REVIEW OF EXISTING ASAL PROJECTS AND EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE ASAL ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCIAL APPROACHES

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

REVIEW OF EXISTING ASAL PROJECTS AND EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE ASAL ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCIAL APPROACHES

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ASAL INSTITUTIONS

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INTRODUCTION

The following institutions report was prepared for IFAD and Ministry of Planning and National Development of the GOK.

Chapter 1 of the report is historical covering ASAL development in the colonial period. Chapter 2 discusses the activities of the first independence decade as a backdrop to the beginning of systematic ASAL developments soon after which is covered in Chapter 3. Existing programmes are reviewed in Chapter 4. There are major metapolicy issues in ASAL development which are drawn together under Chapter 5. The following Chapter 6 draws together constraints on existing ASAL programmes as the constraints stem from historical, programme structural and metapolicy issues. Chapter 7 outlines administrative issues under a new ASAL development strategy. Chapter 8 puts financing issues in the context of the new strategy. Chapter 9 reviews technology issues and contexts them within the new strategy. Chapter 10 restates the new ASAL strategy and the desirable institutional arrangements. Finally Chapter 11 is a summary budget on the finances needed for operations identified by the institutional report.

CHAPTER 1. COLONIAL ROOTS OF ASAL DEVELOPMENT

1.1.The history of ASAL and struggle of rightful share of development goes back to the early colonial period.

1.2.1.Alienation of land for European settlement and the attendant shift of African populations moved people into lands which had not been utilised during the precolonial period. Since the bulk of the land alienation had taken place in the first two decades of this century, in a basic sense one can talk of ASALs conceptually since then.

1.2.2.Large tracts of land were lost to pastoral people who used to use them particularly in the Rift Valley. The Maasai were moved from the Uasin Gishu plateau which was well watered to the ASAL areas of Narok. Maasai people also lost significant parts of what is today Laikipia District and parts of Nakuru. Other peoples in todays' Rift Valley also lost their grazing areas which were integrated in their traditional production systems.

1.2.3.Settled peoples of the Eastern highlands, who had a mixed agricultural and pastoral system based on utilisation of the ASALs surrounding them, lost them to land alienation.

1.2.4.The alienation of land for European settlement combined with the increase in African population led to pressure for settlement in the ASAL areas particularly of the Machakos and Kitui lowlands. The alienation of land for National Parks similarly pushed many people in the eastern forelands and the coastal areas into more arid land.

1.3.1.The combined impact of the land alienation and population growth had by the third decade of this century led to overcrowding in the areas left to Africans. This overcrowding led to deterioration of the land resource and from this decade on one finds the colonial state attempting to address the problem.

1.3.2.At the training level it started agricultural schools at Kabete and Bukura both in the more humid areas of African settlement and thus set the chain of wet agriculture domination in training. At the policy level, the district based Local Native Councils, were given power to raise revenue to build roads and provide other social services in their areas as well as power to regulate forestry and land use. This in turn led into moving a significant proportion of peoples from areas which were zoned for forests in the wetter ASAL massifs into drier areas.

1.4.The policy concern on ASAL did not get focused until after 1936 when, responding to the serious drought of the previous three years in many parts of the country, colonial administrators in ASAL districts agitated for some attention. This resulted in commitment of colonial funds to soil conservation-essentially by forced labour- and forced destocking for the ASAL problems were perceived as essentially driven by overstocking. It was in this context that pastoralist got the cattle complex - a permanent fixture in the literature on ASALs.

1.5.At the technology level, we should note that the pastoralists and semi-pastoralists were perceived as not only dangerous to the environment but they also were a direct threat to the nascent European ranching which had started after the crop farming disasters of the depression years. While some money was put into crops in the humid areas, almost nothing was put into livestock for even where there was minimal veterinary services, they were paid for by the forced taking of livestock. More significantly, the imposition of veterinary rules and regulations to protect European ranchers limited the circulation of breeding stock among the various peoples with dire consequences for their livestock.

1.6.In 1945 the African Settlement Board was established to deal with the problem of over-population in African areas. This body moved some people to some of the few remaining good farming areas. Yet within a year it became clear that the settlement approach was not going to work for the good settlement parts were

not in the native reserves but in the alienated land and the colonial state could not break its covenants to European settlers.

1.7.By 1946 the African Settlement Board was replaced by the African Land Development Board (ALDEV) which came out of the 1946-1955 Ten Year Development Plan. It ALDEV, whose portfolio included among others provision of basic infrastructure (roads and water), project planning and coordination as well as financial control of development funds in African areas, which, for the first time, developed a strategy on the development of ASALs.

1.7.1. The development strategy was conceived as rehabilitation and reconditioning of degraded land. The assumption was that research would produce technical knowledge and government would implement these to solve the problems. Once the lands had been restored they could henceforth be managed in that restored form.

1.7.2.The elements of the strategy involved setting up research on ASALs grasses, bush control, drought resistant crops, pan and subsurface dam construction techniques as well as animal diseases control.

1.8.1.On the programme side ALDEV concentrated on establishing new settlement schemes in the wetter ASALs, grazing control and its attendant forced destocking, afforestation of steep slopes, and gully control .

1.8.2.The pre-war policy assumptions that, giving Local Authorities at the District level powers over significant development sectors, would lead to action on the issues, was superceded by a centralised budgeting, planning and implementation system of the ALDEV programmes. The Department of Agriculture administered the projects.

1.9.ALDEV field implementation depended on total mobilisation of the communities through the administrative structures. Communities were forced to do the defined tasks.

1.10.The ALDEV programme continued through the Swynnerton Plan period (1955-1960) by which time the political climate was so hostile to forced labour that most of the field projects had to stop. Most of the technologies were ignored for they were associated with forced labour. However, knowledge about these technologies is still within the collective memory of the communities who, as environmental and production conditions continue to deteriorate under population pressure, have been forced to rediscover their utility.

1.11.To summarise, the colonial state initiated a lot of research on the grasses, fodder trees and to a less extent crops of the ASALs. It forced communities and their local authorities to undertake many innovations on grazing, soil conservation and afforestation. Given the forced nature of the interventions , the

communities ignored the interventions once the fever of independence came. They did not get back to thinking about these until much later when the euphoria of independence had worn off. Ironically by that time there were no funds either from national government or local authorities for development then.

CHAPTER 2. THE FIRST DECADE.

2.1.The first decade of independence can be considered a lost generation for ASAL development. To begin with the political climate, from 1960 onward, was such that the backbone of colonial ASAL implementation, ie forced labour, grazing blocs, and afforestation could not be continued. After independence the new state concerns on settlement and improvement of agriculture in the humid areas, pushed ASAL concerns outside the policy arena.

2.2.The lack of finance for ASAL development had disastrous impact on them. The populations of the areas ignored the few land improvement practices which had been introduced. Key among these was the reverting to slash and burn agriculture, settlement in the catchment areas, reversion to traditional pastoral systems whereby the rotational bloc systems were ignored, and lack of pan, dam, and subsurface maintenance.

2.3.More dramatic was the movement to even more arid parts of the ASALs as population pressure continued to build up. The dual actions of not following ALDEV activities and growing population pressure were taking place with the backdrop of national government policy which favoured investing in the high return cash crop and land settlement areas of the more humid parts and the Local Authorities - essentially County Councils- whose revenue bases for undertaking the development work were fast eroding. By mid-sixties, the revenue bases of the Local Authorities were so weak that national government took over their development and social welfare roles and from then to date they have not been a relevant actor in development.

2.4.During this first decade it is important to note that there were serious security problems in 18 of the 22 ASAL districts. The security problems in border districts did not lend itself to systematic thinking about the development of the areas. It is ironic that the security dictates did lead to road construction which was the only major investment, particularly in border districts,in the ASALs during the period. Of course this security driven road network forms a conceptual umbilical cord to the earlier ALDEV period's concern with road infrastructure as the driving motor in ASAL development.

2.5.It is important to note that the argument against investing in ASAL development during this lost decade was based on short run conception of return of investments. In a way this was more underdeveloped thinking than had existed in ALDEV when it was

recognised that not investing in ASAL development would in the long-term contribute to many more serious economic problems for the whole country. It is a thought still relevant for the future.

3. INDEPENDENT KENYA ASAL RETHINKING.

3.1.The seventies dawned with some Kenyans beginning to raise issues on ASAL development. The devastating droughts of the first four years of the decade of the seventies gave impetus to ASAL thinking. The impact of the 1970s drought on pastoral and semi-pastoral peoples of the country was so devastating on the Kenyan psyche for it was the first time large numbers of people in independent Kenya had to be systematically fed with relief food.

3.2.Kenya Government focused on the issue of drought and logically moved onto the problem of ASAL development. It broke with the economistic framework of higher returns from the high potential areas. In presentations to donors it not only sought drought relief but also long-term development funds for ASALs. The policy position was in line with several donors whose programme preferences were shifting towards basic needs and hence interest in ASAL development.

3.3.Among the first donors to fund a major programme in ASAL areas was the World Bank which funded Livestock 1. The Norwegians started a programme in Turkana. These two projects were not conceived as ASAL projects. Credit for the conception of ASAL goes to USAID who in 1974 proposed a Drought and Recovery Program of US$ 2.5m. The thrust of the proposals was that there was need for research before there could be investments in the ASALs.

3.4.Kenya government on its part preferred that funds be invested in development activity rather than tie them in studies. The negotiations on these conflicting policy preferences dragged until 1978 .

3.5.It was these USAID funds which were used by the original ASAL Prefeasibility Studies in Machakos , Kitui, Embu and Baringo districts which started in 1977. To implement the studies a separate ASAL section was created under the Ministry of Agriculture, totally separate both in physical terms as well as normal ministry organizational chart. The main contract was with an American universities consortium. Their consultants got a few Kenyan officials to work on the studies with them. The reports produced, still form a valuable data base for the Asals covered. Other programs e.g. West Pokot, Elgeyo Marakwet etc. have published district data. This should be encouraged in all programmes for it would minimize future data collection whilst providing baseline data for current planning efforts.

3.6.The European Economic Community on its part declared interest in financing some ASAL development activity in 1975 and indicated

that about US $ 40m would be available for investment in ASALs. Since the EEC was not particularly interested in research, it asked for a write up on a programme and got one from the Ministry of Finance and Planning for Machakos. On a reduced funding level of about US$ 28m. the EEC was funding the Machakos MIDP by 1977. Since then the programme has been extended two times and is one of the major ASAL programmes.

3.7.The Norwegians were in Turkana from 1972. The first decade of development work there tended to be sector specific and it is not until the eighties that their work can be shown to be related to macropolicy ASAL development issues.

3.8.Similarly the World Bank was involved in Livestock I and Livestock II Projects in the early seventies which took place in the arid districts. These were large-scale and high technology projects. Details of the project are found in the Livestock Report.

3.9.Kenya Government`s commitment to ASAL development culminated in the writing of the ARID AND SEMI ARID LAND DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA; THE FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION, PROGRAMME PLANNING AND EVALUATION in 1979. This statement was important in committing donors to ASAL projects. Although it did not specify so, the tendency emerged that each donor was to go to a specific district. This has led to complications which are covered below.

3.10.Among the donors who now moved into the financing of ASAL development were the Dutch, Swiss, Danes, British, Norwegians, World Bank and FAO and IFAD.

3.11.The objectives of the ASAL programmes were ranked in the 1979 as;-

1. development of human resources
2. exploitation of productive potential
3. resource conservation
4. integration with national economy.

This ranking of ASAL development priorities is as valid today as it was in 1979 for it clearly recognizes that central in the long-term development of the areas is the development of people. It is a still relevant for the future in spite of the attacks by some donors on the utility of investing in human resource.

3.12.Before leaving this section, it is still important to underscore the idea that the proclamation of the 1979 ASAL Strategy, at a metapolicy level, was to create a framework for channeling resources to areas which would not get them under normal economistic concerns, in particular, those project selection criteria which prefer projects with the highest rates of return in the short term. GoK was sending a clear message to the donors that the areas deserved development on their own right.

3.13.Under the 1979 ASAL Strategy, the main programme approach was to be integrated development which by implication was to be area based. The level of government which was relevant therefore was the district. This logical framework did not always work for some donors have operated in ASAL districts at lower levels than the district. DDCs and DECs have argued that projects should be districtwide based on equity arguments. So although there is no contradiction on area based projects being below district level, they are perceived as giving district level personnel and the DDC problems.

3.14.This ASAL district based approach to development happened to dovetail to notions of decentralization of government operations (project identification and planning, budgeting and finance operations) which were initiated around 1966 within the civil service but which did not get clear backing from the political arena until President Moi took leadership on them by discussing the need for a district based rural development process. It was thus from the political arena that the momentum for DF was generated. The first document on it, DISTRICT FOCUS FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT, was issued in June 1983.

3.15.It is important to note that the strand of decentralization ultimately leading to DF and the programmatic planning needs of ASAL conjuncted in the Machakos Integrated Development Project (MIDP), an ASAL project funded by EEC from 1977.

3.15.1.MIDP was thus able to bring about some of the planning, budgeting and accounting innovations which were conceptualized in the earlier civil service decentralization ideas and were to be planned for DF. It put an accountant in the field (district level), started the process of giving district advances to facilitate operations before normal budgetary flows, and also started the process of issuing Authority to Incur Expenditure to District Treasuries. These accounting innovations were very significant for up to then all accounting was done in Nairobi at great cost to development programmes.

3.15.2.Similarly MIDP pioneered in the area of project identification, planning and budgeting at the district level as an input into ministerial (Nairobi based) budget preparation exercises. This is covered in detail later.

3.15.3.Finally MIDP started the practice of housing ASAL programmes in the Planning Ministry. This was an innovation for it was GoK view that the integrated nature of the project precluded locating it in any of the line/sectorial ministries. There are only three non-sectorial ministries within GoK organisation, namely the ministries of Finance and Planning, who have merged and separated several times, and Office of the President. From a GoK organizational point of view, it was natural that ASAL Programmes be located in non-sectorial ministries. Of the three, the Planning Ministry had more claim on hosting ASAL projects for the tasks for them were initially perceived as of planning nature. Both expatriate and local

planners made the argument that the development of ASALs was essentially a planning problem. Even the World Bank financed Baringo Integrated Arid and Semi Arid Project (BISAAP), which started under Ministry of Agriculture, was reassembled with the other ASAL programmes under the Ministry of Planning.

CHAPTER 4. THE EXISTING ASAL PROJECTS.

4.1.1. In the terms of reference it was expected that, after compilation and systematization of the data on the programmes, it would be possible to analyze the benefit ratios of particular components. There were serious problems with data availability and quality. This has been discussed with the IFAD Team Leader and the IFAD representative in Nairobi as part of the interpretation of the terms of reference for it was clear that there would be limits to what could be done within the time allocated to the consultancy. The problem was exacerbated by not only the unavailability of documents in orderly and timely fashion but by the unavailability of officers to assist in systematizing data out of active GoK files which are not normally available to consultants.

4.1.2. Reports sent to the Ministry of Planning by the various ASAL projects are not even kept in one place in a manner facilitating their use. Furthermore, data in the various reports sent in is not in a uniform format to facilitate systematization necessary for, first, establishing each programme's projects' cost benefit ratios and, two, comparing these across programmes so as to make intelligent statements on sector cost benefit ratios. It is clear that resources have to be spent on the systematization of project data for further analysis than have been to date. There should be two levels of concern.

4.1.3. At the programme level, typically there is not firm data on beneficiaries, self help and GoK contribution. As a result even the attempts to arrive at cost benefits are meaningless given the undercounting of resources.

4.1.4. In many of the reports, if a water project is build for example, there are assumptions that it caters to all the population in the administrative unit. Evaluations of some of the projects have argued that this makes mockery of of any cost benefit analyses which may be developed out of such data. Thus projects need to tighten data on beneficiaries. Special attention ought to be made to more clearly define training project beneficiaries.

4.1.5. Self help contribution is on the whole imputed without records of daily work, payment levels etc. being specified. This leads to undervaluation of this component in project costings. This is a serious omission given that there is reason to believe that self help is a major source of development resources. It is also important to account for Self help for too many of rural

people are into self help without explicitly showing benefits to those who work on the projects.

4.1.6. To date there is not uniform method of working out the GoK contribution in ASAL projects. Some count only personnel. GoK obvious contribution like office space , vehicles, provincial administration inputs etc. are usually ignored. Even when GoK inputs are included in budgets, very little imagination goes into the costing. For example as salary increases do not get included. Neither do medical, retirement and housing for GoK staff. These are included for donor employees and therefore tend to show very little GoK contribution.

4.1.7. At the Ministry of Planning level there is need to set up systematic project and programme audit and management processes and to insist that scheduled programme reporting be uniform or at least use comparable categories of data. It is not good enough that data is reported upward in such a way that it cannot establishes simple categories like number of beneficiaries, cost of implementation through GoK as opposed to through Harambee, private sector, cooperatives or NGOs not to speak of the perennial problem of cost of TA.

4.1.7.The Rural Planning Department and its ASAL Section of the ministry should develop a uniform ASAL reporting system to simplify management as well as future uses of the data for comparative analyses of costs and benefits across sectors as well as funding sources.

4.1.8. Table 1a. shows some data on selected ASAL programmes up to 1985. The highest investment per capita among the programmes is in Ndeiya/Karai where Ksh. 267 are invested per inhabitant. This is closely followed by the Baringo programme where Ksh. 257 are invested per inhabitant. These two programmes are in a group by themselves for the next group of programmes made up of Embu-Meru-Isiolo, MIDP , West Pokot and Elgeyo Marakwet respectively invested Ksh. 82, 65, 56, and 46 per capita. The lower end of per capita investments is found in Turkana, Taita-Taveta, Kitui, and Laikipia. The per capita amounts are respectively Ksh. 28, 24, 14, and 4. It is thus clear that the establishment of ASAL programmes contributed to making some resources available to districts. However, their financial importance should not be overstated for, as we argue below, significant amounts of the money did not go into direct development investment. The following section will discuss the various programmes and make tentative conclusions for no definitive conclusions are possible until such time that more firm data is available from all projects.

4.2. MACHAKOS INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PROJECT.

4.2.1. When MIDP was started in 1978, GoK did not have any experience in planning, budgeting, and monitoring development

projects at the district level. The need to test these systems led to the setting of MIDP overall objectives as;-

a. to use and strengthen existing institutions
b. to decentralize planning and implementation to district level.
c. to encourage local participation
d. to elicit self help inputs.
e. to exploit complimentarities among components
f. to ensure flexibility in the programme and provide continuous monitoring

4.2.2.These objectives were met, on the whole, for the project is soon to be evaluated for the third extension. Other projects which came after it have benefited from the experience. Even more significant has been the contribution of the project to the evolution of the DISTRICT FOCUS STRATEGY FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT which was proclaimed in 1983 after the MIDP experience showed to GoK that decentralized planning could be done at the district level.

4.2.3.However, for purposes of thinking about the future strategy it is important to briefly review the MIDP experience. To begin with no systematic baseline data was collected for this was an experiment. An internal Review of Progress and Management Issues of MIDP pointed this out in June 1980. It stated inter alia:

" The original project document and the Financing Proposal was (sic) not very precise in three aspects, (a) targets and costing, (b) technical description, and (c) siting of activities and investment".

Consequently significant part of Phase 1 concentrated on data gathering and making changes in design. No senior Kenyan planners had been posted to manage such a project before at the district level. So MIDP started by contracting the project to a consulting firm which put 13 advisors in the field. The project agreement specified that other than Team Leader, they were to exit in two years. Half of them did not have experience in the country and thus issues of coordination with government personnel both at district and national level were so extremely problematic so much that the referenced internal Ministry of Planning and EEC review as well internal Ministry of Planning documents raised this problem and blamed both sides. It further recommended the reduction of TA by the time Phase 11 was started.

4.2.4.There were problems with the national offices of ministries who not only did not have experience with planning at district levels ,but who didn't accept that the low level district staff should plan for their ministry activities at the district level. As more senior people were posted to the districts and they began to defend their ministry plans and activities at the district level they were able to convince their parent ministries.

4.2.5.It is important to note that as the district ministry staff

began to assert themselves on programme planning and budgeting, conflicts with the TA advisors in MIDP, who operated as a separate entity during Phase one, grew. Fortunately the Rural Planning Division and the Ministry of Planning backed the department district heads for it was an objective that MIDP work through existing district institutions. This problem did not arise in Phase 11 for by then the rules of the game were known to all and the few remaining advisors understood that they were to work for the district ministerial representatives. MIDP management, which was by then unified under the Ministry of Planning Programme Officer, went out of its way to educate the ministries and the DDC that there were not MIDP projects but ministry projects. The relevant district personnel had to defend them in the DDC. This approach led to MIDP playing its coordinating role more effectively.

4.2.6.On the programme side Table 1b. shows Phase 1 actual and Phase 11 planned expenditures. In terms of the total budget, the GoK only contributed 8.4% of Phase 1 expenditures. The rest came from the EEC through the EDF.

4.2.7.Water related development activities took the bulk of the money with 22.5%. Phase 11 planned that this be doubled to to 44% for it is argued that the need and the relevance to other production linkages are important. It is also argued that the water component did not spend the planned funds since the Ministry of Water Development had not posted to Machakos the relevant personnel, particularly senior staff to supervise the TA engineers.

4.2.8.Whereas both agriculture and livestock, which were then in the same ministry, took 21.4% of the Phase 1 expenditure, it was planned that they increase their share in Phase 11 so that both account for 30%, with agriculture having 11% and livestock 9%. Since Kenya has systematically trained in the agricultural sector, some would argue that there is oversupply, the TA was phased out.

4.2.9.The Cooperative Sector is extremely important in Machakos district. It had a turnover of close to Ksh. 500,000m in 1987 according to data produced by the Ministry of Planning and National Development shown in Tables42 and 43. It had not been identified as major target for development funds in Phase 1 but through adjustments ended up with 16%. Phase 11 planned that this level of spending in cooperatives be reduced to 12%.

4.2.10.The other significant components of Phase 1 expenditures were forestry at 5.65%, Social Services at 4.5% and rural industries (essentially support to KIE workshops) at 2.1%. In Phase 11 planning, rural industry expenditure was supposed to grow to 6%. forestry to drop to 4% and social services to grow to 5%

4.2.11.Since most of the planning and management activities of Phase 1 was done by the TA. Expenditure on TA (including housing

construction at 2%), together with the economic planning expenditure stood at 25.4%. This compares with 12.36% for the same activities during Phase11, as shown in Table 2 (which summarizes the planned expenditures by subsectors), although during this phase there was not a housing construction component. It is clear then that the planning and management costs can be reduced by utilisation of local personnel.

4.2.12.For Phase 11, it is not only the changes in sectors shares which should be of interest, but also the planned activities. Table 3 shows planned activities by funding source. In the water sector about 70% was planned for actual structures construction and only about 20% on personnel. EDF was expected to produce the bulk of the funds. The picture changes drastically if one looks at the agriculture and livestock plans where Gok was to produce just about two thirds of the sector moneys. Of the GoK contribution more than 70% is in the form of staff and transportation operations. The same pattern is found in the cooperative, forestry, and programme management unit. It is then clear that significant amounts of funds, which are perceived as developmental are going into subsidizing recurrent operations. The other side of this argument is that MIDP programme, like other ASAL programmes, argues that it is enhancing the operational capacities of staff in the field who would not do any development work for lack of means.

4.2.13 The consultancy proposed that cost benefit analysis of different sectors be done. Above we have indicated the problem with data for working out these in the timeframe of the consultancy. Phase 11 MIDP Project Dossier states;-

"There must be considerable doubt as to whether the estimation of an economic rate of return to the project as a whole can be more than a sophisticated rigmarole, but the exercise has nevertheless been attempted." Tables 4 and 5 show these efforts.

The EIRR for the whole project was estimated as 17% excluding GoK recurrent costs in agriculture. When the later are added the EIRR dropped to 4% showing that benefits from agriculture alone could still justify the project. Water development EIRR was14%, Agriculture over 50%, Livestock 6% and Rural industries 0%. It was not possible to calculate any for cooperatives for this would have led to double counting with agriculture. Calculations for forestry, social services, adult education, economic planning, etc. were not feasible for quantification of their benefits was problematic and also the benefits are more than likely assumed in other sectors.

4.2.14.One of the ideas implicit in all the DF documents is that districts ought to know their priorities and they ought in turn to use these to develop a long-term district strategy. During this consultancy, we asked whether in some ways it can be argued that MIDP has contributed to the development of a Machakos District Development strategy.

Formally the answer is no for no such document exists. One of the challenges for a future ASAL strategy is to develop specific formal district strategies.

4.2.15.But, given the coordination activities of MIDP, an informal district strategy has been worked out both by the DDC and the DEC. It clearly specifies what are District development priorities and its output towards that end is the District Development Plan. Since MIDP has more planning capacity than the office of the DDO, some of the issues which the DDC or DEC want planned are allocated to MIDP to work on as part of its coordination responsibilities. A case in point is the gathering of data and an opinion survey on sand harvesting with a view to making a district wide plan which MIDP is currently undertaking for the DDC although it is not yet part of its designed development programme.

4.2.16.Further, in the view of some MIDP officials, the project's basic contribution towards a district strategy is not in the informal articulation of district priorities, or even in assisting in operations research and planning for the DDC through the DEC, but in the instituting agreement on area based IMPLEMENTATION strategies by all the district department heads.

4.2.17,Programme implementation meetings, coordinated by MIDP, have led to setting cross ministry implementation schedules and even agreements on what must be done first by some ministries to facilitate later work by other ministries. For example community organizing by MCSS leads in organizing water user committees, MOWD follows with construction of water projects and MOENR follows with afforestation programmes. Another example is the contribution to development institutions' problem solving. Since there is a lot of development activity Machakos district depended on mobilized self help, problems have emerged with the village level Harambee groups organisation, representation in the DF committee structure and prioritisation of self help development activities.

4.2.18.Although these mobilisational issues are supposed to be resolved by the DDC committee system which is organized from the village, through the sublocation, location, and division onward to the DDC, at the lowest levels no systematic representation principles have been worked out. Sub-Chiefs, the lowest GoK administrative officials in the sublocations, have not ensured that the organized groups are systematically represented in the DF committee structure. MIDP is investigating whether the sector specific committees e.g. water users, or adult education, or women income generating, who form the basic development substrate in their communities, can be organized in such a way that their members can elect representatives to the village development committees who in turn take part in the upward selection of the sublocational and locational development committees. If such a system is worked out, it will continue the institutional innovation which has characterized the MIDP planning laboratory. It should be an important contribution to

DF.

4.2.19. Out of experience in Phase 1 when a lot of field activities was not closely monitored and evaluated for programme purposes, MIDP learned the need to follow through on issues of accountability. Accountability in this sense means matching budgets, plans and expected project outputs. This has always been a problem in rural development when the implementers have not got supervision. MIDP is a major contribution on how to assure accountability of ministries implementing integrated field programmes.

4.3. KITUI ARID AND SEMI ARID PROJECT

4.3.1.Although USAID was one of the first donors to commit funds to ASAL related activities as early as 1974, it did not sign a district development project until August 1979 and implementation of Kitui ASAL,its project, did not start until October 1981.

4.3.2.The Project Agreement Document stated the Kitui ASAL objectives as to ;-

"--assist Kenya in its efforts to establish a basis for a national accelerated development programme in arid and semi-arid lands through (a) enhanced administrative , planning and technical capabilities (b) testing and proving an array of activities in soil and water conservation and tillage methods. Additionally, the project would assist Kenya to improve and preserve the agricultural production base in portions of Kitui District. Assistance was to be provided for three basic project components; (1) planning for ASAL development, (2) data collection, including feasibility and reconnaissance studies, and (3) activities in soil and water conservation and development of hand tools and improved tillage implements."

4.3.3.The USAID project was complicated, for part of it sought to continue support for a national team to continue some of the work which had been done by its funded Marginal and Semi Arid Lands Pre-investment Study 1977-1978. This idea did not last long for by 1980 it was clear that there would not be any funds for that central role.

4.3.4.Similarly, in spite of the earlier studies having covered Kitui, USAID argued for a pilot phase composed of more studies. The USAID Review of the ASAL Development Project (Hook Report) of June 1983, stated bluntly that: "Except for soil conservation field work to be supported by GoK payment, the USAID project was principally one of study and compilation of data." GoK on its part was pushing for a field implementation programme. The Hook Report recommended that the studies should terminate with the completion of the roads and water study. Tellingly, no

development activity was ever taken along the lines of the two studies in the following four years of project activity to justify their expenditure.

4.3.5.A significant component of training outside the country was undertaken. Table 6 shows only partial data of those trained in a Kitui programme. None of those trained came to work in Kitui ASAL. Although by end of project one professional trained in the project had joined Kitui ASAL the point can be made bluntly that the project was training for other GoK activities not Kitui ASAL.

4.3.6.Table 7 shows the percentage breakdown of planned expenditure for the Project. 59% went to technical assistance, 5% to consultancies, 8% to training, 5% to feasibility studies and 2% to management services. Only 16% went to what could be imputed as development investment within the district. To the extent that 10% of this went to commodities which included vehicles , clearly very little went to development.

4.3.7.Table 8 a-h compares budgets and actual expenditures of Phase 1 and Phase 2 up to April 1985. Subsequent data is not available but discussions within USAID suggest that the order of magnitude is maintained to project completion in 1987. Several points are worth noting . First the budget doubled between Phase 1 and Phase 11 from US$ 4.7m to 8.3m. The second point is that GoK planned contribution, which is in the characteristic areas of personnel and equipment, was not matched. Overall just about 70 % of planned Gok contribution by way of AIEs was produced.

4.3.8.From the objectives for Kitui ASAL ,it is clear that the preponderant cost of TA limited its contribution to any form of development. That it was managed under the same framework developed in Phase 1 of MIDP, where the TA Team Leader shared authority with the Ministry of Planning Project Coordinator, but never evolved to the Phase 11 MIDP model, where departmental heads and TA worked to develop a coherent programme, underscores that designed structures and processes can only function if societal pressure for the desired development outcomes assures that they function accordingly, as was the case in Machakos and not in Kitui. By comparison the Ministry does not seem to have exercised as much supervision over this project as it did in Machakos. The donor also seems to have lost interest and let the contractor get on without much oversight.

4.3.9. In this project the leading sector was water. It is surprising that livestock development which is central in Kitui was practically ignored. A 1985 Interim Evaluation pointed out that livestock development "was an afterthought (interms of being undertaken by the project) and is wholly under-funded."

4.3.10.The Interim Evaluation shows that the cost benefit ratios of water component are 2.07 to 10.7. Those for soil conservation are 1.4. The project beneficiaries are said to be 21,000 families without specific data on family size.

4.3.11.Before leaving Kitui ASAL a comment on women in soil and water conservation. Since the 1896 famine, Kitui district has exported male labour to other districts. During periods of famine the labour export is as high as 80% of all adult males. Even under normal circumstances it is never less than 50%of all adult males. This means that significant numbers of households are female headed. This is the basis of very strong female composed, and usually led, Harambee groups which evolved out of the traditional mwethya (work) groups. Since 1946 when colonial forced labour for land reclamation and dam building was extensively recruited in the district, women have been involved in soil conservation and water projects work. There is thus no base for these groups being touted as a major find for development work in the Kitui ASAL project. That they were not included in the original plans is commentary on the relevance of the plans.

4.3. BARINGO PILOT ARID AND SEMI ARID PROJECT.

4.3.1.This project, started under MOA and was later transferred to Ministry of Planning. It was funded by the World Bank. It started in 1980 and the plan was to reach 55,000 people by working with ministries of Livestock, Water, Environment and Natural Resources, Lands and Settlement, Culture and Social Services, Education and Health.

4.3.2. Priorities in terms of investment sectors were set in the 1979 World Bank Staff Appraisal Report as shown in Table 9. Semiarid and Arid Specialist Staff and Survey were to take 22.2 %. Project headquarters was to take 17.3%. Livestock and Range were to take 10.4%. Rural Services were to take 9.4% Agronomy and Irrigation were to take 6.4%. Soil and Water Conservation was to take 6.2%. A development fund was to take three per cent. The balance 25.4% was to go to contingencies.

4.3.3.The BSAAP Staff Appraisal Report; Implementation Volume, 1980, laid out the major problems in the area as follows;

"However, due to poor communication, lack of staff, the main constraint for agricultural development, both in high and low potential areas, is the inadequacy of the extension service. The problem is one of low morale due to lack of transport and supervision rather than lack of proper extension package".

Given the above, it is strange that the project identified project benefits as follows;

" the primary benefits of the project would be the establishment of the technical, sociological and economic foundations for the future development of the semi-arid areas in Baringo".

4.3.4.As a result, the bulk of the project costs were slated to be for investigations of techniques . Little investment was

directly involved in immediate increase in existing production. No rate of return was therefore calculated for benefits structured as above were unquantifiable.

4.3.4. Table 10 shows BSAAP 1982/83 expenditures against planned budget. In that year two ministries did not spend their budget. Five ministries underspent by between 22% to 60%. One ministry - Agriculture- overspent by 10%. This lack of matching budgets to expenditures continued into 1986/87 year for as shown in Table 11, the Ministry of Water, which had budgeted only Ksh. 4,000 spent Ksh 4,000,000. Other than Agriculture, the variations by the other ministries are not too dramatic. Internal WB forward planning documents in the suggested that for the 1987-1989 period close to 50% of the funding would go to civil works, 23.7 percent into vehicles and equipment, 26.9 per cent into input supplies and operating costs and technical assistance and training a paltry 0.77%. These facts are shown in Table 12.

4.4. ELGEYO/MARAKWET ASAL PROGRAMME

4.4.1. The Elgeyo Marakwet ASAL project, funded by the Netherlands, is interesting in the way it approached assessment of development needs in the district. It initially gave little funds and spend the bulk of it on building planning capacity and planning infrastructure. Since then it has adjusted its funding volume and funding by sector. It is now (1988) set to get into very costly road infrastructure construction which will account for very significant investment.

4.4.2. This project has arrived at this choice of investment after detailed study of the limitations of increasing production if the road infrastructure was not build up. It is an argument developed also in the West Pokot District where the same donor - Netherlands- is involved.

4.4.3. It is not just road infrastructure which is being planned. Education forms major bottleneck in the least developed ASALS. Since the Harambee Self Help system is not generating as many schools as is the case in more developed ASALS like Machakos or Embu, investing in education is a priority. It is even more important to invest in education for productive skills hence the building of village polytechnics by the project.

4.4.4. As shown in Table 13a. and 13b. during the 1982-85 period this project planned to use about Ksh. 13 m. in Elgeyo Marakwet. It was planned that this rise to Ksh. 24 m. for the 1986-88 period. However, actual expenditures were only 17.8m up to the end of 1987. Over the 1982-1987 period the actual expenditure turned out to be about Ksh. 27m.

4.4.5. If one separates TA costs from all other project costs, it is worth noting that the 1982-85 phase one period planned TA costs to be 20.4% thus leaving 79.6% for programme. It turned out

that TA during this phase took 30% of all costs thereby leaving 70% for programmes. For the next two years, part of phase two, TA was planned at 11.4% thereby leaving 88.6% for programme. It turned out that TA took 15.7% and programme 84.3%. Thus between 1982 and 1987 TA took 20.47%of all expenditures and 79.52% was left for programmes.

4.4.6.Under programmes, planning activities and related planning infrastructure was set to take the lions of the budget in the first phase. The plan called for planning and planning infrastructure to take 33% but it took 47%. For the second phase it was planned to be 8.9% but in fact turned out to be 30.2% For 1982-1987 period this category utilized 28% of all expenditures. This high cost of planning within the project is explained by the need to build houses for the TA, support for various planning activities at the district in line with District Focus and the production of a very useful District Atlas which pulled a lot of needed operational data on the district together.

4.4.7.Agriculture was initially planned to take 18% but actual expenditure for the first period was 21%. It was set to be a quarter of programme budget by the second phase, a target which was not achieved as it only achieved 10% For the whole period agriculture commanded a respectable 10.55% of all expenditures.

4.4.8.Village polytechnics, which were expected to be the third highest recipient of funds according to the first plan, -14.7%- kept their position 16.9% but were slated to drop to only 9.6 % during phase 11 for construction was completed. Thus they only got 1.4% for the second part. Over the period they got 4.74% of all expenditure.

4.4.9.The livestock sector, which had initially been planned at 12%, only spent 2%, but, it was expected to maintain its level in Phase 11 at 11% which it slightly beat by getting 13.2%. For the period 1982 -1987 livestock only commanded 7.86% of all expenditures.

4.4.10.Communication which got almost nothing -0.2%- in Phase 1 plans and spent practically nothing -0.4%- was expected to be a significant spender at 11.7% but only managed 4.7% during Phase 11, thus getting only 2.71% over the project period.

4.4.11. Water was initially planned to consume 7.1% but was under target in phase 1 for it only consumed 3.5%. Investment in the sector during phase two was planned at 16% and was almost reached for the sector consumed 15.1% of phase two expenditures. This gave the sector a period average of 9.25% which makes it third after education and agriculture.

4.4.12. Education had been initially planned to take 7.3% Of phase one investments. It took 8%. During the second phase it was planned to take 5.3% but actually ended leading all other sectors for it commanded 15.6% of the expenditures. This it the lead for the whole period as it took 10.60% of all expenditures.

4.4.13. Initially the health sector was expected to be only 4%. Actual expenditure was low at o.5%. During phase two it was planned that this rise to 8.7% and the target was almost met for it got 8.3% giving the sector 4.78% over the whole period.

4.4.14. Resource conservation is in many situations a problematic sector to invest in for the methods of delivering the service are not easy. This sector has over the project period only commanded 1.09% of all expenditure.

4.4.15. In summary then, between 1982 and 1987 actual expenditures show that the main consumer of programme money is still planning and planning infrastructure. It used 27.91% of all expenditures. It was followed closely by TA at 20.47% of all expenditures. Thus in Elgeyo Marakwet planning and TA account for just over 48% of all expenditures. Distantly following these two sectors is education at 10.60%, agriculture at 10.55%, water at 9.25% and livestock at 7.86%. Health care at 4.78% and village polytechnics at 4.74% form an intermediate group. The trailers are communication at 2.71% and resource conservation at 1.09%.

4.5. WEST POKOT ASAL PROGRAMME

4.5.1.Like the Elgeyo Marakwet project, this project was conceived after the DF practices had been tried and tested in MIDP. The projects in Elgeyo Marakwet and West Pokot were started after a joint GoK and Dutch Identification Mission in 1980. It similarly had an initial period of slow build up with little investment as the donor and the DDC worked out development priorities. A gathering of needed operational data was completed and it led to a District Atlas.

4.5.2.The West Pokot ASAL Programme planned to use a total of Ksh. 17m. in the district between 1982 and 1987 but the actual expenditures were Ksh. 26,326.3m. as shown in Table 14.

4.5.3. As in Elgeyo Marakwet, the main consumer of development funds is planning and planning infrastructure. Over the 1982-1987 period it has consumed 27.51% of all funds spend in the programme.

4.5.4. Of the programmes we investigated ,it seems as if West Pokot was able to come to grips with the cost of TA. It has declined steadily as a percentage of total expenditures from 42.38%, 33.92%, 29.6%, 15.79%, 11.62%, to 9.75% in 1987. This is a remarkable achievement and it may be worth investigating in detail to pass onto other ASAL programmes the lessons of West Pokot for their TA and planning costs are high.

4.5.5. If planning and TA costs are added for the period they come to 34.61%. Of the programmes we have covered this is the lowest.

4.5.6.Of the other sectorial projects the leading sector has been

water which over the period has attracted 16.56% of all expenditures. It is closely followed by education which consumed 15.36% of all expenditures. Agriculture forms a close third with 11.78% of all expenditures for the period. Livestock with village polytechnics, resource conservation and health form the bottom group with 5.36%.4.4%, 1.82% and 0.05% respectively.

4.5.7.As is the case in Elgeyo Marakwet discussions with the DDC have led to concern for investments in road infrastructure. The project is evaluating funding a major roads component for it is clear that the district farming and livestock production systems are limited by the prohibitive transport costs. The two district road networks do not lead to markets directly and farmers and pastoralists have to take very long detours to reach the markets.

4.5.8.The West Pokot programme is interesting in the way it has mixed projects in both the relatively high potential and low potential areas of the district. As in other district where some parts have better resource bases, and are therefore likely to have had a jump on development, such balancing is of greatest essence in assuring long-term sustainability of development. Often many projects claim that when DDCs insist on this it is political interference by the politically sensitive DDCs. Such comment forget that fundamentally development is part of a political process.

4.5.9.The projects which were initially identified by the programme were as follows;

Planning/Planning Infrastructure
1. Programme management
2. ASAL transport
3. District Atlas
4. District Development Centre
5. District Information and Documentation Centre
6. ASAL staff housing

Education
1. Materials assistance to primary schools
2. Inservice training of untrained teachers
3. Support to Sigor Secondary School

Social Services.
1. Kodich village Polytechnic and Livestock Development Center support.

Health
1. Support to District Health Team.

Water Development
1. Kodich borehole rehabilitation
2. Boreholes in Sigor and Chepareria Divisions.
3. Water survey
4. Support to Water Maintenance Unit at Kacheliba
5. Kodich Water Supply

6. Shallow wells construction
7. Cheptuya Water Project

Agriculture
1. Weiwei/Sangat Irrigation
2. Suam River Agricultural Development
3. Study of traditional irrigation system
4. Rehabilitation of traditional furrows.
5. ASAL agricultural development.

Livestock
1. Rehabilitation and construction of range dips
2. ASAL range development

Forestry
1. ASAL forest development.

4.5.10. This selection not only represents some geographical diversification but was also targeted at establishing a base for subsequent development activity. In pastoral districts infrastructure funding is still going to be a priority. Similarly it will be very hard to rely on harambee for the social structure cannot support it. Neither is there the cash income base to support it.

4.5.11. Consequently, it may be worth exploring the variation of Harambee started in the pastoral parts of Baringo District where pastoralists contribute livestock and a large auction harambee is organised to generate funds for specific projects in a large area. This has been tried in Marigat Division of Baringo and it has generated substantive amounts of money.

4.5.12. It is important to note that the problems of organizing sublocational, locational, and divisional development committees are particularly acute in pastoral districts. In West Pokot these problems in a way shaped the divisions in which projects were started. More significant though is the continuing problem of organizing such committees to ensure that the projects selected by the DDCs are also rooted in the various communities. The project had to invest in seminars on development committees at the divisional level two years after the start of DF in 1983.

4.5.13. It may be a good idea to ensure that in every ASAL area there are working seminars annually devoted to the issues of project identification by the development committees at the sublocation, location, and divisional levels. Not very many ideas have been generated on how representation to these committees is to be organised.

4.5.14. In heavily pastoral districts the national schedule for fitting projects into the District Development Plan Annual Annexes may have to be revised to fit into the grazing rhythm.

4.6. NDEIYA/KARAI ASAL PROJECT

4.6.1.Ndeiya/Karai is a corner (5% of the population and 10% of the land area) of a high potential district, Kiambu. The tribulations of planning a project for an ASAL area of a high potential districts are many. This area was identified for a project in 1978-79 during the height of the pressure for projects in ASALs. The Netherlands government set aside Ksh.4.8m. for the area but it was not spent since there was not the necessary request for it either from the GoK or Kiambu County Council. These funds had to be re-allocated.

4.6.2.From 1978 to 1980 the possible project idea which attracted the donor was the possibility of developing valley bottoms to give the poor and small scale producers a reliable production base. The feasibility of bottom land cultivation was studied and shown to be impractical for partly technical water availability reasons and also for problems with land rights issues given the target group.

4.6.3.By 1982 the donor put in place a Programme Coordinator whose terms of reference included inter alia to: "formulate a project proposal from the grassroots level using the programmatic approach (and) taking into consideration the ASAL and district focus development policy"

4.6.4.The Netherlands Government did not initially commit Kenya programme money to the project but rather used the small embassy funds for the first operational year-1983. In 1984 and 1985 a total of Ksh.2.8m. was made available from the Kenya programme funds.

4.6.5.Functionally no GoK counterpart was ever appointed to help the expatriate. The assumption that the Kiambu DDO would play the role of a counterpart was dubious. Since the DDC and sub-DDC met infrequently and when they did, matters related to the project were not discussed , the project plodded on with operational contacts at two levels.

4.6.6.The first was the Chairman of the Kiambu County Council who took personal interest. The second was the District Accountant who had to authorize expenditure and payments to District Department Heads.

4.6.7.As Table 15 shows, the bulk of these funds, 49%, were utilised in developing water supply between 1983 and 1985. The only other significant consumer of the funds is education at 18%.

4.6.8.After the project was evaluated in 1985, an extension was recommended only in the water supply sector only if GoK and/or Kiambu County Council was to provide matching funds. Since there was not much interest at the district and national level the project was set to peter out in June 1988, with the last two years having been on a slow burner as most of the Coordinator's time was spent on ensuring that there were institutional

arrangements for managing the various projects, particularly water supply, and winding down other activities.

4.6.8. This brief documentation of Ndeiya/Karai, a marginal area in a high potential district, shows that even with donor interest such pockets will always be ignored for the local tradeoffs are such that they cannot focus on the problems of such areas. Previous projects in Ndeiya /Karai during ALDEV faced similar problems. It therefore seems that the only approach to pockets of ASAL is to go through a national programme targeted to them. Local forces never address marginality for it is a reserve to be raided.

4.7. LAIKIPIA RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

4.7.1. Although this is one of the projects which was negotiated and started since the DF policy had been formulated and operationalised there still seems to be a lack of understanding of the way DF is to work and the relevant levels of settling programme issues. The project agreement was signed in August 1984.

4.7.2. Institutionally there are both a Kenyan Programme Officer and an expatriate Technical Coordinator who is really in charge as Ministry of Planning officials argue. Since the project agreement specified that there will be a Steering committee- strange since the project started after DF- this has been seen by the donor representatives as a problem in spite of the fact that the activities of such committees are subsumed by District Executive Committees in all districts.

4.7.3. In a joint evaluation of this project there are comments that the Project Coordinating Committee set up in the 1979 document is "no longer in existence as a result of the decentralization policies currently adopted by government---- The Committee should be replaced by a planning and coordinating committee specifically for LRDP to be convened half-yearly by the desk officer for the programme of (sic) Ministry of Planning and National Development."

4.7.4. In Annex V11 of the document details on the committee are enunciated as follows.

"Planning and Coordinating Committee

1. Composition

The Committee shall be constituted as follows:

-Representative of the Ministry of Planning and National Development
-Representative of the Implementing Ministries
-Representative of Swiss Development Cooperation

-The Technical Coordinator and the Programme Officer will be invited from time to time as might be deemed necessary to attend the meetings

2. Functions

-The committee shall endeavor to establish links and coordination between Ministries Headquarters and the District implementing authorities.

-The Committee shall establish inter-ministerial coordination of implementing Ministries/Departments at the Headquarter level.

-The Committee shall asses the progress made by the programme on the basis of site visits and progress reports prepared by the Programme Officer and the Technical Coordinator."

4.7.5. This document makes explicit the thinking of some GoK officials that the PCC is not very useful. The issue is whether the functions and responsibilities of the PCC as conceived in 1979 could be moved down the authority structure of the ministry to be operated by the Rural Planning Division or its sections.

4.7.6. DF documents and ASAL programme practices since MIDP, make it clear that it is the business of district ministerial staff to liaise with their headquarters.

4.7.7. There are grave implications if each ASAL project is to have its own Planning and Coordinating Committee. Some of the activities enumerated as functions of the committee are routine matters for staff in the ASAL section. This is a section composed of a Senior Planning Officer as head, a Planning Officer as Deputy and 5 Planning Officers .

4.7.8. There is need for the Ministry of Planning and National Development to get clear policy on what issues come up to the section from the projects. Interviews with field based Project Coordinators show that there is little programming need for coming to Nairobi to coordinate interministerially. This only happens where projects are not serious about District Focus in the opinion of many current and past Project Coordinators.

4.7.9. LRDP, like many other ASALs was conceived to have a Phase 1 which was open ended and during which the project was to concentrate on building planning infrastructure. Tables 16 to 24 show planned budgets and expenditures since inception to 1990.

4.7.10. Examination of Table 16 shows that the three leading sectors in development expenditure in the June 1984 to June 1986 period were water supply (28.23%), followed by expenses related to planning, planning infrastructure and operating costs (28.16%), farming activities (20.16%), and support to village polytechnics (16.12%). Table 17 elaborates the budget in terms of whether the funds are donor source or Harambee source.

4.7.11. Table 18 shows that the budgeted expenditure by Swiss was 83% but only 64% of total expenditure came from the donor. The budgeted figure for harambee of 17% was achieved.

4.7.12. Table 19 compares budgets by source, adding GoK expenditure which did not appear in budgets, and by development sector. In the water sector harambee contributions were over budget by one percent and stood at 24%, whereas Swiss contribution was under budget by 11% and stood at 66%. GOk contribution, which had not been budgeted for, was 10%. In the farming sector again harambee contributions exceeded plan by 25% while Swiss underspent the their contribution by 24%. It is only in the village polytechnic sector where harambee contributions were below plan by 5% and stood at 12%. Characteristically the budgeted Swiss expenditure was underspent by 16% and stood at 67%.

4.7.13. This data clearly shows that harambee is not only an important source of project funds , contributed in the form of labour, but is an important source for driving donor funds. It is not clear why there was such underspending on donor funds.

4.7.14. Table 20 presents the tentative budget for the period up to 1990. If programme support which stands at 13% of budget is added to expatriate staff which is 47% of the total budget , the proposal suggests that there will only be 40% Swiss contribution available for development investment.

4.7.15. Table 21 and 22 show the planned GoK contribution to 1990 which is typical- personnel and a little bit of operating costs.

4.7.16. Table 23 analyses both the Swiss and GoK contributions up to 1990 and shows clearly that staff and programme support will chew up 66% of all moneys for the period and only 34% will be available for development investment. This is just about twice the amount spent on development investment in Kitui ASAL.

4.7.17. We believe that the statistics for LRDP are typical of the other ASALS. They raise serious questions on the long-term meaning of ASAL development financing. Large percentages of Donor funds are expended by expatriate teams and support to GoK personnel operations. These chew up the donor contribution leaving very little of the funds for direct development investment.

4.7.18. Given that the balance of donors contribution left for development investment is just about equal to Harambee contributions to projects, GoK will have to make very hard decisions about the utility of both the expatriates and its officers in ASAL development.

4.8. TAITA/TAVETA DISTRICT PROGRAMME

4.8.1.This is a relatively new project, funded by DANIDA, which was appraised in 1985. The recommendations were that it start slowly and build up experience. Table 25 shows the planned budget of Phase 1 of the project.

4.8.2.Analysis of the categories of funding shows that about 40 % of the Danida contribution will be available for direct development investment. The major planned development sectors are afforestation 13.30%, soil conservation 11.73 percent and water supply 6.73%.

4.9.WAMBA ASAL PROJECT

4.9.1.Wamba ASAL began as a famine relief project in 1979 when GoK requested support from Germany. This assistance went to one of the Divisions -Wamba- in the district. A pre-feasibility was done in 1979 and a full feasibility study done in 1980.

4.9.2.The German government indicated interest in a food security project in 1982. A three year pilot project was proposed to end in 1984. This was extended to 1985 because of the very severe 1984 drought. Again in May 1985 the same pilot project phase was extended to the end of 1988.The pilot projects objective was stated as providing:

"Food security and improvement of the income situation of the rural population, increase in the food production (at first of animal origin) and the creation of marketing possibilities."

The expected outputs were :_

-establishment of a marketing structure for livestock in Wamba
-setting up and maintenance of water places
-improvement of the livestock potential through veterinary and advisory measures with simultaneous reduction of the number of livestock
-introduction of rangeland rotation
-improvement of rangeland by appropriate fodder plants
-building and maintaining a demonstration herd

4.9.3.We have not got data on evaluation of these expected outputs but it would be a miracle if they were achieved in the project period.

4.9.4.The budget for the project between 1986 and 1988 are shown in Table 26. Of the planned expenditure of Ksh. 30m. 65% was for overhead and administration. Thus development investment was to take only 35%.

4.9.5.Within that, the leading sector is animal health at 9.03%. Range Improvement and Livestock marketing were to get just about six percent each. Other development investments are water

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development at 2.42%, and training at 2.3%.

4.10. EMBU/MERU/ISIOLO ASAL PROGRAMME.

4.10.1. This project funded by British aid covers three districts thus making it one of the bigger ASAL projects. For the period 1986/87 to 1988/89 the project, as shown in Table 27, projected that it would spend Ksh. 52,580,000 in Embu, Meru and Isiolo districts thereby making it a big ASAL programmes.

4.10.2.The leading development sector is forestry with 45.15 %, followed by soil and water conservation with 37.11 %. The goat and sheep project is a low third with 17.76 %. Significantly the GoK contribution is 38% with the balance of ie 62% coming from ODA. Of this contribution about 10%is offshore and 53% is local. We do not have data on TA costs.

4.10.3.This project is planning to diversify into irrigation for there is some traditional furrow irrigation in its area of operations. There is potential for expanding the irrigation activities particularly where gravity flow can be used.

4.13.KAJIADO ASAL PROGRAME.

This is a new Netherlands funded project for which whose leading sector is water. It also has components in agriculture , education , community development, cooperatives, roads, forestry, and informal sector activity components. The project was started at the beginning of 1988 and the pilot phase will last two years.

CHAPTER 5. METAPOLICY ISSUES.

5.1.According to District Focus for Rural Development 1987 (DF),

"The task of resource management at the district level is complicated by the fact that funds and other resources come through several different channels, each with its own characteristics".

Those enumerated are Ministry funds for district- specific projects, Rural Development Fund and EEC Micro-projects, Local Authority resources, Local self help, Special programmes, Private sector investments and Rural Trade and Production Center Funds (which are now called the District Development Fund). We review these hereunder.

5.2.MINISTRY FUNDS FOR SPECIFIC PROGRAMMES.

5.2.1. It is generally acknowledged that the ministries have not decentralized their budgets to districts significantly. Part of the failure is typical large bureaucratic inertia but a significant part is the unfamiliarity with decentralized development planning. There has been concern with these failures. Currently the GOK has a committee looking into better ways of ensuring that districts know about their allocations in timely fashion to incorporate them into their planning schedules.

5.2.2. Even where ministries have sought to follow the spirit of DF by showing what resources are to go to districts still key decisions on what to fund, staffing, planning and implementation priorities are taken in ministry headquarters and the districts are only told what they will get.

5.2.3. This process penalizes the 22 ASAL districts (See Team Leader's An Expanded Strategy for the Development of Districts Having Arid and Semi-Arid Lands in Kenya for the 22 Districts which this Mission has used.) whose socio-political and bureaucratic access is not as good as the more developed high potential districts.

5.2.4. In a basic sense the shortage of resources for central ministries to budget for districts, and Ministrys' failures in disaggregating forward budgets by districts, and staffing districts to cope with the DF implied new tasks, has led to many donors going to planning specific projects in districts and financing the district development activities through direct funding. These practices, although they are within the spirit of DF, are increasingly challenged at all levels since they violate basic public budgetary laws and practices. Sessional Paper no.1 of 1986 specifically states that "Budget Rationalisation requires that these programmes be brought within the system and given scrutiny similar to all development projects". We shall return to this problem later.

5.2.5. The central institutional issue impacting on the development problems in the ASALS are the lack of financial, planning and implementation autonomy at the district level. The policy instrument of DF makes the district the centre of development. However, traditions in centralised budgeting, staffing and even in conceptions of what is development, of the first twenty years of independence, limit DF effectiveness.

5.3. RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND.

5.3.1. In some sense the RDF funds are seen by Districts as their fund since districts can develop proposals for development and get money to spend. From 1974 to 1985 RDF as shown in Table 28a. has invested about Ksh.18m in development projects.

5.3.2. Table 28b. shows the allocation of RDF funds by district for the period 1980-1984. Analysis of RDF funding pattern in the country shows that the 22 ASAL districts got only 40% of all RDF

funds between 1980 and 1984. This is shown in Tables 29 and 30.

5.3.3.However, there are interesting variations in the ASAL districts as shown in Table 31. On the whole the semiarid ones did better than the arid districts. Also the ones with high share of RDF funds ie Kitui, Baringo, Elgeyo Marakwet, Tana River and Machakos, have had ASAL projects. This may be an indirect measure of the planning impact of the ASAL projects in those districts. Table 32 shows details of funding in non-ASAL districts for comparative purposes.

5.3.4.The pattern of allocation of RDF funds to ASALs is continued in the 1986-88 period as is shown in Tables 33 and Table 34. In 1986/87 financial year the bottom ten districts in RDF allocations included nine ASAL districts namely, Turkana, Lamu, Mombasa, West Pokot, Taita Taveta, Laikipia, Nakuru, Samburu, Mandera and Narok. All of them got less than two percent of the total allocation. As is shown in Table 34 for the 1987/88 period the bottom 10 districts include Lamu, Turkana, Taita Taveta, Mandera, Laikipia, Samburu, Nakuru, and West Pokot.

5.4. EEC MICRO PROJECT PROGRAMME.

5.4.1.The EEC Microproject Programme was initiated since there was need for a fund which would fund at a slightly higher level per project than the RDF.

5.4.2.As shown in Table 35a.; of the 132 projects undertaken since 1977 in this Programme, the average cost has been Ksh, 1,172,203.

5.4.3.Tables 35b. shows that over the period of the eight tranches, 1981 to 1988 the ASALs have got only 44% of all the funds. More significant is the fact that both the number of ASAL districts and overall ASAL share has been growing from the first Tranche to the current one.

5.4.4.Tables 36 and 37 shows that the share of ASAL districts in tranche one was 38%. It dropped to 32% in the next one and grew to about 69% during the third one. The fourth tranche gave about 51% to ASAL districts and the fifth one 62%. During the sixth 57% went to ASALs. During the seventh ASALs got about 52% and finally got about 62% during the eighth tranche. This is good if maintained in the future for it will ensure that ASAL districts get their fair share of the funds.

5.5.LOCAL AUTHORITY RESOURCES.

5.5.1.Local authorities, particularly County Councils, do not have any significant sources of revenues these days. In spite of the fact that DF 1987 states that their "Revenue generation capabilities the local authorities are currently being reviewed with a view to expanding their resource base" it is still not

clear that they will be viable both in the near and long-term.

5.6.HARAMBEE SELF HELP.

5.6.1.Data available in the short time of the consultancy does not lend itself to calculations on derivation by district and comparison between ASAL and Non-ASAL districts. However data available for the 1979 to 1981 shows that the per capita Harambee contribution increased in 18 of the 21 ASAL districts for which there is information while it declined in the non-ASAL districts. Self Help groups seems to have been found by the special ASAL development projects, a point we shall return to later.

5.6.2.Self help funds present serious problems to planned development and there does not seem to be clear institutional thinking on how it should be fitted into the DF system. Ideally if the Village Development Committees and the Sublocation and Locational Development Committees were systematically organized and functioned in the ASAL areas properly, then some of the planning issues of Harambee would be contained since the various projects would be prioritized at the village/manyatta, Sublocation and Locational levels.

5.6.3.Many of the ASAL projects have found that the DF committee system does not work properly at the lowest levels since communication and the mesh of extant social organizations with the government bureaucracy in ASAL districts is problematic. This is particularly so in the pastoral districts.

5.6.4.Since DF was initiated, concerted effort has been put into training for the District and national levels but little thought and actual training has gone into the level below the Divisional Development Committee. Yet if the DF system is to work, in the sense of being relevant to local development , the prioritisation by the levels closer to the public must be taken seriously. This can come about if the committees there are formed and are active. The metapolicy issue here is the involvement of Chiefs, their assistants and other locational level civil servants and leaders. Essentially this can be achieved by mass mobilisation for development by Provincial Administration. It does not need project finance for it is part and parcel of normal administration.

5.7.SPECIAL PROJECTS.

5.7.1.There have been numerous special ASAL projects. The available funding details are found in Tables 1 through Table 27.

5.7.2.These special ASAL projects were a response to GoK request to donors in the early seventies to assist in the ASAL districts. Other than World Bank Livestock project and Norwegian Turkana sector projects, initial interest in ASAL funding was by USAID

who funded a large ASAL Prefeasibility Study of Machakos , Kitui, Embu and Baringo. Other donors, after this initial effort in 1977, got interested and started funding projects. The EEC led with MIDP in Machakos in 1978. By the early 1980s other donors were planning projects.

5.7.3.The major policy document for the ASAL Projects is ARID AND SEMI-ARID LANDS DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA - THE FRAMEWORK FOR PROGRAMME PLANNING, IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION (1979), which in draft was circulated to Ministries, donors and even NGOs for comment for the GOK felt it needed to get commitment on the policy of development of the ASALS.

5.7.4.This document specified that the basic ASAL strategy had to include adaptive and basic research and expansion of food production.

5.7.5.Institutionally an Interministerial Committee, made up of Permanent Secretaries was created for liaison. It was to be chaired by the PS Planning.

5.7.6.Coordination of ASAL activities at the highest level was to be supervised by the Planning and Coordinating Committee (PCC) under the PS Planning or his designee. However the document recognised that the real project planning coordination work would be done by the Planning Division of the Ministry of Agriculture.

5.7.7.Issues of project planning coordination were seen as different from the technical core activities of the ASAL programmes which would be in the natural resources sector. Consequently a Core Technical Committee was set up under the Chairmanship of the Director of Agriculture. This assumption that the key development needs are in the natural resource areas is not supported by recent development theory and should be changed for the future strategy.

5.7.8. The major metapolicy issue now and for the future is whether a Ministry of Planning and National Development and Ministry of Agriculture ought to share both planning, coordination and technical issues since even the ASAL project started under AGriculture have been transferred to Planning.

5.7.9.The institutional system set up was worked as it generated donor interest and project implementation in the field, even though there were no clear lines of authority. Neither was there clear thinking about what were ASAL development priorities. Consequently every donor and every ministry sought to justify its operations as ASAL. Between 1979 and now all sorts of unrelated programmes have been justified under this label. Depending on the donor and relations with a particular ministry, decisions are made on whether to to tether with planning ministry or with a line ministry.

5.7.10.To this consultant, it seems as if it is time to jettison the ASAL labels and to subsume all district operations under the

DF system which has continued to evolve since it was enunciated in 1983.

5.7.11.The metapolicy issue then is whether a planning ministry should continue being a field development implementing ministry. The line ministries have always questioned this arrangement and have essentially ignored the committees. Since most of the ASAL projects were developed under this umbrella, they all suffer the confusion of whether they are planning exercises or field development projects.

5.7.12.At the metapolicy level it should now be clear to all and sundry that a giving a planning ministry field development programs leads to split in orientation for its primary purpose is to plan and not execute. Towards this later end, the training and experience in decentralized planning which the ministry has got out of the ASAL projects ought to be used to develop systematic planning data in those districts to be the basis of planning development activities in the future. This should enable the ministry to be an independent evaluator of the activities of other actors in ASAL development. At the moment its personnel are involved in the planning, supervision as well as the evaluation of some of the programmes.

5.7.13.Out of the 1979 ASAL policy document, all Special ASAL projects have been project driven. This meant they were not systematically used to strengthen the normal GOK line ministry operations for the long-term. Their funds, expertise and experience was not available to build up planning, budgeting and implementation capacity of the DDCs after the DF policy was enunciated in 1983, to enable the districts to have concrete strategies which they can use for prioritisation as well as planning their short and long- term development, for the ASAL project were Ministry of Planning field projects.

5.7.14.All ASAL projects have argued for the shotgun approach in identifying development ASAL district activities because of the lack of proper planning data which should have been collected and developed into development strategies by the Ministry of Planning. The 1979 policy paper gave them the freedom to justify that pilot phases were for research. Most did not know what was to be done. Many did not seek guidance from the populations they were to serve to get their priorities. Consequently all have had pilot phases. They have been centrally initiated and to a great extent planned even after DF was prescribed in 1983. Since then a few are centrally planned after project identification by District Development Committee officials, but not having emanated from the people or the DF committees closer to them.

5.8.PRIVATE SECTOR.

5.8.1.SESSIONAL PAPER NO.1 OF 1986 ON ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT FOR RENEWED GROWTH argues that development is driven by public and private sector, and harambee self help activities. During this consultancy we attempted to generate data showing how significant

the private sector is in the ASALS.

5.8.2.Data on trading licenses and investments not to speak of business turnover are some of the hardest data to get in the ASAL districts. Collection of such data, which is of essence in long-term planning, calls for extensive fieldwork which one hopes the District Data Centers will embark on.

5.8.3.Although we do not have direct investment data in the ASALS, Postbank data suggests that there is significant savings. Table 38a Estimated Statistics for Ordinary Savings Scheme Per District for the period 1978 to 1987 shows that there has been significant growth in the total amounts saved by the ASALS. Since the data has been average from current figures it would be meaningless to work out the ASAL and non-ASAL district growth rate for the decade.

5.8.4.Table 39 Kenya Post Office Savings Bank Outlets January 1988 shows that the number of outlets has practically doubled from 203 in 1978 to 359 in 1988. In the opinion of the management of the Postbank, the growth has been greater in the ASALs particularly in the real arid areas for in 1978 there were only a handful of outlets there. The current situation of numbers of outlets and number of accounts is shown in Table 40 Postbank: Outlets and Accounts 30/6/1986. Of the 308 outlets for the Postbank 122 or 40% are in the ASAL areas. These outlets have 185,110 accounts, 18.5% of all accounts.

5.8.5. As shown in Table 38b. the accounts in the ASAL districts withdrawals are just about equivalent to the share of accounts, ie 18.87% but the deposits are slightly higher at 20.82% of all deposits. Since the Postbank caters to the poorer savers and it has plans to develop branches in the districts this data is as a good indicator as any that savings can be mobilized in ASALs.

5.8.6.Commercial banking facilities are important in facilitating the private sector to undertake its role in development. Although the total deposits and withdraws and accounts are not available for all the banks in ASALs, Table 41 Commercial Banks in ASAL Districts December 1987, shows that there has been major growth in outlets. In 1979 there were only 30 bank branches. Since then there has been a 103% growth to 61 branches up to December 1987. More spectacular has been the growth of mobile banking facilities. The 1979 base is not known but, Kenya Commercial Bank alone has 61 mobiles operating from its branches in ASALs. It is estimated that the Standard Bank and Barclays bank have about half of the KCB mobile outlets. Thus it is estimated that there are about 100 mobile banking facilities in the ASAL districts making a total of 161 commercial banking outlets in ASALs.

5.9.RURAL TRADING AND PRODUCTION CENTERS.

5.9.1.To date the activities related to Rural Trade and Production Centers have been essentially of a planning nature and the implementation of the project is yet to start. An officer has

been posted to Ministry of Planning Headquarters to start the field project. Not much money is likely to move into the ASAL districts because of this projects pilot nature.

5.10.THE ROLE OF NGOS.

5.10.1.NGOs are are not assigned role in ASALS development. Yet the church NGOs and others have been extremely important operations research on livestock, water drought resistant crops etc. They resist stating how much money they invest in development but in some of the arid districts they are at times the only source of development funds. Since most of them build on local capacities they should be encouraged to transfer the skills to local communities. Their programs should also be come more integrated with the DF system.

CHAPTER 6.CONSTRAINTS ON EXISTING ASAL PROGRAMMES.

6.1.Although in the aseptic reports of the programme documents the only major constraint discussed is methods of moving money, in interviews the major issues raised both by donor representatives and GoK officials is policy on ASALs.

6.1.2.To begin with all seem convinced that ASALs concerns are not center stage in terms of GoK's policy concerns. However this statement is tampered by comments that the political arena is very much interested in making ASAL issues center stage from a policy point of view. The bureaucracy and the major donors on the other hand do not seem to be interested. It is argued that the bureaucracy has followed the lead of the major donors.

6.1.3.Key in the evolution of the bureaucratic attitude is the benign neglect by some of the big donors since their initial ASAL interest and funding in the seventies. In the early seventies, the World Bank was involved in very extensive Livestock Development Project. This project sought to move pastoralists into ranching type grazing blocs. Its socio-political premises and the management systems designed were to say the least so unrealistic that the project was doomed to failure. It essentially saw the ASAL areas as producers of immatures for the former White Highlands' ranches, which were already being subdivided. Its technology was high tech and the permanent joke of the fully equipped mobile workshop stuck on the "road" to nowhere to service a drilling rig, is part of the Kenyan development folklore. By mid seventies the World Bank moved away from livestock in ASALs and concentrated on the the IADP programme. This heralded the age of integrated projects in Kenya's development thinking. Later the World Bank got into ASALs proper, rather than a sector project, in BISAAP. It is considering extending the funding on that project. Furthermore there is some indication that the World Bank is considering further investments in ASALs.

6.1.3.USAID became the major financier of the large ASAL inventory studies of the seventies. At that time it was expected that the studies would lead to major funding for activities in the ASALs. The policy contribution of these large studies was to bring ASAL issues to policy focus and to enable the GoK to issue the 1979 ARID AND SEMIARID LANDS DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA, THE FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAMME PLANNING AND EVALUATION.

6.1.4.Fundamentally this document was an aid lobbying brief. It worked for many other donors started projects or expanded projects they were undertaking in ASALS soon after.

6.1.5.There is irony in history since the USAID and World Bank showed not as much interest as in mid seventies when the smaller donors were moving into them at the turn of the decade. What is clear though is that neither USAID nor World Bank nor the small donors were going to develop the large comprehensive projects.

6.1.6.With the exception of EEC in Machakos, all other programmes were started very small and indeed were not expected to be integrated. MIDP was the last of the integrated monsters of the seventies. Although Kitui ASAL had pretensions of being an integrated project it never developed to one since USAID did not buy the notion of including the large water and roads component. Similarly livestock activities were initially insignificant.

6.1.7.To some extent the two large donors having triggered interest in ASALs committed funds in other programmes. The smaller bilateral donors got in. The later worked within the framework set by ARID AND SEMIARID LAND DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA. In short the initial programmes developed projects for Ministry of Planning.

6.1.8.Since the Planning ministry saw these as their projects, one of the interesting activities of the 1977/1980 period was its attempts to distribute donors to different districts. A donor would be given a district and since the planning bureaucracy was still trapped in the development model of integrated development, their expectations were that the district donors would pick up the whole development load of the districts. In other words, the donor would have an integrated project catering to all the needs of the assigned district, This orientation mainly explains why in each of the districts the various donors started by developing research and surveys on the districts to identify what the district needs were. Significant amounts of resources were spent on this activity rather than on direct development investment.

6.1.9.As donors were linked with the planning ministry, there was a tendency to see their activities as planning. They did not then develop these activities for support of the technical ministries. Technical ministries on their part did not volunteer inputs for these were not their programs. This attitude was compounded by the general staffing condition where district ministry officials were too junior to argue with the donor representatives about programme content, even when, as they

argued, they were bypass by the expatriates to get either to their ministry headquarter staff or to the planning ministry.

6.1.10. The ASAL projects thus spend a lot of time and personnel resources reinventing the programme wheel. Since DF did not systematically take off until around 1985, the bulk of what was identified as programme activities was generated by donor officials sometimes in consultation with ministry staff in Nairobi and at other times in consultation with District personnel. Rarely were consultations with the people.

6.1.11. Perhaps it is appropriate to discuss MIDP here for it was setup to pioneer an approach to District planning. To begin with from an institutional design point of view MIDP innovations are limited. They however were dramatic for their time for MIDP leaped into district planning. It put a Kenyan Planner as Programme Coordinator. It was supposed to coordinate all the ministries plans in the district. There is not evidence that it actually influenced Ministries in rethinking their programmes to Machakos. Building on a 'prefeasibility' study done by Ministry of Finance and Planning , submitted to the EEC in 1977, there was a programme design and appraisal done by consultants for the EEC. The project was contracted out and a Planner from Ministry of Finance and Planning seconded to the project as a Programme Coordinator. This person at no time was totally incharge of the programme design and implementation until Phase 11 . Similarly, from records it is clear that during Phase 1, the ministrys' district personnel were informed that there would be money for activities which had already been designed and asked to submit plans within those predetermined areas. It therefore seems to me that it is not accurate to argue that the initial phase of MIDP was a project to test district planning. At best it was an attempt to test how a donor can put advisors to the district level, develop programmes and then get project activities from the line ministries which operate there. It also was a good way of testing how a planner can operate as coordinator of a development process . This is a marginal operation. Unfortunately it was copied in all the subsequent ASAL projects to the detriment of developing and testing district strategies.

6.1.12. The real district planning need is to gather data for planning purposes and to get the ministries operating in the districts to jointly develop a development strategy for the district. To date nothing of the type exists for the District Development Plans are no more than a catalogue/shopping list put together by DDOs from information supplied by the various ministries. Very few districts have to date developed a coherent district development strategy.

6.1.13. Putting advisors in the ASAL districts in the pre-DF time was deleterious to their long term development for it warped district operations. If a donor was not interested in a particular aspect of development it was ignored. A concrete example is cotton in Kitui. Similarly there was a lot more money available in some sectors without the necessary staff to

supervise implementation and assure development quality control by evaluating the long-term linkage to community development possibilities. Examples are the prohibitive cost of subsurface dams and the continuous failure of associated pumps in MIDP. Community groups build them for a quarter of the MIDP cost. More dramatic is the cooperatives and feeding programs in Turkana where available funds were spend on a sector and a marginalised section of the community which cannot drive the districts development in the long-term.

6.1.14. To the donor employees who developed most of the ASAL programmes, the issue of data loomed large. Basically, since most are trained in quantitative methods, development could only be planned in quantitative terms. This data base did not exist. It had to be developed rather than rely on the judgment of the staff and communities in the districts. This is a controversial point in development planning and development theory but the point is simply that there are surrogates to quantitative data. To invest heavily in collecting it at the detriment of assisting communities in solving already identified bottlenecks in development is misplaced concreteness. Such an approach assured that program activities would not be sustained or replicated for they were funded over and above the resources (personnel, vehicles fuel etc.) which were available to the community and the GoK.

6.1.15. As we discuss elsewhere, the post-DF period led to a different beat where DDCs are proxy for community participation.

6.1.16. At the technology level there has been some breakthroughs within the ASAL projects. First social technologies. Since the critiques of the systems analysis driven SRDP in the early seventies , a lot of writing on Kenya's long-term development has argued that the real challenge in development is for government to assure communities of adequate infrastructure and the communities to seek innovations from within the country where different parts have adapted both social and physical technologies. In this sense development does not come out of large designs imposed from outside the communities unless they develop the social technologies to adapt it. A related argument has been that within the borders of the country there are all sorts of successful ways of organizing development and what is needed is for those areas looking for alternatives to learn from the others.

6.1.17. There is little evidence that new ways of developing social technologies were tried in the ASAL projects unless one looks at the feeding projects in many places where there were attempts to settle destitute pastoralists as such. Even in those cases -and Turkana is the major case- it is now recognised that this was a failure for it bred dependency and did not address the pastoral economy which still dominates the community.

6.1.18. On making breakthroughs in physical technologies the results are not as good for there has not been systematic

planning ensuring that the technologies stay within the reach of communities and individuals. In ASALs the major development constraints are water both for domestic use and production and macro-infrastructure roads.

6.1.19. Water is not just a luxury. Too much labour is tied to its collection. Very little of it is available for production. Possibly the cheapest technology for its collection and storage, which is also environmentally sound is subsurface dams. This Assyrian technology, introduced in Kenya during ALDEV, is divisible and can be implemented on individual or collective basis. Programmes who have used it, like MIDP and Kitui ASAL, have upscaled it and taken it to engineers to design for community water supply, with all the associated problems of design, construction, and maintenance. If this technology was hooked onto community harambeee in districts where such technology was not known and supported in districts where it is practiced already,, in its down scale model, as is now done in projects like Mutomo Soil and Water Conservation Project, real breakthroughs in development would have resulted. It is puzzling that as recently as 1987 some ASAL project had not heard of such relevant technology and they were planning to go and learn from MIDP.

6.1.20. Construction of minor roads by hand labour is a breakthrough by Rural Access Road Programme of the MOTC which has not been copied by many of the ASAL programmes. In the case of Turkana Programme the technique for building a major road at affordable costs was a major breakthrough. From a national development point of view there are problems with ASAL thinking about major roads into ASALs. This is particularly so if one concentrates on the really arid districts. A look at a map of Kenya shows that all its international trade routes pass through the ASAL districts. ASAL projects have resisted funding major roads with the possible exception of EMI and TRDP. In the words of one advisor "WE DO NOT INTEND TO BUILD ROADS FOR THEY WILL ONLY LEAD TO OVEREXPLOITATION OF THE FRAGILE ECOLOGY". Such comments fail to appreciate the fact that to develop major roads in ASALs will link them to the larger national economy as well as making them accessible to the national economy for mutual benefit. Roads make a major contribution to development. It is a pity that many ASAL projects have ignored them.

6.1.21. The West Pokot and Elgeyo Marakwet Programmes have made a contribution in finding ways to support traditional irrigation without upscaling the technology. This is something the other projects could learn from.

6.1.22. Most projects have research activities on dry zone crops. They argue that the national research system has not produced the relevant varieties. Since the trials are more often than not on experimental farms and they are not on-farm trials of perceived important varieties it is difficult to see where these minor experiments are leading to unless one justifies them in terms of giving technical advisers some experience.

6.1.23. Outside Baringo and Turkana little research has been done on water harvesting for food production. Even more dramatic is the failure to develop water harvesting technologies to go hand in hand with the road construction activities and therefore handle the serious problem of road driven erosion.

CHAPTER 7. ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES IN NEW ASAL POLICY STRATEGY.

7.1. Metapolicy

One of the central metapolicy for the GoK is to develop a policy statement to all interested donors that the programmes in the ASAL districts will be coordinated under one body within the two current overarching metapolicies of District Focus and Budget Rationalisation. Such a major metapolicy issue can only be actualized at the highest level for it is fundamental in guiding all ministries and donors. The Ministry of Planning will have to lead in staff work and getting such a statement into the Sixth Development Plan as formal policy is an urgent task.

7.2. Administrative Reorganization.

7.2.1. Interministerial committees like the PCC do not seem to work in the Kenyan context unless they are driven by the powerhouse that is the Office of the President. It is on the basis of this that the utility of the PCC for long-term development of ASALS is questionable.

7.2.2. Given the centrality of District Focus in the system it is clear that the administrative processes must fit into it. The key elements for fit are that plans and budgets and programmes MUST BE DERIVED AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL MAINLY AND ONLY IN THE CASE OF ONE RECOMMENDED NATIONAL PROGRAMME - A MACRO-INFRASTRUCTURE ROADS PROJECT- MUST BE IDENTIFIED AND PLANNED IN NAIROBI.

7.2.3. Under the Infrastructure report, there is a proposed A MACRO-INFRASTRUCTURE ROADS programme whose character is both national and key to the long-term development of the ASALs. It is justified on the need to 1. Improve the international/regional export and import marketing networks by reducing transport costs. 2. To integrate and link ASALs into the national economy for both extractive and supply reasons 3. To provide general and production security in the ASALs. 4. To build up the tourism component of the ASALS. This component is clearly the responsibility of the Ministry of Transport and Communications who should plan and administer it to assure benefits to ASALs first and the nation secondarily.

7.2.4. All other programmes in water, livestock, crop agriculture, small scale irrigation, environmental conservation, health and marketing should be planned, budgeted and administered at the District level. Programme implementation should reflect

the two philosophical basis of District Focus ie local participation and development prioritisation.

7.2.5.The key to this is that the staffing of Districts with high level personnel from the parent ministries, which has dragged in ASALs, will be rectified.

7.2.6.The key administrative institution at the District level will be the various DECs. Donor and ministerial projects will have to fit into this system if they are compatible with District Focus.

CHAPTER 8. FINANCING ISSUES UNDER THE NEW STRATEGY.

8.1.There has not been developed a coherent plan where the financing of the ASALs could be systematically approached by the donors who sought to contribute to the programme as expected in the 1979 document. The document only points out that donor financing was required.

8.2.Donors were then expected to use the normal procedures of initially approaching the External Resources division of the Ministry of Finance, then subsequently to approach the PS Planning in his capacity as the Chairman of the PCC. It was further specified that planning officer "will work with the donors on planning aspects of each ASAL programme including liaison with field staff, joining in field visits and coordinating and integrating planning documents and work plans."

8.3.This specification is the nearest thing to setting up coordination in financing. As an aside, even from a planning point of view, the specified activity never occurred for no documentation to the effect have been given to this mission when asked for.

8.4.It is obvious that the 1979 document could not have expected coordinated financial procedures. The problem is simply that External Resources Division is organized in such a way that there are desk officers for countries or multilateral donors. Donors therefore go to different officers and there was nobody designated to hold a brief on ASAL funding. Appointing one to watch over all ASALs may be useful.

8.5.Elsewhere, we had pointed out that the line ministries felt that the PCC system gave operating powers to the Ministry of Planning. They and donors created programmes which logically should have been in the ASAL framework but were not. Finances were therefore negotiated by line technical ministry needs without coordination. This explains the anomaly that there are programmes now labeled ASAL which in terms of the technical definition of ASAL areas do not qualify. On the other hand there are programmes in ASAL districts which have not been anointed by

the Ministry of Planning as ASAL. During our mission, when the ASAL section of the Planning Ministry called Programme Heads to meet with the Mission some of them were vehement in interviews that they were not ASAL projects and their work and finances were with various line ministries. They did not even seem to accept that they should have been in the meetings.

8.6.The fact that the 1979 document was silent on financing and financial procedures led to the confusing budgetary problems which many programmes and Districts have been caught in. In turn this has led to acrimonious debates within Ministry of Planning, where the field Programme Coordinators have sought to extend the planning functions specified in the document to include supervision over finances to the opposition of the donor personnel in the programmes. Kenyan field Programme Coordinators uniformly argue that when they have sought to intervene in both planning and financial administration, they have been ignored and the higher levels of the ministry, and External Resources Division of Finance, as well as Technical ministries, have been lobbied by donor field and Nairobi personnel to get programmes going. This consultant was told that the latest technique is to lobby the DC who is chairman of both the DEC and the DDC and can at times make decisions on behalf of the two committees.

8.7.Given that finances have been moved by the donor representatives mainly and in some programmes under counter signature by Kenyan Programme Coordinators, the projects have not contributed to the process of developing District based budgeting and planning and by implication they have not been too relevant to Budget Rationalisation at that level.

8.8.Essentially the problem of fit into the Budget Rationalisation stems from the fact that most of the ASAL programmes in specific districts are funded by one donor. Each has over time evolved its own method of handling finance. All the systems are mixtures of Authority to Incur Expenditure (AIE) or Appropriations in Aid (AIA). Many donors have felt that the system of authorization of AIE is too slow and thus it slows the implementation process. On their part GoK officials have felt that significant amounts of money are "lost" since some officers and ministries do not claim AIE reimbursement from the donors. These two positions have contributed to the practice of using AIA in most projects.

8.9.Apart from whether a project uses AIEs or AIA, the problem of who is actually incharge of the funds, has been problematic in all the projects. The issue is really who is incharge of donor money and who accounts both to GoK and donors. In Phase 1 of MIDP, TA personnel were incharge. This practice has been followed by most of the projects. The MIDP Phase 11 practice where a Kenyan officer is incharge of the budgeting and accounting process for both GoK and donors is the exception rather than the norm.

8.10.One of he metapolicy issue confronting the GoK now is the dividing of ASAL districts to a donor. The problem came up as a

result of particular donors who finance development of particular ASAL districts being identified with them and other donors staying away. Development of those districts more often than not is warped by the particular donor's development preferences. The district's development rate, being tied to the donor's level of funding and length of commitment to the particular district, as a consequence suffers. These concerns together with the need to continue funding ASAL development within the reality of budgetary ceilings of a structural adjustment programme has led to discussion of alternative ways of organizing donor funds for ASAL development.

8.11. There are three ways under discussion. First is to continue the existing system where a donor is usually identified with a particular district. This, in spite of its ease of management, is not satisfactory for the reasons adduced above.

8.12. A variation of the existing system is to get donors to go into the same district and to pick on different development programmes. It is said that the advantage of this approach would be that donors pick on what they are good at. In some quarters this approach is not seen in favorable light for several reasons. To begin with, few donors have offered to team up in districts. Secondly donor demands for accounting, reporting, programme control and even supervision, vary so much that field officers' time could be tied up in this to the detriment of work. It is pointed out that the only multidonor funding going to districts directly is the Rural Development Fund but it is also pointed out that it is administered centrally by one donor and all the donors contributing do not get separate reports.

8.13. The third option is the creation of a specific ASAL fund which many donors can contribute to. Such a fund would be restricted to ASAL districts. This proposal must take into account the new budgetary rules beginning with the 1988/89 financial year which specify that budgetary ceilings on ministerial development votes cannot be exceeded in loan or GOK allocations. They can only be exceeded if the development project is a hundred percent grant financed and all current and future recurrent costs are already subsumed under normal GoK recurrent vote allocations. There has been discussion whether such a fund should be exempt to the budget ceilings. This can only be so if all the funds are grants.

Assuming that an ASAL fund can be created to facilitate multidonor contribution to ,there still is the problem of access to the ASAL Fund by ministries and Districts. From a long-term development point of view it is important that resources go to the districts for projects identified by them as priority.

8.14. To some extent the third option is attractive for it would allow the DDCs of ASAL districts to tap into this fund for out of 22 districts about half of them do not have donor driven development projects. It is important to get extra funds to these districts. in spite of its attractiveness it can only be

implemented on a long-term basis for its modalities must be worked out. For the short-term the most expeditious way, as discussed in the Financial and Budgetary Analysis Report, maybe to have a dual track of working through established ministerial votes and through the already established Rural Development Fund.

8.15.An ASAL development fund jointly subscribed by donors and GoK, has been proposed by the ARID AND SEMI-ARID LANDS (ASAL) DEVELOPMENT ISSUES AND OPTIONS report of the FAO/IFAD Cooperative Programme Investment Centre. In setting such a fund issues of sharing cost between donors and GoK as well as cost recovery become central.

8.15.1.Several points ought to be made about GoK contribution to most existing ASAL programmes. The contribution has been essentially in personnel and other GoK costs like office space, and vehicles. In the context of current budgetary problems it is difficult to see this pattern of GoK contribution changing.

8.15.3.With respect to cost recovery, the Infrastructure Report is recommending a Macro-Infrastucture Roads Programme which will, hopefully, be financed by donor grants. The MOTC already has an undervalued toll charging system generating about Ksh.120 m. annually. There are proposals to increase these charges drastically. If the Macro-Infrastructure Roads Programme is executed initially and economic toll charges in the ASAL areas introduced, this can become a major source for replenishing the fund.

8.15.4.In the existing ASAL programmes Harambee self-help labour is already in use and this should not present a problem. The only qualification is the idea that the tradition of harambee is not as well developed in the most arid areas where also there are serious labour availability problems. In current ASAL projects Harambee projects seem to account for between 30 and 40% which is just about what donors are putting into direct development investment in the same areas.

8.15.5.In this report, we have shown that the Postbank and the Commercial Banks have spread to the ASAL areas. Their base ought to be used for specific production lending for they are able to deliver this service cheaper than ministries. This way significant ASAL savings can be drawn into production activities without setting up another project bureaucracy.

8.15.6.It is not feasible nor desirable that cash contributions be programmed for future ASAL programme activities for there are no clear institutional mechanisms which will be fair, responsible and accountable to communities , donors, and GoK equally.

8.15.7.Formal production credit in the country is driven by having title to land which is rare in the bulk of ASALs. Livestock has not become acceptable for national credit needs formally. A commercial livestock insurance scheme, which could lead to establishing livestock based credit systems, was

introduced in the past two years but it is limited to formal ranches and dairy herds and to date not one of the companies is covering ASAL producers. Details on formal production credit systems are covered by another report but it is clear that relatively little of national credit goes to ASAL districts.

8.15.8. Institutionally there is some experience by AFC giving production credit to pastoralists through evaluation by their field staff and getting the Provincial Administration involved in the certification of particulars in the ASAL areas. This is in response to political pressure to lend in ASALS but they are not in favor of it.

8.15.9. It is therefore difficult to see how credit will be secured for ASAL producers unless they fall into the national credit system based on title to land. This implies the urgency for land registration in the areas - an extremely controversial point. In the interim the only pathway seems to be along the very successful unsecured group credit by NGOs.

8.15.10. It may well be then that the only channel to deliver credit to these areas in the immediate future is to go through cooperatives, AFC, Postbank and the commercial banking system. If DDCs get district allocations of the ASAL Fund for onward lending, they could ask these institutions to act on their behalf for a fee.

8.15.11. If credit is organized into a District revolving fund, the interest can be used to re-capitalise the fund and the different institutions can compete for these funds.

8.15.12. Harambee groups microprojects emanating from DDCs have been identified in the IFAD document as the major component for project financing. There is demand for support of many of these projects which to date have not been supported. Clearly the planning of these microprojects and the supervision of their implementation is central to DDC activities. To spread the social benefits this component should form the bulk of project financing funds. Such funds could be channeled to a District Fund to be allocated by the DDC specifically for Harambee groups microprojects.

8.15.13. Studies of both Church and non-church NGOs in Kenya show that they are cash awash on the whole. They also have been accused of most DDCs of failing to adhere to district development priorities. These accusations have led to the current problems which the sector has with the GoK. The large non-church ones have not decentralized to the districts and their programmes are developed and executed mainly by Nairobi based or regionally based individuals. In public meetings NGOs have gone on record as stating that shaping their projects to fit into district priorities will lead to their mandates being distorted. In view of the above I would not recommend including the NGOs into the ASAL fund initially.

8.15.14.Most of the projects in income generating, including activities which are mentioned in the IFAD report - brick making, local handicrafts, maize mills, and farm supply inputs are problematic both from a business and social point of view in recent Kenyan development experience in spite of their being in fashion and many donors being active in the sector. There should be need for very detailed study of the phenomena before proceeding in my judgment.

8.15.15.Having said that there is need for normal commercial business credit for rural industries. However this should be to mainly to processing of ASAL products (both farm and non-farm) and, limited trade goods distribution in areas where basic consumer goods area not available. Again the channel for handling this would be for specific ASAL districts to have a share of the ASAL fund and to let the DDCs administer the project funds as part of their District Development Fund.

8.15.16.In any case in terms of project financing this activity which can be done more expeditiously through commercial banking outlets handling the funds for the respective DDCs. However, it should not be a major component of project financing.

8.15.17.See comments on the relevance of the AFC in the Credit and marketing report. It is not clear whether AFC deserves extra financing.

8.15.18.It is agreed that the major production limitation in production is water. Many individual/families producers could utilize credit for the building of small scale water structures for production and domestic use. Over and beyond credit which would be channeled through AFC type delivery, a special individual small scale water credit line should be part of the ASAL fund.

8.15.19.It is not wise to support recurrent expenditure. The little incremental costs support should should not be to the national level activity of ministries but to the Districts.

8.15.20.In keeping with the main thrust of District Focus, GoK is increasingly of the view that District Commissioners will have more responsibility of horizontal development coordination at the District level. Towards that end, on January 1st, 1988 it was announced by President Moi that DCs will assume supervision over all District ministerial personnel. A circular to that effect is under draft. It is the first time when officially DCs under OP have staff responsibilities over other ministry personnel. If the trend of building up the horizontal management at district level continues, and there is no reason it should not, then there is logic in supporting such efforts by the ASAL Fund.

8.15.21.Vehicles should be minimized for most of the proposals are for support of already existing structures. Information

processing will be important but support should be to enable districts to do their work not ministry headquarters for the bulk of the work will be in Districts.

8.15.22. It is hard to justify funding training in District Focus at District and divisional levels, 5 years since the programme started. There, however, is great need to invest in the training on DF at the sublocational and locational levels, in all ASALs for where there is a lot of activity, processes have not been streamlined to facilitate meaningful development choices. In pastoral areas ,the organizing principles of representation do not seem to be clear . Similarly, the dictates of pastoral rhythms do not seem to fit into the formal planning cycles for District Development Plans annexes. Investment will essentially be mobilisational.

18.15.23. Technical Assistance as discussed elsewhere is a problem within GoK for it is argued that for most of the activities there are Kenyans who can do the work. It will not be easy justifying its funding in the ASAL fund.

CHAPTER 9. TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES UNDER THE NEW STRATEGY.

9.1. There has been some interesting breakthroughs in programming in projects in ASAL districts. Probably the key social technology is the FINDING of Harambee groups as a development implementation mechanism. ASAL projects are now using the Harambee groups in as diverse activities as water, soil conservation and afforestation.

9.2. In terms of the organisation of key development activities in the desired way for ASALS e.g. conservation on catchment basis, although tried in Kitui ASAL, there has not been as great success as was expected in the 1979 document where specifically planning and implementation on catchment basis was referred to.

9.3. Again there is a bottleneck presented by the project approach where the planners and implementers are not wide to community nuances. The focus remains the bureaucracy rather than the people who in the long-term are the real developers.

9.4. Projects still have not extended all the technologies which are already conventional in the water development sector. These are subsurface dams, water harvesting, ground water tanks, roof catchments, small pans and dams for ground water recharge etc. from an institutional, the major programme limitation has been at both the credit and the extension side. That there has been no credit for individual adoption of the technologies has slowed the adoption rate. That normal extension has not pushed the water technologies related to production, other than terracing, has limited the adoption. This is essentially an information bottleneck.

9.5.Earlier we mentioned that projects have also spent significant resources researching "packages" particularly in agriculture and agroforestry. The approaches have not been systematically bottom up where people's knowledge encapsulates some relevant technologies but their applications are limited by specific production problems like availability of supplies and markets, labour, credit etc.

9.6.If a people driven problem solving approach had been adapted in previous ASAL projects, significant packages would have been systematized by now. To be fair, the second generation projects are more problem solving oriented than the large integrated projects of the first generation.

9.7.Another limitation has been in country experience of Technical Assistance personnel. Too many have concentrated on the letter of the agreement, were held hostage by formal processes and thus did not go to the people for they did not have the language and community skills to interact effectively. Parachuting technical assistance personnel take many years to develop the social skills necessary for effective community development work. Given that many of the projects have been donor projects rather than projects for which communities have identified with, either because they dealt with outsiders or local officials, communities did not push TA personnel to acquire the relevant community skills. Relevant knowledge, which highly qualified TA personnel developed, particularly in planning field projects, stood no chance of transmission to communities who did not participate in the process. This has meant has meant that the knowledge has not been systematically internalized in the community or DF system. This is particularly so in areas of resource mapping and quantitative needs assessments. The classic case in this is the Kitui master water study although each ASAL project has its skeletons. Social and community skills for Technical assistance personnel are mandatory. It does not make sense to get highly paid staff who cannot even interact for lack of language.

9.8.Little breakthrough has been made in the area of livestock production. Not many projects have got into the general animal health area which is, in a basic sense, the only relevant calling card into pastoral society. Not much has been done on building on traditional livestock production science and breeding. Even more disastrous is the total lack of interest by most programmes in studying and assisting the informal breeding programmes undertaken by wananchi. ADC has bred ASAL suitable animals - probably the best Boran, Masai Red sheep and improved Galla goats- which do not need pampering like exotic livestock. They need extension. There has been some camel work by NGOs who argue that camels should be further extended to ASAL areas where they are not found traditionally. Outside IPAL, little work has been done on camels by projects.

9.9.There is still less work on ASAL fodder trees in spite of

many claims by many programmes who are into trees.

9.10.Significant work has been done on legumes both at Katumani and the University. Some of it is still subject to the programme researches but that begs the question of extension even when new varieties and performance is tested under different ecological areas.

9.11.On physical technologies there has been clear breakthroughs like the road construction techniques in Turkana where by using dry compaction and collected gravel, costs were reduced drastically.

CHAPTER 10. NEW ASAL STRATEGY AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.

10.1.The new ASAL strategy should not be as project driven as the past ASALS for that system has meant that the specific development activities are determined by the donor preferences in funding.

10.2.We have also argued that the role of Ministry of Planning has been warped in servicing the old ASAL projects to become an implementing ministry rather than being the source of planning data, development strategies and evaluations..

10.3.Previous ASALs started with a conviction that the path to development was through large integrated projects, donor funded and implemented by donor and GoK staff. This has been recognised as not an orientation producing relevant development even by the key donors who pushed that system. Later ASAL programmes broke out of the integrated trap, and, using the shotgun approach in pilot phases, set some interesting mixtures of project activities in the districts they were assigned. On the whole though they supported the public bureaucracy by facilitating them to operate in their mandated areas.

10.4.What was supported essentially was what was identified by the public bureaucracies as projects. Essentially the data bases for identification of projects were the District Development Plan Annexes. Such an approach did not seriously reflect the spirit of DF for what got into these data bases was usually generated by District Field Staff and not the DF institutions closer to the people at the village, sublocation, location and divisional levels.

10.5.Similarly what District Field Staff identified as projects for the data bases more often than not were tailored to the known funding areas of the particular donor in the district. Such informal determination of project funding distorts what must be done in development.

10.6.Many of the ASAL projects have been housed by Ministry of

Planning for in a peculiar sense development of ASALs was seen as a planning problem even by the 1979 Policy Document. This has led to projects not benefiting from technical ministries knowledge and supervision inputs and as a result a lot of reinventing the wheel has taken place at tremendous cost.

10.7.The new strategy must overcome all these past limitations. Its major elements are new roles for already existing institutions and new funding institutions as well as a new approach to development. We cover the key ones hereunder.

10.8.MINISTRY OF PLANNING.

10.8.1.To begin with Ministry of Planning did manage to start the pioneering efforts in ASALs which led to DF practices. For the future it must more systematically;-

a. gather and organize the development data from previous ASAL activities
b. analyze it and make it available to all ministries , donor and especially DDCs to enable them to develop specific ASAL district strategy plans and field projects more systematically.
c. monitor and evaluate how different programmes the explicit national strategies of D F and Budget Rationalisation.
d. develop hard data on programme and project costing to establish the relative advantages of specific interventions in ASAL in economic and social terms from activities in the last 20 years in ASALs. Such data must include the cost of various forms of TA which is usually left out of economic and social cost benefit analysis of particular development interventions.

10.9.DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEES.

10.9.1.The new ASAL strategy is predicated on making DDCs more significant in planning, budgeting and development programme supervision. To date the limitations of DDCs in ASAL areas have been the posting of junior ministerial district personnel, lack of district staff supervision powers, lack of control over the process of developing donor programmes in their their districts and perhaps most important is the lack of District Development Budget.

10.9.2.DDCs/DECs under the new strategy should:_

a. Develop district specific development strategies
b. Coordinate all the ministries, donor and NGO programs to ensure that they fit into the District Strategy and DF and Budget Rationalisation national policies.
c. Improve the system of development prioritisation from the DF committees below the district level. This is essentially a mobilisational issue of people for their own development.

10.9.3.These DDC actions cannot be done effectively if the District Development Fund is not started. To enable the DDCs to act, funds for Ministry projects within districts, donor and NGO

funds targeted to specific districts and any other funds should clearly be identified in the Forward Budgets of the Districts and DDCs given total powers over their utilisation after they have been planned and included into the District Development Plan Annexes..

10.9.4.This new role for DDCs assume that the requisite level staff will be posted there, that the District Treasuries will be beefed up to cope with the higher volume of work and finally that the District Data Centres and District Planning Units will be adequately functioning.

10.10.HARAMBEE SELF HELP

10.10.1.Proper programme and project audit should show that the most significant contributor to ASAL development are the activities of self- help groups. They respond to specific felt needs and have management mechanisms which deliver development services at more cost effective ways than public or donor development bureaucracies.

10.10.2.The new strategy should therefore be for increasing their activities by providing tools , materials, and information on techniques for specific development activities.

10.10.3.Since their major activities must fit into district strategies there is need for the lower level Development Committees to be activated by mobilizing the Government administrative structures at that level and ensuring that organized Self Help is represented at the Village/ Manyatta, Sublocation, Location and Divisional Development Committees.

10.11.INDIVIDUALS OPERATIONS AND BUSINESSES

10.11.1.Most of the past ASAL development programmes have ignored individuals producers and businesses as channels for development. This should change in the new strategy for it is clear that there is a major role for individuals and businesses in extending some of the technologies necessary for the development of the ASALs.

10.11.2.This is most clear in those situations where innovations are needed in the production base of the ASALs. For example, the different water collection techniques and, small scale irrigation, outside traditional irrigation processes, will not takeoff until adopted by innovative producers. Nor will the needed services be brought into the areas unless individual risk takers introduce them.

10.11.3.Assistance in financing individuals and businesses which are in processing of products and services should be an important component of the new strategy. This is most efficaciously done by banking system and not through ministerial bureaucracies.

10.12.COOPERATIVES

10.12.1.Although not as widespread as in non-ASAL areas significant numbers of cooperatives exist in the ASALs as shown in Tables 42 and 43. In the 17 ASAL districts for which there is data, there are close to 500 cooperatives with more than a quarter million members. They have paid Ksh. 728m. in share capital and the annual turnover is Ksh. 587m. These are not just the producer cooperatives but increasingly they are savings and credit cooperatives. They are an important mechanism for garnering savings and channeling them to productive activities. This should be encouraged by not only giving them credit for onward lending but credit for new on farm and off-farm production.

10.12.2.In some of the ASAL districts like Machakos cooperatives (with an annual turnover of Ksh. 470m) are already thinking about moving into water for both food and fodder production. This should be encouraged and where the scale of operation of new technologies is beyond the ability of individuals, cooperatives should be an alternative.

10.13.SECTORIAL MINISTRIES.

10.13.1.The new ASAL strategy should support sectorial ministries only marginally for they are not as efficient deliverers of the development service as the institutions identified above. They not only are remote in distance and relevance, but their operating costs in the ASALs will be for many years to come beyond the affordable cost by the regional society as well as society at large.

11. TOTAL FINANCING REQUIRED (US DOLLARS)

a. Project Financing		
1.Community microprojects 40projects/district/year@$6,000 (100% grant)	240,000	
2.20 individual waterprojects/district /year@$6,000 (50%revolving loan)	120,000	
3.20 rural industries/district/year@ $ 6,000 (revolving loan)	120,000	
b. Budget Support for DDCs operations	50,000	
c. Materials 2micros/district @$5,000	10,000	
Total per District per year		540,000
Budget for 22 Districts per year		11,880,000

12/2/88

TABLE 1a: ASAL PROGRAMMES IN KENYA

DISTRICT(S)	DONOR	POPULATION 1979	POPULATION 1985	YEAR STARTED	DONOR M.KSH.	SH/CAP/YR
Kiambu	Netherlands (DGIS)	40,000	5,000	1983	4	267
Baringo (BPSAAP)	World Bank (IDA)	60,000	60,000	1979	108	257
Embu Meru Isiolo (EMI)	U. Kingdom (ODA)	1,137,000	150,000	1980	74	82
Machakos (MIDP)	EEC (EDF)	1,023,000	750,000	1978	389	65
West Pokot	Netherlands (DGIS)	159,000	70,000	1982	15	54
Elgeyo Marakwet	Netherlands (DGIS)	160,000	70,000	1982	13	46
Turkana	Norway (NORAD)	143,000	170,000	1980	29	28
Taita Taveta	Denmark (DANIDA)	148,000	125,000	1985	3	24
Kitui	US (USAID)	464,000	560,000	1981	39	14
Laikipia	Switzerland	135,000	125,000	1984	1	4

Source: Dietz - Pastoralists in Dire Straits

TABLE 1b: MIDP PHASE I ACTUAL EXPENDITURE 1978-82* (REVISED 15.1.83) AND MIDP PHASE II PLANNED EXPENDITURES 1983/84-1985/86 (K.SH. '000)

Sector	1978/80		1980/81		1981/82		Total 1978-82		Total by Sector 1978	1982	1983-1986			
A. PROGRAMME	Amount	% Source	Amount	% Source	Amount	% Source	Amount	% Source	Amount	% Sector	Amount	% Sector	Popula-tion Served	% of District Population
1. Water									34,327	22.5	63,295	44	230,000	19
GoK	696	8.6	0	0	137	0.9	853	2.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
EDF	7,405	91.4	11,534	100	14,555	99.1	33,474	97.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
2. Agriculture**									32,744	21.4	15,874	11	100,000	8
GOK	3,823	43.3	1,728	12.9	2,403	22.8	7.954	24.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
EDF	5,008	56.7	11,663	87.1	8,119	77.2	24,790	75.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
3. Livestock Dev.											13,618	9	NA	NA
GOK	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
EDF	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4. Cooperative Dev.									24,530	16	17,441	12	NA	NA
GOK	904	14.3	270	2.5	136	1.8	1,310	5.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
EDF	5,430	85.7	10,593	97.5	7,197	98.2	23,220	94.6	-	-	-	-	-	-
5. Rural Industry									3,242	2.1	8,300	6	NA	NA
GOK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		-	-	-	-	-	-
EDF	131	100	1,833	100	1,278	100	3,242							
6. Forestry									8,491	5.6	4,750	4	NA	NA
GOK	551	23.4	0	0	381	13.4	932	11	-	-	-	-	-	-
EDF	1,808	76.6	3,289	100	2,462	86.6	7,559	89	-	-	-	-	-	-
7. Social Services (including Ad. Ed.)									6,889	4.5	7,652	5	100,000	8
GOK	860	39.8	88	5.4	305	9.8	1,253	18.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
EDF	1,299	60.2	1,527	94.6	2,810	90.2	5,636	81.8	-	-	-	-	-	-
8. Economic Planning									1,309	0.9	12,439	9		
GOK	226	35	0	0	204	31.5	431	33.9	-	-	-	-	-	-
EDF	420	65	15	100	444	68.5	878	67	-	-	-	-	-	-
9. Roads and Bridges									900	0.6				
GOK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-
EDF	0	0	0	0	900	100	900	100	-	-	-	-	-	-
B. SUPPORT														
10. Staff Houses									3,031	2	-	-	-	-
GOK	0	0	0	0	91	14.3	91	3	-	-	-	-	-	-
EDF	2,395	100	0	0	545	85.7	2,940	97	-	-	-	-	-	-
11. Aerial Photography									2,911	1.9	-	-	-	-
GOK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-
EDF	829	100	476	100	1,606	100	2,911	100	-	-	-	-	-	-
12. Technical Assist.									3,430	22.5	-	-	-	-
GOK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-
EDF	14,693	100	8,989	100	10,659	100	34,340	100	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sub-total GOK	7,059	15.2	2,087	4	3,678	6.8	12,824	8.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
EDF	39,419	84.8	49,918	96	50,553	93.2	139,890	91.6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	46,478	100	52,006	100	54,231	100	152,715	100	152,715	100	(145,369)			

* Revised 15.1 1983

** Includes livestock development, crop development and soil conservation for 1978-1982 period.

Source: 1. MIDP Phase II 1983/84-1985/86
2. Project Dossier Vol. I - MIDP Phase II Project Agreement UIII/856/84-EN

TABLE 2: MIDP PHASE II PLANNED COSTS (ECU '000)

	EDF	GOK	TOTAL	%
1. Rural Water Supply				
a. Water Projects	6,123.8	707.5	6,831.3	31.5
b. Consultancy survey	330.0	-	330.0	1.5
c. Technical assistance	900.0	-	900.0	4.2
d. Contingencies	1,620.2	155.5	1,775.7	8.2
Sub-total 1	8,974.0	863.0	9,837.0	45.4
2. Rural Development				
a. Agriculture & Livestock				
i. Extension services	965.2	2,743.3	3,708.5	17.1
ii. Soil conservation	549.0	13.0	562.0	2.6
iii. Agriculture sub-project	119.1	16.6	135.7	0.62
iv. Livestock sub-project	471.0	339.1	810.1	3.7
b. Cooperatives	883.5	933.7	1,817.2	8.4
c. Forestry	340.3	21.7	362.0	1.7
d. Rural Industries	260.9	173.9	434.8	2.0
e. Social Services	286.7	59.3	346.0	1.6
f. Adult Education	229.5	69.4	298.9	1.4
g. Programme Management Unit	513.9	221.3	735.2	3.4
h. Technical assistance	600.0	-	600.0	2.8
i. Evaluation	100.0	-	100.0	0.46
j. Contingencies	906.9	1,010.7	1,917.6	8.9
Sub-total 2	6,226.0	5,465.0	11,828.0	54.6
TOTAL 1 + 2 AMOUNT	15,200.0	6,465.0	21,665.0	100
%	70	30	100	

Source: MIDP II Project Agreement

NB: 1. Technical Assistance 4.2 + 2.8 = 7
+
Consultancies 1.5 +
+
Evaluation 0.46 +
+
PMU 3.44
12.36

2. Extension services is mainly transport and operations

TABLE 3: ANALYSIS OF MIDP PHASE II PLANNED EXPENDITURES

A - RURAL WATER DEVELOPMENT - COST ESTIMATE (000 ECU)

1. EDF		(000 ECU)	
Works			
Dam (Manooni)		956.0	
Piping system			
Mulima		1,514.1	
Manooni		1,191.7	
Mekilingi		240.6	
Muthetheni		294.6	
Small water supply	120 at 4,350	522.0	
Rural center projects	3 at 53,900	161.7	
RDF projects	9 at 22,600	203.4	
Self-help projects	90 at 610	54.9	
Dam rehabilitation	15 at 8,700	130.5	
Groundwater	10 at 26,090	260.9	
Railway water (estim.)		217.4	
			5,747.8
Equipment			
Vehicle (2) motorcycle (2)		34.0	
Lorry (2)		43.0	
Tractor and Trailer (1)		25.0	
Engineering equipment (rain gauge, theodolite, etc.)		36.0	
Construction equipment, tools		61.0	
Compressor, spare parts		31.0	
Dam desilting unit		87.0	
Spare parts		52.0	
			369.0
Consultancy survey			
Groundwater		215.0	
Water supply Manooni - Railways		115.0	
			330.0
Technical Assistance			
Supervision of Works (6 man/year)		600.0	
Technical Assistance small project 3 man/year		300.0	
			900.0
Training		7.0	7.0
Contingencies		1,620.2	1,620.0
	TOTAL		8,974.0

2. GOVERNMENT			
GOK personnel - Artisans and supervisors	K.Sh.	6,636,000	577.0
Dam desilting Unit	K.Sh.	1,500,000	130.5
Contingencies	K.Sh.	1,788,000	155.5
	K.Sh.	9,924,000	863.0

B - RURAL DEVELOPMENT - COST ESTIMATE (000 ECU)

Agriculture/Livestock	GOK	EDF
. Extension services		
Buildings	-	219.0
Transport (8 x 4 WD, 14 motor's, 64 by)	-	173.0
Equipment - Miscellaneous	21.0	51.2
Operating costs, staff personnel	2,562.3	-
Transport operation	115.5	306.0
Training	44.5	216.0
. Soil and water conservation		
Hand tools	-	417.4
Operating cost	13.0	122.9
Equipment	-	8.7
. Agriculture sub-projects		
Horticulture	11.4	64.0
Farm implement	-	7.1
Marketing - seeds	-	35.0
Agroforestry	5.2	13.0
. Livestock sub-projects		
Vaccine supply	209.0	140.0
Transport supply (3)	-	50.0
Water tank (1)	-	26.0
Dip water supply	-	87.0
Grazing development	-	68.0
Goat development	-	32.0
Dip rehabilitation	130.0	-
Transport operation	-	68.0
Sub-total	3,112.0	2,104.3
Cooperatives		
Buildings (8)	-	87.0
Store conversions (8)	-	70.0
Mobile bank (1)	-	20.0
Ginnery bale press (1)	-	130.0
Operating cost	151.1	-
Staff	-	55.5
Revolving credit fund (inputs)	782.6	521.0
Sub-total	933.7	883.5

TABLE 3 (cont'd)

B - RURAL DEVELOPMENT (cont'd)

	GOK	EDF
Forestry		
Miscellaneous equipment	-	48.3
Transport operation	21.7	126.0
Nurseries	-	74.7
Protective forest	-	91.3
Sub-total	21.7	340.3
Rural Industries		
Revolving fund	173.9	260.9
Social Services		
Transport supply (14 WD, 14 moto's)	-	47.0
Training	-	73.0
Transport operation	59.3	-
Self-help programme	-	96.6
Equipment for village, cottage industry	-	70.1
Sub-total	59.3	286.7
Adult Education		
Procurement of materials	-	62.5
Training - education	-	65.2
Transport operation	69.4	-
Offices (3)	-	15.7
Part time tracker, etc.	-	86.1
Sub-total	69.4	229.5
Programme Management Unit		
Buildings	8.7	-
Transport supply (2 x 4 WD, 6 moto's)	-	44.6
Equipment, etc.	7.8	33.9
Transport operation	-	115.9
Operating costs - staff	212.6	58.7
Training staff	-	260.8
Sub-total	221.3	513.9
Technical Assistance		
Agro-economist (3 years)	-	300.0
Agronomist (3 years)	-	300.0
Sub-total	-	600.0
Evaluation	-	100.0
Contingencies	1,010.7	906.9
TOTAL	5,602.0	6,226.0

Table 4: MIDP II Aggregate Cost-Benefit Analysis

Source Table	1983/84 Year 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Costs										
Water Programme	23,583	23,192	18,600	1,591	1,591	1,591	1,591	1,591	1,591	1,591
Agriculture Programme	10,077	9,749	10,021	10,289	12,174	10,289	10,289	10,289	10,289	10,289
Livestock Programme	5,194	3,422	2,835	1,184	2,709	1,184	1,184	1,184	2,709	1,184
Rural Industry	2,400	4,582	2,565	65	65	65	65	65	65	65
Other Capital Costs	19,844	14,237	8,201							
Total Costs	61,098	55,182	42,222	13,129	16,539	13,129	13,129	13,129	14,654	13,129
Benefits										
Water Programme		4,170	8,170	11,250	11,250	11,250	11,250	11,250	11,250	11,250
Agriculture Programme	5,601	11,963	23,132	31,617	31,441	31,441	31,441	31,851	31,851	31,851
Livestock Programme	700	700	887	1,625	3,002	3.602	4,122	4,272	3,905	3,417
Rural Industry		199	483	574	582	411	639	670	647	573
Total Benefits	6,301	17,032	32,672	45,066	46,275	46,704	47,452	48,043	47,653	47,191
Net Benefits	(54,797)	(38,150)	(9,550)	31,997	29,736	33,575	34,323	34,914	32,999	34,062

EIRR = 17 per cent

Source: Phase II Project Dossier

Table 5: MIDP II Costs in Relation to Projected Agricultural Benefits (K.Sh. '000)

Source Table	Item	1983/84 Year 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	Costs										
	Agricultural Project	8,125	5,845	4,799	4,561	4,561	6,446	4,561	4,561	4,561	4,561
	Farm Costs	1,952	3,904	5,222	5,728	5,728	5,728	5,728	5,728	5,728	5,728
	Total Agricultural Costs	10,077	9,749	10,021	10,289	10,289	12,174	10,289	10,289	10,289	10,289
	Other MIDP Capital Costs	52,257	44,511	30,727							
	Cost Stream	62,334	54,260	41,748	10,289	10,289	12,174	10,289	10,289	10,289	10,289
	Agricultural Benefit Stream	5,601	11,963	23,132	31,617	31,441	31,441	31,441	31,581	31,581	31,581
	Net Benefit Stream	(56,733)	(42,297)	(17,616)	21,328	21,152	19,267	21,152	21,562	21,562	21,562

Notes: NPV (undiscounted) = K.Shs. 30,939 M
NPV @ 5% discount = (K.Sh. 2,471 M)
By interpolation EIRR = 4 percent

Source: Phase II Project Dossier

TABLE 6: 1983 PARTICIPANT TRAINING STUDENTS KITUI ASAL

Institution	Name	Degree	Specialty	Starting Date
1. TAMU	J. Wanjaiya (MLD)	M.S.	Ag. Econ./ Livestock	8/82
2. TAMU	G. Angwenyi (MLD)	M.S.	Range Ecol.	8/82
3. TAMU	K. Ayuko (MOA)	B.S.	Agron.	8/82
4. TAMU	D. Kangesa (MOA)	B.S.	Agron.	8/82
5. TAMU	G. Mabonga (MOA)	B.S.	Soil and Water	8/82
6. TAMU	D. Mbugua (MENR)	M.S.	Forestry	8/82
7. TAMU	P. Oduol (MENR)	M.S.	Forestry	8/82
8. TAMU	J. Pwanali (MOA)	M.S.	Agroclimatology	8/82
9. TAMU	D. Waithaka (MOA)	B.S.	Soil and Water	8/82
10. TAMU	F. Rimberia (MOA)	M.S.	Ag. Econ.	8/82
11. TAMU	F. Mbato (MOA)	M.S.	Soil Conserv.	8/82
12. Vanderbilt	G. Osoro (MEPD)	Certificate Diploma	Development Economics	1/83
13. Vanderbilt	B.A. Kenyoru (MPED)	Certificate Diploma	Development Economics	1/83
14. S. Houston University	P. Ngure	B.S.	Soil Science	1/83
15. S. Houston University	S. Ole Timoi (MLD)	B.S.	Range Management	1/83
16. TAMU	Suluba (MOA)	M.S.	Ag. Economics	1/83

Source: Review of ASAL (Hook Report) 1983

TABLE 7: USAID FUND PLANNED USE IN KITUI ASAL

1.	Technical Assistance	59%
2.	Consultancies	5%
3.	Training	8%
4.	Feasibility Studies	5%
5.	Evaluation	5%
6.	Field Labour	6%
7.	Commodities	10%
8.	Management Services	2%

Source: Various

TABLE 8a: SUMMARY - COMPARISON OF BUDGET AND ACTUAL EXPENDITURE
USAID GRANT - PHASE I AND II
KITUI ASAL PROJECT (US DOLLARS)*

US$ PHASE II	TOTAL	USAID AIE	USAID/ LBII	USAID DIRECT	TOTAL	USAID AIE	USAID/ LBII	USAID DIRECT
MOWD	1,282,600	923,900	358,700	-	187,230	91,330	95,900	-
MOA - Agriculture	645,900	365,200	280,700	-	116,780	27,280	89,500	
MOA L&D	105,900	46,500	59,400	-	30,500	-	30,500	
MENR	35,500	14,100	21,400	-	3,300	-	3,300	
MOCSS	145,800	65,600	80,200	-	35,900	-	35,900	
MF & P	770,900	70,900	700,000	-	235,300	-	235,300	
All Ministries	2,986,600	1,486,200	1,500,400	-	609,010	118,610	490,400	
Non-Ministries	4,212,900		3,593,000	619,900	1,196,200		1,196,200	
Adjustment	6,600	-	6,600					
All Min. & Non-Min.	7,206,100	1,486,200	5,100,000	619,900	1,805,210	118,610	1,686,600	
Unplanned funds and Adj. for Foreign Exch.	1,106,300			1,106,300				
Total Phase II	8,312,400	1,148,200	5,100,000	1,726,200	1,805,210	118,610	1,686,600	
Total Phase I	4,687,600		3,537,900	1,149,700	4,687,600	-	3,537,900	1,149,700
Total Grant	13,000,000	1,486,200	8,637,900	2,875,900	6,492,810	118,610	5,224,500	1,149,700

* For Phase II the exchange rate of US$ 1 to K.Shs. 15.5 was used- for Phase I US$ 1 to K.Shs. 13.5 was utilized.

** Phase II actual expenditure include the period March, 1984 through April 1985.

TABLE 8b: COMPARISON OF BUDGET AND ACTUAL EXPENDITURE
GOVERNMENT OF KENYA AND USAID - PHASE I AND II
KITUI ASAL PROJECT
(KENYA POUNDS)

MINISTRY OF WATER DEVELOPMENT

	BUDGET PHASE II					ACTUALS* PHASE II				
LINE ITEM	TOTAL	GOK/ AIE	USAID/ AIE	USAID/ LBII	USAID DIRECT	TOTAL	GOK/ AIE	USAID/ AIE	USAID/ LBII	USAID DIRECT
Local staff salaries	214,000	214,000				88,120	88,120			
Travel and accommodation	117,500	60,000		57,500		8,690			8,690	
Office equipment and supplies	30,000	30,000					7,100			
Training	4,000			4,000						
Office construction	5,500			5,500		7,500			7,500	
Field equipment	109,000	5,000		104,000		12,940			12,940	
MOWD Project Construction	551,500		466,000	85,500		110,660		70,800	39,860	
Labour	21,500			21,500		5,310			5,310	
Tendered Projects	250,000		250,000							
TOTAL	1,303,000	309,000	716,000	278,000		240,320	95,220	70,800	74,300	

TABLE 8c: COMPARISON OF BUDGET AND ACTUAL EXPENDITURE
GOVERNMENT OF KENYA AND USAID - PHASE I AND II
KITUI ASAL PROJECT
(KENYA POUNDS)

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT (AG. SECTOR)

	BUDGET PHASE II					ACTUALS* PHASE II				
LINE ITEM	TOTAL	GOK-AIE	USAID/ AIE	USAID/ LBII	USAID DIRECT	TOTAL	GOK/AIE	USAID/ AIE	USAID/ LBII	USAID DIRECT
Local staff salaries	885,000	855,000				364,410	364,410			
Travel and accommodation	55,500	21,000		34,500		8,060	5,140		2,920	
Farm inputs	91,000	40,000	42,000	9,000		20,140	17,820		2,320	
Prototype tools	10,000	10,000								
Training	23,500			23,500		460			460	
Rollers and trailers	6,000			6,000						
Equipment	21,000			21,000		8,420			8,420	
Maint. Plant Equipment	7,700	7,700				1,900	1,900			
Soil and Water testing	7,500			7,500						
Miscellaneous	7,200	7,200				5,270	5,270			
Maintenance of station	5,100	5,100				3,120	3,120			
Conserv. tools & Proj.	261,500	20,000	167,000	74,500		74,540	6,210	21,150	47,180	
Bulldozer rental	115,500		74,000	41,500		8,030			8,030	
TOTAL	1,496,500	996,000	283,000	217,500		494,350	403,870	21,150	69,330	

TABLE 8d: COMPARISON OF BUDGET AND ACTUAL EXPENDITURE
GOVERNMENT OF KENYA AND USAID - PHASE I AND II
KITUI ASAL PROJECT
(KENYA POUNDS)

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT (LIVESTOCK SECTOR)

	BUDGET PHASE II					ACTUAL PHASE II				
LINE ITEM	TOTAL	GOK-AIE	USAID/ AIE	USAID/ LBII	USAID DIRECT	TOTAL	GOK-AIE	USAID-AIE	USAID/ LBII	USAID DIRECT
Local staff salaries	250,000	250,000				102,940	102,940			
Travel & accommodation	32,000	21,000		11,000		8,450	5,400		3,050	
Drugs: Livestock dips	5,000	1,500		3,500		1,760	330		1,430	
Range Management Demo.	6,400		2,900	3,500		2,810			2,810	
Seed and Fodder	8,650		6,150	2,500		1,200			1,200	
Goat improvement	10,500		5,500	5,000		5,540			5,540	
Hives and access	3,000		2,000	1,000						
Other farm inputs	8,800	6,300		2,500		6,730	6,290		440	
Training	2,800	1,800		1,000		3,910	1,780		2,130	
Miscellaneous	40,000	40,000				8,990	8,990			
Range Monitoring	6,510	2,010	3,500	1,000		2,220	2,010		210	
Goat improvements	21,910	5,410	7,500	9,000		9,110	5,410		3,700	
Honey pan shelter	10,200	5,700	2,000	2,500		6,010	5,700		310	
Cattle dips	11,700	1,700	6,500	3,500		4,550	1,700		2,850	
TOTAL	417,470	335,420	36,050	46,000		164,220	140,550		23,670	

TABLE 8e: COMPARISON OF BUDGET AND ACTUAL EXPENDITURE
GOVERNMENT OF KENYA AND USAID - PHASE I AND II
KITUI ASAL PROJECT
(KENYA POUNDS)

MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES

	BUDGET PHASE II					ACTUAL PHASE II				
LINE ITEM	TOTAL	GOK-AIE	USAID-AIE	USAID/LBII	USAID DIRECT	TOTAL	GOK-AIE	USAID-AIE	USAID/LBII	USAID DIRECT
Local staff salaries	43,000	43,000				17,700	17,700			
Travel & accommodation	7,500	4,000		3,500		1,310	1,290		20	
Purchases of stores	19,500	12,000	3,000	4,500		12,540	10,000		2,540	
Training	2,500	1,500		1,000		1,500	1,500			
Purchase stationery	3,300	1,900	900	500		950	950			
Constr. Water supplies	20,000	6,000	7,000	7,000		6,000	6,000			
TOTAL	95,800	68,400	10,900	16,500		40,000	37,440		2,560	

TABLE 8f: COMPARISON OF BUDGET AND ACTUAL EXPENDITURE
GOVERNMENT OF KENYA AND USAID - PHASE I AND II
KITUI ASAL PROJECT
(KENYA POUNDS)

MINISTRY OF CULTURE AND SOCIAL SERVICES

	BUDGETS PHASE II					ACTUALS PHASE II				
LINE ITEM	TOTAL	GOK/ AIE	USAID/ AIE	USAID/ LBII	USAID DIRECT	TOTAL	GOK/ AIE	USAID/ AIE	USAID/ LBII	USAID DIRECT
Local staff salaries	50,000	50,000				20,590	20,590			
Travel & accommodation	7,800	4,300		3,500		4,350	2,800		1,550	
Training material - VP	29,000		26,000	3,000		2,000			2,000	
Training	21,000			21,000		13,160			13,160	
Office supplies and equipment	27,200	25,700	1,500			17,700	9,560		8,140	
Plant and equipment	57,800		23,300	34,500		3,000			3,000	
TOTAL	192,800	80,000	50,800	62,000		60,800	32,950		27,850	

TABLE 8g: COMPARISON OF BUDGET AND ACTUAL EXPENDITURE
GOVERNMENT OF KENYA AND USAID - PHASE I AND II
KITUI ASAL PROJECT
(KENYA POUNDS)

MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND PLANNING

	BUDGETS PHASE II					ACTUALS PHASE II				
LINE ITEM	TOTAL	GOK-AIE	USAID-AIE	USAID/ LBII	USAID DIRECT	TOTAL	GOK-AIE	USAID/ AIE	USAID/ LBII	USAID DIRECT
Studies & consultancy	5,000	5,000				5,000	5,000			
Local staff salaries	360,000	360,000				141,820	141,820			
House allowance	16,500	16,500				6,190	6,190			
Hse allow. AID-staff	12,900	12,900				4,840	4,840			
Passage and leave	1,500	1,500				560	560			
Vehicle operation	266,100	34,600		231,500		63,990	7,590		56,400	
Travel & accommodation	26,000	20,000		6,000		3,360	2,770		590	
Postal and telegram	4,000	4,000				1,500	1,500			
Electricity and water	5,000	5,000				30	30			
Training	155,000	35,000		120,000		36,060	35,000		1,060	
Uniforms and clothing	1,200	1,200				450	450			
Purchase stationery	9,370	2,370		7,000		2,160	890		1,270	
Miscellaneous	8,200	8,200				3,078	3,078			
Technical documents	2,500			2,500						
Transfer office	500			500						
Vehicle procurement	102,500			102,500		77,440			77,440	
Existing vehicle Rep.	56,250	6,750		49,500		45,420			45,420	
Computer	11,500			11,500						
Air conditioner	1,500			1,500						
Office furniture	4,500	3,000		1,500		2,100	2,100			
Maint. Plant and equip.	9,145		6,145	3,000		140			140	
Minor works	48,855		48,855							
Extension to office	5,500			5,500						
TOTAL	1,113,520	516,020	55,000	542,500		394,130	211,810		182,320	
ALL MINISTRIES	4,619,090	2,304,840	1,141,750	1,162,500		1,393,820	921,840	91,950	370,030	

TABLE 8h: SUMMARY - COMPARISON OF BUDGET AND ACTUAL EXPENDITURE
USAID GRANT - PHASE I AND II
KITUI ASAL PROJECT (US DOLLARS)*

NON-MINISTRIES

LINE ITEM	TOTAL	GOK-AIE	USAID-AIE	USAID/ LBII	USAID DIRECT	PHASE I USAID/LBII	TOTAL	GOK-AIE	USAID-AIE	USAID/ LBII	USAID DIRECT	PHASE I USAID/LBII
Expatriate Staff	1,303,000			1,303,000		1,285,500	534,840			534,840		1,285,500
Kenyan Prof. Staff	32,500	32,500					12,190	12,190				
Defense Base Act	12,500			12,500		17,500	2,220			2,220		17,500
International Travel	54,500			54,500		53,500	25,200			25,200		53,500
Per Diem	50,000			50,000		29,000	11,660			11,660		29,000
Excess Baggage	5,500			5,500		500	300			300		500
Mobilization	3,000			3,000		8,000	720			720		8,000
Storage & Transport	65,500			65,500		70,500	15,050			15,050		70,500
Education	27,000			27,000			14,800			14,800		
Appliances & Furniture	7,500			7,500		53,000	80			80		53,000
Auto Shipping Allowance	9,500			9,500		26,500	840			840		26,500
Temporary Quarters	7,500			7,500		6,500	920			920		6,500
Housing Allowance	20,000	7,500		12,500		150,500	9,320	2,810		6,510		150,500
Guard Service	9,500	9,500					2,330	2,330				
Guest House & Nairobi Office	32,000			32,000		26,500	11,740			11,740		26,500
Local Staff	86,500			86,500			20,180			20,180		
Vehicle	11,000			11,000			5,360			5,360		
Comm/Office operations	40,500			40,500		7,500	10,000			10,000		7,500
Report Printing	8,000			8,000								
Participant Training	421,500			421,500		231,000	213,240			213,240		231,000
TAMU Overhead	7,500			7,500		40,000	200			200		40,000
Procurement	83,000	10,000		73,000		63,500	27,840	780		27,060		63,500
Prime Contractor	2,000			2,000		57,500						57,500
Contingencies	554,500	9,500		545,500		10,500	30,980	4,820		26,160		10,500
Housing Kitui	77,500				77,500							
HIID Advisor	325,500				325,500							
Evaluation	77,500				77,500							
Workshops & Training						11,500						11,500
Studies - Rd, Water & Others						239,000						239,000
TOTAL NON-MINISTRIES	3,334,500	69,000		2,785,000	480,500	2,388,000	950,010	22,930		927,080		2,388,000
PHASE II ALL MINISTRIES AND NON-MINISTRIES	7,953,590	2,373,840	1,151,750	3,947,500	480,500		2,343,830	944,770	91,950	1,307,110		
UNPLANNED ADJUSTMENT	857,400				857,400							
PHASE II ALL MINISTRIES AND NON-MINISTRIES PLUS UNPLANNED FUNDS	8,810,990	2,373,840	1,151,750	3,947,500	1,337,900		2,343,830	944,770	91,950	1,307,110		
PHASE I USAID DIRECT												
HIID Advisor						106,500						105,500
Procurement						202,000						202,000
Technical Assistance						75,500						75,500
Participant Training						213,500						213,500
Housing Kitui						178,500						178,500
						776,000						776,000
PHASE I TOTAL						3,164,000						3,164,000

TABLE 9: KENYA - BARINGO PILOT SEMI-ARID AREAS PROJECT

Project Cost Summary

(K.Sh. '000)

Item	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Total	%
Soil and Water Conservation	1,520.0	902.8	902.8	789.8	4,115.4	6.2
Agronomy and Irrigation	1,037.1	1,065.4	1,065.4	1,065.4	4,233.3	6.4
Livestock and Range	1,869.9	1,765.5	1,661.9	1,615.0	6.912.3	10.4
Rural Services	696.7	4.828.0	362.3	362.3	6,249.3	9.4
Project HQ.	6,086.4	1,779.5	1,779.5	1,779.5	11,424.8	17.3
SAAP Specialist Staff & Survey	4,439.8	3,573.1	3,817.1	2,865.7	14,695.7	22.2
Development Fund	500.0	500.0	500.0	500.0	2,000.0	3.0
Physical Contingencies (15%)	2,422.5	2,162.1	1,513.4	1,346.7	7,444.7	11.2
Price Contingencies	874.8	2,367.1	2,796.2	3,334.9	9,373.0	14.2
TOTAL COST	19,447.2	18,943.5	14.398.6	13,659.3	66,448.6	100
Rounded Total	19,000	19,000	14,000	14,000	66,000	

Source: IBRD Staff Appraisal 1979

TABLE 10: BSAAP 1982/83 EXPENDITURES

MINISTRY	PRINTED ESTIMATES	AIE ISSUED	AIE %	EXPENDITURE	% OF AIE
MOA	251,330		22	61,088	110
MLD	36,430	21,698	60	14,866	68
MWD	160,000	70,000	44	55,191	79
MCSS	88,200	7,050	79	6,235	88
M. Basic Ed.	2,010	0	0	0	0
MENR	17,250	9,000	52	6,974	77
MLSPP	31,740	8,000	25	3,226	40
MOH	60,000	0	0	0	0
	614,960	171,328	28	147,580	86

Source: BSAAP Annual Report

TABLE 11: BSAAP 1986/87 BUDGET AND EXPENDITURE

	BUDGET 1986/87	EXPENDITURE 1986/87
1. Civil Works		
a. Agriculture	5,000,000	3,499,999
b. Livestock	700,000	379,123
c. Water Development	4,000	4,000,000
d. Lands and Settlement	-	74,704
e. Planning and National Development	122,000	147,000
2. Vehicle Operating Costs		
a. Agriculture	956,000	900,000
b. Livestock	360,000	359,499
c. Water	-	-
d. Lands and Settlement	220,000	210,062
e. Planning and National Development	122,000	147,000
3. Vet. Local Supplies		
a. Agriculture	-	-
b. Livestock	286,000	285,999
c. Water	-	-
d. Lands and Settlement	-	-
4. Farm Inputs Local		
a. Agriculture	1,112,400	1,085,456
b. Livestock	200,000	200,000
c. Water	-	-
d. Lands and Settlement	-	-
Total in Kenya Shillings	13,066,400	11,387,073

Source: IBRD Internal Supervision Report

TABLE 12: PLANNED FUNDING BSAAP 1987-1989 (K£)

	AMOUNT	%
Civil Works	567,927	48.5
Vehicles Equipment	277,450	23.7
Input Supplies and Operating Costs	315,450	26.9
Technical Assistance and Training	9,000	0.77
Total	1,169,683	100

Source: IBRD Internal

Table 13a: Elgeyo Marakwet: Planned and Actual Expenditures 1982-1987 (K.Shs. '000)

	PLANNED 1982-85		ACTUAL 1982-85		PLANNED 1986-88		ACTUAL 1986-87	
	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
A. Programme								
1. Water	750	7.1	220	3.5	3,460	16	2,661.1	15.1
2. Agriculture	1,883	18	1,329	21	5,500	25.2	1,506.5	10.0
3. Education	770	7.3	505	8	1,150	5.3	2,343.0	15.6
4. Village Polytechnic	1,550	14.7	1,064	16.9	2,100	9.6	210.8	1.4
5. Livestock	1,240	12	119	2	2,400	11	1,993.0	13.2
6. Health Care	425	4	30	0.5	1,900	8.7	1,254.6	8.3
7. Resource Conservation	440	4.1	70	1.1	800	3.7	223.9	1.5
8. Communication	25	0.2	25	0.4	2,550	11.7	704.3	4.7
9. Planning/Planning Infrastructure	3,435	33	2,953	47	1,950	8.9	4,544.6	30.2
SUB-TOTAL	10,518	100	6,315	100	21,810	100	15,046.8	100
B. SUPPORT								
10. Technical Assistance	2,700	100	2,700	100	2,800	100	2,800	100
TOTAL A + B	13,218	100	9,015	100	24,610	100	17,847	100
% A		79.6		70		88.6		84.3
% B		20.4		30		11.4		15.7

Source: Project Documents

Table 13b: Elgeyo Marakwet: Actual Expenditures 1982-1987

(K.Shs. '000)

A. Programme	1982-85	1986-87	Total	%
1. Water	220	2,266.1	2,486.1	9.25
2. Agriculture	1,329	1,506.5	2,835.5	10.55
3. Education	505	2,343.0	2,848	10.60
4. Village Polytechnics	1,064	210.8	1,274.8	4.74
5. Livestock	119	1,993.0	2,112	7.86
6. Health Care	30	1,254.6	1,284.6	4.78
7. Resource Conservation	70	223.9	293.9	1.09
8. Communication	25	704.3	729.3	2.71
9. Planning/Planning Infrastructure	2,953	4,544.6	7,497.6	27.91
Sub-total	6,315	15,046.8	21,361.8	
B. Support				
10. Technical Assistance	2,700	2,800	5,500	20.47
Total A + B	9,015	17,846	26,861.8	99.96
% A	70.04	84.31		79.52
% B	29.95	15.68		20.47

Source: Project Documents

TABLE 14: WEST POKOT ACTUAL EXPENDITURES 1982/1987 (K.SH.)

	1982		1983		1984		1985		1986		1987		Total	
A. Programme	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
1. Water	30,000	2.11	126,791	5.73	741,948	29.29	1,054,396	20.81	1,320,503	19.19	1,083,004	13.2	4,356,642	16.56
2. Agriculture					301,556	11.9	825,512	16.29	819,306	11.90	1,154,431	14.07	3,100,805	11.78
3. Education							527,875	10.42	1,213,286	17.6	2,302,004	28.07	4,043,165	15.36
4. Village Polytechnic	300,000	21.19	823,200	37.24							35,009	0.42	1,158,209	4.4
5. Livestock					3,510	.13	462,311	9.12	393,767	5.72	553,002	6.74	1,412,590	5.36
6. Resource Conservation							5,820	0.11	72,457	1.05	402,800	4.91	481,077	1.82
7. Health			15,000	0.67									15,000	0.05
8. Communication														
9. Planning/ Planning Infrastructure	485,669	34.3	495,486	22.41	735,947	29.05	1,389,293	27.42	2,261,529	32.86	1,870,506	22.8	7,238,430	27.51
SUB-TOTAL	815,669		1,460,477		1,782,961		4,265,207		6,080,848		7,400,756		21,805,918	
B. SUPPORT														
10. Technical Assistance	600,000	42.38	750,000	33.92	750,000	29.6	800,000	15.79	800,000	11.62	800,000	9.75	4,500,000	17.10
SUB-TOTAL B	600,000		750,000		750,000		800,000		800,000		800,000		4,500,000	
TOTAL A+B	1,415,669	100	2,210,477	100	2,532,961	100	5,065,207	100	6,880,848	100	8,200,756	100	26,305,916	100
% Programme (A)		57.61		66.07		70.39		84.20		88.37		90.24		82.89
% T.A (B)		42.38		33.92		29.6		15.79		11.62		9.75		17.10

Table 15 : NKIDP ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE NETHERLANDS BUDGET PER SECTOR

(1983 - 1985 x K.Sh. 1,000)

	Sector	1983	1984	1985	Total	as a percentage
1.	Agriculture	18	195	70	283	9
2.	Livestock	-	45	50	95	3
3.	Water supply	17	312	1,160	1,489	49
4.	Forestry	-	34	20	54	2
5.	Health	-	254	6	260	9
6.	Sanitation	24	48	-	72	2
7.	Education(1)	55	478	24	557	18
8.	Miscellaneous	-	83	11	94	3
9.	Project management local costs	52	67	32	151	5
10.	TOTAL	166	1,516	1,373	3,055	100

(1) Adult education centres and Village Polytechnics Lusigethi and Thigio included (approximately K.Sh. 170,000/-).

Source: Ndeiya/Karai Integrated Development
Arid and Semi-Arid Lands Programme: Evaluation 1955

TABLE 16: TOTAL LRDP - BUDGET FOR 1984/85 AND 1985/86

(K.£)

FIRST PHASE

BUDGET PER PERIOD (1)

TITLE	6/84-6/85		7/85-6/86			
	K.£	%	K.£	%	K.£	%
1. Consultancy	9,300[2]	5.95	21,700	9.49	31,000	8.05
2. Construction						
2.1. Prefabricated block offices	31,000	19.84	-	-	31,000	8.05
2.2. Furniture	7,750	4.96	-	-	7,750	2.01
3. Vehicles	23,250	14.88	-	-	23,250	6.04
4. Running costs						
4.1. Office	3,100	1.98	3,100	1.35	6,200	1.61
4.2. Vehicles	3,100	1.98	6,200	2.71	9,300	2.41
5. Water supply	24,800	15.87	83,850	36.68	108,650	28.23
6. Farming activities	21,700	13.88	55,900	24.45	77,600	20.16
7. Village Polytechnics	23,250	14.88	38,800	16.97	62,050	16.12
8. Self help groups	9,000	5.76	19,000	8.31	28,000	7.2
Sub-total	156,250	100	228,550	100	384,800	100
9. Technical Assistance	?		?		?	
TOTAL	?		?		?	

1. Expenditures are financed 100% as grant from Switzerland and are managed as appropriation in Aid.
2. 1K£ = 3.22 SFr

Source: Operation Plan 1985/86

TABLE 17: LRDP DEVELOPMENT BUDGET - WATER SUPPLY SECTOR
(K£)

PROJECTS	1984/85 LRDP	%	SELF HELP	%	1985/86 LRDP	%	SELF HELP	%	TOTAL	%
1. Muhonia										
1.1. Rehabilitation of borehole and pumping tests	-	-	-	-	4,000	90	500	10	4,500	
1.2. Repairs of windmills, pump and two storage tanks	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
1.3. Construction of new storage tank, and main/distribution pipes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
2. Mutara Dams	-	-	-	-	6,000	75	2,000	25	8,000	
3. Ngobit Dams	4,000	66.7	2,000	33.3	8,000	80	2,000	20	16,000	
4. Sweet Water	-	-	-	-	3,000	85.71	500	14.28	3,500	
5. Mutirithia										
5.1. Construction of intake chamber, repair of pipes & storage tank	4,500	90	500	10	-	-			5,000	
5.2. Repair of diesel pump unit	-	-	-	-	2,500	100			2,500	
5.3. Construction of new storage tank, main and distribution pipes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
6. Rugutu Dam	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
7. Nya Kairo	-	-	-	-	15,000	88.23	2,000	11.76	17,000	
8. Wigumiririe/East Laikipia										
8.1. Repair hydroram, piples & storage	2,000	53.33	1,750	46.67	-	-	-	-	3,750	
8.2. Construction and installation of storage tank, pipes and second hydroram	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
9. Two Ethi Dams	-	-	-	-	6,000	80	2,000	25	8,000	

TABLE 17 (cont'd)

LRDP DEVELOPMENT BUDGET - WATER SUPPLY SECTOR (cont'd)
(K£)

PROJECTS	1984/85 LRDP	%	SELF HELP	%	1985/86 LRDP	%	1986 and Later SELF HELP	%	TOTAL	%
10. Ngarenare water supply for cattle dip	3,000	60	2,000	40	3,000	60	2,000	40	10,000	
11. Roof catchment and water jars	4,000	80	1,000	20	6,000	66.7	2,000	33.3	13,000	
12. Hand pumps	-	-	-	-	2,000	50	2,000	50	4,000	
13. Rehabilitation of borehole	-	-	-	-	4,000	88.9	500	11.11	4,500	
14. Rehabilitation of furrows	-	-	-	-	4,000	44.44	5,000	55.55	9,000	
15. Construction of intake	-	-	-	-	4,000	57.14	3,000	42.85	7,000	
16. Sub-surface dam	-	-	-	-	2,000	66.7	1,000	33.33	3,000	
17. Rock catchment	-	-	-	-	2,000	50	2,000	50	4,000	
18. Seminars and scholarships	2,000	100	-	-	4,000	100	-	-	6,000	
19. General equipment	3,000	100	-	-	3,000	100	-	-	6,000	
20. Miscellaneous	2,300	100	-	-	5,350	100	-	-	7,650	
Sub-total	24,800	77.37	7,250	22.62	83,850	75.9	26,500	24.01	142,400	38.18

TABLE 17 (cont'd)

LRDP DEVELOPMENT BUDGET - FARMING SECTOR
(K£)

PROJECTS	1984/85 LRDP	%	SELF HELP	%	1985/86 LRDP	%	SELF HELP	%	TOTAL	%
1. Experimentation Plots	4,650	100	-	-	5,400	100	-	-	,10,050	
2. Demonstration Storages	1,000	50	1,000	50	3,000	60	2,000	40	7,000	
3. Tree nurseries	4,800	54.54	4,000	45.45	11,200	58.33	8,000	41.66	28,000	
4. Bee keeping										
4.1. Ruai keepers	2,500	66.66	1,250	33.33	2,500	66.66	1,250	33.33	7,500	
4.2. Other groups	-	-	-	-	1,000	50	1,000	50	2,000	
4.3. Fabrications of beehives	1,000	100	-	-	1,000	100	-	-	2,000	
5. Small stock keeping	-	-	-	-	2,000	50	2,000	50	4,000	
6. Fish stocking in dams	-	-	-	-	3,000	75	1,000	25	4,000	
7. Rehabilitation of cattle dips	2,000	80	500	20	3,000	75	1,000	25	6,500	
8. Soil and water conservation	500	20	2,500	80	3,000	37.5	5,000	62.5	11,000	
9. Marura Women Group	-	-	-	-	2,000	50	2,000	50	4,000	
10. Matanya Horticultural Project	-	-	-	-	2,000	50	2,000	50	4,000	
11. Likii Fish Keeping	-	-	-	-	5,000	62.5	3,000	37.5	8,000	
12. Mia Moja	-	-	-	-	2,000	50	2,000	50	4,000	
13. Seminars and scholarships	500	50	500	50	2,000	50	2,000	50	4,000	
14. General equipment	2,000	100	-	0	2,000	100	-	0	4,000	
15. Miscellaneous	2,750	100	-	0	5,800	100	-	-	8,550	
Sub-total	21,700	69	9,750	31	55,900	63.4	32,250	36.58	119,600	32.0

TABLE 17 (cont'd)

LRDP DEVELOPMENT BUDGET - VILLAGE POLYTECHNICS AND SELF-HELP SECTORS

(K£)

PROJECTS	1984/85 LRDP	1984/85 SELF-HELP	1985/86 LRDP	1985/86 SELF-HELP	TOTAL	%
Village Polytechnics Sector						
1. Nanyuki Village Polytechnics	18,000	4,500	20,500	3,500	46,500	
2. Other Village Polytechnics	4,250	500	16,300	3,000	24,050	
3. Scholarships and workshops	1,000	200	2,000	200	3,400	
Sub-total	23,250	5,200	38,800	6,700	73,950	19.82
Self-help Sector						
1. Umande-Muramati road bridges						
1.1. Nanyuki river bridge	7,000	2,000	6,000	2,000	17,000	
1.2. Two bridges (Oltulili and Burongal river)	-	-	-	-	-	
2. Tigithi Kihato road bridges						
2.1. Rongai river bridge	-	-	9,500	2,000	11,500	
2.2. Burguret river bridge	-	-	-	-	-	
2.3. Naro Moru river (barrier for lorries)	-	-	500	500	1,000	
3. Nanyuki Mukima Bridge (Nanyuki river)	-	-	-	-	-	
4. Self-help Fund (small scale activities)	2,000	1,000	3,000	1,500	7,500	
Sub-total	9,000	3,000	19,000	6,000	37,000	9.92
Grand total	78,750	25,200	197,550	71,450	372,950	100

Source: Operation Plan 1985/86

TABLE 18: OVERALL COMPARISON ON ESTIMATES AND EXPENDITURES OF SWISS, GOK AND SELP-HELP CONTRIBUTIONS OF LRDP (IN K£)*

Item	Swiss			Self-Help			GOK		Total Spent
	Budgetted	Expenditures	%	Budgetted	Expenditures	%	Budget	Expenditures	
Infrastructure**	62,000	54,300	88	-	-	-	-	21,000	75,300
Running Costs ***	30,900	33,050	107	-	-	-	-	6,000	39,050
Water Supply	66,725	36,610	55	12,250	5,200	42	-	2,125	43,935
Farming Activities	49,650	43,800	88	25,900	36,425	141	-	21,300	101,525
Youth Polytechnics	42,650	28,450	67	8,550	7,600	89	-	13,450	49,500
Self-help	18,500	18,500	100	7,750	5,750	74	-	1,500	25,750
TOTAL	270,425	214,710	79	54,450	54,975	101	-	65,375	335,060
% BUDGET	83			17			0		
% EXPENDITURE		64			17			19	

* Up to June 30th 1986

** Offices, Furnitures, Equipment and Vehicles

*** Running costs of offices, vehicles, consultancies and general seminars

Source: Joint Evaluation Mission Phase I

TABLE 19: COMPARISON ON BUDGETS AND EXPENDITURES OF SWISS, GOK AND SELP-HELP CONTRIBUTIONS ON LRD*
K.SHS.

WATER SECTOR

PROJECT	SWISS			SELF HELP			GOK	
	Budget	Expend.	%	Budget	Contrib.	%	Budget	Expenditure
1. Muhonia	80,000	1,200	1.5	5,000	-	-	-	
3. Ngobit Dams	160,000	-	-	60,000	-	-	-	4,000
5. Mutirithia	115,000	64,000	56	10,000	11,520	115	-	15,000
7. Nyakairo	150,000	-	-	20,000	-	-	-	-
8. East Laikipia	40,000	30,000	75	35,000	5,680	16	-	8,500
10. Ngare Ndare	90,000	60,000	67	60,000	7,520	13	-	12,000
11. Roof catchment	140,000	114,000	81	40,000	78,600	197	-	-
13. Bore holes	40,000	2,700	7	5,000	-	-	-	3,000
16. Sub-surface dams	20,000	7,000	35	10,000	-	-	-	-
Sub-total	835,000	278,900	33	245,000	103,320	42	-	42,500
% Budget	77			23			0	
% Expenditure		66			24			10

* Up to 30th June 1986

Source: Joint Evaluation Mission Phase I

TABLE 19 (cont'd)

COMPARISON ON ESTIMATES AND EXPENDITURES OF SWISS, GOK AND SELF-HELP CONTRIBUTIONS ON LRDP* IN K.SH.

YOUTH POLYTECHNIC

PROJECT	L R D P			S E L F H E L P			G O K	
	Budget	Expend.	%	Budget	Expend.	%	Budget	Expend.
1. Nanyuki Youth Polytechnic	565,000	714,000[1)]	126	125,000	120,000	96	-	256,000
2. Other Youth Polytechnics	248,000	129,000	52	40,000	27,000	68	-	8,000
3. Training and workshop	40,000	40,000	100	6,000	5,000	83	-	5,000
Sub-total	853,000	883,000	103	171,000	152,000	89	-	269,000
% Budget	83			17			0	
% Expenditure		67			12			21

* Up to June 30th 1986

Source: Joint Evaluation Mission Phase I

TABLE 19 (cont'd)

COMPARISON ON ESTIMATES AND EXPENDITURES OF SWISS, GOK AND SELF-HELP CONTRIBUTIONS ON LRDP*
(K.SHS)

SELF-HELP SECTORS

PROJECTS	L R D P			S E L F H E L P			G O K	
	Budget	Expend.	%	Budget	Expend.	%	Budget	Expend.
1. Nanyuki river Bridge	260,000	260,000	100	80,000	50,000	63	-	4,000
2. Rongai River Bridge	190,000	195,000	103	40,000	40,000	100	-	16,000
3. Self-helpFund (small scale activities)	70,000	84,000	120	35,000	25,000	71	-	10,000
Sub-total	520,000	539,000	103	155,000	115,000	74	-	30,000
% Budget	82			18			0	
% Expenditure		79			17			4

* Up to June 30th 1986

Source: Joint Evaluation Mission Phase I

TABLE 19 (cont'd)

COMPARISON ON ESTIMATES AND EXPENDITURES OF SWISS, GOK AND SELF-HELP CONTRIBUTIONS ON LRDP* IN K.SHS.

FARMING SECTOR

	SWISS			SELF HELP			GOK
	Budget	Expend.	%	Budget	Expend.	%	Budget	Expenditure
Farming Sector								
1. Experimentation plots	147,000	147,000	100	-	-	-	-	14,700
2. Demonstration	50,000	20,000	40	40,000	23,000	58	-	14,300
3. Tree nurseries	208,000	208,000	100	160,000	400,000	250	-	70,000
4. Bee keeping	115,000	85,000	74	48,000	29,000	60	-	17,000
5. Small stock	135,000 [4]	135,000	100	20,000	9,500	48	-	33,800
6. Fish sticking in dams	30,000	28,000	93	10,000	7,000	70	-	35,000
7. Rehabilitation of cattle dips	70,000	60,000	85	20,000	7,000	35	-	63,000
8. Soil and water conservation	40,000	34,000	85	100,000	240,000	240	-	120,000
9. Marura Women Group	20,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10. Matanya Hort. Project	40,000 [3]	40,000	100	40,000	5,000	12.5	-	26,700
11. Likii Fish keeping	50,000	4,000	8	30,000	-	-	-	2,000
12. Mia Moja Hort. Project	40,000 [3]	40,000	100	20,000	6,000	30	-	27,000
13. Seminar and Training	30,000	24,000	66	30,000	2,000	6.6	-	3,200
Sub-total	975,000	825,000	84.6	518,000	728,500	141	-	426,700
% Budget	65			35			0	
% Expenditure	41				37			22

Source: Joint Evaluation Mission Phase I

* Up to 30th June 1986

TABLE 20

L R D P

SWISS CONTRIBUTION: JULY 1987-JUNE 1990 (K£)
(Agreement Budget)

	87/88	88/89	89/90	TOTAL	%
A. Expatriate Staff					
1. Personnel	240,000	240,000	240,000	720,000	
2. Experts vehicles	19,000	9,500	9,500	38,000	
Sub-total Experts	259,000	249,500	249,500	758,000	47
B. Program Support					
1. Consultancy and Training	8,000	10,000	12,000	30,000	
2. Scholarships	9,500	10,000	10,500	30,000	
3. Construction and furnitures	12,000	12,000	4,000	28,000	
4. Programme vehicles	25,000	15,000	-	40,000	
5. Running costs	22,000	25,000	28,000	75,000	
Sub-total Program Support	76,500	72,500	54,500	203,500	13
C. Development Investment					
1. Water Supply and Infrastructure					
a. Water	65,000	69,000	73,000	207,000	
b. Infrastructure (bridges)	15,000	15,000	15,000	45,000	
2. Farming activities	56,000	60,000	65,000	181,000	
3. Handicraft activities	56,000	70,000	85,000	211,000	
Sub-total Development Investment	192,000	214,000	238,000	644,000	40
TOTAL (ABC)	527,500	535,500	542,000	1,605,500	100

Source: Phase II Programme Agreement Draft

TABLE 21

L R D P

KENYAN CONTRIBUTION: JULY 1987-JUNE 1990 (IN K£)
(TENTATIVE)

ITEM	87/88	88/89	89/90	TOTAL
A. Planning Staff				
- Programme Office (1): 36 man-months				
1. Salaries + 7 supporting staff: 252 man-months (2)	11,400	11,400	11,400	34,200
2. Running costs	3,000	4,000	5,000	12,000
Sub-total	14,400	15,400	16,400	46,200
B. Water Supply and Infrastructure				
1. Salaries				
- water technicians 108 man-months (3)	7,200	7,200	7,200	21,600
- 1 infrastructure (MOTC) 36 man-months	2,400	2,400	2,400	7,200
2. - Design and maintenance	10,000	10,000	10,000	30,000
C. Farming Activities				
- 7 technicians: 252 man-months (3)	16,800	16,800	16,800	50,400
- Maintenance of experimental stations, small-stock centre and tree nurseries	14,000	14,000	14,000	42,000
Handicraft Activities				
- 2 technicians: 72 man-months (3)	4,800	4,800	4,800	14,400
- 25 Youth Polytechnic Instructors (2) 900 man-months	30,000	30,000	30,000	90,000
TOTAL	99,600	100,600	101,600	301,800

Source: Phase II Programme Agreement Draft

TABLE 22

L R D P

GOK CONTRIBUTION: JULY 1987-JUNE 1990 (K£)

(Agreement Budget)

	87/88	88/89	89/90	TOTAL	%
A. Local Staff					
1. Salaries	72,600	72,600	72,600	217,800	72.16
B. Program Support					
1. Running Costs	27,000	28,000	29,000	84,000	27.83
TOTAL	99,600	100,600	101,600	301,800	100

Source: Phase II Project Agreement

TABLE 23

LRDP PHASE II 1987-1990
PLANNED SWISS & GOK BUDGETS (K£)

	SWISS			GOK				
	87/88	88/89	89/90	87/88	88/89	89/90	TOTAL	%
A. Staff								
1. Expatriate	259,000	249,500	249,500	-	-	-	758,000	39.74
2. Local	-	-	-	72,600	72,600	72,600	217,800	11.41
Sub-total A	259,000	249,500	249,500	72,600	72,600	72,600	975,800	51
B. Program Support	76,500	72,500	54,500	27,000	28,000	29,000	287,500	
Sub-total B	76,500	72,500	54,500	27,000	28,000	29,000	287,500	15
C. Development Investment	192,000	214,000	238,000	-	-	-	644,000	
Sub-total C	192,000	214,000	238,000	-	-	-	644,000	34
TOTAL	527,500	535,500	542,000	99,600	100,600	101,600	1,907,300	100

Source: Phase II Project Agreement

TABLE 24

LAIKIPIA RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME - FORWARD BUDGET: 1987/88-1990/91 (FIGURES IN K£)

PROGRAMMES AND PROJECTS:

WATER SECTOR

PROJECT NAME	1987/88 K£	1988/89 K£	1989/90 K£	1990/91 K£	REMARKS
1. Muhonia Water Project (Ngobit)	9,000	2,000	-	-	
2. Sweet Water Project (Nanyuki)	3,500	3,000	-	-	
3. Mutirithia Water Project (Segera)	2,500	-	-	-	
4. Nyakairo Water Project (Daiga)	2,500	4,000	2,000	-	
5. East Laikipia W/P (Daiga)	2,500	-	-	-	
6. Ethi Dam Timau & (Daiga)	6,500	-	-	-	
7. Roof Catchment & Water Jars	6,000	7,000	8,000	9,000	
8. Hand Pumps	3,000	3,000	3,000	4,000	
9. Sub-surface Dams (Mukogodo)	4,500	11,600	12,200	10,000	
10. Rock Catchments (Mukogodo)	5,000	6,000	6,000	5,000	
11. Dams and Pans (Central Div.)	5,000	12,000	12,000	13,000	including West Laikipia
12. New Projects	3,000	6,000	22,800	30,000	
13. Transport, allowances LRDP Kenyan staff	2,000	2,200	5,000	5,000	
14. Miscellaneous	6,000	6,000	7,000	8,000	
Sub-total	61,000	64,800	78,000	84,000	

TABLE 24 (cont'd)

COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SECTOR

PROJECT	1987/88 K£	1988/89 K£	1989/90 K£	1990/91 K£	REMARKS
1. Nanyuki Youth Polytechnic	29,000	24,000	-	-	
2. Other Youth Polytechnics	11,000	15,000	34,000	40,000	
3. Handicraft Enterprise Fund	5,000	12,000	24,000	30,000	
4. Training and Workshop for Youth Polytechnics	3,000	6,000	8,000	10,000	
5. Training and workshop for handicraft enterprises and self-groups	2,000	5,300	10,000	12,000	
6. Transport and allowances	1,000	1,700	2,000	3,000	
7. Miscellaneous	5,000	6,000	7,000	8,000	
Sub-total	56,000	70,000	85,000	103,000	

A. MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE

PROJECT	1987/88 K£	1988/89 K£	1989/90 K£	1990/91 K£
1. Experimentation plots	6,000	7,000	8,000	10,000
2. Demonstration plots	2,000	2,000	2,000	3,000
3. Soil and Water Conservation	2,000	2,000	3,000	4,000
4. Supplementary irrigation	6,000	7,000	7,000	5,000
5. Training and Seminars	2,500	2,000	2,000	3,000

TABLE 24 (cont'd)

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE (cont'd)

PROJECT	1987/88 K£	1988/89 K£	1989/90 K£	1990/91 K£	REMARKS
6. Transport and allowances	2,500	3,500	3,100	4,000	
7. Miscellaneous	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	
Sub-total	22,000	24,500	26,100	30,000	

B. MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES

PROJECT	1987/88 K£	1988/89 K£	1989/90 K£	1990/91 K£
1. Tree nurseries	5,000	6,000	6,000	7,000
2. Transport and allowances	1,000	1,000	1,000	2,000
3. Miscellaneous	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
Sub-total	7,000	8,000	8,000	10,000

TABLE 24 (cont'd)

C. MINISTRY OF LIVESTOCK AND DEVELOPMENT

PROJECT	1987/88 K£	1988/89 K£	1989/90 K£	1990/91 K£	REMARKS
1. Small stock	8,500	9,500	10,500	11,500	
2. Beekeeping	3,000	3,600	4,000	4,000	
3. Cattle dips/Animal health	4,000	5,000	6,000	7,000	
4. Training and equipment	2,500	2,000	2,000	2,000	
5. Transport and allowances	2,500	2,500	2,500	3,500	
6. Miscellaneous	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	
Sub-total	21,500	23,600	26,000	29,000	

D. MINISTRY OF TOURISM AND WILDLIFE

PROJECT	1987/88 K£	1988/89 K£	1989/90 K£	1990/91 K£
1. Fish stocking in dams	2,000	2,000	3,000	4,000
2. Likii fish project	2,000	1,000	-	-
3. Transport and allowances	500	900	900	1,000
4. Miscellaneous	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
Sub-total	5,500	4,900	4,900	6,000
Grand Total	56,000	60,000	65,000	75,000

Source: MNDP Forward Budget

TABLE 25: TAITA TAVETA: PLANNED BUDGET (K.Sh.)

A. DANIDA

ITEM	1st Year	%	2nd Year	%	3rd Year	%	TOTAL	%
1. Establishment, Camp								
Six 3-bedroom pre-fab. houses, DANIDA staff	2,100,000		-		-		2,100,000	
One permanent office block, Wundanyi	350,000		-		-		350,000	
One pre-fab. office, Voi	100,000		-				100,000	
One pre-fab. office, Taveta	100,000		-		-		100,000	
Storage facilities, Mwatate Camp	450,000	12.88	-		-		450,000	
Workshop facilities, Mwatate Camp	250,000		-		-		250,000	
1. Sub-total	3,350,000						3,350,000	12.88
2. Provision of vehicles etc.								
Six 4-wheel drive vehicles	900,000		-		-		900,000	
3 tractors 55-65 hp with trailers	775,000		-		-		775,000	
One 5-ton truck	275,000		-		-		275,000	
3 > 3½ ton-truck	550,000		-		-		550,000	
2 water trailers	40,000		-		-		40,000	
3 motorcycles	60,000		-		-		60,000	
2. Sub-total	2,600,000	10					2,600,000	10
3. Provision of equipment and tools								
Office equipment and furniture	250,000		50,000		-		300,000	
Workshop equipment and tools	80,000		30,000		30,000		140,000	
Forestry component and equipment, tools	60,000		140,000		150,000		350,000	
Equipment, water component	500,000		-		-		500,000	
Equipment, agricultural component	25,000		50,000		-		75,000	
3. Sub-total	915,000	3.5	270,000	1.0	180,000	0.7	1,365,000	5.2

TABLE 25 (cont'd)

DANIDA (cont'd)

ITEM	1st year	%	2nd year	%	3rd year	%	TOTAL	%
4. Construction; Water component								
Dams, weirs	100,000		200,000		200,000		500,000	
Shallow wells	50,000		125,000		125,000		300,000	
Provision of hand-pumps for shallow wells	50,000		100,000		100,000		250,000	
Rehabilitation of pre-project water schemes	75,000		75,000		50,000		200,000	
Rock catchments	100,000		200,000		200,000		500,000	
4. Sub-total	375,000	1.44	700,000	2.69	675,000	2.59	1,750,000	6.73
5. Forestry, planting costs								
Operation of nurseries	100,000		150,000		250,000		500,000	
Afforestation of hilltops	240,000		460,000		660,000		1,360,000	
Woodlots	50,000		100,000		150,000		300,000	
Agroforestry: enrichment planting	50,000		100,000		150,000		300,000	
Forest access tranks	150,000		200,000		250,000		600,000	
Agroforestry, training/extension	100,000		150,000		150,000		400,000	
5. Sub-total	690,000	2.65	1,160,000	4.46	1,610,000	6.19	3,460,000	13.30
6. Water component, implementation costs								
Support to V.P.s - roof catchment	-		50,000		50,000		100,000	
Training in maintenance of pumps - VPs	100,000		100,000		100,000		300,000	
6. Sub-total	100,000	0.38	150,000	0.57	150,000	0.57	400,000	1.53
7. Soil Conservation; implementation costs								
Gully control; cut-off drains	400,000		500,000		600,000		1,500,000	
Rehabilitation of eroded land	50,000		100,000		100,000		250,000	
Tools, expendable	100,000		200,000		300,000		600,000	
Lay-out of terraces	100,000		150,000		150,000		400,000	
Training of staff and farmers	100,000		100,000		100,000		300,000	
7. Sub-total	750,000	2.9	1,050,000	4.0	1,250,000	4.8	3,050,000	11.73

TABLE 25 (cont'd)

TAITA TAVETA: PLANNED BUDGET (K.Sh.)

A. DANIDA

ITEM	1st Year	%	2nd Year	%	3rd Year	%	TOTAL	%
8. Improved Agr. practices								
Seed multiplication and testing	50,000		150,000		150,000		350,000	
Demonstration activities	50,000		100,000		100,000		250,000	
Improved on-farm storage	25,000		50,000		75,000		150,000	
Support to income generating activities women groups	50,000		100,000		100,000		250,000	
Training/extension	100,000		100,000		100,000		300,000	
8. Sub-total	275,000	1.0	500,000	1.9	525,000	2.0	1,300,000	5.0
9. Improvement of facilities								
Improvement of forest nurseries	100,000		200,000		-		300,000	
Improvements at Mwakiki Seed Farm	100,000		-		-		100,000	
Improvements at Taveta Seed Plot	50,000		-		-		50,000	
Improvements of springs	50,000		100,000		50,000		200,000	
9. Sub-total	300,000	1.15	300,000	1.15	50,000	0.19	650,000	2.5
10. Administration, Camp								
Administrative costs	20,000		20,000		20,000		60,000	
Salaries to adm. support personnel	75,000		75,000		75,000		225,000	
Salaries to store-keepers	40,000		40,000		40,000		120,000	
Salaries to project employed lorry drivers etc.	180,000		180,000		180,000		540,000	
10. Sub-total	315,000	1.21	315,000	1.21	315,000	1.21	945,000	3.63
11. Operation of vehicles								
Fuel	500,000		600,000		600,000		1,700,000	
Maintenance	100,000		250,000		350,000		700,000	
11. Sub-total	600,000	2.3	850,000	3.3	950,000	3.6	2,400,000	9.2

TABLE 25 (cont'd)

DANIDA (cont'd)

ITEM	1st year	%	2nd year	%	3rd year	%	TOTAL	%
12. Aerial photography	500,000	1.9	-	-	-	-	500,000	
12. Sub-total	500,000	1.9					500,000	1.9
13. Consultancies	50,000	0.19	50,000	0.19	100,000	0.38	200,000	
13. Sub-total	50,000	0.19	50,000	0.19	100,000	0.38	200,000	0.76
14. Evaluation/Monitoring	-		100,000	0.38	100,000	0.38	200,000	
14. Sub-total	-		100,000	0.38	100,000	0.38	200,000	0.76
Sub-total K.Shs.	10,820,000	41.61	5,445,000	20.94	5,905,000	22.71	22,170,000	85.26
Contingency 16%							3,830,000	14.73
TOTAL PROJECT							26,000,000	100
15. Technical Assistance	?		?		?		?	
DANIDA Sub-total	?		?		?		?	
B. GOK	?		?		?		?	

Source: Appraisal Report 1985

TABLE 26: WAMBA ASAL PROJECT: BUDGET AND FUNDING SOURCES (in K SHS)

PROJECT COMPONENT	1986			1987			1988			1986-1988	%
	CPF	FRG	GOK	CPF	FRG	GOK	CPF	FRG	GOK	Amount	
0. Overheads/Administration	3,125,000	4,865,000	210,000	2,260,000	3,240,000	210,000	2,110,000	3,240,000	210,000	19,470,000	64.80
1. Range Improvement	309,000	260,000		459,000	290,000		224,000	230,000		1,772,000	5.9
2. Livestock Husbandry	35,000			85,000			70,000			190,000	0.63
3. Crop Production	75,000	110,000		80,000	140,000		20,000	90,000		515,000	1.71
4. Soil Conservation	40,000	150,000		73,000	150,000		40,000	150,000		603,000	2
5. Water Development	53,000	306,000		53,000	176,000		29,000	110,000		727,000	2.42
6. Training	95,000	90,000		220,000	210,000		73,000	5,000		693,000	2.3
7. Disease Survey	40,000									40,000	
8. Animal Health	870,000			950,000			890,000			2,710,000	9.03
9. Bas. Vet. Services	70,000	70,000		20,000			10,000			170,000	0.56
10. Camel Promotion	227,000			72,000			72,000			371,000	1.23
11. Self-help Organizations	84,000			50,000			50,000			184,000	0.61
12. Beekeeping	150,000			130,000			83,000			363,000	1.2
13. Livestock Marketing	880,000			495,000			425,000			1,800,000	5.99
14. Supply shops	167,000			50,000			50,000			267,000	0.88
15. Monitoring/Evaluation	55,000			45,000			30,000			130,000	0.43
TOTALS	6,275,000	5,851,000	210,000	5,042,000	4,206,000	210,000	4,176,000	3,825,000	210,000	30,005,000	100

EXPLANATIONS:
CPF = Counterpart Funds supplied by Germany through delivery of wheat being sold in Kenya
FRG = Grants from the Federal Republic of Germany
GOK = Government of Kenya's Recurrent Budget

Source: ASAL Development Project. Wamba/Samburu Plan of Operations 1986

Table 27: Projected Project Expenditures at Cash Prices

Project	Kenya Financial Years £ 000 (rounded) 1986/87	1987/88	1988/89	Total	%
Soil and Water Conservation					
ODA - offshore	68	43	33	145	5.51
- local	220	176	220	616	23.42
GOK	61	73	81	215	8.17
Total	349	292	334	976	37.1
Forestry					
ODA - offshore	42	14	2	58	2.20
- local	126	150	158	434	16.50
GOK	192	237	266	695	26.43
Total	360	401	426	1,187	45.15
Goat and Sheep					
ODA - offshore	43	3		46	1.74
- local	167	86	82	335	12.74
GOK	18	28	40	86	3.27
Total	228	117	122	467	17.76
Sub-Total					
ODA - offshore	153	60	35	248	9.43
- local	513	412	460	1,385	52.68
GOK	271	338	387	996	37.88
TOTAL	937	810	882	2,629	99.99

Source: EMI Phase II Midterm Review January 1988

Table 28a: GRANTS TO RDF 1974/75 - 1989/90

DONOR	YEAR 74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84	84/85	85/86	87/88	1989/90	TOTAL
GOK	550,000	1,300,000	-	20,000	500,000	500,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	500,000	902,640	473,640	NA	NA	NA	6,746,280
DANIDA	277,588	394,525	23,100	699,840	-	-	680,889	562,835	700,000	986,000	1,980,000	NA	NA	NA	6,304,777
NORAD	-	73,529	-	145,940	366,675	375,000	-	-	-	509,600	360,000	NA	NA	NA	1,830,744
SIDA	-	-	-	128,100	435,750	175,650	-	-	333,000	265,000	734,000	NA	NA	NA	2,071,500
NETHERLANDS	-	154,750	-	313,190	537,995	-	-	-	158,200	-	-	NA	NA	NA	1,164,135
TOTAL	827,588	1,922,804	23,100	1,307,070	1,840,420	1,050,650	1,680,889	1,562,835	1,691,200	2,663,240	3,547,640		6,500,000	8,000,000	18,117,436

Sources: RDF Joint Evaluation Mission Report 1985 and 19
Review Report 1987

TABLE 28b: FUNDING OF RDF PROJECTS 1980-1984

	DISTRICT	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84	TOTAL 1980-1984	%
1.	Nyandarua	102,110	9,050	19,960	43,721	174,841	1.85
2.	Murang'a	2,090	53,673	50,218	-	105,981	1.12
3.	Kiambu	17,280	38,650	109,338	51,235	216,503	2.30
4.	Nyeri	84,254	18,598	29,665	43,250	175,767	1.86
5.	Kirinyaga	20,060	39,700	41,245	49,408	150,413	1.59
6.	Lamu	-	45,500	38,925	29,268	113,693	1.20
7.	Kilifi	-	57,320	41,054	58,761	157,135	1.66
8.	Mombasa	-	25,026	7,646	24,827	57,499	0.61
9.	Kwale	-	35,414	36,817	36,932	109,163	1.15
10.	Taita Taveta	-	44,500	58,340	29,637	132,477	1.40
11.	Tana River	15,000	42,000	148,129	47,119	252,248	2.68
12.	Meru	-	41,250	-	71,496	112,746	1.19
13.	Embu	27,087	30,000	14,680	57,485	129,252	1.37
14.	Machakos	44,253	44,328	80,533	55,690	224,804	2.38
15.	Kitui	-	70,000	366,883	89,621	526,504	5.59
16.	Isiolo	4,692	36,008	37,926	10,500	89,126	0.94
17.	Marsabit	22,350	36,832	33,210	50,904	143,296	1.54
18.	Wajir	-	18,679	18,750	50,904	88,333	0.93
19.	Mandera	-	36,347	13,810	36,893	87,050	0.92
20.	Garissa	31,234	36,348	13,350	63,066	143,998	1.53
21.	Kisumu	174,380	191,965	247,327	211,067	824,739	8.76
22.	South Nyanza	94,135	240,495	176,108	450,076	960,814	10.20

Table 28b.(cont'd)

DISTRICT	1980/81	1981/82	1983/83	1983/84	TOTAL 1980-1984	%
23. Siaya	18,300	137,057	150,817	67,318	373,492	3.96
24. Kisii	283,240	56,500	148,634	62,307	550,681	5.85
25. Nandi	-	22,000	91,040	54,658	167,698	1.78
26. Trans Nzoia	-	79,186	46,762	31,936	157,884	1.67
27. Elgeyo Marakwet	42,770	38,000	126,840	84,848	292,458	3.10
28. Nakuru	42,685	65,272	15,920	27,782	151,659	1.61
29. Samburu	13,750	54,750	3,496	32,977	104,973	1.11
30. Narok	39,096	87,390	4,586	33,516	164,588	1.74
31. West Pokot	27,890	30,268	59,603	37,214	154,975	1.64
32. Baringo	84,254	131,400	85,800	70,275	371,729	3.94
33. Turkana	13,750	-	49,650	30,146	93,546	0.99
34. Kajiado	17,180	44,770	10,500	48,922	121,372	1.28
35. Kericho	29,413	90,630	40,000	31,936	191,979	2.03
36. Uasin Gishu	50,050	59,024	27,974	64,109	201,157	2.13
37. Laikipia	17,500	33,300	36,915	35,796	123,511	1.31
38. Busia	83,387	82,481	151,786	69,242	386,896	4.11
39. Kakamega	212,746	97,086	296,303	89,800	695,935	7.39
40. Bungoma	6,000	57,440	21,520	45,150	130,110	1.38
	1,620,936	2,358,237	2,952,060	2,479,792	9,411,025	100

TABLE 29: NON-ASAL DISTRICTS: FUNDING BY RDF 1980-1984

DISTRICT	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84	TOTAL 1980-1984	%
1. Nyandarua	102,110	9,050	19,960	43,721	174,841	1.85
2. Murang'a	2,090	53,673	50,218	-	105,981	1.12
3. Kiambu	17,280	38,650	109,338	51,235	216,503	2.30
4. Nyeri	84,254	18,598	29,665	43,250	175,767	1.86
5. Kirinyaga	20,060	39,700	41,245	49,408	150,413	1.59
6. Mombasa	-	25,026	7,646	24,827	57,499	0.61
7. Meru	-	41,250	-	71,496	112,746	1.19
8. Kisumu	174,380	191,965	247,327	211,067	824,739	8.76
9. South Nyanza	94,135	240,495	176,108	450,076	960,814	10.20
10. Siaya	18,300	137,057	150,817	67,318	373,492	3.96
11. Kisii	283,240	56,500	148,634	62,307	550,681	5.85
12. Nandi	-	22,000	91,040	54,658	167,698	1.78
13. Trans Nzoia	-	79,186	46,762	31,936	157,884	1.67
14. Kericho	29,413	90,630	40,000	31,936	191,979	2.03
15. Uasin Gishu	50,050	59,024	27,974	64,109	201,157	2.13
16. Busia	83,387	82,481	151,786	69,242	386,896	4.11
17. Kakamega	212,746	97,086	296,303	89,800	695,935	7.39
18. Bungoma	6,000	57,440	21,520	45,150	130,110	1.38
	1,177,445	1,339,811	1,656,343	1,461,536	5,635,135	60

TABLE 30: ASAL DISTRICTS: FUNDING BY RDF 1980-1984

DISTRICT	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84	TOTAL 1980-1984	%
1. Lamu	-	45,500	38,925	29,268	113,693	1.20
2. Kilifi	-	57,320	41,054	58,761	157,135	1.66
3. Kwale	-	35,414	36,817	36,932	109,163	1.15
4. Taita Taveta	-	44,500	58,340	29,637	132,477	1.40
5. Tana River	15,000	42,000	148,129	47,119	252,248	2.68
6. Embu	27,087	30,000	14,680	57,485	129,252	1.37
7. Machakos	44,253	44,328	80,533	55,690	224,804	2.38
8. Kitui	-	70,000	366,883	89,621	526,504	5.59
9. Isiolo	4,692	36,008	37,926	10,500	89,126	0.94
10. Marsabit	22,350	36,832	33,210	50,904	143,296	1.54
11. Wajir	-	18,679	18,750	50,904	88,333	0.93
12. Mandera	-	36,347	13,810	36,893	87,050	0.92
13. Garissa	31,234	36,348	13,350	63,066	143,998	1.53
14. Elgeyo Marakwet	42,770	38,000	126,840	84,848	292,458	3.10
15. Nakuru	42,685	65,272	15,920	27,782	151,659	1.61
16. Samburu	13,750	54,750	3,496	32,977	104,973	1.11
17. Narok	39,096	87,390	4,586	33,516	164,588	1.74
18. West Pokot	27,890	30,268	59,603	37,214	154,975	1.64
19. Baringo	84,254	131,400	85,800	70,275	371,729	3.94
20. Turkana	13,750	-	49,650	30,146	93,546	0.99
21. Kajiado	17,180	44,770	10,500	48,922	121,372	1.28
22. Laikipia	17,500	33,300	36,915	35,796	123,511	1.31
	443,491	1,018,426	1,295,717	1,018,256	3,775,890	40

TABLE 31: ASAL - FUNDING OF RDF PROJECTS 1980-1984

DISTRICT		%
1.	Kitui	5.59
2.	Baringo	3.94
3.	Elgeyo Marakwet	3.10
4.	Tana River	2.68
5.	Machakos	2.38
6.	Narok	1.74
7.	Kilifi	1.66
8.	West Pokot	1.64
9.	Nakuru	1.61
10.	Marsabit	1.54
11.	Garissa	1.53
12.	Taita Taveta	1.40
13.	Embu	1.37
14.	Laikipia	1.31
15.	Kajiado	1.28
16.	Lamu	1.20
17.	Kwale	1.15
18.	Samburu	1.11
19.	Turkana	0.99
20.	Isiolo	0.94
21.	Wajir	0.93
22.	Mandera	0.92
		40

TABLE 32: NON-ASAL FUNDING OF RDF PROJECTS 1980-1984

DISTRICT		%
1.	South Nyanza	10.20
2.	Kisumu	8.75
3.	Kakamega	7.39
4.	Kisii	5.84
5.	Busia	4.11
6.	Siaya	3.96
7.	Kiambu	2.30
8.	Uasin Gishu	2.13
9.	Kericho	2.03
10.	Nyeri	1.86
11.	Nyandarua	1.85
12.	Nandi	1.78
13.	Trans Nzoia	1.67
14.	Kirinyaga	1.59
15.	Bungoma	1.38
16.	Meru	1.19
17.	Murang'a	1.12
18.	Mombasa	0.61
		60

TABLE 33: RDF DISTRICT ALLOCATION 1986/87

DISTRICT	%	K£
1. Turkana	1.1	40,963
2. Lamu	1.2	45,256
3. Mombasa	1.5	54,307
4. West Pokot	1.7	62,817
5. Taita Taveta	1.8	65,992
6. Laikipia	1.8	65,767
7. Nakuru	1.8	65,706
8. Samburu	1.8	66,708
9. Mandera	1.9	70,521
10. Narok	1.9	69,686
11. Kirinyaga	2.0	73,805
12. Kajiado	2.0	74,482
13. Kericho	2.0	73,002
14. Nandi	2.0	75,645
15. Kwale	2.1	76,150
16. Baringo	2.1	76,183
17. Trans Nzoia	2.1	77,806
18. Uasin Gishu	2.1	77,904
19. Tana River	2.2	82,576
20. Nyandarua	2.3	85,634
21. Elgeyo Marakwet	2.3	84,602
22. Kilifi	2.4	89,748
23. Garissa	2.7	101,507
24. Nyeri	2.8	102,091
25. Isiolo	2.8	101,741
26. Busia	2.8	104,408
27. Murang'a	2.9	107,130
28. Marsabit	3.0	109,559
29. Wajir	3.0	111,536
30. Kiambu	3.2	117,843
31. Kitui	3.2	119,673
32. Kisumu	3.3	121,362
33. Bungoma	3.3	122,513
34. Siaya	3.4	125,678

Table 33 (cont'd)

DISTRICT	%	K£
35. Embu	3.5	128,232
36. Meru	3.5	128,983
37. South Nyanza	3.5	130,780
38. Machakos	3.6	131,867
39. Kakamega	3.6	134,234
40. Kisii	3.8	140,590

Source: Rural Development Fund Review Report 1987

TABLE 34 : RDF DISTRICT ALLOCATION 1987/88

DISTRICT	%	K£
1. Lamu	1.1	70,100
2. Turkana	1.4	80,950
3. Mombasa	1.5	81,375
4. Taita-Taveta	1.8	97,650
5. Mandera	1.8	97,650
6. Laikipia	1.8	97,650
7. Samburu	1.8	97,650
8. Nakuru	1.9	103,075
9. Nandi	1.9	103,075
10. West Pokot	1.9	103,075
11. Kirinyaga	2.0	108,500
12. Kajiado	2.0	108,500
13. Narok	2.0	108,500
14. El Marakwet	2.0	108,500
15. Kwale	2.1	113,925
16. Trans Nzoia	2.1	113,925
17. Uasin Gishu	2.1	113,925
18. Baringo	2.1	120,625
19. Tana River	2.2	119,350
20. Kericho	2.2	119,350
21. Nyandarua	2.3	124,775
22. Garissa	2.4	130,200
23. Kilifi	2.5	135,625
24. Nyeri	2.6	141,050
25. Busia	2.6	141,050
26. Wajir	2.9	157,325
27. Muranga	3.0	162,750
28. Kitui	3.0	162,750
29. Marsabit	3.0	162,750
30. Isiolo	3.1	168,175
31. Kiambu	3.2	173,600

Table 34 (cont'd)

DISTRICT	%	K£
32. Kisumu	3.2	173,600
33. Bungoma	3.2	173,600
34. Embu	3.3	179,025
35. Siaya	3.3	179,025
36. South Nyanza	3.5	194,875
37. Kakamega	3.5	189,875
38. Meru	3.7	200,725
39. Kisii	3.7	200,725
40. Machakos	3.8	206,150

Source: Rural Development Fund Review Report 1987

TABLE 35a: EEC MICROPROJECT PROGRAMME 1981-1988

DISTRIBUTION PER TRANCHE

TRANCHE	YEAR	NO. OF PROJECTS	FUND/TRANCHE (K.SHS.)	FUND/PROJECT AVERAGE (K.SHS)
1	1977-78	9	5,163,830	573,759
2	1973-79	19	12,450,000	655,263
3	1979-80	9	7,500,000	833,333
4	1980-81	12	8,670,000	722,500
5	1981-82	20	16,747,000	837,350
6	1982-83	19	16,300,000	857,895
7	1984-85	21	31,900,000	1,519,048
8	1986-1988	23	56,000,000	2,434,783
TOTAL	1977-88	132	154,730,830	1,172,203

TABLE 35b: EEC MICRO-PROJECTS FUNDING SUMMARY 1981-1988

TRANCHE	K.SHS. TOTAL	%
A. ASAL		
1.	1,967,790	2.30
2.	4,020,000	4.71
3.	5,150,000	6.03
4.	4,400,000	5.15
5.	10,415,000	12.20
6.	9,300,000	10.89
7.	16,580,000	19.42
8.	33,500,000	39.25
	85,332,790	100
B. NON-ASAL		
1.	3,196,040	4.72
2.	8,430,000	12.47
3.	2,350,000	3.47
4.	4,270,000	6.31
5.	6,332,000	9.36
6.	7,000,000	10.35
7.	15,320,000	22.66
8.	20,700,000	30.62
	67,598,040	100
A. ASAL	85,332,790	56.79
B. NON-ASAL	67,598,040	44.20
TOTAL A + B	152,930,830	100

TABLE 36: DISTRIBUTION OF EEC MICRO-PROJECTS (1981-1988)

A. ASALS

DISTRICT	TRANCHE	PROJECT	K.SHS.	%
1. Machakos	1	10 Tree Nurseries	460,000	8.90
2. Mandera	1	Kalaliyo Minor Irrigation Scheme	303,930	5.85
3. Wajir	1	Sebunley Secondary School	607,860	11.77
4. Kajiado	1	Enoomatasiani Secondary School	596,000	11.54
Sub-total			1,967,790	38.06
1. Tana River	2	Mau Mau Secondary School	750,000	6.02
2. Embu	2	Ishiara Irrigation Scheme	520,000	4.17
3. Garissa	2	Garissa Secondary School	700,000	5.62
4. West Pokot	2	Ortum Secondary School	700,000	5.62
5. Narok	2	Kilgoris Secondary School	650,000	5.22
6. Samburu	2	Kirisia Secondary School	700,000	5.62
Sub-total			4,020,000	32.27
1. Kwale	3	Vanga Water Project	1,500,000	20.00
2. Lamu	3	Lamu Ice Cold Storage	650,000	8.60
3. Kitui	3	Kiima Water Project	750,000	10
4. Marsabit	3	Marsabit Girls' Secondary School	750,000	10
5. Turkana	3	Turkana Girls' Secondary School	750,000	10
6. Baringo	3	Kituro Secondary School	750,000	10
Sub-total			5,150,000	68.66

DISTRICT	TRA-NCHE	PROJECT	K.SHS.	%
1. Taita Taveta	4	Mwasera Secondary School	750,000	8.65
2. Isiolo	4	Malka Garfass Irr. Scheme	750,000	8.65
3. Baringo	4	Kabimoi Secondary School	750,000	8.65
4. Elgeyo Marakwet	4	Metkei Secondary School	750,000	8.65
5. Laikipia	4	Ndindika Health Centre	650,000	7.49
6. Nakuru	4	Olenguruone Secondary School	750,000	8.65
Sub-total			4,400,000	50.70
1. Kilifi	5	Vitengeni Health Centre	950,000	5.67
2. Embu	5	Rwika Technical High School	900,000	5.37
3. Marsabit	5	Loyangalani Fisheries Development	825,000	4.92
4. Garissa	5	North Eastern Technical High School	1,000,000	5.97
5. Mandera	5	Shantole Flood Control	750,000	4.47
6. Turkana	5	Lokori Shallow Wells	800,000	4.77
7. West Pokot	5	Kabichbich Water Project	750,000	4.47
8. Elgeyo Marakwet	5	Kerio Valley Secondary School	840,000	5.01
9. Kajiado	5	Kibiko Water Project	1,000,000	5.97
10. Laikipia	5	Mukogodo Bure Holes Project	1,000,000	5.97
11. Narok	5	Narok Secondary School	800,000	4.77
12. Samburu	5	Wamba Technical School	800,000	4.77
Sub-total			10,415,000	62.13
1. Kilifi	6	Kombeni Tech. High School	800,000	4.90
2. Kwale	6	Mwachi Bridge	800,000	4.90
3. Taita Taveta	6	Mbogoni Bridge	750,000	4.60
4. Tana River	6	Kipini Water Wells	1,000,000	6.13
5. Isiolo	6	Isiolo Girls' Sec. School	900,000	5.52
6. Kitui	6	Migwani Agr. High School	1,000,000	6.13
7. Wajir	6	Wajir Secondary School	750,000	4.60
8. Turkana	6	Lodwar Secondary School	900,000	5.52
9. West Pokot	6	Suam River Irr. Scheme	800,000	4.90
10. Laikipia	6	New Mutaro Irr. Scheme	800,000	4.90
11. Nakuru	6	Bahati-Chania Water Proj.	800,000	4.90
Sub-total			9,300,000	57.00

Table 36 (cont'd)

DISTRICT	TRA-NCHE	PROJECT	K.SHS.	%
1. Kilifi	7	Mkanjuni Village Polytech.	1,200,000	3.76
2. Kwale	7	Tiwi Community Centre	1,300,000	4.07
3. Lamu	7	Faza Secondary School	1,660,000	5.20
4. Embu	7	Kibugu Health Centre	1,660,000	5.20
5. Kitui	7	Ikoo-Imwatime Water Proj.	1,660,000	5.20
6. Machakos	7	Machakos Teacher T.C. Farming Project	800,000	2.50
7. Marsabit	7	Moyale Secondary School	1,660,000	5.20
8. Mandera	7	Mandera Secondary School	1,660,000	5.20
9. Baringo	7	Kiptagich Health Centre	1,660,000	5.20
10. Kajiado	7	Kisamis Water Project	1,660,000	5.20
11. Narok	7	Olulunga Water Project	1,660,000	5.20
Sub-total			16,580,000	51.93
1. Taita Taveta	8	Chala Irrigation Project	3,000,000	5.53
2. Tana River	8	Madogo Secondary School	2,000,000	3.69
3. Embu	8	21 Embu Cattle Dips	2,500,000	4.61
4. Isiolo	8	Malka Daka Irrig. Scheme	3,500,000	6.45
5. Kitui	8	Kalambani-Mutha Water Project	2,500,000	4.61
6. Machakos	8	Kisau Girls Sec. School	2,000,000	3.69
7. Wajir	8	Bute Secondary School	2,000,000	3.69
8. Baringo	8	Kapluk Secondary School	2,000,000	3.69
9. Baringo	8	Baringo Technical College	4,000,000	7.38
10. Elgeyo Marakwet	8	Kapcherop Health Centre	2,000,000	3.69
11. Kajiado	8	Magadi Loop Road	4,000,000	7.38
12. Laikipia	8	Rumuruti/Ngarua 10 Earth Dams	2,000,000	3.69
13. Nakuru	8	Mama Ngina Kenyatta Secondary School	2,000,000	3.69
Sub-total			33,500,000	61.79

TABLE 37: DISTRIBUTION OF EEC MICROPROJECTS 1981-1988

B. NON-ASALS

DISTRICT	TRA-NCHE	PROJECT	K.SHS.	%
1. Kiambu	1	Nyaga Water Project	644,700	12.48
2. Kirinyaga	1	Theita Kamburi Water Project	497,340	9.68
3. Murang'a	1	Michuki Technical School	690,000	13.36
4. Nandi	1	Kaptumo Secondary School	644,000	12.47
5. Busia	1	Bujumba Secondary School and Water Project	720,000	13.94
Sub-total			3,196,040	61.93
1. Kiambu	2	Kiganjo Village Polytech.	620,000	4.97
2. Kirinyaga	2	Kiamutugu Secondary School	750,000	6.02
3. Nyandarua	2	Kirima Water Project	700,000	5.62
4. Nyeri	2	Naro Moru Water Project	750,000	6.02
5. Nyeri	2	Endarasha Water Project	750,000	6.02
6. Murang'a	2	Gaturi Water Project	500,000	4.01
7. Kisii	2	Menyenya High School	630,000	5.06
8. Kisumu	2	West Same Water Project	670,000	5.38
9. Siaya	2	Karabwo Water Project	700,000	5.62
10. South Nyanza	2	Karungu Water Project	650,000	5.22
11. Nandi	2	Sarora Water Project	470,000	3.77
12. Busia	2	Angurai Health Centre	620,000	4.97
13. Nairobi	2	Nairobi Girls' School	620,000	4.97
Sub-total			8,430,000	67.65
1. Murang'a	3	Kandara Children's Home	900,000	12.00
2. Meru	3	Ikuu Girls' Secondary School	750,000	10.00
3. Kakamega	3	Soy Craft Training Centre	700,000	9.33
Sub-total			2,350,000	31.33

Table 37 (cont'd)

DISTRICT	TRA-NCHE	PROJECT	K.SHS.	%
1. Nyandarua	4	Kambaa Secondary School	720,000	8.30
2. Mombasa	4	Changamwe Secondary School	750,000	8.65
3. Trans Nzoia	4	Suwerwa Health Centre	650,000	7.49
4. Uasin Gishu	4	Sogiani Health Centre	650,000	7.49
5. Kericho	4	Chebwagan Secondary School	750,000	8.65
6. Bungoma	4	Tongaren Health Centre	750,000	8.65
Sub-total			4,270,000	49.23
1. Kisii	5	Nyamira Technical School	800,000	4.77
2. Kisumu	5	Korwenje Water Project	750,000	4.47
3. Siaya	5	Yenga Siranga Water Proj.	832,000	4.96
4. South Nyanza	5	Kitere Technical School	800,000	4.77
5. Trans Nzoia	5	Kimondo Water Project	750,000	4.47
6. Uasin Gishu	5	Yamumbi Water Project	750,000	4.47
7. Bungoma	5	Matili Craft Centre	900,000	5.37
8. Kakamega	5	Ebusakami Technical School	750,000	4.47
Sub-total			6,332,000	37.75
1. Kiambu	6	Gitiha Gathangari Water Project	750,000	4.60
2. Kirinyaga	6	Kirinyaga Bee Keeping Project	750,000	4.60
3. Nyeri	6	Muhoya's Water Project	900,000	5.52
4. Mombasa	6	Kisauni Village Polytech.	800,000	4.90
5. Meru	6	Ntumburi Water Project	1,000,000	6.13
6. Kericho	6	Manaret Water Project	800,000	4.90
7. Nandi	6	Meteitei Secondary School	1,000,000	6.13
8. Busia	6	Bumbe Technical School	1,000,000	6.13
Sub-total			7,000,000	42.91

Table 37 (cont'd)

DISTRICT	TRA-NCHE	PROJECT	K.SHS.	%
1. Nyandarua	7	Leshau Karagoini Water Project	1,660,000	5.20
2. Nyeri	7	Mathenge Technical School	1,660,000	5.20
3. Meru	7	Kianjai Village Polytech.	1,660,000	5.20
4. Kisii	7	Nyaore Village Polytech.	1,000,000	3.13
5. Siaya	7	Nyakongo Secondary School	1,660,000	5.20
6. South Nyanza	7	Migori Agr. Secondary School	1,660,000	5.20
7. Trans Nzoia	7	Kwanza-Kolongolo Water Project	1,660,000	5.20
8. Uasin Gishu	7	Uasin Gishu School Farming Project	1,200,000	3.76
9. Bungoma	7	Kisiwa Village Polytech.	1,500,000	4.70
10. Kakamega	7	Shamberere Rural Education Programme	1,660,000	5.20
Sub-total			15,320,000	47.99
1. Kiambu	8	Kinale Health Centre	200,000	0.36
2. Kirinyaga	8	Kiaragana Girls' Secondary School	2,000,000	3.69
3. Nyandarua	8	Ngorika Water Project	2,500,000	4.61
4. Nyeri	8	Waraza Jet Luisoir Irrigation Project	3,500,000	6.45
5. Mombasa	8	Mtongwe Village Polytech.	2,000,000	3.69
6. Meru	8	Ntumburi Water Project Phase II	2,500,000	4.61
7. Kisumu	8	Katito Health Centre	2,000,000	3.69
8. South Nyanza	8	Nyandema Secondary School	2,000,000	3.69
9. Kericho	8	Siwot Youth Polytechnic	2,000,000	3.69
10. Nandi	8	Kaigat Water Project	2,000,000	3.69
Sub-total			20,700,000	38.17

TABLE 38a: ESTIMATED STATISTICS FOR ORDINARY SAVINGS SCHEME PER DISTRICT FOR THE PERIOD 1978 TO 1987

	1978					1979					1980				
DISTRICT	NO. OF ACCOUNTS	DEPOSITS KSHS.	CTS	WITHDRAWALS KSHS.	CTS	NO. OF ACCOUNTS	DEPOSITS KSHS.	CTS	WITHDRAWALS KSHS.	CTS	NO. OF ACCOUNTS	DEPOSITS KSHS.	CTS	WITHDRAWALS KSHS.	CTS
NAIROBI	271,106	46,767,159	00	41,207,080	20	299,000	67,301,684	20	60,504,451	30	331,721	80,976,865	60	75 ,253,190	00
KISUMU	33,573	3,117,810	60	3,410,241	10	36,500	8,820,112	30	6,179,678	70	41,080	9,731,791	10	8,400,240	00
EGEYO MARAKWET	1,762	866,058	70	198,930	70	1,882	1,061,142	30	243,814	50	2,156	1,314,386	40	315,015	40
TURKANA	2,518	277,138	70	1,420,933	80	2,724	339,565	50	174,153	30	3,081	420,603	65	225,011	00
NANDI	5,875	519,635	10	497,326	80	6,589	636,685	35	609,536	45	7,189	788,631	80	787,538	50
SIAYA	8,393	1,039,270	00	1,278,840	40	9,111	1,273,370	70	1,567,379	50	10,270	1,577,263	-	2,025,099	00
BUNGOMA	11,750	1,385,693	60	1,420,933	80	13,078	1,697,827	65	174,153	25	14,378	2,103,018	20	225,011	00
TANA RIVER	1,762	467,671	55	255,768	05	1,882	573,016	80	313,475	90	2,054	709,768	65	405,019	80
BUSIA	4,196	692,846	80	710,466	90	4,606	848,913	80	870,766	40	5,135	1,051,509	10	1,125,055	00
KAKAMEGA	23,501	3,412,270	45	3,126,054	30	24,357	4,180,900	65	3,831,372	15	28,756	5,178,682	40	4,950,242	00
MOMBASA	52,878	5,023,139	30	3,694,427	85	59,304	6,154,625	30	2,527,985	25	64,701	7,623,441	10	5,850,286	00
MERU	16,786	3,810,657	40	1,847,213	95	18,826	4,669,026	10	2,263,992	60	20,540	5,783,300	15	2,925,143	00
NAKURU	61,271	5,369,562	70	4,120,708	05	67,717	6,579,082	25	5,050,445	10	74,971	8,149,195	65	6,525,319	00
BARINGO	2,518	502,313	90	312,605	40	2,724	615,462	50	383,137	20	3,081	762,344	10	495,024	20
UASIN GISHU	23,501	2,424,963	80	4,262,801	00	25,357	2,971,198	40	5,224,598	40	28,756	3,680,281	90	6,750,330	00
MANDERA	1,678	242,496	30	14,209	30	1,882	297,119	80	174,153	20	2,054	368,028	10	225,011	00
EMBU	10,911	294,459	80	710,466	90	11,237	360,788	35	870,766	40	13,351	446,891	35	1,125,055	00
TRANS NZOIA	16,786	1,731,170	00	1,420,933	80	17,826	2,122,284	60	1,741,532	80	20,540	2,628,772	80	2,250,110	00
LAMU	1,678	346,423	40	255,768	05	1,783	424,456	90	313,475	90	2,054	525,754	00	405,019	80
MURANGA	15,108	2,078,540	00	1,705,120	50	16,943	2,546,741	50	2,089,839	00	18,486	3,154,527	30	2,700,132	00
ISIOLO	4,197	173,211	70	284,186	70	4,607	212,228	40	348,306	55	5,135	262,877	25	450,022	00
GARISSA	4,196	246,423	40	227,349	90	4,608	278,645	25	535,754	50	5,136	525,754	50	360,017	60
KIAMBU	69,665	6,928,468	00	3,978,614	60	78,130	8,489,138	40	4,876,291	80	85,241	15,515,091	20	6,300,308	00
KILIFI	7,554	692,846	80	426,280	80	8,372	848,913	80	522,459	80	9,243	1,051,509	10	675,033	00
SOUTH NYANZA	13,429	2,078,540	40	1,705,120	50	14,061	2,546,741	50	2,089,839	35	16,432	3,154,527	30	2,700,132	00
KAJIANDO	5,875	692,846	80	426,280	10	6,489	848,913	80	522,459	00	7,189	1,051,509	00	675,033	00
MACHAKOS	25,180	4,157,080	80	2,841,867	60	27,240	5,093,483	10	3,483,065	60	30,810	6,309,054	70	4,500,220	00
WEST POKOT	1,678	242,496	35	184,721	35	1,781	297,119	80	226,399	00	2,054	368,028	10	292,514	30
NYERI	52,878	3,810,657	40	2,983,960	95	58,304	4,669,026	15	3,657,218	80	64,701	6,783,300	10	5,725,231	00
KIRINYAGA	9,232	1,039,270	20	994,653	60	10,154	1,273,370	75	1,279,072	00	11,297	1,577,263	65	1,575,077	00
KISII	16,786	1,039,270	20	2,278,840	00	18,826	2,273,370	75	1,567,379	50	20,540	1,877,263	65	2,025,099	00
KITUI	6,714	1,039,271	30	852,561	20	7,530	1,273,372	15	1,044,920	50	8,216	1,577,260	50	1,350,065	00
KERICHO	6,714	1,039,270	00	952,560	20	7,530	2,273,770	75	1,044,919	60	8,216	2,577,263	-	28,50,066	00
KWALE	1,678	519,635	00	426,280	00	1,881	636,685	30	522,459	80	2,054	788,631	80	684,033	00
TAITA	10,072	1,212,481	90	852,560	20	11,296	1,485,599	20	1,044,919	60	12,324	1,840,140	95	1,350,065	10

Table 38a (cont'd)

ESTIMATED STATISTICS FOR ORDINARY SAVINGS SCHEME PER DISTRICT FOR THE PERIOD 1978 TO 1987

	1978					1979					1980				
DISTRICT	NO. OF ACCOUNTS	DEPOSITS KSHS.	CTS	WITHDRAWALS KSHS.	CTS	NO. OF ACCOUNTS	DEPOSITS KSHS.	CTS	WITHDRAWALS KSHS.	CTS	NO. OF ACCOUNTS	DEPOSITS KSHS.	CTS	WITHDRAWALS KSHS.	CTS
SAMBURU	1,678	173,211	70	113,674	00	1,882	212,228	45	139,322	60	2,054	262,877	25	180,008	00
MARSABIT	1,762	346,423	40	142,093	35	1,976	424,456	80	174,153	25	2,156	525,754	00	225,011	10
NAROK	3,357	277,138	00	156,302	70	3,765	339,565	50	191,568	60	4,108	420,603	00	247,512	10
NYANDARUA	10,911	692,846	80	710,466	90	12,237	848,993	80	870,766	80	13,351	1,051,509	10	1,125,055	00
LAIKIPIA	839	519,635	10	426,280	00	941	636,685	30	522,459	00	1,027	788,631	10	675,033	00
WAJIR	1,678	173,212	00	99,465	35	1,882	212,229	10	121,907	30	2,054	262,876	90	157,507	70
TOTAL	823,624	107,425,518	35	88,564,242	50	906,819	148,648,542	95	115,536,072	85	1,053,692	183,584,385	70	153,085,893	40