formulation of other activities etc. In this way the confidence between the people and the programme can be established.

As the afore mentioned four limitations and conditions appear to play a crucial role in the land use planning in the four districts, these will be discussed more in detail in chapters dealing with the review of the land use planning activities (chapters 3 & 4), while in chapter 5 the significance of



### 3. LAND USE PLANNING IN THE DISTRICTS, STATE OF AFFAIRS

#### 3.1 Keiyo & Marakwet

##### 3.1.1 State of affairs<sup>7</sup>

After a difficult start, where a relatively long period was required to convince district officers, politicians and local people on the importance of resource management, the Programme introduced the Transect Area Approach (TAA): an approach addressing the interrelated land use issues of the highlands, the escarpment and the valley in a the physical and organisational framework of a transect. Presently the programme is implementing the approach in four pilot areas (transects): two per district.

The approach entails the following (planning) steps:

1. Set-up of basic organisation: identification of partners, development of an organisational framework within the districts.
2. Elaborating the concepts of TAA within the created organisational framework.
3. (Transect) Area selection based on pre-defined criteria.
4. Training and awareness raising for divisional staff, local leaders and communities
5. Data collection through PRAs.
6. Establishment of the organisational framework in TAs. Transect Area Committees (TACs) were set up being the coordinating body at TA level with representatives from the Project Management Committees (PMCs). The PMCs can be considered as the primary functional groups which are planning, proposing and implementing the project activities in the TA. The TAC is responsible for development of Community Action Plans (CAP), providing guidelines on environmental management, M&E, and approval of an annual workplan for the transect.
7. Planning and design: Development of CAPs by and with communities; development of indicative land use plans and merging the indicative Land use plan with the CAP into annual work plans.
8. Endorsement of workplans in ASC and DDC.
9. Implementation .
10. Monitoring and Evaluation.

Implementation of the TAA is accompanied by intensive training programmes at district, transect and grass-root (PMC) levels. Implementation of projects through PMCs started since mid 1996. At present there are over 200 PMCs with projects in different stages of implementation. In Marakwet the process is in a more advanced stage than in Keiyo.

##### 3.1.2 Assessment, conclusions and recommendations

In view of the thoroughly prepared developed approach, the functional institutional setting of TACs and PMCs, the particular attention paid to the training component and based on the field visits, the mission is of the opinion that the Programme has laid a thorough foundation for successful implementation of community based (local level) land use planning.

Moreover, with the TAA being the central approach in Phase III, the Programme has adopted resource management as a focal issue in its strategy, rather than a separate activity.

Notwithstanding the foregoing positive conclusion, the mission made the following observations:

- a. The effectivity and impact of the adopted approach can only be assessed after successful implementation of a substantial number of (environmentally sustainable) activities. At present the number of finalized projects is too small to make a proper judgement.

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<sup>7</sup> See for elaborated description of state of affairs: "Status Report on Land Use Planning in Transect Area Approach for Sustainable Rural Development in Keiyo and Marakwet Districts; May 1997.



Another aspect is that the acceptance by the communities of adhering to agreements such as 'vacating 'red zones' or 'buffer zones' could not be tested as yet.

- b. Although awareness raising on environmental issues is considered important for resource management, it is not a guarantee that environmental sustainable activities will be proposed by the beneficiaries. With the projects/activities being proposed and formulated by the communities (PMCs), the danger exists that the proposals are biased towards activities with direct short-term benefits. Conditions for project proposals are presently set by the PMU. However a more systematic system of built-in conditionalities is required at different levels:

- project/activity level: projects are scrutinized on resource management conditions
- TA level: TA annual plans should show a balance between 'short term benefit projects' and 'environmental effective projects'. The TACs should be evaluated on the balanced implementation of the TA plans. Moreover a sequence of activities could be built in (carrot-stick): projects favoured by the population (dispensary, school, upgraded cattle, etc) only to be implemented after successful implementation of environmental sustainable projects (protection of micro-catchments, vacating buffer areas, etc)
- District level: similar procedures as applied at transect level could be adopted at district level.

- c. Most of the time and energy of the programme went into the establishment of the framework for local level land use planning. At district level the following achievements were made:

- improved coordination between line agencies in planning and implementation through coordination mechanisms as ASAL Steering Committee (ASC) and Transect Area Project Committee (TAPC).
- progress in analysis of environmental constraints (as a basis for development of strategies) through a number of training sessions and workshops.

However little progress is made on the elaboration of strategies on the most crucial issue of the livestock production system (livestock densities estimated four times the carrying capacity). As the programme is becoming fully in the implementation phase, the demand for innovative activities on this subject becomes evident. Therefore it is recommended to give priority to this issue following three tracks simultaneously:

- community level: through (i) putting the livestock issue on the agenda in the dialogue with the community (in TAC and PMC meetings), (ii) monitor the effects of project activities on livestock numbers and density.
- research level: more information is required on the dynamics of the livestock production system through farming systems research (see also 1993 recommendations).
- experiences from elsewhere: as the livestock issue is prominent in large parts of Eastern Africa, lessons could be learned from experiences elsewhere in the region either through bringing in specialized expertise or visiting ongoing promising activities (study tours).

- d. As implementation of activities has just fully taking of in 1997, the implementation capacity is not yet felt being a constraining factor. At present the question on what has to be done (in terms of volumes of work) and what can be done (in view of implementation capacity) can not be answered yet. It is therefore recommended to:

- elaborate the indicative land use plans into (indicative) volumes of work and required implementation inputs.
- to set a timeframe for the development of the TAs based on required volumes of work and implementing capacity of the TAC through the PMCs and district line agencies.

- e. As already can be foreseen in the present planning stage, the lup process will be



soon confronted with legal issues: such as adherence to agreements made on vacating 'red zones' (areas with severe resource degradation) or agreements on grazing areas. These agreements need to be laid down in bye-laws that need approval from the DDC to make these legal.

In that respect the existing (often informal) linkages between the created institutions for land use planning (PMC, TAC) and district institutional structure need to be strengthened and formalized.

### 3.2 West Pokot

#### 3.2.1 State of affairs

Since 1995 the following lup related activities were undertaken:

- |                |                                                                                                                                                        |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| November 1995: | LUP workshop in the District, in which a general framework was elaborated, pilot areas identified and an action plan formulated.                       |
| April 1996:    | Support mission on LUP from ETC.                                                                                                                       |
| October 1996:  | Preparation of 1997 Work Plan, which declares LUP (resource management) to be an innovative activity as well as a 'powerful' planning tool.            |
| February 1997: | Recruitment of a Land Use Planning Coordinator within the PMU.                                                                                         |
| March 1997:    | Participatory Planning Workshop for Resource Management: training on planning tools (logframe, participatory planning tools) and again an action plan. |
| May 1997:      | Outline for the LUP strategy, based on the foregoing workshops.                                                                                        |

#### 3.2.2 Assessment, conclusions and recommendations.

It has to be concluded that 4 years after the 1993 evaluation and 2 years after the 1995 backstop mission little tangible has been achieved on resource management. Even ongoing successful activities related to lup (integrated catchment area approach) developed during phase II, discontinued in phase III. Only since late 1996 LUP came again on the agenda through incorporating LUP in the programme approach and by recruitment of the LUPC.

Based on the discussions with the PMU and ASAL contact officers, the mission came to the following observations:

- a. The 1995 recommendation is repeated that high emphasis should be given to initiate the local level land use planning process. In that respect the mission recommends that the proposed district wide desk study and RRA for the selection of pilot areas is kept to a minimum, because:
  - a lot of information on district resources is already available; the WRAP report provides a comprehensive overview and more important: the knowledge of the district officers on environmental issues is substantial.
  - based on the available knowledge a justified selection of pilot areas can be made<sup>8</sup>.
  - it is better to utilize the (scarce) resources for conducting surveys/investigations in the selected pilot areas in order to rapidly initiate the local level planning exercise.

A short review of the existing available information would suffice to verify the selection of the pilot areas. Further data collection should focus on further

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<sup>8</sup>) The mission had a workshop-like meeting with the district officers; during this workshop a 'quick and dirty' selection of pilot areas was done, based on identified selection criteria (resource degradation, resource conflicts, implementation capacity, access, poverty indicators, etc.). The exercise resulted in the same selected areas as in the 1995 workshop. It is therefore recommended to limit the research efforts to these pilot areas only.



refinement of the boundaries of the pilot areas, identify the land use conflicts (user groups for different resources) and identify the approach (catchment/transect, village or sublocation as homogeneous unit, etc)

- b. The workshop proceedings (especially the 1997 one) are considered to be too abstract for direct utilization in the local level land use planning process. What is required by now is the guidance (backstopping) of a land use planner, experienced in local level land use planning, to assist in the formulation and review of the subsequent steps in the planning exercise. Or in other words: the general framework as formulated in the 1995 workshop needs to be 'translated' into concrete planning steps.
- c. A lot can be learned from the Keiyo & Marakwet experience, where the land the planning exercise is in a more advanced stage, especially regards the establishment of the organisation structure, awareness raising and training in project formulation and implementation with primary groups. Moreover there are many similarities in resource management constraints between the two programmes: i.e. the transitional zone between the highlands and the ASAL. Increased collaboration between the two programmes is therefore recommended. A study tour of the DWG-LUP to the district could be a first activity.
- d. The mission strongly endorses the recommendation made in a working paper of the 1997 workshop <sup>9</sup> to lend support to the ongoing activities of the MALDM in the catchment area rehabilitation. ASAL can contribute with the experiences (lessons learned) in the earlier programme of integrated catchment approach (Kerelwa) as well as through training of the more recently available methods in community mobilization; moreover logistic support could be provided.
- e. The mission recommends to strengthen the working relationship with VI and ELCK, which are successfully implementing activities related to land use planning. Possible modes for cooperation are: (i) jointly development of lup strategies, (ii) mutual support in implementation (iii) joint implementation of lup activities.

### 3.3 Laikipia

#### 3.3.1 State of affairs<sup>10</sup>

The Laikipia ASAL Programme has made resource management the central approach of the programme right from the start in 1993:

- a zonation of the district was introduced allowing development of planning strategies for the different zones,
- a scenario study was conducted in 1994 for the smallholder sector indicating different strategies for the identified farming systems,
- the Adaptive Research Unit (ARU) was established to test and monitor several introduced technologies in the different zones of the district,
- a district forum on land use planning was planned (however not yet established) to bring the land use issues at the (district) policy level.

#### 3.3.2 Assessment, conclusions and recommendations

The mission, in general, endorses the followed approach of the programme, especially regards:

- the introduction of various innovative activities,
- the right balance between implementation and research,

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<sup>9</sup>) See: Mwichabe Situma, Quick observations on land use issues in West Pokot District; par II.3

<sup>10</sup>) See for a more elaborate description of the state of affairs: "Current Status of the Programme" Annex 1 to Annual Work Plan 1997



- strategy development: the programme has found a good balance between using the knowledge of the communities, the line agencies and NGOs and external (outside district) expertise,
- the linkages the programme has established with all actors in the district.

The mission had the following observations:

- a. The ARU is instrumental as an interface between research and extension. Over the years ARU has tested a number of introduced technologies through on-farm trials; moreover a number of more in-depth studies has been conducted. After three years of testing, there is a need to evaluate the introduced technologies on their effects on the changes in the farming systems in a more systematic way .  
Closely related to the foregoing is the observation that after 3 years experience the programme should be able to review the scenario's as developed in the 'scenario's study' of 1994. This study gave the framework for strategies for the development of farming systems in the smallholder sector. The study indicated possible interventions for different farming systems. After 3 years experience with a range of interventions, the scenario's can be further elaborated and finetuned as a basis for further strategic development of the smallholder sector.
- b. The District is confronted with a few land use policy issues which need to be addressed at national level:
  - the sub-division of former private ranches through land buying companies into non-viable or marginally viable units for agriculture/ livestock enterprises.
  - the issue of lands for agriculture in the unsuitable agro-climatic zone of V & VI (approx less than 400 mm rainfall area).
  - the issue of the livestock economy in Mukugodo Division, which is undergoing serious soil and pasture degradation due to shrinkage of grazing territory.

Already in 1995 the Programme intended to create a forum at district level to discuss these issues. For a number of reasons no progress was made. The mission recommends to follow the successive steps of:

1. analysis of consequences of the above mentioned land use constraints and identify alternative land use options.
2. discuss the analysis and development options at district level and reach consensus on the major issues.
3. bring the issues at national level at a pre-defined forum.

### 3.4 Kajiado

#### 3.4.1 State of affairs

Land use planning in Kajiado started in 1995 with the coming of the Land Use Planning Coordinator; in the same year a first district level workshop was held where the general framework for the strategy was outlined. Local level lup started in one pilot area and is by now extended to three. A core group at District level was established composed of representatives of the various departments. For the implementation of the local level lup in the pilot areas Divisional Teams were created.

#### 3.4.2 Assessment, conclusions and recommendations

The mission made the following observations:

- a. After two years the created institutions of the Core Group and the Divisional Teams



seem to be well established as appeared from the shown interest and commitment from the team members, the mission has met.

- b. As regards local level lup, the programme has struggled (and is still struggling) with identifying the right methodology. The lup process in the first pilot area of the Kuku Ranch Group resulted in a land use plan indicating a range of sectoral activities to be implemented over time, rather than an analysis of optional strategies for resource management in identified resource conflict areas.

The plan is static in the sense that it presents an implementation plan of activities rather than the development of a circular process of problem identification, development of options, implementation of starter activities, developing/refining options through in-depth analysis, implementation, etc.

In order to rectify above shortcomings in the methodology, a fresh approach based on the 'lessons learnt' is being tried out in a third pilot area of Dalalekutuk. During the field visit the mission concentrated on the followed (improved) planning methodology in local level lup. Based on the field visit, the following observations were made:

- the people were not aware of the purpose of the conducted PRA and other data collection activities.
- the expectations as expressed by the people were related to the project's provision of services (health, education, water).
- people are aware of the increasing resource degradation and some expressed a clear vision on the future development (problems and prospects) of their area.
- the needs assessment seems to be purely bottom-up; the resource issue is not brought into the discussion from the beginning; this together with broadening the problem analysis to the services sector results in prioritization (and expectations) in the more service sector oriented issues.
- the timeframe from first contact with the community until actual implementation of a first (starter) activity is too long to keep momentum in the process (raised expectation versus Programme's inputs). This is related to:
  - . the amount of (field) data collection which is probably too big in relation to the objective of the first step: problem analysis, first identification of strategy, identification of first activity.
  - . the time which is spent on reporting of the data collection
  - . the other activities of the DTs.

- Based on the foregoing, the mission has the following recommendations:

- Restrict (in a first step) the problem analysis to resource management issues.
- Include the resource management issue in the dialogue with the community right from the start. Link with the existing awareness on resource degradation and link with the already existing visions on resource management.
- link with ongoing (successful) activities on resource management (f.e.: crop & livestock intensification around constructed pans).
- review/analyze the first (field) data collection on its necessity for achieving the first step.
- restrict the reporting to a minimum.
- make the process leading to the identification of the first activity as continuous and as short as possible.
- to have a one time exercise leading to the identification of a first activity with key officers in lup and guided/supported by an experienced land use planner.



- c. The first activity regarding district land use planning: the description/analysis of the distinct resource management units was planned to be executed by mid 1996 and to be executed by the ASAL Programme. However only in 1997 this activity will start and is contracted out to ETC Consultants.  
As there is a wealth of information in Kajiado District (WRAP, KARI/KSS, KWS, DRSDS), this exercise will be mainly focused on extraction and analysis of the available information.
- d. The Mission is of the view that the Core Team has been adequately equipped with the tools to effectively coordinate and facilitate the implementation of the land use planning process within Kajiado district. However, there is at the moment no linkage with the DDCs who have a long-term responsibility for land use planning in the district such as the District Environmental Management Committee (DEMC). Furthermore it is anticipated that as progress in Local level LUP is made, issues relating to policy and legal interventions might arise and which will require such a forum to resolve. It is the view of the mission that the CT establishes linkage with the DDC by coopting the secretary of the DEMC who should then assume chairmanship of the CT with the LUPC as its secretary.
- e. The Mission finds that the Core Team has put a lot effort into the development of a GIS based Land Use Planning Information System in collaboration with DRSDS. Reports on studies carried out in the district (by ASAL and others) are being catalogued for archiving and reference. Also field maps sketched from the pilot areas showing cadastre and natural resource patterns are being digitized. For purposes of better time allocation, this information system development exercise should take off from centre stage to allow more time to be expended in the operationalization of the land use planning methodologies at the local level lup; and elaboration of concepts and strategies at the district level. Indeed, the Land Use Planning Information System will best be developed further when implementation has started by which time it will facilitate monitoring of the progress, accessing of effects and forward planning.
- f. The overall conclusion is that the LUP process has not really come of the ground as yet: at local level the programme is still struggling with the methodology, while at district level still a start has to be made. The mission realizes that it takes time to find the right methodologies for the lup process and that only through trial and error the 'right track' can be found.  
However also internal management problems are part of the relatively slow progress in the lup process. Different views between the LUPC, the PO/PA and the ETC Consultants are due to this. However a major flaw in the SNV-ASAL Programme management structure is that the LUPC was primary responsible to SNV Nairobi and not to the PO/PA. This structure allowed the LUPC to work relatively independently from the rest of the ASAL Programme, causing frictions between the LUPC, PO/PA and the ETC Consultants.  
Although the foregoing was rectified during 1996, i.e. LUPC responsible to PO/PA, the procedure has not been formalized as yet. In order to avoid future (management) problems the mission strongly recommends to formalize this.  
With rectifying the said management structure, the mission expects that the PO/PA give more guidance/support to the lup process.
- g. The ASAL Programme has not fully utilized the available expertise in lup in the MLRRWD. The mission recommends to strengthen the linkages between the Programme and the ministry as well as between SNV and the ministry in this respect.

f. Although resource management is considered a priority component in the Programme's policy, it is not yet in the main stream of the ASAL activities. Reasons for this are:

- the relatively isolated 'environment' in which the LUP activities have taken place and
- no outputs are yet available from the LUP exercise to 'feed' the general ASAL policy.

The mission expects that with resolving the flaws in the management structure resulting in a more active role of the PMU in the lup process, resource management to become the central approach in the ASAL Programme.



#### 4. ISSUES IN LAND USE PLANNING

##### 4.1 Incorporation of land use planning in the district planning process

As has been discussed in par. 2.4, land use planning is compatible with the de-centralized planning process of the "district focus". It adds the elements of bringing in resource management as a focal issue; it seeks a balance between interventions addressing the short and long term needs and between interventions in the productive sector and the social sector. In this way land use planning is considered to imply a re-orientation of the present planning process and is not considered as a separate activity.

In reviewing the progress made in this "re-orientation", it may be concluded that:

- In making the transect area approach, the central approach, the Programme in Keiyo & Marakwet has been able to make this transformation.
- In West Pokot the land use planning process is still in an initial stage and therefore it is too early to judge how land use planning will be incorporated in the planning process.
- In Laikipia, resource management has been the focal issue from the start in 1993, while in
- Kajiado, land use planning has remained a separate activity so far.

There are several factors due to these differences in progress:

- a. One factor is the history of the programmes. Laikipia could make a fresh start in 1993, making use of the lessons learnt after more than 10 years experience in ASAL support. On the other hand, the oldest programme in West Pokot has not known drastic changes in the planning approach. Here the 'traditional' way of planning through the line departments is still ongoing and therefore re-orientation of the approach will meet more resistance, especially from the heads of departments who are used to get their share in every annual plan.  
The programme in Keiyo & Marakwet has experienced many changes between the programme phases in terms of approach and in terms of donor organisation.
- b. Another aspect is the perception of land use planning of the PMUs and district officers and the willingness to incorporate it in the programmes. As stated in chapter 2, there is still no consensus on the need of resource management. Some of the PMUs considered land use planning as an extra burden for the PMU for which they considered not to be properly equipped.  
This brings up the issue of monitoring of the ASAL programmes. While resource management is conceived as a priority policy by the MLRRWD and the donor, it took four years before a start was made in West Pokot. More intensive and coordinated monitoring from the Ministry and the donor could have avoided this situation.  
It is recommended that the 1997 overall ASAL review will look into this issue, especially regards coordination mechanisms at the national level.
- c. Closely related to the foregoing is the available expertise in the programmes on land use planning:  
In Keiyo & Marakwet a land use planning advisor is full-time available to assist the programme in guiding the process; moreover the programme has been able to draw upon the available expertise in the country in contracting consultancy firms and the universities on specific issues.  
In Laikipia, the ARU takes a special place in the development of dry land farming through adaptive research, while the PMU is able to acquire the expertise required for specific issues.  
In West Pokot and Kajiado, land use planning advisors are attached to the PMU. Moreover backstopping is provided by ETC Kenya. The main problem here is the definition of the roles of the backstopper and the advisor. It appears that the



- backstopping is not sufficient to get the (local level) planning process of the ground. In both programmes the mission recommended that, in order to find the right track, a land use planner experienced in the local level planning is required to assist in the formulation and review of the subsequent steps in the planning exercise. This requires a more intensive input in the initial stage than presently is provided.
- d. In Kajiado the progress has been seriously hampered because of internal management problems between the Programme and SNV Office, Nairobi as explained in par. 4.4.2.

## 4.2 Policy and legal issues

### 4.2.1 Constraints related to policy and legal issues, as experienced in the districts

One of the findings of the mission is (especially in Keiyo & Marakwet and Laikipia) that as soon as implementation of land use planning activities at the local level starts, they are immediately confronted by matters requiring legal (and policy) action to facilitate further implementation of the LUP activities. The following examples may illustrate this:

1. The local communities in Keiyo are reluctant to implement an action plan indented to create and manage "Buffer Zones" within the escarpment until the security of their investment is guaranteed through the change of land tenure from trustland to freehold under individual title. The mandate to change land ownership from trustland to freehold lies with the District Land Board who has to put a case to the local County Council (who are the custodians of the trustlands on behalf of the residents of the district) to alienate the buffer zones for adjudication, registration and titling. Liaison between community representatives (via TAC), the District Land Board and the County Council of Keiyo has to be forged to enable change of land tenure.
2. Within the transect areas in Keiyo and Marakwet, there are spots within the escarpment and valley which have undergone severe de-vegetation and soil truncation to an extent that the most appropriate option for rehabilitation/reclamation is "exclusion" from both cultivation and grazing (trampling). The spots are referred to as "red zones". Through the various PMCs, some agreements have been reached between the PMCs and the ASAL programme on how the communities will enforce this "exclusion". Whereas awareness raising has enabled the communities to embrace the ideas, it will not always be guaranteed that they will faithfully follow the agreements out of good will without some kind of legally binding provisions. It is the view of the mission that the existing agreements with the respective PMCs be formalised through the respective DDCs and to give the legal approval on these contracts. The best placed avenue is the District Environmental Management Committee. It is still also possible to tactfully use the Chiefs Authority Act to enforce such agreements but a lot of by-laws have to be stipulated to determine the quantum of rights and obligations.
3. In Keiyo and Marakwet districts, it has become necessary to gauge the environmental impact assessment of the activities supported by the programme especially those relating to cattle dips, irrigation schemes, water supply systems and civil works (especially roads). The programme formed a task force out of the DEMC to look into ways and means of effecting this EIA process. Seminars were held and the issues are well articulated. However this task force is in no position to enforce the ideas. The issues should be made the responsibility of the DEMC who have the policy mandate to enforce the EIA process.
4. In Laikipia, the policy and legal issues are way beyond the mandate of the DDC. With an influx of immigrants from the neighbouring high agricultural potential areas (which also have high levels of landlessness), there is a tendency for these immigrants to put their lands under rainfed crop farming where the climate is clearly unsuitable. Cultivation of maize and beans is being extended beyond Agro-Ecological Zones IV into AEZ V and VI. With the present technology level, these cultivations should not be extended beyond AEZ IV. To enforce this, a legal and policy decision has to be made at the national level by the mandated sector technical chief (Director of Agriculture) to restrict extension of cultivation beyond the Agro-Ecological zone IV northwards.
5. Landlessness has forced peasant families of the higher potential areas to seek land within the large scale ranches on the Laikipia plateau with the assistance of land buying companies.



Unlike in the past where the sub-division was based on carefully determined grazing capacity and hence human carrying capacity, the current sub-division is primarily based on equity between the registered members of the company. This means individual parcels are as small as 5 acres and on the average 10 acres, a unit which is below the carrying capacity of 1 Tropical Livestock Unit (TLU) of about 12 ha/TLU. An average family will certainly require far more than 1 TLU to survive. It has become necessary that any further acquisition of the ranches on the plateau by the land buying companies should be guided by law in the sub-division process such that the carrying capacity of the land becomes the key criterion in determining the minimum farm size that is optimal for the families welfare as well as ensuring conservation and guaranteed perpetuity of the natural resources incident on such a piece of land. Again here the way out is a policy decision (which will be legally binding) has to be made by the Commissioner of lands, the Director of Land Adjudication with technical support from the Director of Livestock development to guide the land buying companies in the process of land sub-division.

6. To the north of the Laikipia district lies Mukogodo Division which is inhabited by the transhumant Maasai pastoralists. For centuries, the nomadic pastoral economy has been sustained by access to the Laikipia plateau and the Ewaso Ng'iro Valley and Lorrogi plateau and Ndoto highlands in Samburu during the dry spells to access pasture and water. Of recent, the Laikipia and Lorrogi plateaux have undergone land tenure changes into private freehold farms. This, together with the recent rise in insecurity has curtailed access to the Ewaso Ng'iro Valley and the Ndoto highlands. As such the Maasai find themselves trapped in these rangelands which are poorly endowed with pasture and water. Yet population is on the increase. The future of the livestock economy in Mukogodo division has to be critically examined with a view to introducing drastic changes to stop any further deterioration of the natural resources. The Director of Livestock Development has to look into the most appropriate option for livestock in the division. Alongside this, the government in general has to re-examine the possibility of enhancing off-herd alternatives in livelihood sources. A drastic population policy needs to be taken in the immediate future to forestall a human disaster.

The above examples illustrate that part of the legal issues, with which the programmes are confronted could find their solution at district level; at least the institutions at district level have the mandate to solve them: DDC, District Land Board and the County Council. Other problems, especially those experienced in Laikipia require policy decisions at the national level. Before discussing the recommended approach to be followed in this respect, a short overview on the present debate on land use policy at national level will be dealt with in the next paragraph.

#### 4.2.2 National land use policy, present state of affairs

Arable land in Kenya is scarce, comprising 112,446 km<sup>2</sup> or 19.2% of total land, of which 13,396 km<sup>2</sup> or 2.2% is covered by forests and woodlands, while 460,200 km<sup>2</sup> or 81.8% is arid and semi-arid. 80% of the population live on the arable 17%. Despite its scarcity, land and land based resources are the most important means by which the country generates its economic assets and on which over 80% of the people derive their livelihoods directly. Yet no national land use policy exists as such; except numerous sectoral policies formulated largely in line with the different mandates the government has assigned to sectors and departments dealing with usage and or conservation of natural resources<sup>11</sup>. Therefore the land use policy in Kenya is fractious and comprises diverse sectoral policies governing exploitation and conservation of natural resources incident on land including agriculture, livestock, forestry, wildlife, wetlands, water, environment, research, energy and industry.

Since the late 70s through the 80s, ad hoc reviews of the sectoral mandates have attempted to graft an integrated national outlook into the sectoral policy frameworks. These reviews are presented in form of Parliamentary Sessional Papers, National

<sup>11</sup>) The proceedings of the "Environmental Management Workshop" in Keyo & Marakwet (November 1996) provides a good overview of the present legislation.



Development Plans or Sectoral Action Plans. These papers and plans constitute the main body of what can be called a national land use policy. For example:

1. The Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986 entitled "Economic Management for Renewed Growth" states in part that .. "Anything short of optimal land use would jeopardize the economic future of the country. Private land owners have a social obligation to put their land to the best use. Sanctity of private land will be respected, but it can only operate if private land is used in socially responsible and productive ways. Two misuses of land must be prevented: first, there must be a limit to sub-division of land in to units where total returns to land begin to diminish. Secondly, land must not be allowed to lie idle or be under-utilized in large holdings (...)" and in part recommended for "(...) the government to appoint a high-level commission to review land tenure laws and practices and legislation that will bring conformity to development needs". The commission was to look into taxation and incentives for productivity, regulations limiting sub-division, security of seasonal leases of land for arable farming, means of faster acquisition of land for urbanization and industry and appropriate infrastructure; as elements of the land policy.
2. The National Development Plan of 1988-93 acknowledged that as a result of rapid population growth, the amount of land in medium and high potential areas is not capable of generating adequate income using the present technology; and that population pressure is gradually compelling people to cultivate more marginal lands every year. The plan proposed that to prevent further deterioration of ASAL areas it may be necessary to curb population movements, curb further sub-division of ASALs into uneconomic units, curb the growing of unsuitable crops, and therefore check any further environmental deterioration.
3. The government has recognized the difficult challenge of maintaining the equilibrium between population, ecosystems and development and hence initiated a process for development of a National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP). The process identifies, among other things, the need to review and reform issues relating to land tenure and use, particularly the possibility of massive landlessness in future, access by women, and the need to formulate strategies that are area specific other than blue print applications. The process also entails suggestions on reform measures to manage land use conflicts, encroachment on catchments and recognition of pastoral production systems.
4. The policy followed in the ASAL as described in par. 2.3.2.

It is clear that attempts to arrive at an overall land use policy have been (and are) made. At present, land use and land tenure are topics in the development debate, more so among scientists and donors than among politicians. The ASAL programmes can contribute to this discussion by feeding the debate with 'cases' as experienced in the land use planning process. The function of linking with the national debate is more directed at contributing to the process of creation of a comprehensive and effective legislation, than to the specific problems in the districts.

The policy and legal issues arising out of Laikipia district present the type of linkages that land use planning need to forge with the national level. Since the mandated and institutions on environmental management, land use zoning, land tenure, population and legal provisions are fragmented along sectors; the MLRRWD has to take a lead and organize inputs from the respective sectors into the programmes. For a start, the MLRRWD should organize a national forum in which these issues will be decided upon. Most important however is to strengthen the linkages and support from the national level to the programmes by continuously making decisions legal and policy matters affecting the programmes.

#### 4.2.3 District level

As illustrated in par 4.2.1, the main problems encountered with legal issues at district level are occurring in Keiyo & Marakwet. According to the mission, the main reasons for the non implementation of the legislation are (apart from the earlier mentioned fractious nature of the legislation):



- a. the weakness of the institutions dealing with the legal issues,
- b. the political environment not conducive for solving the land related environmental issues,
- c. the (lack of) linkages between the Programme and the district institutions (see also par. 4.3)
- d. the under estimation of the complexity regards legal issues.

Although the Keiyo & Marakwet programme has made commendable efforts to discuss the legal issues in a wider forum (see workshops on environment and forestry), time consuming efforts will be required to involve the institutions on (legal) land use issues in the TA activities and to improve on the linkages between the programme and the district institutions. Lobbying at political level and "to bring the case into national fora" will be another required activity to achieve the objectives.

Although it is realized the mentioned activities will not guarantee that the issue on legal matters will be solved, the mission is of the opinion that not all possibilities are exhausted.

#### 4.3 Institutions

In addressing land use issues, the LUP process often requires the formation of functional institutions (and groups). The mission finds that to facilitate the LUP process in the districts, there is need to have a pragmatic institutional arrangement which may necessitate the constituting of functional institutions at district and local level.

In Keiyo and Marakwet, the LUP process has led to the emergence of grassroots institutions (Project Management Committees) as well as Hybrid Sub-DDCs (Transect Area Committees) which hang between location and division levels.

In Keiyo-Marakwet and Kajiado, the District Working Groups are not yet directly linked to the DDC as is the case in West Pokot where the Working Group has coopted a head of department (District Environment Officer) as its chairman. In Laikipia, linkages have been innovatively established with the DDC via task related involvement of key departments and committees.

Whereas there is the need to put in place such functional institutions, there has to be a deliberate and systematic effort to link these institutions into the District Focus by coopting key heads of departments into the LUP District Working Groups considering that the committees within the DDC are the ones charged with the long term responsibility for LUP; and also are the only avenues to resolve legal issues affecting the LUP process.

#### 4.4 Strategy development for major land use issues

The mission notes that as the introduction of land use planning progresses, the immediate implication has been (a) diversification and intensification of arable farming (including irrigation) as well as (2) introduction of conservation resource degraded areas (buffer, red zones) in the production/farming systems; both of which take a substantial portion of the water and pasture resources at the disposal of the livestock economy.

The level of strategy development for major resource management issues differs per Programme:

- In Keiyo and Marakwet, all the efforts have gone into 'making the foundation' for local land use planning, while less attention has been paid to working out of solutions/strategies for the crucial resource issues. District officers are still convinced that with upgrading of cattle, pasture improvement and introduction of zero-grazing, the farmers will automatically de-stock their local herds.
- In Laikipia, efforts are made to find entrances for solutions of the Mukogodo issue where pastoralists are confined to the over-stocked and over-populated area in the north east of the district. Communities, district officers as well as researchers from

relevant institutes are involved in this analysis process.

- In Kajiado, the level of understanding of the district officers on the constraints and prospects of the livestock economy is good. Moreover the programme is starting a research on the effect of cattle upgrading on the total herd composition.

It is the view of the mission that the development of concepts towards transforming the livestock economy to be in conformity with LUP should take centre stage within the district LUP activities.

#### 4.5 Concluding remarks

In chapter 3 the state of affairs of the resource management efforts in the four districts was discussed; in this final chapter some of the most important issues were further analyzed. From the foregoing two chapters it may be concluded that:

1. Progress has been made in the methodology development of (mainly) local level land use planning, mainly in Keiyo and Marakwet and to a lesser extent in Kajiado.
2. In searching for innovative technical solutions for major resource management issues the programme of Laikipia is most advanced, while in Keiyo and Marakwet the need for technical solutions of the districts' most urgent problems is felt hardest.
3. The lack of a (national) land use policy, the non-enforcement of the existing policy and the non conducive institutional and political environment are the most constraining factors in implementation of the land use planning process. Many of the identified problems can not be solved at the local or at the district level. It may be expected that some of the local level land use planning exercises may be successful in the future: f.e. improvements in the farming system of the small holder sector in Laikipia (AEZ IV & V), the transects in Keiyo & Marakwet and probably also in West Pokot, as well as the resource management in the group ranches in Kajiado (AEZ IV & V). However the most important issues like Mukugodo Division in Laikipia, the alienation of lands in AEZ IV & V for agriculture, depriving the livestock sector from its lifeline, can not be solved at the district level. The ASAL programmes here can be instrumental by bringing up these issues (making a case) to the national level. The national seminar on the 'Laikipia case' is the first example in this context. The relevance of resource management efforts of the ASAL programmes in contributing to the national debate might be even more important than the successes of land use planning exercises at the local level.



## 5. CONSULTED DOCUMENTS

### 1. General

- MLRRWD, Situma Mwachabe, Background paper on land tenure and natural resource utilization in the Arid and semi Arid Lands of Kenya; February 1997
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- Dietz, T; The Arid and Semi-Arid Lands Programmes in Kenya, with a focus on West pokot, Elgeyo Marakwet and Kajiado, Draft; March 1997
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- Joint Kenyan Netherlands Programme Review ASAL; 1993
- Land Use Planning for ASAL Districts in Kenya, report of the backstop mission; 1995

### 2. Keiyo & Marakwet

- Status Report on Land Use Planning in Transect Area Approach for Sustainable Rural Development in Keiyo and Marakwet Districts; May 1997
- Environmental Management Workshop; November 1996
- Forest Management strategy Workshop; April 1997
- Annual Work Plan 1996
- Annual Work Plan 1997
- Training of Chesasak Sproing Protection PMC; 1997
- Discussion Paper on Monitoring and Evaluation; May 1997

### 3. West Pokot

- Land Use Planning in West Pokot District; A three year proposal for the District Integrated Development (ASAL) Programme, February 1996; ETC Kenya
- Resource Management Area Approach, A strategy for District and Local Level Land Use Planning
- Resource Management Area Approach, An Outline of the Proposed Land Use Planning Strategy in West Pokot; May 1997
- Annual Work Plan 1996
- Annual Work Plan 1997

### 4. Laikipia

- ARU, Annual Report 1996
- ARU, Internal Review Meeting 1997
- ARU, Proceedings of the farming systems workshop 1995
- OVS on Land use change scenarios in Mutirithia & Kariunga
- Annual Work Plan 1996
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### 5. Kajiado

- Proceedings of the Land Use Planning Workshop, held at ASAL Kajiado; June 1996
- Guidelines local level; land use planning, Kajiado district; August 1996
- Participatory Land Use Plan 1, Kuku Group Ranch; December 1996
- Report on second support mission to land use planning in Kajiado district; October 1995; ETC Kenya
- Annual Work Plan 1996
- Annual Work Plan 1997

## ANNEX 1

### Terms of Reference Backstop mission on Land Use Planning for ASAL Districts.

Final version; Date: 9 April 1997

1. Introduction
2. Background
3. The land use activities in ASAL programmes
4. Tasks of the mission
5. The consultancy team
6. Reporting

#### 1. Introduction

##### *ASAL support programmes*

The Netherlands Government supports the MLRR&WD with the implementation of multi sectoral rural development projects in four ASAL programmes (West Pokot, Kajiado, Laikipia, Keiyo & Marakwet). In line with Kenyan and Netherlands policies the theme of sustainable land use should be further developed in the ASAL programmes and integrated in the District planning exercise.

The 1993 bilateral evaluation mission for the ASAL programmes recommended that there should be more emphasis on strategic planning in addition to the implementation-oriented activities of the ASAL programmes. The lack of land use planning has been identified as a major constraint to district development.

The issue of land use in these areas is mainly a matter of land allocation for private ownership and the subsequent land use changes. Large stretches of range lands, formerly Trust Land used by pastoralists, are being subdivided and allocated to individual owners who tend to practice crop cultivation (Laikipia, Kajiado). Widespread and rapid land degradation is usually the result. At the root of land use problems in these areas is the breakdown of traditional land management, the conflict between pastoralists, wildlife and crop cultivation and the population growth through immigration. Rapid deforestation and over-exploitation of the available land (in the valleys as well as on the escarpment), individualization of title resulting in loss of access, uneconomic subdivision undermining productivity, inadequate monitoring of resources, etc. is eminent in the Districts of Marakwet, Keiyo and West Pokot.

In addition other land use issues are the planning and management of water resources and the ample scope for improvement of land use (farm management) on established agricultural land.

The key problem in land use planning (both at national and district level) is that of coordination. Some institutions are dealing with land use planning for food security as sector technical assignments e.g. agriculture, livestock and forestry. Others are dealing with land tenure and its administration e.g. Ministry of Lands, local authorities and Office of the President. Yet others are dealing with land use planning as a natural resource conservation strategy e.g. Kenya Wildlife Services, Forestry etc. What is missing is coordination of policies, strategies and actual implementation of activities on the ground. Also the key actors i.e. GoK, NGOs and resource users are not properly integrated.

The relationship of land use and land tenure can be perceived in three perspectives. Modern and traditional Land tenure determines land use patterns through:

- (i) levels of access to resources by different sectors of communities.
- (ii) guarantee of security of tenure and of investments and operations on land.
- (iii) facilitation of access to credit for optimal resource management and improvement.



Land use planning can significantly contribute towards (iii) in the short term but can only provide baseline information towards (i) and (ii) which are subjects of national agrarian policy and legal reform.

Reference is made to a concept paper, 'Land Tenure and Natural Resource Utilization in the Arid and Semi Arid Lands of Kenya', which gives a summary of the outstanding issues as regards land tenure and land use in ASAL.

The ASAL programmes addressed the above mentioned issues in the respective plans of operation for the period 1995-2000. A backstop mission was fielded in 1995 to appraise the different proposals and where applicable to assess the progress made with the implementation. The mission advised on mainly two aspects: 1. appraisal of proposed strategies and activities on local level land use planning 2. appraise the progress and advise on further forward and backward linkages between local level land use planning and district planning.

## 2. Background

### *Terminology Land Use*

Land use is often defined as "the use of a stretch of land, which involves the interaction between the land and its users and thus encompasses numerous interactions between a bio-physical and socio-economic system". Interactions therefore take place between, on the one hand, bio-physical features (geology, topography, soil, climate, fauna and flora, etc.), and on the other hand, socio-economic features (land tenure, culture, community organisation, marketing etc.). Land use is therefore not static, but may change from one year to the next as part of a dynamic process.

The concept of sustainable land use aims at maintaining land use practices at levels which are necessary to meet the needs of the present population in a sustainable way, i.e. without compromising the ability to meet future needs as a result of excessive environmental degradation. The term sustainable adds a long-term perspective to land use, in addition to the present and short-term focus on land use dynamics. Sustainable land use thus not only refers to environmentally sound land use practices, but also to sustainable development as a whole. The DGIS Policy Document "Sustainable Land Use" stresses the importance of research, data collection and analysis as an important condition to achieve sustainability in rural development (DGIS, 1992).

Land use planning refers to the planning and subsequent management of the use of a certain stretch of land with a given land tenure. It is different from the administrative procedures of land adjudication and land registration, which formally assign a stretch of land to an owner and define its size, location and ownership, without any reference to land use.

At present, the key pillars of sustainable land use in ASAL are:

- (i) Maximizing socio-economic and political-cultural needs and obligations of the local people.
- (ii) Equity or fairness between present and future generations and between gender groups (women, youth etc).
- (iii) Perpetuity of the resources ie. conservation or presentation (biological diversity etc.)

Land use planning is the vehicle to balance the three principles.

### *National level*

Land use planning takes place at different levels from the national level (Central government) down to the farm level (farmer). At the national level the government assigns, for example, large stretches of government or trust land a protected status as National park or Forest Reserve. Central government agencies are often responsible for the management of such areas, i.e. Kenya Wildlife Service, Forest Department. Also at a national level policies are developed that aim to influence land

are given for the different districts. They are for West Pokot 0.9, Keiyo & Marakwet 0.3, Laikipia 1.3 and Kajiado 2.9. From Rainy and Worden's analysis it could be seen that cattle could provide approximately for 50% of the subsistence needs in Kajiado district. According to the FEWS report, available cattle biomass is somewhat less and it shows that the other three ASAL areas are lagging far behind. This corresponds well with the assertion of the Laikipia ASAL, where it was stated that the Mukogodo area was for 11 out of 12 months dependent on famine relief. For the population of West Pokot, Keiyo and Marakwet, livestock has become an almost insignificant source of subsistence.

The urgency of action in the Kenyan rangeland districts is identified in an analysis of the livestock and wildlife counts by the Department of Remote Sensing and Resource Surveys (DRSRS) over a period covering almost 20 years. Rainy and Worden (1997) predicted massive extinction of both domestic and wild herbivore species in the next decade in many of the rangeland districts in Kenya. Their document has been distributed by the Netherlands Embassy and the interpretation will be analyzed by some dutch experts in population dynamics and statistical analysis. Kajiado and Laikipia are districts where the decline in wildlife and livestock is relatively small compared to the more northerly districts. West Pokot, Keiyo and Marakwet were not analyzed, but the adjacent Turkana and Baringo districts were. They show a dramatic decline in all animal species, including all species of livestock. The trend lines in their report show that by the aerial census methods used by DRSRS no more donkeys and cattle will be detectable in Turkana district by the year 2015, goats will become undetectable in 2020 and camels in 2030. Between 1960 and 1997 ten large wild herbivore species have become undetectable and the remaining five species will become undetectable by the year 2025. This general state of affairs is likely to apply to West Pokot, being adjacent to Turkana district. Baringo district is known for its large tracts of degraded land, while still enjoying a rainfall higher than the typical ASAL areas. This district lost four species out of twelve large herbivores to the detection methods of DRSRS between 1980 and 1997 and the remaining species will be gone by 2030 if the regression lines will be correct. In Kajiado six out of sixteen species of herbivores will no longer be detected by the year 2020 and the livestock population will still be sustainable at some level. In Laikipia four out of sixteen species will become undetectable and in addition sheep and goats will become undetectable by the year 2010.

Norton Griffiths (1997) analyzed the DRSRS data set independently and describes a decline in wildlife of 48% in general and of 31% in the protected areas. In districts where landowners have directly benefited from wildlife, e.g. Laikipia, wildlife has not decreased and even increased in numbers. This makes the decline in the more vulnerable districts of the north way above 50%.



These dramatic events show that the habitats in these areas are seriously degrading and losing their productivity. It is therefore essential to look very hard for management scenarios that will address the loss of viable habitat, both for livestock and for wildlife. Changes in wildlife populations may be a very good indicator for decline or improvement in habitat productivity. In this report I describe some management scenarios that have been able to turn this negative trend. On the basis of these and information gathered during area visits I make recommendations for the different project area.

### **Effect of the workshop for the ASAL programmes**

#### Kajiado

Although the plan of setting up a task force for the implementation of the use of wildlife was not carried out, a consultant (David Hopcraft) was hired to assess one large group ranch in the Kajiado district (Oldoinyo Onyokie). Hopcraft's report was not yet available. Elsewhere, Hopcraft writes about his assessment of the group ranch. In his first meeting with elders and tour of the land, everyone becomes impressed with the serious level of land degradation and the general lack of vegetation. In Hopcraft's assessment the system of seasonal grazing was destroyed by the increase in human population with their cattle. As a result people, livestock and wildlife were in poor shape. Hopcraft plans further meetings with the elders to help them make an appropriate management plan.

ASAL and KWS in Kajiado: ASAL felt that they are best placed, because of years of experience and their mission, to carry out community development programs. KWS has now started with their partnership programs and are active in community development. ASAL felt here is an opportunity for collaboration with KWS by offering to carry out community participatory development activities for KWS. ASAL expressed concern that the current KWS approach may be at the expense of anti-poaching and general wildlife management. There appears to be a need for collaboration and integration between ASAL and KWS.

KWS in Kajiado has already set up several registered wildlife associations on the basis of communal landownership. They are: Sagiloni, Ngorika, Lobilibil, Ilmungush & Ildamat land owners associations. There are six others to be formed. KWS expects that these associations will get economic returns from wildlife and also get assistance from KWS with wildlife based conflicts, like crop raiding, predation and human injury or loss of life. KWS sees the role of ASAL as being able to assist in other community needs, like water supply, medical and veterinary services, the establishment of schools, etc. ASAL would also help in rangeland improvement, according to KWS.

In their budget plans for 1997, ASAL has reserved KES 200,000.- for wildlife related activities. They have given support to workshops in one of the major conflict areas around Amboseli. In addition there has been some support for the community of the Kuku group ranch, which is setting up a new wildlife based tourist lodge and carries out consumptive utilization in the form of bird shooting on similar lines as Richard Bonham's lodge at Mberikani (see below: examples of wildlife use in ASAL areas)

The project advisor was very impressed with the way the Olelepo Landowners Conservation Co is being set up and sees this development as an instructive example worth testing elsewhere in the district.

### Laikipia

Before the workshop, the Laikipia ASAL programme had no contact with the Laikipia Wildlife Forum (LWF). Since the workshop, the ASAL project advisor regularly hosts LWF meetings and is in close contact with the leaders of this large group of landholders.

Following the action plan, ASAL has implemented guineafowl farming on approximately 100 small scale farms.

The plan of the Laikipia ASAL is to agree on a zoning of the district, north of which no subdivision of land will be allowed. This would separate the areas where arable agriculture is practiced from the dry rangeland. Part of this border is already fenced by the famous Laikipia wildlife fence. This fence deals with the hard edge between wildlife and small scale farming, where land is at high risk from elephant damage. The separation of rangeland from arable land, would allow to delineate a tract for further fencing, provide protection for small scale farmers and allow wildlife based development north of this zone.

Huber & Opondo have on commission from the ASAL programme studied the consequences of subdivision of ranches in Laikipia and have identified a number of land use scenarios. They calculated the benefits of a wildlife fence for two subdivided areas, Mutirithia and Kariunga area. Assuming that the fence would last for 30 years, they calculate that the benefits based on todays prices would be KES 175m over 30 years or KES 5.8m per year. The authors do however not give the cost of building the fence.

One particular area that ASAL has targeted for wildlife based income generation is the Mukogodo area. This area contains a large forest reserve, surrounded by group ranches. On one of these group ranches, Illegwesi group ranch, a tourist lodge has been established, which is run by the members of the group ranch. According to members of the LWF, this example could be duplicated and the Mukogodo area could be made into one large wildlife conservancy, which would be not only for the benefit of the local



population, but also revert the serious land degradation as already has happened at Illegwesi (further discussed under examples of wildlife use in ASAL areas).

The Laikipia ASAL enjoys excellent relationships with the Laikipia Wildlife Forum. Collaboration with KWS is fair. It was better before the partnership officer was transferred to Nyeri and based in Nanyuki. Similarly to the Kajiado ASAL comments, the project feels that it is better geared to community development than KWS and that collaboration would be mutually beneficial. In this area the lead group is the forum (LWF), which is well placed to coordinate between ASAL and KWS.

#### Keiyo and Marakwet

In Keiyo district in the Kerio valley lies Rimoi National Reserve, an area of 6800 ha of dry woodland with an elephant population of over a hundred animals. This was the target area for the action plan of this ASAL. Since the workshop, this programme has been actively taken up by KWS, supported by KES 18m World Bank support. Initially information reached the ASAL programme, that KWS planned to fence the entire park, which would imply that there is no longer a dispersal area or interaction with the landholders surrounding the area. However, following information obtained from KWS headquarters, it appeared that fencing was not part of the plan. The development was on gates for collection of entrance fees, on the development of roads, office buildings for the Kerio partnership office of the KWS (currently based in Iten) and for the building of some simple tourist bandas. This area should be looked at together with the adjacent Kamnarok National Reserve, which is separated from Rimoi by the Kerio river.

There was a very productive meeting at Iten resulting in an action plan and visit of the reserve ( see below).

#### West Pokot

The ASAL programme identified 25,000 ha of land for development of wildlife based tourism around the Masol hills. David Hopcraft was invited as a consultant to help develop a management plan. This area is also in the Kerio Valley and forms part of an important migration area for elephant through this valley. The selected area borders a game reserve in Turkana and the Nasolot Game Reserve of West Pokot. The area is inhabited by Pokot who are engaged in serious armed conflicts with the Turkana. There are also cattle raids from the neighbouring Uganda Karamajong area. In other words security is the first limiting factor for further development. A brief report from David Hopcraft is available and attached as an appendix.

There is communication between KWS and ASAL. The ASAL programme will support KWS activities and has been considering support of a workshop in Sigor for further development of the Masol hill area for wildlife related activities. However the programme

advisor had to postpone these activities for reasons of insecurity and an assessment that the initial proposal by Hopcraft needs to be adapted to the needs of the Pokot population. The ASAL advisor proposes to develop a joint strategy before going further.

#### General conclusions:

There have been activities to develop a wildlife based land use activity in all programs. All the ASAL programmes have areas with potential for wildlife use coupled with rangeland rehabilitation. There is no potential for game cropping in any of the areas where ASAL has identified an interest in the use of wildlife. In some areas there is scope for bird shooting (Kajiado and possibly Laikipia), but the main potential at present is for some form of community managed tourism. The development of this sector in the ASAL programme are possibly very important, but not of high priority within the current wide range of activities. In all areas the land is over used and badly needs a management strategy that involves resting periods on the basis of rotational grazing. A detailed development plan for such a strategy would have to be worked out with the local communities. A strategy of removing temporarily large tracts of land from continuous grazing could be compensated by income generated from tourism. For scenarios, I refer to examples given below.

#### **Examples of wildlife use in the ASAL areas**

##### **Kajiado**

This district has large potential and actual development in the area of wildlife based tourism. The district is dominated by Masai pastoralists, who are no longer able to make a living from livestock alone. According to Rainy and Worden, the population can on average only subsist for approximately 50% on livestock, which is the main land use activity in the district. There are some areas with limited arable agriculture potential. Looking at the herbivore trends, this district compares favourably with other districts, but even so the trends are downwards. Such trends appear to be indicating a general degradation of lands which will further narrow the possibilities of existence for the increasing human population. The average cattle density since the end of the last century has not changed dramatically, but the number of cattle or kg of cattle biomass per inhabitant has decreased as stated above. If this trend is not halted, land degradation will also lower the productivity per unit land and the population will be increasingly impoverished. Diversification has long been recognized as a need to alter this process, but traditional societies are slow to adapt and realize their own plight. The number one priority is clearly to restore and maintain the natural productivity of the land, regardless of the kind of land use that is advocated. Diversification into wildlife based tourism, eco-tourism or cultural tourism offer an opportunity in some areas to address the general state



of affairs, but are by no means a panacea for the reversal of land degradation. The ingredients for success are a community that is coherent and has every reason to trust each member within the community, a large land holding where the management goal is to safeguard the quality of the land or to reverse downgraded land and at least a remnant wildlife population that can build up to a tourist attraction under good management.

There are a number of wildlife based tourist activities in Kajiado district involving to a greater or lesser extent the pastoral Maasai community. These activities invariably involve a non Maasai tour operator and the Maasai community. The successful operations are commercial, with variable benefits to the Maasai community. I will discuss some examples that may serve and attempt to rate them with regard to community benefits.

### **Commercial operations**

#### **Olelepo Landowners Conservation Co. Ltd**

The Melepo Hills are situated just south of Kajiado town. It is one of the first areas in Maasai land where individual title deeds were given out. The hills are divided among a group of individual landowners and the parcels of lands are mostly between 100 and 300 acres, with one landholding of 2000 acres. There is a large variety of wildlife and the common plains game species consist of giraffe, zebra, few wildebeest and kongoni, gerenuk, Grant's and Thomson's gazelle and the odd stray buffalo. The hills are beautiful and offer long vistas including a good view of the Kilimanjaro on clear days. The landowners consist of Maasai, some living there and some absentee landlords and two *mzungu* landowners, one American and one Kenyan. The latter two make a living out of specialized tourism, Rainy through large educational groups and small up-market tourism (Bush homes) and Beaton is an absentee landlord with an interest in the developments spearheaded by Rainy.

When Rainy came into the area almost four years ago, he found that heavy poaching and severe overgrazing took their toll out of the landscape. Rainy has the Maasai close to his heart, has been living with Maa speaking people for over 30 years and speaks the language fluently. He decided to address the problems of overgrazing and poaching in a series of meetings with his neighbours. The overgrazing was the result of making extra money by renting land out to outsiders for grazing fees. Rainy offered as an incentive twice the price of the grazing fees if the landowners would no longer allow outsiders to graze their cattle on their land. This scheme has been running for 39 months with striking results. The grass has come back, the wildlife has doubled its population and become less shy and the landowners have not lost any of their cattle in spite of a recent drought. With the extra income, they were able to satisfy many of their cash requirements, like the payment of school fees, the improvement of their homesteads or the running of a car.

This scheme has costed Rainy approximately \$1,000.- per month and after 39 months, in April of this year, when a drought was striking, the scheme was abandoned because the pressure on the remaining good grazing land was too high for the individual land holders to prevent outsiders to bring their cattle in for grazing.

When the scheme was abandoned there was initially serious disappointment, but everyone realized that there was breach of the contract made with Rainy. Scheme participants also realized the benefits of their land management practice. It was not only the cash payment that benefited them, but also the improved grazing. As stated before they did not loose cattle in the drought, the cattle kept a good condition and they also appreciated the potential income that could come from the increased wildlife population.

The Maasai recognized Rainy's leadership and requested him to set up the appropriate relationship with KWS, improve marketing of tourism and set up a scheme on a commercial basis that would allow them to benefit as before but on a new basis. This new basis was the subject of much discussion and eventually led the members to invite a lawyer and establish a commercial company. Landowners could become shareholders and the goals were set on the basis of the previous experience, with an additional focus of creating a new income basis for the shareholders.

The success of this scheme is that a community with individual titles to their land learned and understood that they had to manage the land in a larger holding than each one of them had. They saw how this was beneficial for their livestock and for the wildlife. They became enthousiastic about the improved quality of the range. They became resensitized about the role wildlife plays in these ecosystems and wanted to learn how to manage wildlife for profit. Although the company is in its infancy, these important lessons were already learned.

The total area comprises 3,500 ha and has generated an average income on tourist levies of \$15 per bednight amounting to \$500 per month. This comes to an income for the community of \$1.70 per ha, which is more than 8 times the income a commercial cattle ranch in Laikipia can produce (Heath, 1998).

The community is strong and has good leadership. There is good social control and with the shareholding system and company structure, there will be no inequality in income distribution. This model is exemplary and needs testing on its merits in other environments. As in all commercial companies, the results depend on the leadership provided. Part of the company activities include very close monitoring, both of the wildlife and the vegetation with daily observations and counts and vegetational assessments every 10 days. This may be a costly and labour intensive way of operation, but the spin off is clearly the empowerment of the local people who are part and parcel of



this monitoring system. It also allows for a first class educational example, useful for all forms of tourism and thus improves the marketable product of the landowners company.

### **Mberikani group ranch and Richard Bonham safaris**

This is one of the largest landholdings in Kajiado district, covering 125,000 ha. It is one group ranch with a ranch committee and over 1000 members. The ranch is overstocked with cattle and as a result land degradation is increasing. There is a large and varied wildlife population with good herds of wildebeest, zebra, eland, Thomson's gazelle, Grant's gazelle, impala and the common carnivores, like lion, leopard, hyena, jackal and many of the small carnivores. It is one of the really beautiful spacious landscapes in Kenya, dominated by a spectacular range of volcanic hills, the Chyulu hills and a magnificent view on mount Kilimanjaro.

The Maasai ranch members enjoy several sources of income from this operation, which are mainly paid to the ranch committee, but in some instances to the borehole account. The reason for this discrepancy is that payments to the borehole account reach more members than payments to the committee. The sources of income are lease of 10 acres of land belonging to the lodge, conservation fees in the form of a levy of \$10 per tourist-bednight, birdshooting fees at \$50.- per gun if non resident or \$25.- per gun if resident hunter. The total income for the group ranch in 1996 amounted to KES 1,276,196 or approximately \$25,000.-. There are many additional benefits like employment and training of game scouts, which accompany the bird hunters and may also guide tourists, benefits from a specially set up trustfund, the Maasailand preservation trust which sponsors for schoolfees (secondary school, in some case boarding school, supplies books and assists in basic school maintenance, cleaning up of dams, supply of drinking water to the people and to the livestock. These are major benefits, that are difficult to calculate but could at a glance easily double the total benefits given.

According to the tour operator there is no room for a second operator on this large land holding. I presume that this is due to the fact that the tourist operation is only on that part of the group ranch that lies in the Chyulu hills.

If the total income is divided over the entire area excluding the additional benefits the tourist operation provides income equal to \$0.20 per ha, which is in the same order of magnitude as can be earned on a large commercial ranch from cattle ranching (\$0.18/ha, Heath, in prep). These are additional benefits to the Maasai community, who may make a similar or larger income, depending on range conditions and weather. It may provide the 50% extra income needed to supplement the falling income from livestock (Rainy and Worden, 1997).

There is a problem of income distribution and it appears that payments to the committee of the group ranch do not reach the members. The tourist operation has no control over the stocking rates of cattle, which if they are too high, will affect the quality of their operation. In other Group Ranches similar situations have resulted in the subdivision of the ranch, which from a range management point of view, would be disastrous. Production of livestock or wildlife in semi-arid lands is dependent on large scale land use, a situation which currently exists but is in jeopardy through the greed of the committee.

### **Kuku group ranch and wildlife manager Malte Sommerlatte**

Kuku group ranch is another very large landholding of approximately 100,000 ha. The area is adjacent to Mberikani and together they cover the south western slope of the Chyulu hill range.

Malte Sommerlatte, who has been working closely with KWS on wildlife utilization policy, is the wildlife manager of Kuku Group ranch and has been working for the last few years to set up a tourist camp, which was recently completed. In addition arrangements have been made for birdshooting safaris, which may start this season, from July 1 to the end of October. Sommerlatte has developed some working relationship with the ASAL programme and has presented the prospects of wildlife management in the area to the ASAL programme. How the operation of Kuku Group ranch differs from Mberikani, I have not been able to find out yet. Sommerlatte is willing to provide details of his management plans, distribution of income strategy, relationship with the members of the group ranch and working relationship with KWS and ASAL, but at the time of writing he had to cancel arrangements for a meeting to discuss this programme in detail.

### **Community resource management programs**

#### **The Elangata Wuas Ecosystem Management Programme**

The Elangata Wuas Ecosystem Management Programme (EWEMP) is a partnership between a number of Maasai group ranches, the National Museums of Kenya and some supporting NGOs.

The programme operates in an area of 160,000 ha. Its scope is not specifically directed at wildlife, but at natural resource management in general. The programme works through a system of empowerment, going through all the different phases from the creation of awareness to the implementation of new activities. The EWEMP started in 1991 and for the first two years focussed on the development of methodologies suitable for the needs of the population. With the first trained people, surveys were carried out on the natural resource potential of the area. Plans were developed and started for a large and diverse number of activities, including the training of parataxonomists, the establishment of a



project site, the development of campsites, the propagation of suitable plants and shrubs for food and forage. An important programme was the start of ecological monitoring systems for wildlife populations and land degradation. The land degradation monitoring is quite innovative, making use of biological indicators to give early warning of environmental stress, rather than measuring already and obviously degraded land. In short, this programme is focussed on the diversification needed to address the reduced income for subsistence by traditional pastoralism.

The ostrich scheme had some successes in the beginning of the operation, by making use of the fact that over 90% of wild ostrich chicks do not survive naturally. The system was based on identification of nests, removal of part of the chicks after hatching and herding them in a semi-natural system. In 1994 10 herdsmen earned from the sale of ostriches, almost \$300.- each. For this type of ostrich farming to take off, it would be necessary to scale up the process to an operation of approximately 1000 head, which would allow for the necessary investment into a meat processing plant and a tannery, according to the former project advisor.

Another success was the training of parataxonomists, who are not only identifying plants and animals, but also take care of the monitoring of the health of the entire ecosystem. These well trained Maasai are excellent guides and are in a position to make more income out of tourism than they will out of their livestock.

EWEMP did a pilot survey on marketing and their findings are that the local market is not interested in wildlife per se, but in a much wider package with scenery, opportunities to walk, encounters with the local Maasai population with their indigenous knowledge, are key elements.

Land rehabilitation is also identified as a key issue. It was not clear how EWEMP approaches such rehabilitation. EWEMP recognizes the different land qualities needed for various activities, which complicates the issue of land rehabilitation. Cattle production and game cropping need large areas of grazing lands, camels need bush, like hunters and guinea fowl and other game birds thrive in moderately degraded land. A combination of zoning and clear management objectives could address these issues.

While the programme has created a lot of enthusiasm amongst the local population, it is not clear how it runs under its current direction. Indications are that the programme has lost momentum. The area is vast and so is the population. My impression is that EWEMP has not built the solid community structure that would be needed to make a real difference with their innovative activities to the local community. NGOs currently supporting the programme are uncertain to continue their financial support.

The EWEMP appears to lack the necessary leadership to manage the programme towards a success. The area and the communities involved are large, and the investment is modest. In my view this programme needs a thorough review by others who have been successful in Maasailand. Here is a likely base for ASAL to evaluate with a view to encourage further development and empowerment based on some of the successful aspects of EWEMP. The private sector like the Olelepo Conservation Co, Bonham Safaris together with KWS, ASAL and the National Museums of Kenya as the host agency of EWEMP, together with Ford Foundation as one of the important donor NGOs to the programme, could evaluate this programme on its merits for future development of natural resources management in areas of Kajiado's Maasailand.

### **Other examples not discussed**

There are a number of other examples of community and commercial operations that are wholly or partially dependent on wildlife. Another well known community programme is the Ol Kirimatian and Shompole Conservation Project, which had inputs from SNV.

Two commercial tourist operations that I would like to mention is the Selengei Lodge (developer: Pat Neylan) and the highly acclaimed Tortilis camp, run by Kelly and Peacock close to the Amboseli National Park. The socio-economic benefits for the Maasai have not been assessed by me.

### **Report on visit to Keiyo area.**

#### **Participants:**

Mr. N'geno, co-ordinator of sector H transect, consisting of 37 Project Management Committees (PMCs).

Mr Albert Auko Mabinda, Partnership officer Kerio Valley of KWS. Mr Mabinda is in charge of implementing the building of the infrastructure that KWS is building in Rimoi NR.

Mr. Gilbert K. Chelimo, Assistant Chief of Kimogich area and the link person of the community living with the wildlife of Rimoi National Reserve.

Henk Peters, ASAL project advisor.

#### **Description of the area:**

This area comprises 6800 ha, with an estimate dispersal area of similar dimensions. Wildlife present: Elephant (100-300), buffalo (45), Rothschild giraffe (10), eland, impala, bushbuck. No report on the presence of lesser or greater kudu or gerenuk, species still present in areas of the adjacent Baringo district. All people familiar with the area stated the large number of leopard. *There exists an inventory study done by an American student, which was not readily available from the partnership officer.*



Transect H of the ASAL programme borders Rimoi National Reserve, which is good elephant habitat, with a sizable population of between 100 and 300 elephants, depending on whose figures you accept.

A participatory rural appraisal (PRA) of the area has been carried out which is available from the ASAL office in Iten.

### **Issues discussed in the meeting**

1. General discussion about the problems facing the rangelands based on the analysis done by Rainy and Worden. Although no data were presented on Keio and Marakwet, their analysis includes Baringo district, which stands to lose 9 species of wildlife by the year 2030, which is 75 % of the major species present. The same report indicates that somewhere between the year 1999 and 2010, cattle will no longer be detectable by the DRSRS survey methods. All participants volunteered that these figures gave a realistic impression of the situation that is faced in the Keio and Marakwet districts. The consultant warned that the analysis had been deemed statistically invalid, that the scenarios given were bad but not worst case scenarios and that because of the dramatic picture given and the implications for the population in the rangeland districts of Kenya, funds were made available for further in depth analysis of the herbivore population trends. Participants in the meeting re-iterated that the picture given by Rainy was not only interesting, but also realistic. It was agreed there was cause for alarm and need for some strong measures to address the rangeland situation.

### **2. The hard edge**

The hard edge is the area, where there is no compatibility between land use of the people and the presence of wildlife. Even though the rangeland in the area appears to be extremely heavily used, there are areas with permanent water, where arable agriculture and horticulture is successfully practiced. Such land use is incompatible with elephant intrusion and a year's work and harvest can be destroyed in a matter of hours, apart from the physical threat that the elephants pose to the local population. The answer to these problems is electric fencing. We discussed two possible approaches: fencing part of the Rimoi National Reserve or fencing vulnerable agricultural developments. The consultant proposed the latter, since the RNR is small, holding too large a population of elephants for the area. The elephants need a larger dispersal area and need to be able to migrate north and south in the Kerio Valley. The arable land is dependent on the presence of permanent water, which comes mainly from the slopes of the western wall of the Rift Valley. An estimated 30% of the land occupied is used for arable agriculture, while 70% is used for livestock. This 70%, lies outside the actual reserve and could be a dispersal area for the wildlife shared with livestock. It is for this area that a detailed assessment

needs to be made on the cost benefits of wildlife and livestock. Such an assessment should be the basis of a choice made by the community towards livestock, wildlife or an integrated wildlife and livestock use.

### 3. Human population aspects

There are three ethnic groups in the dispersal area of Rimoi, Marakwet, Tugen and Keyo. The dispersal area appears to have moderate densities of human settlements and it was stated that a substantial part of the population had left the area, because of the presence of elephants. There are three locations bordering the park, Keu, Kamogich and Kiptuilong of which the two first ones are the prime locations.

### 4. KWS and Rimoi National Reserve

The park lies in County Council trustland and was gazetted as a National Reserve in 1983. It was not until 1993 that KWS started to implement management activities for the future development of the park. This started with a Memorandum of Understanding between the County Council and KWS indicating and delineating the intentions for further development. The community of Kamogich has offered KWS 30 acres of land to set up a station for their wildlife management activities. This station is now active and patrols the area regularly. This is also the area, where the headquarters of the Kerio partnership officer of KWS will be established and where the southern gate of the park will be built. Site visits by Triad architects to develop and design the gates and buildings have been made. KWS has an Ksh 18m budget to develop the infrastructure of the area. Most of the funds will be spent on the two entrance gates and headquarter buildings. Access and park roads will also be established and improved. Water will be provided in collaboration with ASAL and KWS will establish campsites with the necessary ablution blocks.

There is a detailed development plan, which was not available from Mr. Mabinda, but is at KWS HQ Nairobi and the provincial HQ in Nakuru. It will be important and relevant for ASAL to be issued with a copy of this report.

The expectations of Mr Mabinda are that in 1998 facilities will be ready to receive the first tourists.

#### Comments:

A park has been set aside 14 years ago at the expense of the local communities. So far there is no clear sign how the affected communities will benefit. Tourism is their only hope. Some awareness work has been started by KWS, but the community has no idea if they are going to benefit at all from the park or if it means an increased vulnerability to elephant damage alone with no compensation.



#### 5. Views of the community representative, Gilbert K. Chelimo, Assistant Chief, Kamogich location.

The community is very keen to develop campsites ( already some campsites in place), and other tourist accomodation for badly needed income generating activities to compensate for the burden of wildlife. Chelimo will start by setting up a project management committee, specially for addressing the possibilities for wildlife based tourism. Chelimo showed the consultant around in the area, which was very instructive. The community is very keen to do what they can to live with wildlife, but for income not for no benefits. This is an urgent matter, if the park is to survive.

Mr Chelimo sees the way forward through collaboration between ASAL, KWS, the Council and the local community.

#### 6. County Council

No representative present. Apparently the council pays from income generated outside this area to assist development of the needed infrastructure of Rimoi. This is a very positive situation, where it seems that the council is really doing something for its population, rather than burdening the income of the population for their own benefit as appears to happen in other areas of Kenya.

#### **Action plan**

The meeting decided on the following action plan to be started with immediate effect.

1. Establish a PMC for wildlife based tourism within transect H of ASAL. Action by Gilbert K. Chelimo. Expected time needed: two weeks, ie completed by July 14, 1997
2. Meeting between this PMC, KWS, Council and ASAL. Purpose to set up a tour to Rimoi for awareness generation between all parties involved.
3. Awareness educational tour: participants will be councillors, PMC members, KWS and ASAL representatives.
4. Outside expert on tourism will be invited to do a cost benefit study on tourist development for the area. His report and proposal will be the subject of a
- 5 Workshop to discuss the viability of the plan with all stakeholders. If the plan is considered viable
- 6 An Implementation Schedule will be established.

All parties represented in the meeting were very enthousiastic and keen to move forward according to this schedule. The meeting was adjourned and the area chief Gilbert Chelimo took the consultant with someone representing the council on tour to the site of the Rimoi

KWS headquarters and his home in Kamogich location. It was pouring with rain. Elephant activity was apparent from fresh tree damage in many places. However no wildlife was seen in this nice *Acacia tortilis* woodland, cut through by many seasonal and one permanent river.

Close to the park, settlements became more sparse. The recent PRA will give the densities in relation to the park. Although the final access is difficult, it is only approximately 20 km on rough roads, which were also passable during heavy rains in a 4WD vehicle.

On return the consultant met the assistant project advisor Mr Langat, who was very articulate in urging the tourism development to go ahead along the points of the action plan. Mr. Peters is also keen for the action plan to go ahead immediately.

### **Laikipia: the Mukogodo area**

This is an area that covers roughly some 25,000 ha (100,000 acres). It is part of Laikipia district, has about 9 different ethnic groups in there and is bordering in the south the commercial ranches of Laikipia district and in the east commercial ranches in Isiolo district. The western border is best indicated from a line starting in the commercial ranching zone up north through Doldol township until it reaches the border with Samburu district. Its northern border is formed by Samburu district. ( See map)

#### The Illegwesi lodge, a successful example of a group ranch running a tourist lodge.

In its south eastern corner there is a group ranch that has formed a commercial company called Illegwesi Co. Ltd. The ranch covers an area of 21,000 acres (8,765 ha) and borders onto the Lewa Down and Borana ranches, well known for their spectacular wildlife. Lewa Downs ranch has been changed into a wildlife conservancy and holds a sizeable proportion of the endangered Grevy zebra population. Lewa Downs conservancy is almost entirely fenced with game proof fencing, but it has one open section in recognition of the need for some wild animal populations, like elephant, to migrate.

Over the years they have worked with the people owning the group ranch that has now been converted to the Illegwesi Co. They have 448 members in the group ranch. This relationship has eventually led to the formation of Illegwesi Co, which has a board of directors made up from a number of leaders of the area. The directors supervise the operation of a small elegant lodge, that is entirely operated by the people from the former group ranch. The lodge has a capacity of 8 beds and can only be rented in its entirety. The fees are \$ 225.- per night. It is therefore not dependent on percentage occupancy for its operation, but on number of days of the year taken. Its use is over 60% of the year, or about 220 days of the year. This would generate a gross income of approximately \$50,000 per year. This compares favourably with a potential income from cattle ranching



of approximately \$6,000.- per year, based on the projections made by Heath (1998), but which still can be obtained as additional income.

The lodge has been started from grant capital, amounting to US \$ 180,000.-. This investment does not need to be paid back. The lodge produces an estimated net surplus of \$ 25,000.-, according to one of the founding directors. Calculated against the area this provides the members with an income of \$2.85 per ha.

Following the establishment of the company with clear land management goals for the benefit of wildlife populations there have been a number of striking results:

1. the quality of the range has been dramatically improved. There is a good stand of grass and there is a healthy increasing wildlife population.
2. the population owning the ranch have a good sustainable source of income, benefiting directly from the improved habitat
3. there is a management structure which actively promotes the development and exploitation of the area safeguarding and improving the existing habitat
4. 1,2 and 3 have allowed training programs with the well known wildlife management institute of the University of Pretoria.

Over time there will be highly qualified local staff, who understand both the ecological and economic needs to turn the management of this rangeland area into a sustainable success.

The Laikipia Wildlife Forum (LWF Ltd.) see this example as the beginning of a new development that could turn the Mukogodo area into a large well managed wildlife conservancy and becoming a major tourist attraction. The driving force will be the enthusiasm of the local people, sparked off by the success of the Illegwesi company. Such a development needs to be carefully planned and designed by professionals. This expertise is partly available in the local Laikipia Wildlife Forum, which was set up a few years ago as a limited company of landholders for no profit. The directors of LWF Ltd are best placed to start of this development, making good use of the expertise in community development of ASAL and the wildlife management mandate of KWS. These three in partnership, with the help of consultants to make a detailed study of the area and a plan with a benefit/cost analysis, could spearhead a development that could be the beginning of the necessary turn around in land management to protect Kenya's spectacular but fragile rangelands.

The success of this development is based on the trust and good leadership in this group ranch. The group ranch was encouraged to form a private company with a clear management structure and management goals. One of these goals is to keep the size of the

landholding intact, rather expand than fragment. The same model should be tested in other areas of Kenya, notably Kajiado district, where there are still large group ranches with good wildlife habitat and where good management could turn the negative trends in range quality with declining numbers of domestic and wildlife populations. The Kajiado ASAL programme has been working with one of these group ranches, Kuku group ranch. Kuku ranch with the adjacent Mberikani group ranch cover together an area of over 225,000 ha. It would be of interest if a similar approach as taken by the Illegwesi Co could be adopted there.

### LESSONS LEARNED

**Table 1. Income per ha from wildlife based tourism in comparison to income from typical cattle ranch in Laikipia**

Tourist operation	District	Size of landholding	Income/ha for community	Comments
Mberikani	Kajiado	125,000 ha	\$0.20	very large area, community income from land lease, levy per visitor, bird shooting
Melepo	Kajiado	3,500 ha	\$1.70	small area, community income from levy per visitor
Illegwesi	Laikipia	8,765 ha	\$2.85	lodge operated by community
Camp	Narok	10,000 ha	\$13.50	projected income for investor in camp*
Cattle ranch	Laikipia	10,000 ha	\$0.18	projected income from cattle ranching only**
Cattle ranch	Laikipia	10,000 ha	\$0.85	projected income from game cropping**
Cattle ranch	Laikipia	10,000 ha	\$3.50	projected income from hunting**

\* projected income from tented camp to owner (Earnshaw and Emerton, 1998)

\*\* projected income from typical cattle ranch in Laikipia, varies depending on stocking rate from a making a loss of \$1.70 per ha at stocking rate of 1500, \$ 0.18 at 2000 head of cattle, \$2.40 at 2500 and \$ 4.30 at 3000 head of cattle stocking rate. The sustainable stocking rate is 2000 head. Game cropping and hunting are compared on a ranch stocked with 10 species of wild herbivores totalling 1500 animals with a metabolic biomass of



approximately 80kg per ha. These animals include elephant (35) and buffalo (210) who together make up 40% of the biomass (Heath, 1998).

Table 1 presents the relative income from wildlife and cattle in rangelands in Kenya, related to landholding size and relationship with the community. It is obvious from these figures that wildlife based tourism is an attractive way for the landholder to generate extra income and to allow the land to recover. At Mberikani, the lodge has no control over the cattle stocking rates and the management is complaining of the overgrazing. At Melepo the income is linked to reducing the grazing pressure on the land and has resulted in voluntary lowering of grazing pressure by the Maasai. A similar situation exists at Illegwesi where the lodge is operated and owned by the landholders and the vegetation has recovered dictated by the needs to improve the wildlife habitat, which provides the major portion of the income to the landholders. The last four examples are projections by experienced tour operators and by an experienced Kenyan farmer. Projections by Earnshaw and Emerton (1998) are even up to \$50-60 per ha for a tourist camp, thus competing with arable agriculture in revenue. In all the wildlife utilization examples additional income can be made out of livestock at sustainable stocking rates. The presence of livestock can be an advantageous management tool to control the use of vegetation, since these animals can be easily sold or purchased. Such a combination provides good income, takes care of the land and is therefore sustainable. These operations all require good management which is achievable under the right circumstances (Illegwesi, Melepo) where the ownership over the animal resources is in the hands of the landholder. When the owning community is not involved in the management of the wildlife based income provided by tourism or hunting, the objective to reduce the grazing pressure and look after the land is difficult to achieve.

### 1. Kajiado

Target areas are either group ranches with a strong leadership (Mberikani, Kuku and Selenge Group ranches, covering together an area of approximately 275,000 ha) or by combining areas that have been subdivided into individual land holdings (Olelepo Co). The advantage of the latter is that it is easier to create a group on the basis of agreement between individual land owners than to come to an agreement with the members of a group ranch. Also income would not be taken just by individual members of the committee, but distributed according to equity owned to the different shareholders. One such a development is the Olelepo Landowners Conservation Company, that is being formed and registered on the basis of common interest in grassland management and wildlife utilization.

### 2. Laikipia

Mukogodo area:

The Mukogodo population ( 9 different ethnic groups) have a decreasing livestock and wildlife population. Their land is badly degraded. They could benefit from the range management skills of the commercial ranchers, offer in exchange security and a dispersal area for wildlife in combination with the adoption of a range management plan, that would restore their land to its potential. One such program is already ongoing: the Illegwesi group ranch, adjacent to Lewa Downs ranch on the edge of Laikipia district in Isiolo. A management plan could be made for other group ranches in the area in a similar situation.

The group ranch committees of the Mulogodo area are represented in the Laikipia Wildlife Forum. It is through the forum that initiatives must be made to develop a large part of Mukogodo into one wildlife conservancy. The concept of such a development is already there and could take off by collaboration between the forum, ASAL and KWS, whereby the forum as representative of the landowners must take the lead. The potential of the land could be assessed by a number of institutions in Laikipia, the ARU, LRP and ASAL and the Mpala Wildlife Research Trust. My recommendation is that the ASAL and the Mpala Wildlife Research Trust make an overall zoning plan for Mukugodo area, assess what the potential is for setting up similar schemes as the Illegwesi Group Ranch and identify areas that need protection from the ongoing land encroachment like the Mukugodo forest. The area has spectacular scenery, but suffers from total lack of management.

According to LWF members there is potential to set up a 100,000 acre wildlife conservancy, which includes the current Illegwesi Co.

Commercial ranchers need security against encroachment by the overpopulated Mukugodo area. The ranchers have now large herds of wildlife, the trends of these populations is stable and many of them make extra or their only income on wildlife based activities.

3. Rimoi appears to have very good potential. It is easily reached from Eldoret and could be attractive in a tourist circuit from Eldoret to Baringo, with the spectacular Kerio valley, lake Baringo, lake Bogoria and lake Nakuru and to the other side Mount Elgon and the northern area of the Kerio valley in West Pokot as components of such a circuit. At present, West Pokot would not be suitable for general tourism because of insecurity. Rimoi area with the adjacent Kamnarok Reserve are safe tourist destinations. With half of the World Bank money for the development of Rimoi, a lodge similar to Illegwesi could be built, which would be a good start for income generation by the community. Such development would depend on the appropriate community structure (limited company) and may still be initiated by discussions between the community, the council, KWS and ASAL.



## **General conclusion**

Whatever development one wants to do in the dry rangelands of Kenya, the first prerequisite is to care for the land and maintain a habitat suitable for both wildlife and livestock. At present the pressure on these areas is so high that both domestic and wild animal populations are declining rapidly as a result of over use. Livestock cannot support the subsistence needs of the population. At best for about 50% in Kajiado district, 25% in Laikipia district, 15% in West Pokot and 5% in Keiyo and Marakwet (FEWS and Rainy & Worden 1997). The first approach is to create income that is not related to high stocking density of either livestock or wildlife. Once the land can be rested or exposed to tightly controlled use, the habitat can recover (Illegwesi and Melepo are the examples), and the population can enjoy an increased income.

Every type of land has its limits for use. Arid and semi-arid areas are habitats that have to be managed at a large scale, meaning land management units in the order of 5,000 or 10,000 ha or much larger, depending on the climate and the nature of the land. The division of Laikipia in arable land and ranch land is sensible and fits within the concept of wise land use. It is such wise land use that will sustain a happy human population that can enjoy a good income based on the use of their abundant natural resources. It is obvious that in many areas of the rangelands the existing population can not be sustained at present, whatever scheme of land use is introduced. There will be a need for some pastoralists to change their lifestyle and seek employment away from the land.

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### **Resource persons spoken to during this consultancy**

1. Mr. N'geno, co-ordinator of sector H transect, consisting of 37 Project Management Committees (PMCs).
2. Mr Albert Auko Mabinda, Partnership officer Kerio Valley of KWS, (former title game warden). PO Box 330, Iten. Mr Mabinda is in charge of implementing the building of the infrastructure that KWS is building in Rimoi NR.
3. Mr. Gilbert K. Chelimo, Assistant Chief of Kimogich area and the link person of the community living with the wildlife of Rimoi National Reserve. Address: PO Box 299, Iten. (the Chief is Philip Chebii, who resort under the DO Tambach division)
4. Henk Peters, ASAL project advisor.
5. Malte Sommerlatte, safari operator of Kuku Group Ranch
6. Richard Bonham, safari operator on Mberikani Group Ranch
7. Mike Rainy, educational safari operator, Melepo Landowners Conservation Co. Ltd (about to be formed)
8. Nick Georgiadis, Director Mpala Research Centre, Laikipia
9. Ian Craig, Director Lewa Wildlife Conservancy and Illegwesi Co. Ltd.
- 10 Theo Hendriksen, project advisor ASAL Laikipia program
11. Lex Merlijn, project advisor ASAL Kajiado
12. Nelson Sindyo, partnership officer KWS Kajiado
13. Geoffrey Shidai Ncharo, Melepo Landowners Conservation Co. Ltd (about to be formed)



14. Bezalel Mokinyo, Melepo Landowners Conservation Co. Ltd (about to be formed)
15. Brian Heath, Director FARM Africa based in Nanyuki
16. Patricia Luke of Richard Bonham safaris
17. Matthijs de Vreede, initiator of the Elangata Wuas Ecosystem management programme.
18. David Hopcraft, Game Ranching Ltd, PO Box 47272, Nairobi
19. Simon N. Olekinyaga, senior chief. Ilngwesi location, PO Box 137, Kisima
20. Raipeti Ole Sekenoi, Chief of Dol Dol location, Box 1, Dol Dol

Land use planning can significantly contribute towards (iii) in the short term but can only provide baseline information towards (i) and (ii) which are subjects of national agrarian policy and legal reform.

Reference is made to a concept paper, 'Land Tenure and Natural Resource Utilization in the Arid and Semi Arid Lands of Kenya', which gives a summary of the outstanding issues as regards land tenure and land use in ASAL.

The ASAL programmes addressed the above mentioned issues in the respective plans of operation for the period 1995-2000. A backstop mission was fielded in 1995 to appraise the different proposals and where applicable to assess the progress made with the implementation. The mission advised on mainly two aspects: 1. appraisal of proposed strategies and activities on local level land use planning 2. appraise the progress and advise on further forward and backward linkages between local level land use planning and district planning.

## 2. Background

### *Terminology Land Use*

Land use is often defined as "the use of a stretch of land, which involves the interaction between the land and its users and thus encompasses numerous interactions between a bio-physical and socio-economic system". Interactions therefore take place between, on the one hand, bio-physical features (geology, topography, soil, climate, fauna and flora, etc.), and on the other hand, socio-economic features (land tenure, culture, community organisation, marketing etc.). Land use is therefore not static, but may change from one year to the next as part of a dynamic process.

The concept of sustainable land use aims at maintaining land use practices at levels which are necessary to meet the needs of the present population in a sustainable way, i.e. without compromising the ability to meet future needs as a result of excessive environmental degradation. The term sustainable adds a long-term perspective to land use, in addition to the present and short-term focus on land use dynamics. Sustainable land use thus not only refers to environmentally sound land use practices, but also to sustainable development as a whole. The DGIS Policy Document "Sustainable Land Use" stresses the importance of research, data collection and analysis as an important condition to achieve sustainability in rural development (DGIS, 1992).

Land use planning refers to the planning and subsequent management of the use of a certain stretch of land with a given land tenure. It is different from the administrative procedures of land adjudication and land registration, which formally assign a stretch of land to an owner and define its size, location and ownership, without any reference to land use.

At present, the key pillars of sustainable land use in ASAL are:

- (i) Maximizing socio-economic and political-cultural needs and obligations of the local people.
- (ii) Equity or fairness between present and future generations and between gender groups (women, youth etc).
- (iii) Perpetuity of the resources ie. conservation or presentation (biological diversity etc.)

Land use planning is the vehicle to balance the three principles.

### *National level*

Land use planning takes place at different levels from the national level (Central government) down to the farm level (farmer). At the national level the government assigns, for example, large stretches of government or trust land a protected status as National park or Forest Reserve. Central government agencies are often responsible for the management of such areas, i.e. Kenya Wildlife Service, Forest Department. Also at a national level policies are developed that aim to influence land



use at lower levels. Ideally a comprehensive land use policy should exist in Kenya, however, mainly sectoral policies apply.

#### *District level*

The second level of land use planning on a lower level of aggregation is the District land use planning. At this level the land use planning deals basically with land suitability, land use priorities for different types of land, strategic (development) planning, policies, rules and regulations and their enforcement.

Land use is considered an important element in district planning; reference is made to chapter 6 of the National Development Plan. At present land use planning in the districts is lacking. The following constraints are mentioned: at district level there is a lack of capacity and facilities; at national and district level there is a lack of legislation, a lack of mandate for the institutions concerned, a lack of enforcement of existing regulations. Moreover the issues related to land use are politically highly sensitive.

At district level, government has, as mentioned before, the mandate to assign land use to stretches of government or trust land, in line with national policies, and may be responsible for their management (either directly, or indirectly on behalf of the Central Government, i.e. District Forestry Officer). Through their regulatory and coordinating mandate the district administration also has the potential to translate, to adjust and to implement sectoral policies to influence land use.

The key problem is un-coordinated land use planning especially the integration of existing capacities and facilities which can significantly handle LUP at district and local levels. The same is true for coordinative and integrated policies, legislation and enforcement mandates.

It is widely acknowledged, that major improvements to the district planning capacity are needed.

#### *Local level*

At community (village) and farm levels decisions are being made by groups and/or by individuals on what use a particular stretch of land is going to have (choice of size and location of agricultural crops, trees, grazing areas, buildings etc.) and how the land as a resource is exploited (management practice). Usually this is referred to as "local level land use planning". Activities in this field are implemented following different approaches such as catchment approach, transect areas a.o.

It is estimated that the community and farm level planning applies to about 80% of the land area of Kenya, namely those areas that have a private ownership (12%), group ranches (6%) and the bulk of Trust Land that is under communal tenure (62%). The remaining 20% of the land is Government Land, owned and managed by the government (National Parks, Forest Reserves etc.). Ideally, the above mentioned different planning levels should interact.

#### *Gender factor*

In land use the gender factor plays a role at different levels. More so than men in the rural areas, the majority of women depend on land for their livelihood. At the same time traditional communal land rights for women are not protected any more under new tenure systems. Women's rights to inherit land are not guaranteed under the constitution. As a result of customary law and traditions women's rights to own and use land are limited. In some areas women are not allowed to invest in land such as through planting of trees. The Government has recognized this as an issue and has included 'the increase of women's access to land rights' in the policy guidelines for the current plan period. Lack of collateral limits their access to credit and other resources that could help them in using land in a sustainable way. Also women have special interests as far as water resources are concerned. In some of the ASAL areas for the male pastoralist community water for livestock is a first priority, for the female community access to safe drinking water is more of a priority. Women (groups) play an



active role in promotion of sustainable land use in land adjudication and promotion of women's interests and women's representation in decision making bodies on land issues at district and other policy levels. However, gender issues have not been addressed in land legislation and policies, nor in the mandate of the Ministries concerned with land use planning. Relevant data bases are usually not gender based.

It should be noted that ownership and right to invest in land is in places an issue wider than women. In group ranches; women, sons and grandsons are marginalized by the council, of elders "fathers" who are in charge of the committee of representatives.

### 3. The land use activities in ASAL programmes

Activities on land use planning could be developed at three levels: local, district and national level. An ultimate objective should be facilitation of policy development and awareness raising on the need for sustainable land use, taking into account the gender aspects, participatory resource planning and management and optimal interaction of land use planning at all levels with backward and forward linkages. In the meantime the ASAL programmes also have a direct objective in contributing towards improved environmental management through community based activities. The mission should concentrate on the District - and Local level Land Use Planning.

#### *District level*

The districts are supported by activities such as data collection and data analysis in selected areas to support land use policy strategies and to facilitate appropriate land use and resource management within the given socio-economic context. The activities would thereby make use of existing channels and strengthen these whenever needed.

Issues that will be addressed should arise from district-felt needs (and thus may vary by district). Such issues should relate to the sustainable use of natural resources in the district, in particular to the productive sector (agriculture, livestock, agroforestry, fisheries and forestry). The following type of activities are undertaken, dependent on district-specific conditions: (-) Institutional development of the planning capacity; (-) Strengthening the legislative capacity of the district; (-) Establishment of a monitoring system to assess land use trends; (-) A review (and suggestions for adjustment) of national and district legislation pertaining to land use matters; (-) preparation of environmental profiles.

#### *Local level*

Based on a participatory planning approach, activities aim to introduce and/or facilitate or promote appropriate land use practices at catchment, transect or village level, support and strengthen participatory resource management capability (including lobby and self-help groups). This includes demonstration and training in micro-catchments (up to 200 farms) and is implemented through the lower level district focus institutions and the grassroots organizations.

### 4. Tasks of the mission

In view of the fact that land use issues in ASAL districts can vary, different concepts were developed in the respective ASAL programmes over the last two years.

I. The mission should appraise the ongoing activities and proposals in the field of local level land use planning in the four ASAL programmes (Keiyo & Marakwet, West Pokot, Laikipia and Kajiado) as outlined in the respective year plans or in separate documents. The mission will advise on these initiatives (catchment rehabilitation, transect approach, soil conservation measures etc.) and their place in relation to the ongoing ASAL programmes and on possible new initiatives to be addressed depending on the mission's findings.



A.O. - an additional area of details the team should look at the "Approaches" to local level land use planning by the various programmes; especially how they circumvent the problem of implementation capacity vis a vis inadequacies in the DDC-sub-committees.

II. The mission should assess the existing and/or proposed assistance from the four ASAL programmes to the respective district land use planning in general. The mission will also advise on further integration of land use planning into district planning activities and will draft proposals/options on the basis of which further support to the district planning mechanisms, within or outside the framework of the existing ASAL programmes, could be further detailed and prepared for implementation/formulation.

A.O. the team will look at the following aspects:

- The status of district institutions, such as the Land Control Board, proposed District Liaison Committees, the District Planning Unit, the District Information and Documentation Centre etc.
- Ongoing land use planning initiatives/activities at district level, involvement of the local authorities, integration of land use planning in the district development plans, the relationship between local and district level (land use) planning.

III. The mission should identify specific issues and/or constraints with respect to sustainable land use involving all relevant parties in the District.

#### 5. The consultancy team

The team will include one international expert on land use planning, regional planning, institutional aspects. The team will be complemented by a Senior Land Use expert of the Ministry of Land Reclamation Regional and Water Development.

The team will be required to spend 2 to 3 days in each of the ASAL districts.

#### 6. Reporting

The team will present its conclusions and submit a draft report or at least an aide memoir at a joint GoK/GoN debriefing to be held in Nairobi at the end of the mission. The final version of the report will be produced within 4 weeks after conclusion of the mission and will be used as an input to the general 1997 ASAL Review Mission.

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Annex 2: **ITINERARY**

12 - 28 May 1997

- |       |   |                                                                                                               |
|-------|---|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Mo 12 | - | Briefing at the ASAL Ministry and travel to Eldoret                                                           |
|       | - | Travel to Eldoret                                                                                             |
|       | - | Meeting with PA and LUPA                                                                                      |
| Tu 13 | - | Visit to Keyo District: meeting with district officers involved in TAA and field visits (meeting with PMCs)   |
| We 14 | - | Meeting with PMU,                                                                                             |
|       | - | Visit to Marakwet District: meeting with district officers involved in TAA and field visits, meeting with TAC |
| Th 15 | - | Concluding workshop with district officers of Keyo & Marakwet                                                 |
|       | - | travel to Kithale                                                                                             |
| Fr 16 | - | Meeting with PMU                                                                                              |
|       | - | Meeting with Heads of Departments                                                                             |
| Sa 17 | - | Field visit                                                                                                   |
| Su 18 | - | Report writing                                                                                                |
| Mo 19 | - | De-briefing West Pokot                                                                                        |
|       | - | Travel to Laikipia                                                                                            |
| Tu 20 | - | Meeting with PMU                                                                                              |
|       | - | Visit to Mukogodo Division                                                                                    |
| We 21 | - | Visit to Central Zone                                                                                         |
| Th 22 | - | Field visit                                                                                                   |
|       | - | Study ARU documents                                                                                           |
|       | - | De-briefing laikipia and travel to Nairobi                                                                    |
| Fr 23 | - | Travel to Kajiado                                                                                             |
|       | - | Meeting with PMU                                                                                              |
|       | - | Meeting with District Core Group                                                                              |
| Sa 24 | - | Field visit pilot area of Dalalekutuk                                                                         |
| Su 25 | - | Report writing                                                                                                |
| Mo 26 | - | De-briefing Kajiado                                                                                           |
|       | - | Travel to Nairobi                                                                                             |
| Tu 27 | - | Wrap-up meeting at the MLRRWD                                                                                 |



## ANNEX 3

### BACKSTOPPING MISSION FOR LAND USE PLANNING IN ASAL PROGRAMMES

12 - 27 May, 1997

De-briefing Notes  
(draft)

#### A. BACKGROUND

1. In view of the general trend of resource degradation in the ASALs, the 1993 joint Kenyan- Dutch ASAL evaluation mission recommended to give high priority on this issue in the project phase 1994 - 1997. Land use planning or resource management would be one of the strategies to be adopted in the ASAL Programmes to cope with the resource degradation. Since 1994, several initiatives have been taken by the four Dutch funded ASAL programmes to incorporate land use planning in the programmes. Because of the different nature of the resource degradation, also the adopted approaches differed per district.

In 1995 a land use planning backstopping mission was fielded to review the land use planning initiatives. One of the recommendations was to give priority in a first stage to local level land use planning as compared to district level land use planning.

The present land use planning backstop mission is considered as a follow-up of the 1995 one and has the objective to review the progress made in the land use planning exercises in the four districts.

2. The mission consisted of Mr Situma Mwachabe, Assistant Director, Land Use of the MLRRWD and Mr Pieter Jan Zijlstra of Consultants for Development Programmes, the Netherlands. At the start the mission was briefed by the Director Land Reclamation (ASAL) of the MLRRWD, Mr E.C. Chesinya and First Secretary of the RNE, Mr P.L. Gooren. In the period 12 - 26 May the mission visited the four ASAL Programmes, had discussions with the PMUs, representatives of relevant departments and institutes and made field trips to visit the ongoing land use activities. The mission had a wrap-up meeting in Nairobi at 27 May with the Director Land Reclamation of the MLRRWD, representatives of the RNE and ETC-Consultants.

#### B. LAND USE PLANNING, STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE DISTRICTS

##### B1. KEIYO & MARAKWET

3. The Programme in Keyo and Marakwet has introduced the Transect Area Approach (TAA), characterized by integrating the interrelated land use issues of the highlands, the escarpment and the valley. The programme is implementing the approach in four transects (2 per district)

Since 1994 the programme has concentrated to get the *local level land use planning process* of the ground through implementation of the subsequent steps of awareness raising, training of government officers at various levels, development of general (indicative) land use plans for each transect, mobilization of the land users through PRAs, setting up of functional committees Project Management Committees (PMCs), being the primary functional groups and Transect Area Committees (TAC), training of TACs and PMCs in project formulation and planning.

Implementation of projects through PMCs started since mid 1996. At present there are over 200 PMCs with projects in different stages of implementation. In Marakwet the process is in a more advanced stage than in Keiyo.

4. In view of the foregoing and based on the field visits, the mission is of the opinion that the Programme has laid a thorough foundation for successful implementation of community based (local level) land use planning.

Moreover, with the TAA being the central approach in Phase III, the Programme has adopted resource management as a focal issue in its strategy, rather than a separate activity.

Apart from the foregoing positive conclusion, the mission made the following observations:

- a. the effectivity and impact of the adopted approach can only be assessed after successful implementation of a substantial number of (environmentally sustainable) activities. At present the number of finalized projects is too small to make a proper judgement.



- a. the effectivity and impact of the adopted approach can only be assessed after successful implementation of a substantial number of (environmentally sustainable) activities. At present the number of finalized projects is too small to make a proper judgement. Another aspect is that the acceptance by the communities of adhering to agreements such as vacating 'red zones' or 'buffer zones' could not be tested as yet.
- b. Although awareness raising on environmental issues is considered important for resource management, it is not a guarantee that environmental sustainable activities will be proposed by the beneficiaries. With the projects/activities being proposed and formulated by the communities (PMCs), the danger exists that the proposals are biased towards activities with direct short-term benefits. Conditions for project proposals are presently set by the PMU. However a more systematic system of built-in conditionalities is required at different levels:
  - project/activity level: projects are scrutinized on resource management conditions
  - TA level: TA annual plans should show a balance between 'short term benefit projects' and 'environmental effective projects'. The TACs should be evaluated on the balanced implementation of the TA plans. Moreover a sequence of activities could be built in (carrot-stick): projects favoured by the population (dispensary, school, upgraded cattle, etc) only to be implemented after successful implementation of environmental sustainable projects (protection of micro-catchments, vacating buffer areas, etc)
  - District level: similar procedures as applied at transect level could be adopted at district level.
- c. Most of the time and energy of the programme went into the establishment of the framework for local level land use planning. At district level the following achievements were made:
  - improved coordination between line agencies in planning and implementation through coordination mechanisms as ASAL Steering Committee (ASC) and Transect Area Project Committee (TAPC).
  - progress in analysis of environmental constraints (as a basis for development of strategies) through a number of training sessions and workshops.

However little progress is made on the elaboration of strategies on the most crucial issue of the livestock production system (livestock densities estimated four times the carrying capacity). As the programme is becoming fully in the implementation phase, the demand for innovative activities on this subject becomes evident. Therefore it is recommended to give priority to this issue following three tracks simultaneously:

  - community level: through (i) putting the livestock issue on the agenda in the dialogue with the community (in TAC and PMC meetings), (ii) monitor the effects of project activities on livestock numbers and density.
  - research level: more information is required on the dynamics of the livestock production system through farming systems research (see also 1993 recommendations).
  - experiences from elsewhere: as the livestock issue is prominent in large parts of Eastern Africa, lessons could be learned from experiences elsewhere in the region either through bringing in specialized expertise or visiting ongoing promising activities (study tours).
- d. As implementation of activities has just fully taking off in 1997, the implementation capacity is not yet felt being a constraining factor. At present the question on what has to be done (in terms of volumes of work) and what can be done (in view of implementation capacity) can not be answered yet. It is therefore recommended to:
  - elaborate the indicative land use plans into (indicative) volumes of work and required implementation inputs.
  - to set a timeframe for the development of the TAs based on required volumes of work and implementing capacity of the TAC through the PMCs and district line agencies.
- e. As already can be foreseen in the present planning stage, the lup process will be soon confronted with legal issues: such as adherence to agreements made on vacating 'red zones' (areas with severe resource degradation) or agreements on grazing areas. These agreements need to be laid down in bye-laws that need approval from the DDC to make these legal. In that respect the existing (often informal) linkages between the created institutions for land use planning (PMC, TAC) and district institutional structure need to be strengthened and formalized.



## B2. WEST POKOT

5. Since 1995 the following LUP related activities were undertaken:

- November 1995: LUP workshop in the District, in which a general framework was elaborated, pilot areas identified and a action plan formulated.
- April 1996: Support mission on LUP from ETC (report not available to the mission)
- October 1996: Preparation of 1997 Work Plan, which declares LUP (resource management) to be an innovative activity as well as a 'powerful' planning tool.
- February 1997: Recruitment of a Land Use Planning Coordinator within the PMU
- March 1997: Participatory Planning Workshop for Resource Management: training on planning tools (logframe, participatory planning tools) and again an action plan.
- May 1997: Outline for the LUP strategy, based on the foregoing workshops.

6. It has to be concluded that 4 years after the 1993 evaluation and 2 years after the 1995 backstop mission little tangible has been achieved on resource management. Even ongoing successful activities related to LUP (integrated catchment area approach) developed during phase II, discontinued in phase III of the ASAL Programme.

Only since late 1996 LUP came again on the agenda through incorporating LUP in the programme approach and by recruitment of the LUPC.

7. Based on the discussions with the PMU and ASAL contact officers, the mission came to the following observations:

- a. The 1995 recommendation is repeated that high emphasis should be given to initiate the local level land use planning process. In that respect the mission recommends that the proposed district wide desk study and RRA for the selection of pilot areas is kept to a minimum, because:
  - a lot of information on district resources is already available; the WRAP report provides a comprehensive overview and more important: the knowledge of the district officers on environmental issues is substantial.
  - based on the available knowledge a justified selection of pilot areas can be made <sup>1</sup>.
  - it is better to utilize the (scarce) resources for conducting surveys/investigations in the selected pilot areas in order to rapidly initiate the local level planning exercise.A short review of the existing available information would suffice to verify the selection of the pilot areas. Further data collection should focus on further refinement of the boundaries of the pilot areas, identify the landuse conflicts (user groups for different resources) and identify the approach (catchment/transect, village or sublocation as homogeneous unit, etc)
- b. The workshop proceedings (especially the 1997 one) are considered to be too abstract for direct utilization in the local level land use planning process. What is required by now is the guidance (backstopping) of a land use planner, experienced in local level land use planning, to assist in the formulation and review of the subsequent steps in the planning exercise. Or in other words: the general framework as formulated in the 1995 workshop needs to be 'translated' in concrete planning steps.
- c. A lot can be learned from the Keiyo & Marakwet experience, where the land the planning exercise is in a more advanced stage, especially regards the establishment of the organisation structure, awareness raising and training in project formulation and implementation with primary groups. Increased collaboration between the two programmes is therefore recommended. A study tour of the DWG-LUP to the district could be a first activity.
- d. The mission strongly endorses the recommendation made in a working paper of the 1997 workshop <sup>2</sup> to lend support to the ongoing activities of the MALDM in the catchment area rehabilitation. ASAL can contribute with the experiences (lessons learned) in the earlier programme of integrated catchment approach (Kerelwa) as well as through training of the more recently available methods in community mobilization; moreover logistic support could be provided.

<sup>1</sup> During the workshop a 'quick and dirty' selection of pilot areas was one, based on identified selection criteria (resource degradation, resource conflicts, implementation capacity, access, poverty indicators, etc.). The exercise resulted in the same selected areas as in the 1995 workshop. It is therefore recommended to limit the research efforts to these pilot areas only.

<sup>2</sup> See: Mwachabe Situma, Quick observations on land use issues in West Pokot District; par II.3



- e. The mission recommends to strengthen the working relationship with VI and ELCK, which are successfully implementing activities related to land use planning. Possible modes for cooperation are: (i) jointly development of lup strategies, (ii) mutual support in implementation (iii) joint implementation of lup activities.

### B3. LAIKIPIA

8. The Laikipia ASAL Programme has made resource management the central approach of the programme right from the start in 1993:

- a zonation of the district was introduced allowing development of planning strategies for the different zones,
- a scenario study was conducted in 1994 for the smallholder sector indicating different strategies for the identified farming systems,
- the Adaptive Research Unit (ARU) was established to test and monitor several introduced technologies in the different zones of the district.
- a district forum on land use planning was planned (however not yet established) to bring the land use issues at the (district) policy level.

9. The mission, in general, endorses the followed approach of the programme, especially regards:

- the introduction of various innovative activities,
- the right balance between implementation and research,
- in the strategy development, the programme has found a good balance between using the knowledge of the communities, the line agencies and NGOs and external (outside district) expertise,
- the linkages the programme has established with all actors in the district.

10. The mission had the following observations:

- The ARU is instrumental as an interface between research and extension. Over the years ARU has tested a number of introduced technologies through on-farm trials; moreover a number of more in-depth studies has been conducted. After three years of testing, there is a need to evaluate in a more systematic way the introduced technologies on their effects on the changes in the farming systems.
- Closely related to the foregoing is the observation that after 3 years experience the programme should be able to review the scenario's as developed in the 'scenario's study' of 1994. This study gave the framework for strategies for the development of farming systems in the smallholder sector. The study indicated possible interventions for different farming systems. After 3 years experience with a range of interventions, the scenario's can be further elaborated and finetuned as a basis for further strategic development of the smallholder sector.
- The Districts is confronted with a few land use policy issues which need to be addressed at national level:
  - the sub-division of former private ranches through land buying companies into unviable or marginally viable units for agriculture/livestock enterprises.
  - the issue of lands for agriculture in the unsuitable agro-climatic zone (approx less than 400 mm rainfall area)
  - the issue of the livestock economy in Mukugodo Division, which is undergoing serious soil and pasture degradation due to shrinkage of grazing territory.

Already in 1995 the Programme intended to create a forum at district level to discuss these issues. For a number of reasons no progress was made. The mission recommends to follow the successive steps of:

1. analysis of consequences of the above mentioned land use constraints and identify alternative land use options;
2. discuss the analysis and development options at district level and reach consensus on the major issues.
3. bring the issues at national level at a pre-defined forum (see also par...)



11. Land use planning in Kajiado started in 1995 with the coming of the Land Use Planning Coordinator; in the same year a first district level workshop was held where the general framework for the strategy was outlined. Local level lup started in one pilot area and is by now extended to three. A core group at District level was established composed of representatives of the various departments. For the implementation of the Illup in the pilot areas Divisional Teams were created.

12. After two years the created institutions of the Core Group and the Divisional Teams seem to be well established as appeared from the shown interest and commitment from the team members, the mission has met.

As regards Illup, the programme has struggled (and is still struggling) with identifying the right methodology. The lup process in the first pilot area of the Kuku Ranch Group resulted in a land use plan indicating a range of sectoral activities to be implemented over time, rather than an analysis of optional strategies for resource management in identified resource conflict areas.

The plan is static in the sense that it presents an implementation plan of activities rather than the development of a circular process of problem identification, development of options, implementation of starter activities, developing/refining options through indepth analysis, implementation, etc.

In order to rectify above shortcomings in the methodology, a fresh approach based on the 'lessons learnt' is being tried out in a third pilot area of Dalalekutuk. During the field visit the mission concentrated on the followed (improved) planning methodology in Illup. The following observations were made:

- the people were not aware of the purpose of the conducted PRA and other data collection activities.
- the expectations as expressed by the people were related to the project's provision of services (health, education, water).
- people are aware of the increasing resource degradation and some expressed a clear vision on the future development (problems and prospects) of their area.
- the needs assessment seems to be purely bottom-up; the resource issue is not brought into the discussion from the beginning; this together with broadening the problem analysis to the services sector results in prioritization (and expectations) in the more service sector oriented issues.
- the timeframe from first contact with the community until actual implementation of a first (starter) activity is too long to keep momentum in the Illup process (raised expectation vs Programme's inputs). This is related to:
  - the amount of (field) data collection which is probably too big in relation to the objective of the first step: problem analysis, first identification of strategy, identification of first activity.
  - the time which is spent on reporting of the data collection
  - the other activities of the DTs

13. Based on par 12, the mission has the following recommendations:

- Restrict (in a first step) the problem analysis to resource management issues.
- Include the resource management issue in the dialogue with the community right from the start. Link with the existing awareness on resource degradation and link with the already existing visions on resource management.
- link with ongoing (successful) activities on resource management (f.e.: crop & livestock intensification around constructed pans),
- review/analyse the first (field) data collection on its necessity for achieving the first step.
- restrict the reporting to a minimum.
- make the process leading to the identification of the first activity as continuous and as short as possible.
- to have a one time exercise leading to the identification of a first activity with key officers in Illup and guided/supported by an experienced land use planner.

14. The first activity regarding district land use planning: the description/analysis of the distinct resource management units was planned to be executed by mid 1996 and to be executed by the ASAL Programme. However only in 1997 this activity will start and is contracted out to ETC Consultants. As there is a wealth of information in Kajiado District (WRAP, KARI/KSS, KWS, DRSDS), this exercise will be mainly focused on extraction and analysis of the available information.



15. The Mission is of the view that the CT has been adequately equipped with the tools to effectively coordinate and facilitate the implementation of the land use planning process within Kajiado district. However, there is at the moment no linkage with the DDCs who have a long-term responsibility for land use planning in the district such as the District Environmental Management Committee (DEMC). Further more it is anticipated that as progress in LLLUP is made, issues relating to policy and legal interventions might arise and which will require such a forum to resolve. It is the view of the mission that the CT establishes linkage with the DDC by coopting the secretary of the DEMC who should then assume chairmanship of the CT with the LUPC as its secretary.

16. The Mission finds that the Core Team has put a lot effort into the development of a GIS based Land Use Planning Information System in collaboration with DRSRS. Reports on studies carried out in the district (by ASAL and others) are being catalogued for archiving and reference. Also field maps sketched from the pilot areas showing cadastre and natural resource patterns are being digitized. For purposes of better time allocation, this information system development exercise should take off from centre stage to allow more time to be expended in the operationalization of the land use planning methodologies at the LLLUP; and elaboration of concepts and strategies at the district level. Indeed, the Land Use Planning Information System will best be developed further when implementation has started by which time it will facilitate monitoring of the progress, accessing of effects and forward planning.

17. The overall conclusion is that the LUP process has not really come of the ground as yet: at local level the programme is still struggling with the methodology, while at district level still a start has to be made. The mission realizes that it takes time to find the right methodologies for the lup process and that only through trial and error the 'right track' can be found.

However also internal management problems are part of the relatively slow progress in the lup process. Different views between the LUPC, the PO/PA and the ETC Consultants are due to this. However a major flaw in the SNV-ASAL Programme management structure is that the LUPC was primary responsible to SNV Nairobi and not to the PO/PA. This structure allowed the LUPC to work relatively independently from the rest of the ASAL Programme, causing frictions between the LUPC, PO/PA and the ETC Consultants.

Although the foregoing was rectified during 1996, i.e. LUPC responsible to PO/PA, the procedure has not been formalized as yet. In order to avoid future (management) problems the mission strongly recommends to formalize this.

With rectifying the said management structure, the mission expects that the PO/PA give more guidance/support to the lup process.

18. The ASAL Programme has not fully utilized the available expertise in lup in the MLRRWD. The mission recommends to strengthen the linkages between the Programme and the ministry as well as between SNV and the ministry in this respect.

19. Although resource management is considered a priority component in the Programme's policy, it is not yet in the main stream of the ASAL activities. Reasons for this are:

- the relatively isolated 'environment' in which the LUP activities have taken place (see par.11) and
- no outputs are yet available from the LUP exercise to 'feed' the general ASAL policy.

The mission expects that with resolving the flaws in the management structure resulting in a more active role of the PMU in the lup process, resource management to become the central approach in the ASAL Programme.



## C. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS & EMERGING ISSUES

### 20. *General progress*

In general it can be stated that regards land use planning, good progress has been made in Keiyo & Marakwet and Laikipia; in Kajiado the lup process has not yet taken off the ground as yet, while in West Pokot the process has just started.

### 21. *LUP as approach or activity in the programmes*

In Laikipia, resource management has been the focal approach right from the start; in Keiyo & Marakwet the Programme has succeeded to re-orient its approach towards resource management, whereas in Kajiado lup has been a somewhat isolated activity within the programme.

### 22. *Institutional linkages*

In addressing land use issues, the lup process often requires the formation of functional institutions (and groups). The mission finds that to facilitate the LUP process in the districts, there is need to have a pragmatic institutional arrangement which may necessitate the constituting of functional institutions at district and local level. In Keiyo and Marakwet, the LUP process has led to the emergence of grassroots institutions (Project Management Committees) as well as Hybrid Sub-DDCs (Transect Area Committees) which hang between location and division levels. In Keiyo-Marakwet and Kajiado, the District Working Groups are not yet directly linked to the DDC as is the case in West Pokot where the Working Group has co-opted a head of department (District Environment Officer) as its chairman. In Laikipia, linkages have been innovatively established with the DDC via task related involvement of key departments and committees. Whereas there is the need to put in place such functional institutions, there has to be a deliberate and systematic effort to link these institutions into the District Focus by co-opting key heads of departments into the LUP District Working Groups considering that the committees within the DDC are the ones charged with the longterm responsibility for LUP; and also are the only avenues to resolve legal issues affecting the LUP process.

### 23. *Legal interventions*

The mission has found out from Keiyo - Marakwet and Laikipia districts that as soon as implementation of land use planning activities at the local level starts, they are immediately confronted by matters requiring legal (and policy) action to facilitate further implementation of the LUP activities. For instance the local communities in Keiyo are reluctant to implement an action plan intended to create and manage "Buffer Zones" within the escarpment until the security of their investment is guaranteed through the change of land tenure from trustland to freehold under individual title. Also the DDC needs to give the legal approval on the contracts that have been entered between the ASAL programme and the local communities (through PMCs) on management of buffer and red zones. In Laikipia, a legal and policy decision has to be made to restrict extension of cultivation beyond the Agro-Ecological zone IV northwards; restrict land buying companies from sub-dividing land (ranches) into units way below the sustainable carrying capacity and the future of the livestock economy in Mukogodo division. The Keiyo - Marakwet programme held a district workshop to resolve some of these issues but no solution has been reached yet. In Laikipia, the district has made an analysis of the problem and possible solutions but awaits decision from the national level. In the short term, the mission has recommended the MLRRWD to conduct a national workshop as a forum in which these issues will be decided upon. Most important however is to strengthen the linkages and support from the national level to the programmes by continuously making decisions legal and policy matters affecting the programmes.

### 24. *Strategy development for major land use issues*

The mission notes that as the introduction of land use planning progresses, the immediate implication has been (a) diversification and intensification of arable farming (including irrigation) as well as (2) introduction of conservation resource degraded areas (buffer, red zones) in the production / farming systems; both of which take a substantial portion of the water and pasture resources at the disposal of the livestock economy.

The level of strategy development for major resource management issues differs per Programme:

- In Keiyo and Marakwet, all the efforts have gone into 'making the foundation' for local land use planning, while less attention has been paid to working out of solutions/strategies for the crucial resource issues (see par 4c). District officers are still convinced that with upgrading of cattle,

pasture improvement and introduction of zero-grazing the farmers will automatically de-stock their local herds.


- In Laikipia, efforts are made to find entrances for solutions of the Mukogodo issue where pastoralists are confined to the over-stocked and over-populated area in the north east of the district. Communities, district officers as well as researchers from relevant institutes are involved in this analysis process.
- In Kajiado, the level of understanding of the district officers on the constraints and prospects of the livestock economy is good. Moreover the programme is starting a research on the effect of cattle upgrading on the total herd composition.

It is the view of the mission that the development of concepts towards transforming the livestock economy to be in conformity with LUP should take centre stage within the district LUP activities.


#### 25. *Internalizing of the LUP process*

The rate or degree of internalizing of the LUP approach into the ASAL programmes by respective PMUs vary. Generally, the internalization process is higher within Keiyo - Marakwet and Laikipia programmes compared to West Pokot and Kajiado. This has to do partly with the history of each programme; and partly on the capacity of the respective PMUs. The levels of internalization can be greatly improved through cross-fertilization by way of visits and joint seminars. Most important is that for future recruitment of PAs and DPOs, knowledge of natural resource management or LUP should be one of the key criteria for selection.





KENYA AGRO-ECOLOGICAL ZONES



KENYA ASAL DISTRICTS



## CHAPTER 2. ASAL, DEVELOPMENT CONSTRAINTS AND PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY

### 2.1 ASAL, main characteristics, development constraints and prospects<sup>1</sup>

#### 2.11 Definition, extent and population

The definition of ASAL is based on moisture availability. To the ASAL belong those lands where the rainfall-evapotranspiration ratio is less than 50% ( $R/E < 50\%$ ). According to this definition a total of 466,000 km<sup>2</sup> or 88% of the national land area are ASAL (see map 1). The ASAL are subdivided into four Agro-Ecological Zones (AEZ). Main characteristics of the AEZ are presented in table 1.

Table 1. Main characteristics and area of the four ASAL agro-ecological zones.

Agro Ecological Zone (AEZ)	R/E (%)	Rainfall average (mm)	Area (Km <sup>2</sup> )	Percentage country area
IV Semi-humid	40 - 50	700-850	27,000	5
V Semi-arid	25 - 40	550-700	87,000	15
VI Arid	15 - 25	300-550	126,000	22
VII Very arid	< 15	200-300	236,000	46
Total			466,000	48

According to the 1989 Census 7.4 million people reside in the ASAL (or 24% of the total population). Currently the average population growth is slightly lower than the national figure (3.29% vs 3.34%). Population growth varies per district; while some of the more remote districts show a low or even a negative growth, some districts in the AEZ's IV & V have a population growth up to 6.5% due to in-migration from the high potential areas.

The increasing land pressure as a consequence of natural population growth and high immigration into the ASAL is considered as the main cause of identified development constraints. Of the total land area of 46.6 million ha, an estimated 400,000 ha (or 0.85%) are under crop cultivation. The total area within the cultivation cycle is ten to fifteen-fold the annual cropped area.

The total livestock population amounts to an estimated 19 million (beef-cattle 30%; sheep and goats 63%; camels 5% and donkeys 2%) or 2.5 ha per livestock number.

<sup>1</sup>) This chapter is based upon the papers "Development Policy for ASAL, MRDASW, September 1992" (In this paper further referred to as the "GOK ASAL Policy Document" and "Environmental Action Plans for ASAL in Kenya, MRDASW, November 1992").

## 2.12 Land use patterns

Dominant land use patterns, which can be distinguished in the AEZ's are:

AEZ IV: A mixed agriculture/livestock farming system is prevailing. Main crops are maize, beans and cotton. Cattle, goats and sheep are of local breeds. Animals graze in general within the farm boundaries. Animal traction is being applied. Farm manure is used on a modest scale, while fertilizers are hardly applied. Crop production is the most important enterprise, while livestock in general is an insurance against crop failure. Main constraints are inadequate rainfall, and incidence of pests.

AEZ V: The main cropping system is maize/cowpea/pigeon pea. The rate of failure of maize is high. The zone is suited for sorghum and millet. Due to taste preference and declining labour availability for bird scaring, maize remains the main grain crop.

Three quarter of the farm families own livestock (mainly goats). Animals are grazed communally and are moved away from the homestead are in the dry season.

Main constraints are: soil erosion, low soil fertility and frequent droughts.

AEZ V/VI: Farms in this transitional zone occur a.o. in Elgeyo Marakwet and West Pokot. Sorghum/millet/cowpea/green gram is the main cropping system. Tillage is carried out by hand; the main labour input is bird scaring. Consequently the cultivated areas are small. Livestock is generally grazing on communal land.

Main production constraints are frequent droughts, erosion and low soil fertility.

AEZ VI and VII: Pastoralism dominates in these zones, which covers 60% of the ASAL. Herds are highly mobile. Pastoralists exchange stock for grain and other consumer goods. Cereal cropping is increasing in areas where water concentrates: the so-called key production areas.

### Transitional zone between the high potential areas and the ASAL:

A special zone is formed by the transition between the high potential areas and the ASAL. In the Rift valley, this zone is marked by an escarpment. The zone forms a major water source for downstream furrow irrigation and drinking water. Due to land pressure in the highlands the zone is being increasingly cultivated, often leading to de-forestation and adversely effecting the water sources. Especially in West Pokot and Elgeyo Marakwet this zone is prominent.



### 2.13 Major trends in resource use

General and distinct trends can be recognized for the AEZ IV & V and AEZ VI & VII.

In the AEZ's IV & V, the population pressure has increased significantly in the past decennia, which resulted in an increase of the cultivated area <sup>2</sup>, and a decrease of the average landholding by 50 - 60% in the period 1969 - 1989.

The overall livestock population has decreased as more land has come under cultivation. Although no accurate general data are available on livestock numbers, the data from Tharaka Division show that the number of livestock per capita has decreased from 5.8 in 1958 to 2.1 in 1988.

Adaptations in the farming systems as a result from the increasing land pressure have been: crop intensification, introduction of improved land management practices in some areas, such as terracing and tree planting, de-stocking, perimeter fencing, creation of paddocks and controlled grazing or lending livestock for grazing in the dry months.

These adaptations have, however, not sufficiently resulted in a sustainable resource use. Over-grazing and over-cultivation due to shortening of the fallow periods and due to the use of agricultural techniques by settlers of the high potential areas in the dryer ASAL, have attributed to de-vegetation, increasing soil erosion and depletion of soils.

Other factors (other than population growth and increasing land pressure) which attribute to resource degradation are: increase of water resources use in the high potential areas leading to a decrease in quantity and quality of the downstream flows and the increased wildlife protection area affecting the cultivation and grazing areal.

The long term trend in livestock populations in AEZ's V & VI has been a declining one, while at the same time grazing lands have been lost to agriculture, settlements and wildlife reserves. A special threat to pastoralists is the loss of key production areas<sup>3</sup>, which are important water sources in dry periods and serve as areas for supplementary agricultural production. The overall result is that the growing population can not be supported anymore by the declining livestock population.

As a consequence pastoralists are increasingly dependent on sources outside the livestock sector. Pastoralists are increa-

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<sup>2</sup>) Data of the Lower Meru District illustrate that the land within the cultivation cycle increased sixfold from 12% to 74% in the period 1948 - 1982.

<sup>3</sup>) Small pockets of high potential areas situated in a marginal potential environment.

singly involved in agriculture in the form of shifting cultivation in the dry areas.

Furthermore livestock is being exchanged for grain. As a consequence the poorer pastoralists enter in a vicious cycle of exchanging livestock for grain resulting in too less animals to recover the herd resulting in exchange of livestock for food, etc.

The foregoing factors have resulted in sedentarisation of pastoralists which is accelerated by the existence of central service (water, education and health).

Overgrazing and subsequent destruction of the vegetation cover is reported to be most serious on dry-season grazing areas, around settlements and around water-points.

#### 2.14 Services and infrastructure

Poor basic infrastructure (particular transport and communications) in ASAL, especially in AEZ VI and VII, will restrict the growth of non-pastoral employment.

The single most important constraint to infrastructure development in ASAL is the high unit costs against few benefits. The widely dispersed nature of the settlements constrains expansion of electricity.

The most intractable problems in delivering health, education and social services are encountered in AEZ VI and VII. In the pastoral districts, the unit costs of reaching the population are highest and the population is least able to contribute to cost sharing and self-help schemes. A shortage of trained personnel is directly related to the poor quality of services provided in ASAL.

In view of the many constraints to manufacturing and trade development in ASAL, care must be taken to match the effort and resources allocated to local conditions, resources and needs. Support should be directed to strategically located areas with growth potential. Improvement in infrastructure such as roads, electricity, watersupply and banking should be strategically located to take advantage of promising economic trends.

Outside agriculture and the public sector, employment opportunities in the informal sector far outweigh those in the formal wage sector. Most (over 70%) small scale enterprises are engaged in rural-based areas of trade and commerce.

The formal sector is relatively poorly developed in ASAL, and there are few manufacturing and service enterprises. Most growth in employment and in income generation is in the informal sector.



### 2.15 Development constraints

From the foregoing the following major development constraints may be summarized:

#### AEZ IV & V:

- increasing land pressure resulting in shortening of the cultivation cycle and decreasing availability of communal grazing lands; both contributing to soil depletion and erosion.
- The use of agricultural techniques by settlers from the high potential areas unsuitable for the dryer areas.
- Labour constraints in agriculture especially during land preparation.

#### AEZ VI & VII:

- Loss of pasture lands for the pastoralists especially the dry season grazing areas and key production areas as a result of increasing area under cultivation and wildlife reserves. As a result the population can not be supported anymore by cattle alone.

The above mentioned constraints lead to the following main resource conflicts:

- livestock - agriculture: the arable lands in AEZ V & VI, which are increasingly brought under cultivation, are important as dry season grazing lands for the pastoralists.
- livestock - wildlife: Also the creation of wildlife reserves has deprived the pastoralists from important dry land grazing areas.
- agriculture - wildlife: serious crop damages are caused by wildlife.

### 2.16 Production potential

The ASAL Policy Document states that the present agricultural and livestock production potentially could be doubled. This production increase would primarily come from the AEZ's IV & V, through combined measures directed at improvement of rain-fed agriculture and livestock production.

In view of the above mentioned constraints this doubling of production will only be reached over a considerable time span.

The major concern therefore is whether the production increase will be in pace with the population growth. This implies that the ASAL do not constitute a major reserve of productive land to accommodate the overspill of people from

the high potential areas. Surpluses, especially livestock will be generated following good rainfall years, but on average the ASAL will continue to be net importers of food.

## 2.2 GOK policy on natural resource development

### 2.21 Objectives

Objectives in the ASAL Policy Document related to sustainable land use can be summarized as follows:

- \* Development of human resources and institutional capacities,
- \* Strengthening of community participation,
- \* Enabling ASAL communities to apply low cost and appropriate technologies,
- \* Introduction of risk-minimizing farming systems
- \* Stimulation of non-pastoral and off-farm activities
- \* Reclaiming and/or protecting fragile eco-systems
- \* Expanding and intensifying research linked to sustainable development of resources.

The ASAL policy document contains a wide range of proposals and guidelines on technical, institutional and infra-structural issues. In this paper only a few major ones will be highlighted.

### 2.22 Proposed technical interventions

Production increase in AEZ's IV & V is feasible through implementation of combined interventions directed at improvement of dry-land farming (e.g. introduction of improved seeds, timely land preparation and planting, stimulation of animal traction, soil and water conservation measures, inclusion of agro-forestry in the farming system) and directed at increased livestock production (e.g. as improvement of the local breeds, improvement of the veterinary services and production of fodder crops).

Livestock development in AEZ's VI & VII should be geared towards the introduction of more productive livestock systems. The policy documents are less clear with regard to required actions in this respect. Understandably the issue of the pastoralist systems is a complex one. "The main issue is whether traditional range management is more appropriate in these areas compared to modern range management systems aimed at improving pastures (...). The latter requires that land is subdivided into fenced paddocks and allocated to individuals or small groups" <sup>4)</sup>. The present (traditional) range manage-

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<sup>4)</sup> Développement Policy for ASAL; paragraph 3.27 & 3.28.



ment of pasture rotation has beneficial effects for pasture management, at the other hand the system is constraint by factors as conflicts with cultivators and wildlife, risks of raiding and distribution of grazing around water supplies. "Modern" range improvement activities such as vegetation improvement and soil improvement have proven not to be feasible on communal lands. From the foregoing it is clear that no clear-cut solutions are available. Improvement of the livestock sector is closely related to landownership.

#### 2.23 The issue of land adjudication

Security of landownership is considered to be a pre-requisite for land development and on-farm resource conservation. Land adjudication in zones IV and V started in 1965. After more than 25 years the process of land adjudication continues to proceed at a low pace. Experiences sofar show that security of land tenure does not automatically lead to land development. Privatized pastoral lands have been resold to farmers or subdivided into plots too small to be economically viable. Nevertheless secured land tenure is considered important and the ASAL policy document therefore recommends an accelerated process of land adjudication.

#### 2.24 Extension and research

Extension and research have traditionally focused on the high potential areas.

As a result extension workers are equipped with knowledge of agricultural techniques of the high potential areas, often not suitable for the ASAL. The T & V-system introduced in the ASAL in Machakos has proven to be ineffective. The system with standard package messages has proven only to be suitable under homogeneous circumstances.

The Policy Document therefore makes the following recommendation regarding extension:

- a review of the training curricula for extensionists in agriculture, forestry and livestock with regard to the dry-land production techniques and farming/pastoralist systems.
- development of a more flexible and integrated extension approach,
- coordination and integration between the involved Ministries (MOA, MOLD and MENR) in the extension operations.

With regard to research the Policy Document recommends expansion and intensification of applied research on especially rain-fed crops and introduction of agro-forestry systems.

## 2.25 Environmental Action Plan

In 1992 the MRDASW introduced the Environmental Action Plan (EAP) for all ASAL districts. Under guidance of the ministry's head office, every district prepared its own district EAP.

Guidelines for implementation of the EAP's were formulated as follows <sup>5)</sup>:

- Ensure that environmental legislation is enforced and implemented; to make provisions that environmental assessment is being made prior to project implementation,
- enhance adequate environmental protection standards and to monitor changes in the state of environment and resource use,
- ensure specific projects to have a multisectoral approach,
- to emphasize community participation,
- to make use of local expertise and technology.

## 2.26 GON policy on sustainable land use

The GON policy on sustainable land use, as laid down in the recently published Sectoral Policy Paper on this subject, dovetails to a large extent with the GOK policy in terms of analysis, objectives and guidelines for implementation. Especially in the formulation of the priorities for intervention both documents are in congruence: e.g. the need for strengthening of community participation, introduction of risk minimizing farming systems, stimulation of off-farm and non-pastoral activities.

The GON stresses the importance of the introduction of Low External Input and Sustainable Agriculture (LEISA) as an approach. Although the term LEISA is not mentioned in the GOK Policy Document, many of its elements can be recognized, such as optimal use of local resources, introduction of risk minimizing farming systems, the need of a participatory approach in on-farm research.

An issue which the GON policy emphasizes is the need for a thorough analysis of the factors which have led to the present environmental situation at national as well as at regional level as a basis for an adequate strategy development in sustainable land use.

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<sup>5)</sup> Environmental Action Plans for ASAL in Kenya; MRDASAAW, paragraph 5.1.2.



## **V WILDLIFE USE REPORT**

**WILDLIFE USE AND THE ARID AND SEMI ARID LANDS (ASAL)  
PROGRAMME IN KENYA AS SUPPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENT  
OF THE NETHERLANDS.**

Jan Geu Grootenhuis

DRAFT

July 1997



## **Wildlife use and the Arid and Semi Arid lands (ASAL) programme in Kenya as supported by the government of the Netherlands.**

### **Terms of reference**

This consultancy is meant to find out what was done by the four ASAL programmes with the strategic action plans made at the workshop held two years ago at Game Ranching Ltd. This is further detailed in 7 points to be addressed:

1. Assess how the experience of the workshop has influenced the activities of the four ASAL projects as reflected in annual plans and implemented activities.
2. Define tangible results ranging from
  - increased awareness
  - the development of plans for the use of wildlife,
  - interactions with local communities on the use of wildlife,
  - local assessment of the natural potential for wildlife use.
3. Describe what follow up is desired by the project.
4. Define realistic possibilities for the wildlife utilisation activities (consumptive and non consumptive) within the framework of the project.
5. Analyze the potential and the needs for wildlife utilization in each project.
6. In case of good potential for the use of wildlife, develop a framework of requirements and steps to be taken by the project for implementation.
7. Assess existing collaboration with KWS and advise on how the collaboration with the new partnership programme of KWS can be improved.

The output is contained in this report, which discusses a number of relevant cases of wildlife use in the project areas and outlines approaches to be taken by the relevant ASAL programme.

### **Introduction**

Although wildlife based tourism is one of the mainstays of Kenya's economy, it has always surprised me that both the subjects of wildlife and tourism are rarely considered in the context of development. It appears that the common sense on this issue is changing, shown by the fact that the Royal Netherlands Embassy had commissioned a workshop in 1995 to create awareness on the use of wildlife in the four Arid and Semi-arid land district programmes, which are supported by Dutch development aid, either by DGIS (General Directorate for International Collaboration) or SNV (the Netherlands Foundation for Voluntary Service). This workshop was held on the pioneering ranch for

consumptive wildlife use, Game Ranching Ltd at Athi River. The output of the workshop was generally an increased awareness of the potential and problems around different forms of wildlife utilization and the generation of specific action plans for each ASAL programme. These plans were:

1. West Pokot:

Establish a small tourist camp, from where tourists could make trips through the area, using a number of fly camps. A site on trust land was established, suitable for donkey tracking and night time game viewing. The following actions had to be carried out: the trust land had to be transferred into a group ranch, a commercial operator had to be identified interested in the development of this activity and the necessary infrastructure had to be developed.

2. The group representing Keiyo and Marakwet suggested to focus their activities on the recently gazetted reserve of Rimoi. They saw this as an opportunity to offer a wildlife experience of the beaten track. The action plan included the training of staff and the creation of a community awareness program. The area has high scenic value and could be included in a tourist circuit.

3. Laikipia was very concerned with vulnerability of land holdings to elephant damage. They would like to address these problems through a system of zoning, whereby land was specifically designated to arable agriculture, commercial ranching, group ranches and pastoralism. One of their interests was the development of small scale wildlife farming, for instance with guineafowl.

The Laikipia ASAL was also interested in the testing of the hypothesis presented by David Hopcraft, that wildlife are an integral part of healthy rangelands and they would like to select a degraded rangeland area for rehabilitation along the lines of this concept.

The Laikipia ASAL had no relationship with the Laikipia Wildlife Forum. They felt that many of the group ranches and small landholders would like to become members of this forum and explore ways to benefit from wildlife use.

4. The Kajiado ASAL wanted to establish a task force to execute activities on wildlife use. They wanted to address the objective of optimal wildlife utilization by starting with a resource survey, facilitating the formation of wildlife associations through workshops, trainings and pilot projects.

In all of these areas livestock is if not the only source of income, at least the major source of subsistence. The needs per capita for subsistence are approximately seven tropical livestock units (TLU) or just over 1400 kg of cattle biomass. In a vulnerability assessment by Famine Early Warning System (FEWS, 1995) for Kenya TLU per capita