

HEINEKEN

GBN



*Futures of Africa*

## **Futures of Africa** *(work in progress)*

***Scenarios created during the Heineken Futures of Africa Workshop in Johannesburg 6 – 8 October 1999.***

- Introduction
- Current indicators of African development
- Workshop output – initial scenarios
- 3 Scenarios: Futures of Africa
  - Two tiered Africa
  - African Strength
  - Tears over Africa




# **Futures of Africa**

## ***Introduction***

The following is a reflection of work in progress which is undertaken by Heineken's Africa Cluster and the local general managers of Heineken in Africa. The purpose of this process is to create a small number of relevant scenarios which can serve as a backdrop (context) for the development of Heineken's strategic decisionmaking regarding the legitimacy of the Heineken business and opportunities for growth offered by this problematical continent.


To start the process a workshop designed and facilitated by GBN Europe was held 6 – 8 October 1999 in Johannesburg from which scenarios have emerged, which have been further defined and developed in preparation for the second stage of this process, the meeting of the African Cluster with the newly formed Africa Advisory Council.

In addition to the scenarios some current data pertaining to Africa have been included in the beginning of this document.






















## **AFRICA**


### **Current Indicators**

***Sources:***


International Marketing Data and  
Statistics, Euromonitor  
Global Environmental Outlook  
UNEP




# GDP growth Africa (in mio US dollars)



**GDP per capita**  
(in US dollars)




# Exports Africa (in bio US dollars)






## Urbanization Africa (x 1.000)



### Urbanization (% of total population)




Line graph showing the percentage of the population aged 15 and over who are literate in various African countries from 1975 to 1999. The Y-axis represents the percentage (0.0 to 160.0) and the X-axis represents the year (1975 to 1999). The graph includes lines for Cameroon, Congo Dem. Rep., Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and the Africa average. Literacy rates generally show an upward trend over the period, with South Africa and Nigeria showing the highest rates by 1999.

Country/Region	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	1999
Cameroon	115	110	115	110	115	110
Congo Dem. Rep.	110	110	110	110	110	110
Côte d'Ivoire	110	110	110	110	110	110
Ghana	110	110	110	110	110	110
Kenya	110	110	110	110	110	110
Nigeria	110	110	110	110	110	110
South Africa	110	110	110	110	110	110
Tanzania	110	110	110	110	110	110
Uganda	110	110	110	110	110	110
Africa	110	110	110	110	110	110




## Per capita food production


index numbers 1961=100



**Malnutrition stunting among children under age 5 (%)**




**Life expectancy**  
(1972 vs. 1998)







**Forest extent Africa  
(million ha)**




Traditional and commercial energy use




**Fresh water access**  
(% of population; 1991-93)











## Two-tiered Africa



*The Future of Africa - Heineken Africa*




## Local Strength




*The Future of Africa - Heineken Africa*

# Tears over Africa



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# Forward to the Roots




*The Future of Africa - Heineken Africa*

<i>Scenario</i> <i>Element</i>	<i>Tears over Africa</i>	<i>Local Strength</i>	<i>Forward to the Roots</i>	<i>Two-tiered Africa</i>
1. <i>Developmental aid</i>	Yes	Small (and misused)	After change support from IMF/WB	--- (only role big companies)
2. <i>Influence of global institutions</i>	Strict conditions	---	Following 'forward to the roots	---
3. <i>Spiritualism</i>	---	---	Back to African values combined with modern society	Strongly in poor areas
4. <i>Private investment</i>	Down	---	---	In rich pockets only
5. <i>Social structures</i>	---	Family structures broken down before change	---	African values & tribalisation in poor areas
6. <i>Infrastructure development</i>	Up then down	After change	After change in tune with nature/values	Only in rich pockets by big companies for themselves
7. <i>ICT</i>	---	---	---	Global link in rich pockets
8. <i>New leadership</i>	Dominantly leadership inertia	Responsible leadership	From responsible leadership to ~ inertia	Responsible leadership (mainly rich pockets)
9. <i>Health</i>	---	Aids rampant	---	---
10. <i>African economic development</i>	Large countries active players in Africa	---	---	Passive supplier (rich and poor areas)
11. <i>Geopolitical evolution</i>	Interaction between large & small countries	---	---	Rich pockets versus poor areas
12. <i>Ecological sustainability</i>	---	---	---	Local natural resources invested in/used by foreign companies
13. <i>Skilled resources</i>	---	Intellectual brain- drain & -return	Braindrain when corruption sets in	Lack; no education for the poor masses
14. <i>Security</i>	Criminality, corruption, etc.	Corruption before change	Corruption after period of stability	High in rich pockets, low in poor areas: corruption, etc.
15. <i>Dominance of SA</i>	---	---	---	---




16. Globalisation in Africa	Fragmentation: only big countries temporarily	---	---	Fragmentation
17. Demography	---	---	---	---
18. Technological change in our industry	---	---	Micro breweries	---
19. Structure of innovation	Maximum social responsibility for companies	Maximum social responsibility for companies	Production with minimal manpower	---
20. Social equity	Low	Low, especially before change	Down due to revolutionary change and up again	Low, between rich pockets and poor areas
21. Urbanisation	Uncontrolled	Uncontrolled → controlled after change	Controlled/stop	Uncontrolled in poor areas

<i>Scenario</i> <i>Element</i>	<i>Tears over Africa</i>	<i>Local Strength</i>	<i>Forward to the Roots</i>	<i>Two-tiered Africa</i>
<i>Economic</i>	Big countries wealthy before downturn, small countries poor	Start: poor economic conditions	From crisis to stability to crisis again	Wealth in rich pockets, rise of black markets in poor areas
<i>Social</i>	Good in large countries at first, later less; bad in small countries	From poor conditions for the masses to better distribution of wealth	From poor to better to poor again	Poor at start and in poor areas, good in rich pockets after change
<i>Technological</i>	---	---	---	Only to the benefit of big companies
<i>Political</i>	Dynamics lead to military coups in large and small countries	From dictatorship to 'controlled democracy' (via failed revolution)	From responsible leadership to nepotism and corruption	Minimal in rich pockets, nepotism in poor areas
<i>Ecological</i>	---	---	Use of available natural resources	Investment in natural resources by foreign companies
<i>Country interaction</i>	Large	---	---	Rich pockets versus poor areas
<i>Leadership change</i>	Military coups	From corrupt to responsible	Chiefs initiative	In reaction to investments by foreign companies
<i>Corruption</i>	Large	Before change	After period of stability	In poor areas
<i>Brain drain</i>	From small to large countries	Initially but -return after change	After period of stability	(Possibly from poor areas to rich pockets)
<i>Democratisation</i>	First large, then small countries; later down again	(Ethnic representation in government)	First yes, then no	---
<i>Ethnic conflicts</i>	---	In reaction to leader gaining power and wealth	---	(Possible in poor areas)
<i>Inequality</i>	Between large and small countries	(Between leaders and mass population)	Between leaders and mass population	Between rich pockets and poor areas
<i>Education</i>	Investment by companies	From low to investment by government; also by companies	From low to investment by government to deterioration again	From none to taken up by companies in rich pockets
<i>Social responsibility companies</i>	Education, health care, social security, pension fund	Education, health care, social security, pension fund	---	Education/training employees




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## Two-tiered Africa - Core characteristics

(1)

- ☐ **Fragmented development** of Africa: small, rich and developed pockets across countries (only accessible to the happy few) next to large, poor areas.
  - investments in large, (relatively) developed African countries lead to development of rich pockets - e.g. around Lagos (oil, gas), Nile (agriculture) and the African highlands (coffee, tea)
- ☐ Africa mainly **passive supplier** due to **dominance of large companies** (the 'new imperialism'): African (few, Western oriented) and Western companies (majority), which develop their own infrastructure in rich pockets (partially due to **resource scarcity**) and taking care of their own employees only (education, health, pension funds) due to **lack of skilled resources** resulting from **lack of educational institutions, braindrain** and **AIDS**.
- ☐ **Passive leadership** due to autonomous economic development in rich pockets, **struggling**, sometimes **corrupt leadership** in poor areas resulting in **extensive braindrain** to rich pockets and Western world.
- ☐ As a result of lack of trust **decreasing international aid** (after some years) as African countries in general do not meet criteria of international institutions (which leads to decreased investments in education, infrastructure, agriculture and water supply).

1

## Two-tiered Africa - Core characteristics

(2)

- ☐ **Lack of dynamics** between poor areas and "fenced-off" richer pockets: the "compounded Africa".
- ☐ **End state:** stability in wealthy pockets dominated by few large (African and Western) companies, relative stability in large poor areas as mass population is politically apathetic and not powerful enough to fight powerful and corrupt governments (state of 'muddling through').





## Two-tiered Africa - Additional elements

- ☐ Global materialistic orientation in rich compounded areas, (back to) family structures and tribalisation in poor areas, christian and muslim fundamentalist tendencies become visible.
- ☐ Only rich "compounds" have access to ICT evolution via large companies - they are connected to world trade and global economic developments..
- ☐ Corruption and criminality no major issue in rich "compounds" (but large investments by Western companies in security), corruption and nepotism in poor areas but mass population not in position to challenge it.
- ☐ Volumes of markets in rich "compounds" relatively small while in poor areas dominance of second hand merchandise and 'make-shift products'.
- ☐ Passive acceptance of social inequality between rich, developed areas and poor areas - political apathy.
- ☐ Broad ecological constraints, pollution of water and air leading to water shortage, deterioration of agricultural land resources.
- ☐ Few natural resources largely exploited by African and Western companies that have access to required capital, technology and know-how.



## Two-tiered Africa - Starting conditions

- ☐ Western companies strongly increase investments in large, (relatively) developed African countries (South Africa, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Egypt) from the beginning of the 2000s onwards ('snowball effect').
- ☐ Their investments pay off as a result of participating on the global market and offer employment-opportunities to well-educated Africans in particular (as a result of which many well-educated return from abroad to their home countries).
- ☐ Both developments lead to enforced democratization in pockets of development which are favoured by their access to natural resources and market position and contribute to social stability and economic wealth creation in these "compounds".
- ☐ Institutions and governments invest heavily in developing industrialized areas and tax facilities are negotiated appropriately where possible.



## Two-tiered Africa - Middle

(1)

- The rise of rich "compounds" due to vicious social cycle in large areas and virtuous economic cycle in small areas:
  - as Western companies investing in Africa mainly offer employment to well-educated Africans, the gap between the have's and have-not's increase steadily and results in severe social problems, increased criminality and large security problems;
  - problems deteriorate as economic upheaval attracts large numbers of (illegal) emigrants from other African countries and percentage of HIV/AIDS patients grow;
  - governments and companies invest heavily in law-enforcing (police, prisons, etc.) to control criminality but their efforts only worsen social problems and gradually result in large governmental budget deficits which lead to decreased investments in social and physical infrastructure resulting in (further) lack of skilled resources, infrastructure and water scarcity;
  - as a result of these developments, Western companies concentrate in selected, well-secured pockets (some of which cross borders; they buy security) in which they, out of sheer necessity, invest heavily in the infrastructure they need themselves due to which only few African companies with access to required capital succeed (beer companies have to invest in infrastructure and housing, next to education, social security and health systems for their employees);

### ***The Nation State Defunct in Africa***

*What is emerging in Africa are a limited number of cross-traditional national boundary pockets of socio-economic compounds developing their own rules. The political figureheads have less and less grip on these "compounded" developments . . . .*

*The Economist, May 2002*

*The Future of Africa - Heincken Africa*





## Two-tiered Africa - Middle

(2)

- however, within these global oriented pockets Western companies are thriving which keep them investing in these areas which contributes to positive economic cycle in these areas - the paradox: human resource costs are rising fast giving an incentive to modern manpower extensive investments;
  - some spin-off developments visible, e.g. growing services sector;
  - growing problems outside these pockets prevent investments in poor areas (lack of visible investment opportunities).
- ☐ The problems in poor areas increase:
- governments and institutions are not in a position to stop growing gap between the rich "compounds" and the poor areas, they attempt to redistribute the wealth of the rich to the poor areas but fail overall - no redistribution mechanisms, fiscal policies are "locked in";
  - demand for basic commodities is the overall driving force, no markets, purchasing power for e.g. international brands;
  - social problems in large, poor areas result in riots, growth of criminality and corruption and, in several countries, military coupes;
  - new (military) governments non-ideological but material-driven, corrupt (nepotism); they do not hinder the few Western companies in their countries in any way but instead profit financially from their presence (also resulting in a strong rise of black markets);
  - international institutions and Western governments drastically decrease aid given the disputable reputation of most African governments as a result of which problems deteriorate further;





## Two-tiered Africa - Middle

(3)

- this results in extensive braindrain from these countries to rich "compounds" (which have limited absorption capability);
- due to social and economic problems braindrain and AIDS (decrease in life expectancy), population not in a position to fight corrupt regimes but instead struggle to survive;
- overall, political apathy.

### *Report from Lagos:*

*A peaceful transition was maintained by the military replacing the democratically elected government by a cabinet consisting of a majority of business leaders . . .*

*The Nation (Kenya), May 13th 2003*

*Financial Times, Africa Supplement, October 16th 2003*

*The gap between rich and poor in Africa widens as a result of Internet and e-commerce. 85% of the connected and active people and institutions are in the resource-rich "compounded" areas of Africa. The other parts are disconnected with the exception of South Africa where . . .*



## Two-tiered Africa - End situation

- ☐ Both rich "compounds" and poor areas relatively stable; differences is that the rich pockets are *thriving* whereas the poor areas *muddle through*:
  - rich wealthy pockets with broad social equality and stability dominated by few large (African and Western) companies which are doing well in these areas and keep investing; they exploit Africa's most valuable resources;
  - relative stability in poor areas as population lacks power to fight corrupt regimes and have to struggle for their own survival, they leave urban centres and fall back on agriculture and family structures and escape in spiritualism (African, christian and muslim).
- ☐ Overall, government inertia and irresponsibility (corruption, nepotism, etc.), without any intention to improve the situation for the poor masses.
- ☐ International community keeps disputing about the proper way to improve the situation and as IMF/WB stick to their strict conditions, international aid is limited.
- ☐ Stalemate situation.





## Two-tiered Africa - An industry perspective

- ☐ **Few big players** offering a goods and services, risk and entrance costs are high as companies have to invest in their own infrastructure and education, health, social security for their own employees.
- ☐ **International brands** (or local brands with international image) for rich “compounds”, Hiltons and Hyatt’s.
- ☐ Winners succeed in operating in both tiers, **flexibility** key, international orientation with local understanding/knowledge.
- ☐ **access to capital and education** is key success factor in rich compounded areas to invest in infrastructure and education but also contributing to modern capital and technology production (which, in turn, lead to unemployment) and only few African companies that succeed (the international-oriented ‘SAB’s of Africa’).
- ☐ **Small entrepreneurial service activities** emerge in and around the compounded areas
- ☐ The industry in poorer areas delivers **commodities** through low-cost distribution means, production and investment in these areas stands still due to lack of skills, capital and infrastructure.







## 2 African Strength - Core characteristics (1)

- ☐ Situation of crisis: famine, corruption, AIDS, wars/conflicts, etc.
- ☐ **Accute awareness** of a general situation of crises which is shared by a growing number of African leaders. Africa realises that the endemic problems can only tackled from within and **takes its development in its own hands** (Africanization; Pan-African meeting; responsible leaders standing up) and African countries join forces to fight AIDS from the bottom-up - using powerful traditional ideas, beliefs and values - and eventually become an **active player** in global markets due to **economic cooperation** between countries (leading to **decreasing trade barriers**) and broad access to **ICT evolution**.
- ☐ **Responsible leadership rooted in traditional African values** successfully fights corruption, criminality and military regimes; **social responsibility** and community/citizenship values gain relevance while Western churches loose their institutional power and transfer into community builders (knowing that they are otherwise out).
- ☐ **Waves of investments in infrastructure**, education, health system, environmental protection/-pollution control with **extensive international aid** (international institutions respect African-oriented initiatives); Afro-American U.S. institutions active in "African reveil".

## 2

### African Strength - Core characteristics

(2)

- ☐ Favorable development of Africa offers more and more **attractive investment opportunities** to Western companies but in close cooperation with African companies: **rise of African-Western joint-ventures**.
- ☐ Strong increase in intra-African trade, economic development leads to increased buying power and **geo-political, social stability** (reduced conflicts and increased tribal tolerance), **equality** and **brain-return** (highly educated Africans returning from Europe and U.S. to their native countries).
- ☐ Sports important as a social integrator.
- ☐ **End state:** stronger African continent emerges that takes over some of the current roles of South-East Asia and Africanises Western knowledge and technologies to take-off establishing less economic dependence on the Western world.

## 2

### African Strength - Additional elements

(1)

- ☐ Evolutionary leadership changes in Africa but revolutionary leadership changes in countries as they see that other countries succeed in fighting major problems (e.g. 'follow Uganda' in fighting AIDS); revolutionary changes supported by (responsible) military.
- ☐ Sustainable balance found between natural resources (air, water, mineral, woods, etc.) and their exploitation via continent-wide ecological programs and strict pollution controls enforced by (pan-African) agreements.
- ☐ Agricultural potential of the continent is widely given priority in its development; "Africa can feed itself" is a policy slogan which finds its way in many programmes, in many countries.
- ☐ Africa is an emerging market of the 20th century due to high percentual increase in buying power, decreasing gap between have's and have-not's reflecting a more equal distribution of wealth.
- ☐ Strong increase of entrepreneurship over the continent stimulated by ICT/Internet (which enable youth and women to take a lead position, bypassing some of the traditional constraints in e.g. Islamic countries).



## 2

### African Strength - Additional elements

(2)

- ☐ Rise of new economic structures around tradition-based innovation and (well-educated) youth, establishment of science-parks ('the African Silicon Valleys') and strong support of biological/ecologically sound new technologies.
- ☐ Africa becomes an energy supplier of the world through big solar energy systems in Saharan countries.
- ☐ Tourism becomes major economic driver, as heritage, tradition and game parks have become scarce in the world.

## 2

### African Strength - Starting conditions

- The UNEP report 'Global Environment Outlook 2000' states that:
  - famine and HIV/AIDS will increase strongly in Africa in the next decade;
  - Africa will be the only continent on which poverty is expected to rise during the next century;
  - 14 countries are subject to water stress or water scarcity, and expects that a further 11 will join them by 2025;
  - an estimated 500 million hectares of land have been affected by soil degradation, including as much as 65% of agricultural land;
  - Africa lost nearly 50 million hectares of tropical forest during the 1980s;
  - the environment and key natural resources in most African countries have been increasingly threatened by escalating and unsustainable pressures from fast-growing cities;
  - the per capita food production has decreased by nearly 20% in the past 25 years while its population has been growing strongly.
- and concludes that 'the human condition in Africa remains as daunting as ever' while adding to it that 'of the 45 countries on the UN list of Low Human Development Indicator, 35 are in Africa'.
- A growing number of reports are published on criminality, corruptive governments and nepotism, crises and conflicts, etc.

#### **Worldbank report**

*By the year 2000, nearly 300 million Africans will live in a water-scarce environment. About 65% of rural inhabitants and one-fourth of people in cities are now without adequate water; 73% of the rural and 43% of the urban population are without proper sanitation. The region's forests also continue to be non-sustainably exploited. The threat of deforestation during the next century extends to massive ecosystems like the Congo Basin primary forest, which makes up over 90% of the remaining primary forests in Sub-Saharan Africa.*



## African Strength - Middle

(1)

- ☐ Newspapers note a growing awareness and debate among African leaders on the problems Africa is facing. On invitation of president Mbeke, leaders from 8 African countries meet in Johannesburg to discuss Africa's future. One year later, 14 African countries meet again in Lagos and decide to join forces and take Africa's development in their own hands. Directly after the conference the development of plans starts to develop infrastructure, invest in education and health system, and agricultural production.
- ☐ In the same year, African leaders meet the leaders of the top-9 countries in Paris to discuss the African plans. They promise broad financial support and lowering of trade barriers. Half a year later, IMF announces a broad remittance of African debts and an extensive financial support programme for Africa.
- ☐ Two years after the Lagos-conference:
  - an AIDS programme across African countries is in operation, which is (based on the experiences of Uganda) rooted in African values and beliefs; first signs are that the programme succeeds in challenging the directives of the Catholic church;
  - agricultural development is given the highest priority; "African can feed itself" is used as a policy slogan in many countries;
  - major investments in infrastructure, education and health systems become visible;
  - plans are announced to stimulate trade between African countries;
  - ecological programmes are started to stop soil degradation and deforestation, and improve the water situation;
  - following the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, an African commission is installed to investigate human rights violations in Africa to heal the wounds of wars and conflicts.



- Western companies signal many attractive investment opportunities in Africa. The most successful companies in Africa turn out to be African companies and African-Western joint-ventures. Western companies are aware that understanding of African values and traditions is key.
- As governments and companies invest heavily in infrastructure and education, African economies improve, intra-African trade grows, unemployment decreases and buying power increases, all contributing to geo-political and social stability and equality.

#### **Diversification of oil companies**

*As the water scarcity problem in Africa became more acute oil companies were invited by some enlightened African governments to use their 3rd seismic technology to explore for fresh water basins on the continent. This has resulted in the discovery of substantial new reserves which are produced and treated at low cost. In treatment phase effective use is made of one source which is abundantly available: solar energy.*

*The Herald Tribune, September 24th 2002*

- As the first signs of success become visible in the countries that took the lead in fighting major problems and reforming their economic and social structures, other African countries follow swiftly. In many of these countries revolutionary changes take place, supported by the military and stimulated by the return of well-educated Africans. On the 9th Pan-African conference in Harare, 28 African countries are present (debates on African democracy and the African way of doing business are central topics). The changes in these countries give new impulses to the economic development of the whole continent leading to a progressive development of the African economies.

*The Future of Africa - Heineken Africa*





## African Strength - Middle

(3)

- ☐ Many highly educated Africans return from Europe and the U.S. to their native countries. Many of them join the growing number of young entrepreneurs that start their own business. Around industrial centres clusters of small service businesses arise, which make extensive use of Internet and ICT. The first African science parks are developed (some newspapers even speak of the "African Silicon Valleys"); there is a strong support for development of biological/-ecologically sound technologies.
  - ☐ With the economic improvement in many countries, Africans' pride in Africa's heritage, traditions and cultures increases:
    - community and citizenship values gain relevance;
    - African-rooted spirituality replaces the influence of Western churches, who loose their institutional power;
    - Afro-American groups in the U.S. welcome and actively support the "African reveal";
    - the Pan-African games held in Nairobi are attended by all African athletes and watched in over 150 countries worldwide; 23 new world records are recorded in six different sports;
    - Nigeria beats Germany in the finals of the World Cup 2006;
    - a group of young African artists from several African countries exhibit their work on Internet; in the first two months the exhibition is visited by nearly 50 million people worldwide.
- Awareness about Africa's heritage lead to a stream of tradition-based innovations, which find its way to the global market rapidly.



## African Strength - Middle

(4)

- ☐ In 2005 a combination of African and Western companies starts building big solar energy systems in Saharan countries. By the end of the decade Africa has already become a significant energy supplier to South-European countries, this provides a "new age" alternative for the French nuclear power.
- ☐ Tourism becomes a major economic driver as heritage tradition and game parks have become scarce in the world and are promoted widely through attractive internet web pages and "African e-package tours".

### ***A five star restaurant amongst the elephants***

*Tourist can now move up when they want to enjoy a luxury safari in the heart of Africa. GAMETOURSAFRICA.COM are enticing those who used to sail their yachts in the Greek waters to spend their holidays in luxurious surroundings while viewing game and enjoying worldclass cooking and service to go with it. In the past decade tourism has been booming in Africa from 20 million in 1995 to an expected 46 million tourists this year.*

*Africa Today, May 25th 2004*

## 2

### African Strength - End state

- ☐ African economies are growing, which contributes to social stability and equality. The gap between the have's and have-not's has decreased significantly compared with the beginning of the 2000s; Africa is an emerging market due to a high percentual increase in buying power.
- ☐ Africa is a player in the global market, for agricultural products (coffee, tea, chocolate, etc.) but increasingly for industrial products too ("made in Africa" is gaining credibility); many biological/technological sound new products are developed in Africa (African universities play a key role in these areas).
- ☐ Overall geo-political stability except for some minor conflicts (in which African peace-keeping forces play a central role).
- ☐ The number of HIV/AIDS patients is rapidly decreasing in most countries as the government-campaigns (rooted in African values and beliefs) pay off and Africans can afford available therapies.
- ☐ Situation of ecological sustainability, the UNEP reports in 2015 that:
  - agricultural land resources and tropical forests are growing and exploited in a sustainable way;
  - Africa can feed itself and exports agricultural products and wood to Europe and the U.S.;
  - only 2 countries struggle with their water supply.
- ☐ African values and spirituality are respected worldwide and inspire designers, architects and artists all over the world.


## 2 African Strength - An industry perspective

- ☐ Main players are **African (local) companies** and **African/Western joint-ventures**.
- ☐ Rise of **many small companies**, few foreign entrances, only some joint-ventures.
- ☐ **Locally produced products** for the majority, pan-African brands for the middle class and only premium import for niche of people with global orientation.
- ☐ **Understanding of African values** is absolutely key to ensure match to local taste and preferences.
- ☐ Companies pay **increased taxes** to governments (who invests it in development of infrastructure education, health care, environmental protection and pollution control, etc.).





### 3 Tears over Africa (The story of 'Niamwa')



*The Future of Africa - Heineken Africa*

### 3 Tears over Africa - Core characteristics

- ☐ Relatively wealth of large economically well-performing countries ("African Lions") but **economic downturn** sets in as small/other countries do not take off and pull them down (collapse of their African export markets).
- ☐ **Diseases/AIDS rampant** leading to significantly decreasing population and workforce (life expectancy drops dramatically), and **excessive criminality and corruption** (as AIDS patients do not worry about future implications).
- ☐ Rising of **religious fundamentalism** driving regions apart leading to conflicts, succession of fundamentalist/military coupes and **xenophobia** across Africa.
- ☐ **Disadvantageous dynamics** between relatively rich and poor countries resulting in **economic and social crisis** all over Africa as international institutions **decrease international aid** (as the experience was that it was largely misused by governments).
- ☐ **Incidental attempts to revolutionary change** in some countries leading to temporary establishment of fake democracies which end in chaos, nepotism and corruption (reflecting gradual change from responsible to irresponsible leadership).
- ☐ **End state:** overall chaos, religious fundamentalist/tribal/regional conflicts/crises, social and economic disruption, military coupes and regimes leading to intervention by Western world in attempts to improve the situation.

### 3

## Tears over Africa - Additional elements

- ☐ Collapse of African economies (including further erosion of agricultural potential) due to disadvantageous interaction between few exploiting large and many exploited small countries.
- ☐ Rise of protectionist nation-state leading to barriers and decrease of continental trade.
- ☐ Limited international aid by IMF/WB under strict interventionist legislation.
- ☐ Uncontrolled demographics (negative population growth) and massive urbanization, also contributing to excessive criminality and insecurity and decreasing working population.
- ☐ Emergence of new forms of Apartheid (e.g. between rich and poor, between African people based on xenophobic tendencies).





### Tears over Africa - Starting conditions

- ☐ Lomé Convention V, successful negotiations and broad support for development of Africa in particular.
- ☐ Relative wealth of large four countries ("African Lions") as (major African and Western) companies mainly invest in these countries to produce variety of products and benefit from low-cost labor.
- ☐ Democratic governments of "African Lion" countries invest heavily in infrastructure, education, health systems and environmental protection to establish sustainable development; governments are helped by international institutions as they are credible and capable of heading-off initial problems.
- ☐ Overall the development of these countries signal successful development to the Western world and international institutions which is attributed to the Lomé Convention V.
- ☐ U.N. Development Programme report reveals that HIV/AIDS is far more widespread than earlier estimates, new infection rates: South Africa - 34%, Nigeria - 37%, Zambia - 29%, ... on basis of this information life expectancy drops, to 43 years for example in SA.



### Tears over Africa - Middle

(1)

- ☐ In "African Lions":
  - economic growth in relatively successful countries leads to fully uncontrolled urbanisation and massive; influx of people from smaller countries (which these countries actively try to stop);
  - only well-educated benefit from success of companies, large majority only benefit marginally.
- ☐ Domination of (companies in) successful countries lead to exploitation of smaller countries:
  - profits earned are re-invested in the large countries;
  - smaller countries do not succeed in attracting foreign companies (apart from low-cost production);
  - as a result economies of small countries deteriorate contributing to poverty and social unrest.
- ☐ International institutions take "African Lions" as role model for development of African countries and, based on adjustment of Lomé Convention V, set strict conditions to smaller less well-performing countries:
  - several small countries adopt conditions, supported by military they organise elections and establish feeble democracies;
  - other countries react defensively and protectionistic, increasing barriers to trade;
  - however, as money earned largely flows out of small countries, governments fail turning the unfavourable economic tide; moreover, they turn out to be largely corrupt, channeling aid to Western bank accounts, as a result of which international institutions decrease aid;
  - result: decline of smaller countries even more significant.

**Malawi under control of IMF**

*The Malawi government has agreed to implement very strict monetary and fiscal controls in order to secure a loan from the IMF. The loan is a typical interventionist conditional loan which will be made available in tranches, each tranche will be conditional on the strict adherence of the government as its policy implementation monitored by the IMF.*

*The African Chronicle, 2001 January 23rd*

- ☐ AIDS takes its toll, as many die, population drops dramatically and family structures are torn apart - governments of large countries, with financial support from international institutions, invest heavily in health systems (at the expense of investments in infrastructure and education).
- ☐ Due to the rise of AIDS and poverty for the majority people escape in religious spiritualism which gradually develops into religious fundamentalism.
- ☐ Poverty and religious fundamentalism lead to large social unrest and increasing number of local conflicts between rivaling tribes, religious groups (muslim, christian) and nation states/border conflicts and the emergence of new forms of Apartheid based on xenophobic tendencies.





## Tears over Africa - Middle

(3)

### **FAO's plans rejected by Zambia.**

*A two-day conference held in Lusaka in which the FAO presented its masterplan for the revival of Zambia's agricultural potential ended in chaos. The Zambian officials out of hand rejected the plans proposed by the FAO.*

*Washington Post, November 21st 2004*

- Economies of the Lion countries start deteriorating, first slowly but, as Western companies stop investing and African companies and governments lack capital, a progressive development of economic downturn sets in:
  - economies of smaller countries collapse and export markets disappear for companies in African Lion = collapse of continental trade;;
  - in large countries population and workforce (buying power!) drops due to AIDS, lack of skills, etc.;
  - poverty and AIDS contribute to excessive criminality and insecurity, both the human and natural resource situation gets out of control.

### **BAT withdraws its investments from Zimbabwe**

*In order to consolidate their investments in safer havens, BAT announced yesterday that they will concentrate their investments in what are recently known as the African Lion countries. As from next year their manufacturing facilities in Zimbabwe will be shut down.*

*The Nile Post, 20th September 2005*





### Tears over Africa - End state

- ☐ Collapse of African economies, continent wide, contributing to social crisis and social divides.
- ☐ Broad social unrest, dominance of religious fundamentalism, large number of local conflicts, continuous succession of regimes and military coupes.
- ☐ Discussions in U.N. and Western world, call for new Lomé Convention VI - still assuming positive interventions can be made.
- ☐ First indications of successful re-introduction of African values in combatting socio-economic misery - back to the roots of the cultures as a new sense of identity and belonging.
- ☐ Movement away from the Western materialism back into African values, beliefs and spiritualism.

### 3

## Tears over Africa - An industry perspective

- ☐ **Industry favoured positions only in “African Lions” countries**, producing variety of products (both commodities and non-commodities) and sold on global and African market.
- ☐ Winners own **large-scale, low-cost and mixed-technology production sites** and have good links with governments (more important than strong international brands and marketing).
- ☐ **Minimal investments** in production sites as major investments do not pay off given collapse of market.
- ☐ Companies have to **invest heavily** in security and education and training, medical care and social security for their employees.

## 4

### The story of "Niamwa" - Core characteristics

- ☐ **Context of 'Tears over Africa':** small country in crisis, neighbor of one of the well-performing "African Lions".
- ☐ Facing a multitude of major problems in their own country while observing the favourable development of the "African Lions" (including the aid these countries get), influential leaders choose a **young, well-educated politician** as the only presidential candidate (i.e. **revolutionary change**).
- ☐ New-chosen president seeks to combine the best of traditional African values and elements of Western society and succeeds to get **financial support from IMF and Worldbank** (who welcome any African country that take the "African Lions" as their example).
- ☐ Initially investments in infrastructure seem to pay off and result in stability but as president and his people gain power and wealth, **nepotism and corruption** sets in contributing to **tribal and ethnic conflicts** and extensive **brain drain** from the country. Good intentions to change situation of mass population end in self-enrichment.
- ☐ **End state:** back to square one, overall chaos in the country, economic and social crises.

#### 4

### The story of "Niamwa" - Additional elements

- ☐ Election of young politician as president only hide significant underlying problems.
- ☐ Investments in infrastructure and education almost randomly without real vision.
- ☐ "Niamwa" does not succeed in attracting major Western companies (who are focusing their efforts on the "Africa Lions").
- ☐ HIV/AIDS major problem, much larger than assumed (the UNDP report published in 2000 estimated infection rate for the country of 29%, but a few years later this proves to be an underestimation). Insufficient capital to fight this problem.
- ☐ Uncontrolled demographics (negative population growth) and massive urbanization which contributes to excessive criminality and insecurity and decreasing working population.
- ☐ Collapse of agricultural production, "Niamwa"'s people face hunger.



#### 4

### The story of "Niamwa" - Starting conditions

- ☐ Lomé Convention V, successful negotiations and broad support for development of Africa in particular.
- ☐ The UN Development program reports host of problems for "Niamwa", a selection: HIV/AIDS infection rate is 29%, large majority of population suffers from poverty and famine, massive and increasing urbanization, braindrain of the well-educated, and investments of Western companies reduced to a minimum.
- ☐ "Niamwa" has faced nearly continuous succession of tribal and ethnic conflicts in the past 15 years. Together with (governmental) corruption and nepotism this has led the country into total bankruptcy. At this stage "Niamwa" only receives international aid as part of food programs.
- ☐ Meanwhile, several African countries (the "African Lions"; one of which is a neighboring country) start to perform well economically. These countries have invested heavily in infrastructure, education and the health system and succeeded in attracting Western companies and acquiring broad financial support from international institutions.



## The story of "Niamwa" - Middle

(1)

- ☐ Influential political, military, tribal and spiritual leaders of "Niamwa" meet to discuss the host of problems the country is facing. They see the favourable development of the "African Lions" and the international aid these countries get and conclude that it is time to join forces to take on the domestic problems, restore balance and hook on to the "African Lions". They decide to choose a young, well-educated son of a former leader, a graduate from Cambridge with experience and charisma, as the only presidential candidate (i.e. revolutionary change).
- ☐ New-chosen president seeks to combine the best of traditional African values and elements of Western society and succeeds to meet the strict conditions of IMF and Worldbank to get financial support (who welcome "Niamwa" which takes the "African Lions" as its example).
- ☐ Government starts building a four-lane road (that will connect the two major cities in the country) and initiates a large dam project (of which they say 'this will create clean energy, away from killing our forests for charcoal), and starts up a new university (that will focus on 'educating computer-specialists'). International institutions financially support these projects, but within a few years these projects all strand as budget deficits and failures are mounting up, funds disappear and international investors withdraw.

### **MwaMwa people arm themselves**

*The MwaMwa people, who have traditionally lived in the Nia basin and developed it's agricultural potential, are arming themselves. Young soldiers are getting prepared to fight with the national guards to protect their land which is planned to be swamped by the new Nia Dam*

*The Niamwa Post, June 1st 2003*

#### 4

## The story of "Niamwa" - Middle

(2)

- ☐ It turns out that government officials have misused international funds for their own benefit. This leads to a wave of domestic conflicts between tribes and ethnic groups. The military attempts to restore balance but is also divided. As a result, international aid is being withdrawn.
- ☐ Domestic problems abound as HIV/AIDS infection rate keeps increasing (80% of the beds in the country hospitals are occupied by AIDS patients) and criminality keeps increasing (to which AIDS contributes) dramatically and government not able to control the situation. Half of the population suffers from below standard of living conditions, many of which move to the two major cities in the country, based on false promises.
- ☐ Agricultural production minimal, "Niamwa's" dependence on food imports increases.
- ☐ The escape is in religion, and first signs are visible of religious fundamentalism (several conflicts between christian and muslim fundamentalist groups).
- ☐ Facing a big trade deficit (especially with the "African Lions"), government reacts defensively and protectionistic, increasing barriers to trade as a result the economic situation of the country only deteriorates further.



#### 4

### The story of "Niamwa" - End situation

- ☐ Context: collapse of African economies, continent wide, contributing to social crisis and social divides.
- ☐ Overall chaos in the "Niamwa", dramatic economic and social struggles, population suffering from poverty and famine, while a small elite channels money earned to Western bank accounts.
- ☐ Population lacks power to challenge the corrupt regime and change the situation to their benefit
- ☐ After a short period of promise and hope, the country is back in the position it found itself in at the beginning of the new millennium.



## 4 The story of "Niamwa" - An industry perspective

- ☐ Industry favoured position only in "African Lions" countries. Western companies limit their investments to these countries. Country only succeeds in attracting **some minor investments** in production of commodities using old-technology.
- ☐ Most successful companies produce **basic commodities** (mostly African companies) with **local brands**; international brands only for the elite.
- ☐ Overall, **lack of infrastructure**. Getting (well-educated) **employees major problem**. Investments by companies in education and training hardly pays off.

## 7. EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

### 7.1. INTRODUCTION

Ethiopia had a formal early warning system (EWS) long before most other African countries. It was set up in 1976, and has played a major role in famine early warning (EW) ever since. It has always been located within the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), since it took over from the 'Food and Nutrition Information System' of the Ethiopian Nutrition Institute (ENI) in the 1970s. Despite this long tradition of a formal EWS, there is room for improvement and modification. Indeed, the EWS has been subject to various reviews (for example, Holt and Cutler, 1984; FAO, 1991) and has undergone a number of changes and developments since its inception.

The EWS in Ethiopia has always been highly centralised. Therefore, the new 'Directives for Disaster Prevention and Management', to be implemented under the recently decentralised system of government, is a radical change in orientation. In many ways a more decentralised EWS offers the potential for a much improved information system. For example:

- (i) The information collectors and analysts are likely to be closer to the people and to the problems they are monitoring, and are therefore more likely to be sensitive to local needs.
- (ii) Cooperation between line ministries, which are the principal suppliers of EW information, is often easier to achieve at lower levels in the administrative hierarchy where government officials are more task-oriented.
- (iii) There is greater flexibility to design an EWS which is appropriate to local conditions.

However, there are also potential pitfalls for a more decentralised system of early warning. For example, it is likely to be more demanding of staff and resources, and the problem arises of standardisation between a number of local level EWS so that comparisons can be made and priorities set for allocating national (and international) resources.

This section aims to set out a framework for modifying the EWS to become a more decentralised, yet effective, system of early warning. It also offers some suggestions for improving the technical design of the EWS, particularly in relation to the indicators which are monitored.

### 7.2. EWS IN ETHIOPIA BEFORE REGIONALISATION

The Early Warning and Planning Services (EWPS) is one of 17 units within the RRC. Over the years it has built up a team of considerable experience and expertise, despite operating with rather limited resources and with less technical assistance than most other national EWS in countries in Africa.

Whilst data collection was based on the old administrative unit of the awraja, all data analysis, interpretation and report writing were carried out in Addis Ababa. Appeals for international relief assistance used the EWPS's information. Relief allocations were decided upon in Addis, and decisions regarding relief interventions were communicated from the centre downwards, to regional and awraja level. In brief, it was a highly

centralised system, with little contact between data collectors at awraja or regional level, and data analysts who wrote the EW reports in the capital. All the RRC's early warning staff were based in Addis Ababa. The field staff who collected the EW data mostly belonged to the Central Statistical Authority (CSA), which was contracted to carry out EW data collection at awraja level (see below).

The EWS was designed to cover two broadly defined systems of food supply upon which the population depends: an agricultural one which is crop dependent, and a pastoral one which is livestock dependent.

EW monitoring was carried out in 237 awrajas, at least in theory - security, staffing and logistics permitting. In each awraja there was supposed to be an EW committee comprising representatives from the CSA, Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), Peasants Association (PA), chaired by the awraja administrator. Information was passed through various channels to regional level, where the RRC was represented, and eventually reached the RRC in Addis Ababa. See Figure 7.1. (to be added\*). Thus, although the RRC has been responsible for collating and analysing EW information, it has been dependent on other line ministries to collect most of the data. A list of different data sources used by the EWPS is the following:

1. **Crop production forecasting and assessment.**  
Provided by CSA during the 1980s, until 1992 when CSA staff became involved in the population census. (Since then, EWPS has been dependent on MOA for crop assessment data, see below).
2. **Market monitoring.**  
This was contracted out to CSA. Market surveys were carried out in over 100 awraja-centre markets, covering the main cereals, pulses and livestock. Recently, some cash crops were added to the list in certain parts of the country.
3. **Meteorological data collection and vegetation monitoring.**  
The EWPS has relied upon the National Meteorological Services Agency (NMSA), primarily for rainfall forecasts and monitoring, and also for monitoring of the Normalised Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) through satellite imagery. This information has been supplied within Addis Ababa. The NMSA also produces its own 10-day and monthly bulletins during the main rainy season, as well as 10-daily flash reports.
4. **Pastoral surveillance.**  
EWPS teams from Addis Ababa have carried out their own surveillance of the main rangeland areas, twice a year, at the end of the expected rains when forecasts can best be made. This covered approximately 6 pastoralist awrajas (FAO, 1991).
5. **Nutritional surveillance.**  
The EWPS has had its own Nutrition Unit to carry out nutritional surveillance on an ad hoc basis in selected vulnerable areas. Because of limited resources, EWPS has been particularly reliant on non governmental organisations (NGOs) to provide nutritional surveillance data, for example Save the Children Fund(UK)'s Nutritional Surveillance Programme (NSP).



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information from the pastoralist area assessments and from the disaster area assessments, has also been identified as a priority need (ibid, 1993).

### 7.3. A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT EWS: CAPACITY AND PERFORMANCE

#### 7.3.1. Overview

Although the process of regionalisation started one year ago, the process of decentralising the EWS to fit into the new structure has barely started. The RRC's EW activities are still centralised. The EWPS has remained unchanged, although it is on the brink of being reorganised as part of a restructuring exercise within the RRC (see Section 4 above). Some regional and zonal EW representatives have been appointed - see Table 7.1 (to be added\*) - but it is only the EWPS in Addis Ababa which is currently analysing EW data and regularly publishing EW bulletins.

Regionalisation has caused a number of disruptions in the way that EW information is collected at local level, as well as in the means of channelling information from the field to the centre. This has coincided with another major upheaval within the EWS: the withdrawal of all CSA staff, who really formed the backbone of data collection activities at regional and awraja levels, to carry out the population census.

As a result of both of these events, but particularly the withdrawal of CSA enumerators from EW, the EWPS started to appoint its own regional representatives over the last year, for the first time. So far, a total of 4 regional EW representatives have been appointed, covering regions 1 (Tigray), 3 (Amhara), 4 (Oromia) and the Southern regions.. Regional EW representatives have only been appointed in the highland regions where the food supply is predominantly 'crop dependent' (although region 4 does include pastoralist areas).

The EW staff are located within the regional relief and rehabilitation bureaus (RRB), and have taken over some EW responsibilities previously carried out by the CSA regional office. Some of the new regional EW representatives were redeployed from other RRC departments, like the agricultural technology department, the land use and reclamation department, the settlement administration and cooperatives development department, and the engineering and technical department. Many of the new EW staff were given short training/orientation courses of 2 to 3 days, either in Addis Ababa or in the regional centres. However, these four departments mentioned above have all since been transferred to MOA, and therefore some of the newly trained regional EW staff were lost. New ones have had to be appointed, and training provided all over again.

So far, the regional EW offices are only collecting and collating data for onward transmission to the EWPS in Addis. They are not yet doing their own data analysis - indeed, they have no facilities to do so, beyond simple calculators. They are not yet producing their own EW reports.

Eventually, the RRC plans to have EW representatives at zonal level as well (in the 4 regions mentioned above, there are already EW staff appointed at zonal level), but not down to woreda level.

The process of regionalisation and the redeployment of CSA field staff have caused a number of disruptions to the smooth running of the national EWS.



The influence of the latter event has been more significant than the former, and has had a major impact on the programme of regular monitoring of certain indicators, like market prices and crop performance. For a number of months the EWPS in Addis Ababa received almost no market data: in June 1993 it received only 18 monthly questionnaires out of an expected 150 - a reporting rate of 12%. By August 1993 the reporting rate had slightly improved, but only to 30%. Likewise, monthly reporting on crop performance has deteriorated. Only about 50% of the monthly questionnaires were returned to EWPS in August 1993 - out of an expected total of 190 questionnaires. MOA field staff are now depended upon for crop assessments and crop forecasting, but the information has not always been readily available nor readily transmitted.

There has been little change in the way that one-off nutritional surveillance, disaster area assessments, and the pastoralist area assessments have been carried out, although there are reports that teams from RRC headquarters are having greater difficulty in accessing information at regional level compared with previous experience (see section 7.3.3. below).

NMSA has continued to monitor rainfall and vegetation conditions from Addis Ababa, using satellite imagery. Their monitoring capacity at field level has been seriously impaired in some areas as a result of the war.

The following two sections provide a more detailed review of current early warning capacity and performance in the two regions selected for the assessment: Region 3, focussing on North Wollo zone, and Region 5.

### 7.3.2. Current Status of Early Warning in North Wollo Zone of Region 3

#### Introduction

North Wollo zone is one of the most drought-prone in Ethiopia, and was very seriously affected in the famine of the mid 1980s. 5 woredas within North Wollo are most prone to drought. These are mostly in the lowland areas. In some of the highland areas, hailstorm damage to crops is a greater threat than drought.

The new structure for decentralised disaster management appears to have been communicated to most levels of local government in Region 3. Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committees (DPPC) have been set up at regional, and in North Wollo, at zonal level a number of months ago. In the two woredas visited in North Wollo, they had each set up a WDPPC in the last month on the instructions of the zonal authorities, although they had received nothing in writing about the functions of the DPPC. Indeed, concern about drought during the recent meher season has given greater poignancy to the establishment of the WDPPC in Kobo woreda, and has galvanised the administration and line ministries into preventative action.

#### EW at regional level: RRB

Although the team was unable to visit Bahir Dar, it has been possible to gather some information about EW capacity. A very large regional relief and rehabilitation bureau, of almost 100 staff, has been established in Bahir Dar. An EW section has been set up, with 2 staff in post. The head of EW was redeployed from the RRC in Addis Ababa.

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As yet, they have not started producing their own EW reports; most of the data is still being forwarded to the EWPS in Addis for analysis.

#### EW at zonal level: RRB

The office of the RRB in Woldia is well-established, as the RRC was represented in a number of awrajas in this drought-prone area even before regionalisation. There is now a staff of around 60, including 6 EW personnel. Their office facilities are reasonable. In terms of staff alone, this provides the basis for building strong EW capacity, which should be well able to collate and analyse EW data.

In practice, the staff are not yet well trained in EW activities, and have only recently started to compile EW information. A monthly 'telephone questionnaire' is communicated to Bahir Dar. And monthly market and crop assessments, also using the EWPS's questionnaire, are sent directly to Addis. As mentioned above, there have been serious disruptions in the regular transmission of information to the EWPS over recent months.

#### Rainfall monitoring

There is only one meteorological station (check\*) in the whole of North Wollo. Instead, qualitative monitoring of rainfall is carried out by MOA staff at woreda level.

For one of the most drought-prone regions of Ethiopia, this is a major gap, especially as regionalisation proceeds. The results of NMSA monitoring of rainfall using satellite imagery in Addis Ababa, are not yet available to zonal level staff.

#### Crop monitoring and assessment

The MOA's crop monitoring activities at zonal and woreda levels are particularly relevant for EW.

The Development Agents (DAs) are carrying out monthly reporting of crop performance, on forms which are sent to the MOA at woreda headquarters. In turn, this information is transmitted to MOA in Woldia. If the reports indicate there is a problem, the zonal authorities will follow up with field visits. For example, during August and September '93, MOA officials from Woldia had visited Kobo woreda four times, mainly for follow-up monitoring because of growing concern about the impact of drought. This system of regular monitoring by DAs seems to work reasonably well, although geographical coverage is a problem. In both Kobo and Wadla Downt woredas, there are unfilled DA positions, especially in Wadla Downt which is a newly created woreda with many staff vacancies (details\*\*).

Furthermore, the zonal authorities had taken their own initiative to carry out an early assessment, during August of this year, of agricultural and food conditions in North Wollo in response to the drought. All line ministries were mobilised (see below), and the MOA carried out its own preliminary crop assessment. The data is being analysed in Woldia, and should provide a provisional estimate of crop production per woreda. The methodology used is subjective in terms of estimating area under



cultivation. Farmers' own estimates of yield are fed into the calculations. This is the second time that the MOA at zonal level has carried out its own early crop assessment. The methodology has improved this year over a very simplified approach used in 1992. However, the MOA officials are keen to receive guidance and training in crop assessment methodologies. For the most recent assessment they relied upon an FAO manual for lack of any other advice.

This crop assessment will probably feed into an initial estimate of numbers of people in need, which will be made by the RRB staff at zonal level in association with the zonal administration. (This was the procedure followed during 1992). It is unlikely that this initial figure will be used by the EWPS at national level. An official national crop assessment will succeed the zone's assessment, in October/November. In 1992, differing figures between the two assessments led to some negotiation between the zone and the centre. Eventually the zonal figure (of 350,000\*\*) prevailed (check\*\*) over the EWPS's lower assessment of 180,000.

#### Livestock monitoring

Reporting on livestock within MOA is more limited, and most relevant to the highland woredas. Indicators which are monitored include the condition of animals (based on observation), water availability and availability of fodder and grazing. In the lowland woreda of Kobo, only livestock market prices are monitored on a regular basis.

#### Market monitoring

The RRC staff are currently monitoring 3 markets in North Wollo: Woldia, Kobo and Lalibela. Meanwhile, the MOA is monitoring a much larger number of markets. For example, in each of the two woredas of Kobo and Wadla Downt, the MOA has one member of staff monitoring 3 and 2 markets respectively, on a weekly basis. Crop and livestock prices are recorded, and in Kobo, the price of oil crops as well. The market data is sent to MOA in Woldia each month.

Thus, it appears that there are unused market data available, which could potentially be extremely useful for EW monitoring in the zone. Even if EWPS in Addis continues to monitor only 3 of the principal markets in North Wollo, the zonal and regional EWS could greatly benefit from wider market coverage as an indicator of food security conditions.

#### Health and nutrition

MOH has its own regular system of health reporting, from clinic to woreda to zonal level. As with MOA, geographical coverage is somewhat limited. Kobo woreda has 3 clinics for 40 PAs. Wadla Downt has 4 clinics for 59 PAs. The reporting system for the latter woreda is not yet in line with the new regionalisation process; the MOH officials are still reporting to Meket, the old awraja headquarters. Unlike Region 5 (see below), there are community health workers operating in North Wollo in other PAs beyond those served by clinics.

The EWS is making use of some MOH data, on an ad hoc basis. There is scope for making much greater use of this data in a more systematic way in the future.

Nutritional surveillance for EW in North Wollo is entirely the domain of SCF(UK). MOH does have the capability to carry out nutritional surveillance, as it recently carried out nutritional assessments funded by UNICEF. This capability should be built upon in the future, for one-off assessments in times of food crisis.

#### School attendance

School attendance has never been used as an indicator of drought by the RRC's EWS. However, Ministry of Education (MOE) staff report that reduced school attendance is an early indicator of drought stress, when parents can no longer afford school fees. Indeed, at zonal and woreda levels there is much closer contact between MOE and other line ministries involved in EW data collection than at national level in Addis Ababa.

School attendance is a potentially useful and important indicator, which could be incorporated into a decentralised EWS in the future.

#### Coping strategies and other socio-economic indicators

There is no monitoring of indicators other than agricultural, market and health. For example, no line ministry is looking at on-farm storage, nor off-farm sources of income. Local people's coping strategies are not yet incorporated into regular monitoring procedures. Yet, in a food deficit area these are very important indicators to assess food insecurity, and for early warning.

#### The process of information collection, and collaboration between line ministries

The DPPC at zonal, and in the case of Kobo, at woreda level, seems to have provided a forum for greater collaboration between line ministries who are collecting EW information as part of their regular reporting procedures. In Woldia, for example, the ZDPPC took the decision that some kind of early drought assessment should be carried out by the line ministries in August this year. A technical committee was formed, which included MOA, MOH, RRC, Ministry of Natural Resources (MONR), and MOE. They worked together to devise an approach to this assessment. Ultimately, the fieldwork and writing up has been done separately, ministry by ministry. There is clearly room for much greater collaboration in the assessment and analysis stages. However, the results will be discussed by all line ministries together with the zonal administration in the ZDPPC. This kind of collaboration and zonal initiative is very positive, and should be built upon.

The recent experience of the newly established WDPPC in Kobo is also encouraging. Set up in August '93, it has focussed immediately on the current drought which is affecting parts of the woreda. Thus, in the WDPPC's second meeting, MOA, MOH, MOE, Ministry of Finance and the woreda administration took the opportunity to exchange information about the severity of the drought. In the third meeting which was scheduled for the end of September, the respective ministries had been requested to come up



with proposals for mitigating the impact of drought. The MONR had a proposal for a food-for-work (FFW) project in one drought affected area; MOA had plans for seed distribution. This illustrates the potential for much greater collaboration between departments than occurred in the past. Previously, each ministry had its own committee, on which other line ministries might sit, but with more limited tradition of information exchange and joint problem-solving.

#### Constraints to EW

1) Many parts of North Wollo are inaccessible by road. Limited communications and transport facilities are the biggest constraint to effective EW. For example, MOA reports that it takes approximately one week for woreda reports to reach them at zonal level, and two to three weeks for more distant woredas. From Woldia to Bahir Dar, the transmission of reports usually takes less than a week. The postal system is relied upon in most cases. For early warning data, this speed of transmission is slow. There is an urgent need for more rapid means of communication. In Kobo woreda, there is an additional communications hazard. One road, which gives access to approximately 7 PAs, has been mined and is regarded as unsafe, except on foot.

2) Geographical coverage is limited. MOH and MOA have the most extensive network of officers, but still do not cover all PAs. This is particularly problematic in Wadla Downt, a new woreda where there are only 27 DAs in an area that used to have 67 (check\*\*).

#### Overall assessment of EW in North Wollo zone

Although EW is in the early stages of being decentralised to regional or zonal levels within Region 3, a reasonable framework is in place in North Wollo which can be built upon to strengthen decentralised EW in the future. It is not dependent on donor or NGO agencies, (unlike Region 5 - see below), but on line ministries at zonal and woreda levels. The MOA is the corner-stone, and is already collecting a lot of information which is relevant to EW in its routine reporting activities. MOH is also collecting relevant data. But neither of these are well linked into a zonal level EWS yet, coordinated by the RRB. There also exists under-utilised potential for EW at zonal and at woreda levels: for example, the MOE could also play a role by providing information about levels of school attendance.

The experience of the ZDPPC in Woldia with its recent crop assessment, and the experience of the Kobo WDPPC represent a positive departure from earlier procedures. They have started to build collaboration between line ministries, especially in information collection and exchange. This begins to show the potential for decentralised EW in the future, although there are many ways in which the EWS can, and should, be strengthened.

#### 7.3.3. Current Status of Early Warning in Region 5

##### Recent disaster experience

There are two main 'disasters' which threaten region 5: drought, which is the most common, and floods. To these two 'natural disasters', a third could be added: population displacement, which may be caused by drought or

flooding, but is more likely to be attributed to man-made causes like civil strife and insecurity. In the last two years, parts of region 5 have experienced all three. There was severe drought in 1991/92; in the first rainy season of 1993 there were exceptionally heavy rains which caused serious flooding in many locations; and throughout, there has been large-scale population displacement as returnees have crossed into the Ogaden from Somalia and from Kenya, and there has been internal displacement caused by drought.

As a result, the relief spotlight has been focussed on region 5 since 1991. Large-scale relief operations have been launched, with deliveries to the Ogaden of up to 5000t of relief food per month. NGOs and international aid agencies have been active in the area. Monitoring and assessment have been stepped up. This particular experience in region 5, because of the the recent crisis, means that its current capacity and experience in disaster management may be different from other lowland pastoralist areas in Ethiopia. However, the underlying institutional capacity is extremely weak, and there are few formal systems for managing disasters which have been set up with a long term perspective.

The capacity for carrying out EW, and the current coverage of EW monitoring is extremely weak, and incomparable with the EW capacity and performance in region 3. The main sources of EW (and monitoring) data are the following:

- 1) EWPS's pastoralist assessment;
- 2) Ad hoc monitoring visits by the Emergency Prevention and Preparedness Group in Ethiopia (EPPG);
- 3) One-off assessments by a Task Force or Committee, set up specially to deal with the current crisis, usually based in Gode;
- 4) Regular, but very patchy, monitoring and reporting by line ministries.

Indeed, there is very little genuine early warning. Often assessments are carried out once the disaster has hit. There is very little regular monitoring on a monthly basis, and geographical coverage is extremely patchy: in large parts of the region there is simply no data collection at all.

#### EW by the RRC: Pastoralist assessment

The most regular and formalised EW component is the EWPS's pastoralist assessment. Yet this takes place only twice a year, and there is no monitoring of food security conditions on a monthly basis in the interim. The assessment covers a wide range of indicators, almost all of which are measured qualitatively. For example, rainfall, water and pasture availability, livestock and crop conditions, unusual migrations, market data and other food supply indicators are all included. There are a number of general references to coping mechanisms in the questionnaire, but apart from market data and unusual migratory patterns there are no specific indicators of local coping strategies. This pastoralist assessment provides an overview of conditions in region 5, and has served as an important source of data in the absence of any other more regular or localised EW information. However, there is tremendous scope for improving EW monitoring in pastoralist areas in the future.



Since regionalisation, the EWPS has continued to carry out the twice-yearly pastoralist assessment. But the team from Addis has faced much greater difficulties in accessing the data within the region. For example, during the most recent assessment, they were dealing with new staff in the line ministries who were not familiar with this kind of EW exercise. There was not yet a firm working relationship between the administration and technical departments which hindered the progress of the assessment team. At the same time, there was a parliamentary conference in session in Gode, attended by all zonal administrations. This meant that the team was unable to carry out its work at sub-regional level. Although the latter problem was related to the transitional period of establishing local government in Region 5 (a process which is still incomplete and unstable), the former problems reveal the inexperience of some heads of regional bureaus with respect to EW and disaster management.

The RRC staff who are based in Region 5 have never been charged with responsibility for EW data collection. They are principally involved in relief distribution, and the RRC organisation in Region 5 is currently in a state of chaos (see section 4 above). Yet the RRC staff is huge. In Kebre-Dehar zone alone there are over 30 RRC staff. At least the zonal representative or assistant representative should be able to carry out some simple, yet regular monitoring, for example of market prices. There is under-utilised capacity in this respect.

#### Contribution of UN agencies

Some of the UN agencies associated with the relief effort have helped to fill the information vacuum over the last couple of years. In particular, EPPG field officers have played a very important role in carrying out one-off assessments, with their advantage of good transportation facilities and direct lines of communication to Addis. The World Food Programme (WFP) has also been able to carry out some monitoring (although mostly of relief food distribution) using its 5 field monitors - based in Kelafo, Kebre-Dehar, Deghaboor, Dollo and Bare. The closing down of EPPG at the end of 1993 could leave a serious gap in regular EW reporting from Region 5 unless urgent measures are taken to improve EW capacity within the region in the meantime.

#### Role of temporary disaster committees

For both the drought relief operation, and the more recent flood disaster, a Task Force and Emergency Committee have been set up in each respective case, in Gode. These have both been action-oriented, with an operational focus to deliver relief to those in need. Both committee structures comprised members of line ministries, representatives of NGOs and UN agencies, and were chaired by the regional administration. For example, the flood Emergency Committee included members from RRC, MSF(B), EPPG, WFP, Southern Ethiopian Rangelands Project (SERP), Ministry of Health (MOH), MOA, Ogaden Welfare Society, and was chaired by regional administration.

In the absence of an RDPPC, or any other similar body which meets on a regular basis, the Task Force and Emergency Committee have both provided an important forum for the exchange of information and some decision-making. To a very limited extent they have served an EW function, although in both

cases the disaster had already taken its toll before preventative action was launched.

The significance of these two temporary institutional structures is that they offer the basis for formalising a permanent RDPPC<sup>1</sup> where EW information can be discussed and exchanged; they have also served to bring together government officials and international aid agency representatives, who have collaborated and pooled resources to carry out one-off needs assessments. This happened in the case of flood damage in Denan earlier this year which resulted in a regional decision to provide relief to flood victims. Likewise, occasional joint assessments were launched during 1992, for example to investigate reports of epidemics, or to monitor conditions in different parts of the region (EPPG, 1992/93).

In the current climate of political change in Gode, no such committee structure exists at the moment. But the potential, and to some extent the experience, is there to establish a permanent RDPPC. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that the NGOs and UN agencies are by far the strongest partners in these committees, and they have usually been providing most of the resources necessary to carry out the assessments. Also, in other lowland regions which are predominantly pastoralist, with poor infrastructure and limited institutional capacity, they have not had the same experience as Ogaden over the last year, in terms of establishing a disaster committee and carrying out collaborative assessment exercises.

At zonal level in Region 5 there has been no such committee structure for dealing with disaster, and inter-sectoral collaboration has been much weaker.

#### Regular monitoring by line ministries

##### 1) Health and nutrition:

MOH is one of the few line ministries which has the bare bones of an information/reporting system. Health clinics are supposed to complete monthly reporting forms, which includes clinical reporting of disease and illness. In the absence of a zonal health bureau, these reports are forwarded to the hospitals. The two health clinics visited in Shelabo and Debreweyn were apparently fulfilling this monthly reporting requirement, sending their completed forms to the hospital in the zonal headquarters of Kebre-Dehar. In the event of an epidemic breaking out, the health clinic staff will send a message to the hospital requesting drugs and assistance, by the quickest possible route. In theory, there is a health reporting system. In practice, there are some very major constraints:

- (i) There are very few health clinics in Region 5. For example, in Kebre-Dehar zone, which is relatively better served, there are only 3 health clinics for ....\*\* woredas: in Shelabo, Debreweyn and Sheckosh. In Shelabo, it was also reported that there used to be community health workers in some rural areas, who could have fulfilled some kind of health monitoring function, but this system is no longer working because there is no budget to support them.

<sup>1</sup> During the consultants' visit, the regional administration was totally unaware of the NDPPS, and the proposed institutional structures for decentralising disaster management, like the RDPPC and ZDPPC.



(ii) There is no zonal health bureau in Kebre-Dihar to carry out an analysis of the health data, and very limited capacity to analyse, or even store the data, in Gode (staff\*\*). Currently, in Kebre Dehar zone, the hospital responds to reported outbreaks of disease in an ad hoc way, depending on the drugs available at the time. There is little real preparedness.

(iii) Transport and communication constraints mean that it can take days, or even weeks, for reporting forms to reach Gode. The Kebre Dehar hospital reported that it takes about 10 days for information from the clinics to reach them. Reporting from some health clinics is very haphazard.

The MOH does have plans to improve and upgrade its reporting system. It has recently had a proposal approved by World Health Organisation (WHO) to carry out training of 27 staff in health statistics in the region, costing approximately Birr 50,000. This is an important first step, but the limited coverage of MOH clinics, and the very difficult communications will continue seriously to hamper the reporting system.

MOH has no capacity to carry out nutritional surveillance. The only regular nutritional surveillance being carried out over the last couple of years has been done by NGOs in camps of displaced and returnees (for example, by MSF[B] and MSF[H]). SCF(UK) also carried out one-off nutritional surveillance as part of their helicopter survey in 1991 (Holt and Lawrence, 1991\*\*). MOH has initiated discussions with the ENI to carry out a baseline nutritional assessment in Region 5, for which donor funds will be sought. If this is implemented, this could provide very important baseline data for future EW.

## 2. Livestock indicators

SERP is doing some regular monitoring of livestock conditions, particularly on livestock disease. They also do some monitoring of range conditions and water availability. Their method of data collection is through DAs at woreda level, or through zonal officers going into the field from their zonal headquarters<sup>2</sup>.

The DAs operate in close consultation with local community elders. This was explained in Shelabo woreda by the SERP livestock DA. Each tulo is asked to select two elders who are responsible for reporting outbreaks of livestock disease to the DA. This system of reporting is somewhat ad hoc, but it does ensure that the DA (who has no means of transport) is kept informed. Monthly reports are sent to the zonal office in Kebre Dehar.

SERP, as a donor funded project, is relatively better resourced than the line ministries, especially in terms of vehicles and mobility. But the reporting system still faces a number of constraints:

(i) SERP coverage is limited. In Kebre Dehar zone, only three out of ....\*\* woredas are covered: Shelabo, Debreweyn and Warder.

(ii) As with MOH, it can take many days for information to be passed from woreda to zonal or regional offices.

<sup>2</sup> It should be noted that the location of SERP offices does not, however, match the new administrative boundaries.

(iii) Staff in the zonal office of SERP in Kebre Dehar spend little time in the field, partly because of security problems, and they are also restricted by language as few of them speak Somali.

### 3. Market indicators

There is some limited monitoring of markets in Region 5 by different institutions. SERP has a marketing section which is supposed to monitor livestock and grain prices on a weekly basis in four markets: Gode, Kebre-Dehar, Kelafo and Warder. Within some zones like Kebre-Dehar, the zonal officers are also supposed to be monitoring some woreda markets. In practice, market monitoring has been erratic, sometimes because of transport constraints. RRC's office in Gode reported that it tries to monitor prices in four to five different markets, although this is also very erratic, and the data does not reach EWPS in Addis Ababa. (The EWPS market monitoring system only covers Dire Dawa and Jijiga in Region 5. There is no regular monitoring of markets in any pastoralist areas).

Weekly recording of market prices by officials who are based in selected market centres should be one of the easiest EW indicators to monitor. In pastoralist areas, livestock/ cereals terms of trade is a very important indicator, but it is not currently being monitored on a regular basis.

### 4. Rainfall monitoring

There is no (check\*) system for measuring rainfall in the Gode or Kebre-Dehar areas, despite the fact that drought is the most serious threat to the region.

Add Ministry of Education\*\*

### Examples of local people raising the alarm

In the absence of regular EW monitoring by the line ministries in Region 5, there are a number of examples of how local people have raised the alarm and have requested assistance when an emergency or disaster has occurred. MOH staff at all levels, from the clinics to the hospitals, frequently hear about epidemics when local people come into their offices to request assistance. The MOH staff do not have transport facilities to travel out of the centres where they are based. If a disease problem is reported at clinic level in Kebre-Dehar zone, the health assistant will usually send a message to the hospital requesting assistance so that a rapid assessment of the situation can be carried out, and drugs provided. (The Kebre-Dehar hospital has only one functioning vehicle).

This happened in July 1993 in Shelabo woreda where there was an outbreak of measles and malaria. The message was sent to Kebre-Dehar hospital, and the doctors visited the woreda to treat the problem. In Kebre Dehar, which is relatively better served than many other zones in Region 5 with one of the best hospitals in the region, it can take about a week to 10 days for an urgent message to be transmitted to the hospital and for assistance to reach the woreda. As many of the MOH staff are highlanders, and do not speak Somali, this can hinder awareness of conditions outside the settlement where the clinic is located, and hence information flow.

The SERP office in Gode also reports that it receives information and requests for assistance from local community members, for example when there is an outbreak of livestock disease.



In section 5 above, community mechanisms for EW and for discussing emergencies amongst the elders are described. Of course there are very strong community information systems which can be tapped. But one of the critical problems is distance and communication. The recent flood disaster illustrates this point very well. The floods destroyed homes, killed livestock whilst some people perished as well. In one case, it took 25 days for the local people to send a message to Gode requesting assistance, from Keri Jokot in Nogob. In another case in Denan zone, it took 15 days for the elders to reach Gode and to request assistance. This can hardly be described as early warning. In the flood disaster, eventually a Ministry of Defence helicopter was used for assessment and assistance, being the most appropriate means of transport in the circumstances.

#### Overall assessment of EW in Region 5

It can be concluded that there is no real early warning capacity in region 5. In the absence of any form of regional EWS, the RRC's twice-yearly pastoralist assessment is a valuable, albeit limited, source of information. And one-off assessments which have been carried out since the drought and emergency in Ogaden were brought to the attention of government and donor agencies in 1991, have played an important role. The danger is that the capacity to carry out such rapid assessments could quickly disappear as relief agencies begin to withdraw.

MOH and SERP are trying to do some regular monitoring, not specifically for EW, although the indicators they monitor are relevant. But both institutions are facing enormous constraints, even the better-resourced project of SERP. Transport and communication difficulties in the vast territory of Region 5 is the number one problem. Limited geographical coverage is the second.

Any capacity that does exist to analyse and pull together information which is relevant to EW is located in the regional capital of Gode. It is here that attempts to build up EW should be concentrated. But this capacity is currently very dependent on NGOs and UN agencies, although line ministry staff have gained some valuable experience during the recent crises. The priority must be to strengthen the regional bureaux to transfer EW capacity to them. Because of the very weak institutional base in Gode, this is a huge challenge.

In the meantime, the burden for 'early' warning falls on local communities. They have to send their own representatives to inform the authorities of a crisis and to mobilise resources. Recent experience has shown how long this process can take.

#### 7.4. PROPOSED STRATEGY FOR DECENTRALISING THE EWS

##### 7.4.1. Underlying principles

A start has been made to decentralising the RRC's EWPS, mainly through the appointment of regional, and in some cases zonal, EW staff. However, the detailed design of a more decentralised EWS is still in the process of being drawn up. Recommendations about how EW activities can be spread between the different levels of the administrative hierarchy, whilst still

maintaining linkages between them, are proposed. The strategy is based on the following underlying principles:

1) The national EWS and national EW capacity should be retained, for the following reasons:

- a) To ensure some standardisation in the design of the EWS, and in the collection and analysis of data in different zones and regions, although there should be some flexibility to ensure that the EWS is appropriate to local conditions.
- b) To provide 'quality control' on EW data emanating from the regions, by providing some kind of objective assessment.
- c) To make judgements on priorities between the needs of different regions in the case of a disaster, and to allocate resources at national level accordingly.
- d) When necessary, to issue appeals for relief assistance, and to make contact with international donors.

2) As far as possible, the EWS should be based on ongoing systems of monitoring and data collection within relevant line ministries, rather than setting up new or parallel systems of data collection. This requires strong collaboration between the RRC, which has overall responsibility for EW, and line ministries.

3) The basic unit for data collection should be the woreda. The key ministries for providing EW data at woreda level are likely to be MOA, MOH, and MOE. MOA is the cornerstone. EW data collection should be coordinated through the WDPPC. (Whether this can be put into practice straight away, depends on the existing institutional capacity of the line ministries at woreda level. The Region 5 scenario is very different from the Region 3 scenario in this respect - see below).

4) The RRC has, or will eventually have, EW staff at regional and zonal levels, in accordance with the Emergency Directives.

5) For an EWS to be timely and effective, the transmission of data from collectors to analysts must be as speedy as possible, and supported by a good communications network.

6) The current system of relief delivery is often too slow to reach beneficiaries before the 'hungry season' and the rains begin (Buchanan-Smith and Petty, 1992). This is partly related to the timing of decisions to respond to EW. Where possible, the EW/ relief process has to be started earlier to ensure more timely delivery of relief.

Because of the different EW experience, institutional capacity, production systems and food economies in the lowland pastoralist and highland cropping areas, two different sets of recommendations are made. The first is for the highland regions, where the food supply is 'crop-dependent' (using the EWPS's classification), and is based on the mission's findings in North Wollo zone of Region 3. The second set of recommendations is for the pastoralist areas, where the food supply system is 'livestock-dependent', and is based on the mission's findings in Region 5 - especially in Gode and in Kebre-Dehar zone.



#### 7.4.2. EW in 'crop-dependent' highland regions

These recommendations are based on the assumption that there already exists some EW activities at regional and zonal levels, that the RRC has a presence at least at regional level, and that line ministries are represented to woreda level and have some kind of regular reporting systems in place.

##### Information collection

As stated above, data collection will be carried out by line ministries at woreda level. They will be required to fill in EW questionnaires on a monthly basis, mainly using data they are already collecting through their field-based staff. MOA will be the main source of EW information, and has the most extensive network of field-based DAs. The WDPPC will be the forum for information exchange between line ministries within the woreda.

##### Information channels, and data analysis

There are three possible options:

- (i) There are two information flows from woreda level: the first is direct to EWPS in Addis Ababa, and the second is to zonal and eventually regional EW staff.
- (ii) Information flows from woreda level to zonal, to regional and eventually to national level. The information is collated and forwarded by each level in the hierarchy.
- (iii) Information flows from woreda to zonal level, where it is collated and passed on to both regional EW staff and to the EWPS in Addis Ababa simultaneously.

The first option is rejected as being unmanageable: EWPS in Addis would receive information from more than 600 woredas, which presents a huge task of analysis, and it would be very difficult to chase up at woreda level if the information does not come through.

The second option is rejected as being too slow. In many of the most drought-prone regions of Ethiopia communications are very poor, and it could easily take a week or more for information to be transmitted from one level to another.

Therefore, the third option is the preferred one. Information will be passed from woreda to zonal level, where it will be collated and some preliminary analysis will take place. From there, it will be forwarded to regional level, but also direct to EWPS in Addis Ababa, probably with selected data rather than the full range of data available. The EWS at regional level will carry out a full analysis of all the data it receives, and will publish a quarterly (or monthly?\*\*) bulletin. This will be much more detailed than the EW reports at national level. The EWPS reports will be similar to their current system, and they will continue to produce a monthly bulletin. This will give the overall picture, and can draw comparisons between different regions.

#### One-off EW assessments

At regional and zonal? levels, capacity to carry out one-off nutritional assessments and disaster assessments should be built up. Thus, if an emergency is signalled, these teams could be mobilised swiftly to carry out a rapid assessment which provides supplementary EW data. Where relevant, NGOs which are involved in EW activities could be included in these teams.

Thus, the capacity to carry out nutritional assessments and disaster area assessments which currently exists in the EWPS in Addis, would gradually be transferred to the regions. The capacity should not be entirely run down at national level, but as the regional capacity increases, there should be less demands on the national teams.

#### Annual crop assessments

The annual crop assessment would continue to be the key EW activity on which forecasts about the food situation in the coming year are made, and on which recommendations for relief are based. However, the coverage of the assessment should be broadened to look at other determinants of food security as well as crop production. It should also be carried out in two stages (based on the North Wollo experience of 1993).

The first stage would be a preliminary assessment carried out by the zone, in late August/early September. This would be a joint exercise by all relevant line ministries: MOA, MOH, MOE and RRC. They would produce a joint report which would come up with an initial assessment of food security prospects for the coming year, to be cleared through the regional administration. Thus, if a problem is signalled this early, there is plenty of time to start the process of mobilising relief resources and other activities like employment generation schemes.

The second stage would be the final crop assessment, which is a well-established part of current EW procedures. It would continue to be coordinated at national level but would use regional and zonal staff. It would be carried out in about November, and would come up with the final assessment of food security prospects and, if necessary, relief needs. As with the preliminary crop assessment, the scope could be broadened to include other determinants of food security as well as crop production.

#### Other indicators (and who should collect data)

\*To be added...

- rainfall monitoring
- market monitoring
- crop performance
- other socio-economic indicators and coping strategies
- nutritional surveillance
- etc...

7.4.3. Recommendations for putting the decentralised EWS in place, in 'crop-dependent' highland regions

a) Training Requirements

1) Training of EW staff

There is an urgent need for training of EW staff at regional and zonal levels. Short 2-3 day training courses have been run by the RRC for some EW regional representatives within the RRBs. More intensive training courses are now required, to cover:

- a) conceptual issues related to EW, particularly on EW indicators;
- b) training on data collection methodologies;
- c) training in data analysis and report preparation.

Such training courses should be coordinated, and as far as possible, implemented by the EWPS of the RRC. Officials from line ministries who are, or will be, providing information to the EWS should also be part of such training courses, particularly MOA staff. Although most training should be carried out in the regions, there may be a need for some staff to attend longer training courses in food security overseas.

Once the regional and zonal EW staff have been trained, it will be their responsibility to train woreda level staff in data collection and analysis.

Combined with the regional training courses (or as follow-up), EW staff should be trained in rapid rural appraisal/ participatory rural appraisal (RRA/PRA) techniques. Such exercises should be run to identify appropriate EW indicators for different localities, which can be added to the basic design of the EWS. In particular, RRA/PRA should be used to identify local coping strategies which can be monitored as part of the EWS.

2) Training in crop assessments

There is a need to train MOA staff at zonal level in crop assessment techniques, if they are to take responsibility for the preliminary crop assessment. NMSA staff from their agro-meteorological department should also be included in such a training exercise. Discussions are currently underway for CSA training of MOA staff in crop assessment techniques. This may be the best way forward for such a training programme.

3) Specialist training

Capacity needs to be built up at regional (and zonal?\*) levels in nutritional surveillance and disaster assessment. Training of the nutritional assessment and disaster assessment teams at regional level is required.

For each of these training programmes, the most drought-prone regions must be given first priority. Where NGOs are active in the field of EW and have experience in particular regions, they may be able to contribute to the training programmes proposed above, either in an advisory, or in an operational capacity.



#### b) Resource Requirements

##### Regional RRB: requirements for EW section

- Micro-computer for data analysis and word processor for report preparation
- Photocopier
- Fax machine
- (Radio for contact with remote zones and woredas?\*)
- Vehicle

##### Zonal RRB: requirements for EW section

- Photocopier
- Radio for contact with remote woredas
- Vehicle

##### Woreda level: MOA/WDPPC

- Radio, if there is no functioning telephone system.

##### Meteorological equipment

- Meteorological stations (details to be added\*)

#### 7.4.4. EW in 'livestock-dependent' lowland regions

The following recommendations are based on the assumption that there is no, or very limited, EW capacity within government institutions in the regions and zones which are 'livestock-dependent', ie. predominantly pastoralist.

##### Overall approach

Although the basic principle is to use the woreda as the unit of data collection, in regions like Region 5 there is currently inadequate representation of line ministry staff at woreda level for this to be feasible. Where there are staff at woreda level from MOA (or SERP in the case of Region 5), MOH or MOE, they should be charged with data collection which is relevant for EW. Until this manpower capacity is properly established, EW may have to focus on regional and zonal levels, but still drawing on the manpower and existing reporting systems of the line ministries.

As soon as possible the RRC should appoint EW staff within the RRB, at regional and zonal levels. These staff should be charged with responsibility for setting up a regional EWS.

##### Design of the EWS

Initially, the regional EWS should draw upon the experience of the RRC's pastoralist assessment to identify appropriate indicators to monitor. However, there is great scope for refining and improving the basic framework of the twice yearly pastoralist assessment.

It is recommended that some RRA/PRA exercises be carried out to identify the most appropriate indicators which can be monitored on a monthly basis. In addition, there may be a need for some in-depth studies on livelihood strategies and coping mechanisms to inform the design of the EWS.

Meanwhile, it is recommended that the RRC's twice yearly pastoralist assessment should continue until a regional EWS is in place, at which time the necessity of carrying out an assessment from Addis should be reviewed.



The data should be analysed at regional level, and written up in a quarterly bulletin. In times of an emergency or crisis, the production of EW reports could be stepped up to monthly bulletins.

In order to maintain contact with the EWPS in Addis Ababa, it is recommended that a telephone questionnaire be used on a monthly basis.

A programme for setting up a regional EWS in all lowland pastoralist areas simultaneously should be implemented. It is recommended that the RRB EW staff from the different regions should meet on a quarterly basis to exchange experiences, to encourage as much standardisation as possible between different pastoralist areas.

#### Indicators

\*To be added....

- Rainfall
  - Market prices, including terms of trade
  - Diet
  - Population movements and migratory patterns
  - Other socio-economic indicators and coping strategies
  - Health and nutrition indicators
- etc...

#### 7.4.5. Recommendations for putting the decentralised EWS in place, in 'livestock-dependent' lowland regions

##### **a) Technical Assistance and Training Requirements**

In view of the very limited, or nonexistent, EW capacity within pastoralist regions, it is recommended that technical assistance be provided, initially for 2 years, to the regional RRB. The technical assistance should also work closely with EW staff at zonal level.

The aims of the technical assistance would be the following:

- (i) to provide on-the-job training to regional and zonal RRB EW staff;
- (ii) to help design an appropriate EWS for pastoralist and agro-pastoralist areas;
- (iii) to coordinate a training programme for line ministry staff in EW data collection and analysis, eg. in nutritional surveillance for MOH.

##### **b) Research and Studies**

A programme of short studies and RRA/PRA exercises should be implemented, in order to inform the design of the EWS and to ensure appropriate indicators are selected.

c) Resource Requirements

Regional RRB: requirements for EW section

- Micro-computer for data analysis and word processor for report preparation
- Photocopier
- Fax machine
- Radio for contact with zones and woredas
- Generator?\*
- Vehicle

Zonal RRB: requirements for EW section

- Photocopier
- Radio for contact with woredas
- Vehicle

Woreda level: MOA/WDPPC

- Radio

Meteorological equipment

- Meteorological stations (details to be added\*)

7.4.6. Recommendations for assistance to national EWS to support programme of decentralised early warning

- To be added....

8. FROM EARLY WARNING TO RESPONSE

To be added.....

# ABBREVIATIONS

CSA	Central Statistical Authority
DA	Development Agent
DPPC	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee
ENI	Ethiopian Nutrition Institute
EPPG	Emergency Prevention and Preparedness Group in Ethiopia (UN)
EW	early warning
EWPS	Early Warning and Planning Services (RRC)
EWS	early warning system
FFW	food-for-work
MONR	Ministry of Natural Resources
MSF(B)	Médecins Sans Frontières (Belgium)
MSF(H)	Médecins Sans Frontières (Holland)
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOH	Ministry of Health
NDPPS	National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Strategy
NDVI	Normalised Difference Vegetation Index
NGO	non governmental organisation
NMSA	National Meteorological Services Agency
NSP	Nutritional Surveillance Programme
PA	Peasants Association
PRA	participatory rural appraisal
RDPPC	Regional Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee
RRA	rapid rural appraisal
RRB	relief and rehabilitation bureau
RRC	Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
SCF (UK)	Save the Children Fund (UK)
SERP	Southern Ethiopian Rangelands Project
TGE	Transitional Government of Ethiopia
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WDPPC	Woreda Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee
WFP	World Food Programme
ZDPPC	Zonal Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee



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## 7. EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

### 7.1. INTRODUCTION

Ethiopia had a formal early warning system (EWS) long before most other African countries. It was set up in 1976, and has played a major role in famine early warning (EW) ever since. It has always been located within the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), since it took over from the 'Food and Nutrition Information System' of the Ethiopian Nutrition Institute (ENI) in the 1970s. Despite this long tradition of a formal EWS, there is room for improvement and modification. Indeed, the EWS has been subject to various reviews (for example, Holt and Cutler, 1984; FAO, 1991) and has undergone a number of changes and developments since its inception.

The EWS in Ethiopia has always been highly centralised. Therefore, the new 'Directives for Disaster Prevention and Management', to be implemented under the recently decentralised system of government, is a radical change in orientation. In many ways a more decentralised EWS offers the potential for a much improved information system. For example:

- (i) The information collectors and analysts are likely to be closer to the people and to the problems they are monitoring, and are therefore more likely to be sensitive to local needs.
- (ii) Cooperation between line ministries, which are the principal suppliers of EW information, is often easier to achieve at lower levels in the administrative hierarchy where government officials are more task-oriented.
- (iii) There is greater flexibility to design an EWS which is appropriate to local conditions.

However, there are also potential pitfalls for a more decentralised system of early warning. For example, it is likely to be more demanding of staff and resources, and the problem arises of standardisation between a number of local level EWS so that comparisons can be made and priorities set for allocating national (and international) resources.

This section aims to set out a framework for modifying the EWS to become a more decentralised, yet effective, system of early warning. It also offers some suggestions for improving the technical design of the EWS, particularly in relation to the indicators which are monitored.

### 7.2. EWS IN ETHIOPIA BEFORE REGIONALISATION

The Early Warning and Planning Services (EWPS) is one of 17 units within the RRC. Over the years it has built up a team of considerable experience and expertise, despite operating with rather limited resources and with less technical assistance than most other national EWS in countries in Africa.

Whilst data collection was based on the old administrative unit of the awraja, all data analysis, interpretation and report writing were carried out in Addis Ababa. Appeals for international relief assistance used the EWPS's information. Relief allocations were decided upon in Addis, and decisions regarding relief interventions were communicated from the centre downwards, to regional and awraja level. In brief, it was a highly

centralised system, with little contact between data collectors at awraja or regional level, and data analysts who wrote the EW reports in the capital. All the RRC's early warning staff were based in Addis Ababa. The field staff who collected the EW data mostly belonged to the Central Statistical Authority (CSA), which was contracted to carry out EW data collection at awraja level (see below).

The EWS was designed to cover two broadly defined systems of food supply upon which the population depends: an agricultural one which is crop dependent, and a pastoral one which is livestock dependent.

EW monitoring was carried out in 237 awrajas, at least in theory - security, staffing and logistics permitting. In each awraja there was supposed to be an EW committee comprising representatives from the CSA, Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), Peasants Association (PA), chaired by the awraja administrator. Information was passed through various channels to regional level, where the RRC was represented, and eventually reached the RRC in Addis Ababa. See Figure 7.1. (to be added\*). Thus, although the RRC has been responsible for collating and analysing EW information, it has been dependent on other line ministries to collect most of the data. A list of different data sources used by the EWPS is the following:

1. **Crop production forecasting and assessment.**  
Provided by CSA during the 1980s, until 1992 when CSA staff became involved in the population census. (Since then, EWPS has been dependent on MOA for crop assessment data, see below).
2. **Market monitoring.**  
This was contracted out to CSA. Market surveys were carried out in over 100 awraja-centre markets, covering the main cereals, pulses and livestock. Recently, some cash crops were added to the list in certain parts of the country.
3. **Meteorological data collection and vegetation monitoring.**  
The EWPS has relied upon the National Meteorological Services Agency (NMSA), primarily for rainfall forecasts and monitoring, and also for monitoring of the Normalised Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) through satellite imagery. This information has been supplied within Addis Ababa. The NMSA also produces its own 10-day and monthly bulletins during the main rainy season, as well as 10-daily flash reports.
4. **Pastoral surveillance.**  
EWPS teams from Addis Ababa have carried out their own surveillance of the main rangeland areas, twice a year, at the end of the expected rains when forecasts can best be made. This covered approximately 6 pastoralist awrajas (FAO, 1991).
5. **Nutritional surveillance.**  
The EWPS has had its own Nutrition Unit to carry out nutritional surveillance on an ad hoc basis in selected vulnerable areas. Because of limited resources, EWPS has been particularly reliant on non governmental organisations (NGOs) to provide nutritional surveillance data, for example Save the Children Fund(UK)'s Nutritional Surveillance Programme (NSP).



#### 6. Disaster Area Assessments

For areas where acute problems have been signalled, the EWPS has sent out its own Disaster Area Assessment Team from Addis, on an ad hoc basis, to carry out special surveys.

The RRC has been producing a range of different publications for EW. It has been credited with a relatively good record for the timely publication of its reports (FAO, 1991). These publications are as follows:

- (i) 'Food Supply Prospect', published in October/November.
- (ii) 'Synoptic Food Supply', for the meher and belg seasons, published in January/February, and in August, respectively.
- (iii) 'Food Supply Situation of the Pastoral Population', usually published twice per year.
- (iv) 'Monthly Bulletins'
- (v) 'Special Flash Reports', on particular serious and localised problems.
- (vi) 'Relief Plan of Operation', published in March/April.

The EWS's main output each year has been an annual estimate of the numbers of people in need of relief assistance, and total relief requirements. This is a very difficult calculation to make, and has been based on a fairly crude methodology. Despite a now well-established system for carrying out annual relief assessments, for making international appeals, for the pledging and delivery of relief food, there are still long time-lags between early warnings being issued and relief assistance finally reaching beneficiaries (Buchanan-Smith and Petty, 1992). The greatest failure of early warning to trigger response was in the mid 1980s, resulting in one of the worst famines in Africa this century. All future attempts to modify the early warning and response system in Ethiopia must do everything possible to ensure that this tragedy is never repeated.

Suggestions for strengthening the EWPS, before regionalisation was introduced, have included the following:

- a) Up-grading the RRC's information on coping mechanisms, through regular monthly monitoring of local people's coping strategies, at PA level (FAO, 1991: 49). This implies the inclusion of more socio-economic indicators.
- b) Up-grading the MOA's reporting system on crop conditions, while trying to minimise duplication of effort between different agencies in annual crop assessments (FAO, 1991:39,49).
- c) Expanding the use of market price data, in particular including calculations of livestock/grain terms of trade (FAO, 1991:49).

None of these recommendations have been taken up yet. Even where the EWS has been strengthened, for example by adding extra questions to existing questionnaires, the models for analysing and interpreting the data have not always been modified or updated to incorporate the new indicators (Lemma, 1993). Improved data processing, for example to computerise qualitative



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information from the pastoralist area assessments and from the disaster area assessments, has also been identified as a priority need (ibid, 1993).

### 7.3. A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT EWS: CAPACITY AND PERFORMANCE

#### 7.3.1. Overview

Although the process of regionalisation started one year ago, the process of decentralising the EWS to fit into the new structure has barely started. The RRC's EW activities are still centralised. The EWPS has remained unchanged, although it is on the brink of being reorganised as part of a restructuring exercise within the RRC (see Section 4 above). Some regional and zonal EW representatives have been appointed - see Table 7.1 (to be added\*) - but it is only the EWPS in Addis Ababa which is currently analysing EW data and regularly publishing EW bulletins.

Regionalisation has caused a number of disruptions in the way that EW information is collected at local level, as well as in the means of channelling information from the field to the centre. This has coincided with another major upheaval within the EWS: the withdrawal of all CSA staff, who really formed the backbone of data collection activities at regional and awraja levels, to carry out the population census.

As a result of both of these events, but particularly the withdrawal of CSA enumerators from EW, the EWPS started to appoint its own regional representatives over the last year, for the first time. So far, a total of 4 regional EW representatives have been appointed, covering regions 1 (Tigray), 3 (Amhara), 4 (Oromia) and the Southern regions.. Regional EW representatives have only been appointed in the highland regions where the food supply is predominantly 'crop dependent' (although region 4 does include pastoralist areas).

The EW staff are located within the regional relief and rehabilitation bureaus (RRB), and have taken over some EW responsibilities previously carried out by the CSA regional office. Some of the new regional EW representatives were redeployed from other RRC departments, like the agricultural technology department, the land use and reclamation department, the settlement administration and cooperatives development department, and the engineering and technical department. Many of the new EW staff were given short training/orientation courses of 2 to 3 days, either in Addis Ababa or in the regional centres. However, these four departments mentioned above have all since been transferred to MOA, and therefore some of the newly trained regional EW staff were lost. New ones have had to be appointed, and training provided all over again.

So far, the regional EW offices are only collecting and collating data for onward transmission to the EWPS in Addis. They are not yet doing their own data analysis - indeed, they have no facilities to do so, beyond simple calculators. They are not yet producing their own EW reports.

Eventually, the RRC plans to have EW representatives at zonal level as well (in the 4 regions mentioned above, there are already EW staff appointed at zonal level), but not down to woreda level.

The process of regionalisation and the redeployment of CSA field staff have caused a number of disruptions to the smooth running of the national EWS.

The influence of the latter event has been more significant than the former, and has had a major impact on the programme of regular monitoring of certain indicators, like market prices and crop performance. For a number of months the EWPS in Addis Ababa received almost no market data: in June 1993 it received only 18 monthly questionnaires out of an expected 150 - a reporting rate of 12%. By August 1993 the reporting rate had slightly improved, but only to 30%. Likewise, monthly reporting on crop performance has deteriorated. Only about 50% of the monthly questionnaires were returned to EWPS in August 1993 - out of an expected total of 190 questionnaires. MOA field staff are now depended upon for crop assessments and crop forecasting, but the information has not always been readily available nor readily transmitted.

There has been little change in the way that one-off nutritional surveillance, disaster area assessments, and the pastoralist area assessments have been carried out, although there are reports that teams from RRC headquarters are having greater difficulty in accessing information at regional level compared with previous experience (see section 7.3.3. below).

NMSA has continued to monitor rainfall and vegetation conditions from Addis Ababa, using satellite imagery. Their monitoring capacity at field level has been seriously impaired in some areas as a result of the war.

The following two sections provide a more detailed review of current early warning capacity and performance in the two regions selected for the assessment: Region 3, focussing on North Wollo zone, and Region 5.

### 7.3.2. Current Status of Early Warning in North Wollo Zone of Region 3

#### Introduction

North Wollo zone is one of the most drought-prone in Ethiopia, and was very seriously affected in the famine of the mid 1980s. 5 woredas within North Wollo are most prone to drought. These are mostly in the lowland areas. In some of the highland areas, hailstorm damage to crops is a greater threat than drought.

The new structure for decentralised disaster management appears to have been communicated to most levels of local government in Region 3. Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committees (DPPC) have been set up at regional, and in North Wollo, at zonal level a number of months ago. In the two woredas visited in North Wollo, they had each set up a WDPPC in the last month on the instructions of the zonal authorities, although they had received nothing in writing about the functions of the DPPC. Indeed, concern about drought during the recent meher season has given greater poignancy to the establishment of the WDPPC in Kobo woreda, and has galvanised the administration and line ministries into preventative action.

#### EW at regional level: RRB

Although the team was unable to visit Bahir Dar, it has been possible to gather some information about EW capacity. A very large regional relief and rehabilitation bureau, of almost 100 staff, has been established in Bahir Dar. An EW section has been set up, with 2 staff in post. The head of EW was redeployed from the RRC in Addis Ababa.



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As yet, they have not started producing their own EW reports; most of the data is still being forwarded to the EWPS in Addis for analysis.

#### EW at zonal level: RRB

The office of the RRB in Woldia is well-established, as the RRC was represented in a number of awrajas in this drought-prone area even before regionalisation. There is now a staff of around 60, including 6 EW personnel. Their office facilities are reasonable. In terms of staff alone, this provides the basis for building strong EW capacity, which should be well able to collate and analyse EW data.

In practice, the staff are not yet well trained in EW activities, and have only recently started to compile EW information. A monthly 'telephone questionnaire' is communicated to Bahir Dar. And monthly market and crop assessments, also using the EWPS's questionnaire, are sent directly to Addis. As mentioned above, there have been serious disruptions in the regular transmission of information to the EWPS over recent months.

#### Rainfall monitoring

There is only one meteorological station (check\*) in the whole of North Wollo. Instead, qualitative monitoring of rainfall is carried out by MOA staff at woreda level.

For one of the most drought-prone regions of Ethiopia, this is a major gap, especially as regionalisation proceeds. The results of NMSA monitoring of rainfall using satellite imagery in Addis Ababa, are not yet available to zonal level staff.

#### Crop monitoring and assessment

The MOA's crop monitoring activities at zonal and woreda levels are particularly relevant for EW.

The Development Agents (DAs) are carrying out monthly reporting of crop performance, on forms which are sent to the MOA at woreda headquarters. In turn, this information is transmitted to MOA in Woldia. If the reports indicate there is a problem, the zonal authorities will follow up with field visits. For example, during August and September '93, MOA officials from Woldia had visited Kobo woreda four times, mainly for follow-up monitoring because of growing concern about the impact of drought. This system of regular monitoring by DAs seems to work reasonably well, although geographical coverage is a problem. In both Kobo and Wadla Downt woredas, there are unfilled DA positions, especially in Wadla Downt which is a newly created woreda with many staff vacancies (details\*\*).

Furthermore, the zonal authorities had taken their own initiative to carry out an early assessment, during August of this year, of agricultural and food conditions in North Wollo in response to the drought. All line ministries were mobilised (see below), and the MOA carried out its own preliminary crop assessment. The data is being analysed in Woldia, and should provide a provisional estimate of crop production per woreda. The methodology used is subjective in terms of estimating area under



cultivation. Farmers' own estimates of yield are fed into the calculations. This is the second time that the MOA at zonal level has carried out its own early crop assessment. The methodology has improved this year over a very simplified approach used in 1992. However, the MOA officials are keen to receive guidance and training in crop assessment methodologies. For the most recent assessment they relied upon an FAO manual for lack of any other advice.

This crop assessment will probably feed into an initial estimate of numbers of people in need, which will be made by the RRB staff at zonal level in association with the zonal administration. (This was the procedure followed during 1992). It is unlikely that this initial figure will be used by the EWPS at national level. An official national crop assessment will succeed the zone's assessment, in October/November. In 1992, differing figures between the two assessments led to some negotiation between the zone and the centre. Eventually the zonal figure (of 350,000\*\*) prevailed (check\*\*) over the EWPS's lower assessment of 180,000.

#### Livestock monitoring

Reporting on livestock within MOA is more limited, and most relevant to the highland woredas. Indicators which are monitored include the condition of animals (based on observation), water availability and availability of fodder and grazing. In the lowland woreda of Kobo, only livestock market prices are monitored on a regular basis.

#### Market monitoring

The RRC staff are currently monitoring 3 markets in North Wollo: Woldia, Kobo and Lalibela. Meanwhile, the MOA is monitoring a much larger number of markets. For example, in each of the two woredas of Kobo and Wadla Downt, the MOA has one member of staff monitoring 3 and 2 markets respectively, on a weekly basis. Crop and livestock prices are recorded, and in Kobo, the price of oil crops as well. The market data is sent to MOA in Woldia each month.

Thus, it appears that there are unused market data available, which could potentially be extremely useful for EW monitoring in the zone. Even if EWPS in Addis continues to monitor only 3 of the principal markets in North Wollo, the zonal and regional EWS could greatly benefit from wider market coverage as an indicator of food security conditions.

#### Health and nutrition

MOH has its own regular system of health reporting, from clinic to woreda to zonal level. As with MOA, geographical coverage is somewhat limited. Kobo woreda has 3 clinics for 40 PAs. Wadla Downt has 4 clinics for 59 PAs. The reporting system for the latter woreda is not yet in line with the new regionalisation process; the MOH officials are still reporting to Meket, the old awraja headquarters. Unlike Region 5 (see below), there are community health workers operating in North Wollo in other PAs beyond those served by clinics.

The EWS is making use of some MOH data, on an ad hoc basis. There is scope for making much greater use of this data in a more systematic way in the future.

Nutritional surveillance for EW in North Wollo is entirely the domain of SCF(UK). MOH does have the capability to carry out nutritional surveillance, as it recently carried out nutritional assessments funded by UNICEF. This capability should be built upon in the future, for one-off assessments in times of food crisis.

#### School attendance

School attendance has never been used as an indicator of drought by the RRC's EWS. However, Ministry of Education (MOE) staff report that reduced school attendance is an early indicator of drought stress, when parents can no longer afford school fees. Indeed, at zonal and woreda levels there is much closer contact between MOE and other line ministries involved in EW data collection than at national level in Addis Ababa.

School attendance is a potentially useful and important indicator, which could be incorporated into a decentralised EWS in the future.

#### Coping strategies and other socio-economic indicators

There is no monitoring of indicators other than agricultural, market and health. For example, no line ministry is looking at on-farm storage, nor off-farm sources of income. Local people's coping strategies are not yet incorporated into regular monitoring procedures. Yet, in a food deficit area these are very important indicators to assess food insecurity, and for early warning.

#### The process of information collection, and collaboration between line ministries

The DPPC at zonal, and in the case of Kobo, at woreda level, seems to have provided a forum for greater collaboration between line ministries who are collecting EW information as part of their regular reporting procedures. In Woldia, for example, the ZDPPC took the decision that some kind of early drought assessment should be carried out by the line ministries in August this year. A technical committee was formed, which included MOA, MOH, RRC, Ministry of Natural Resources (MONR), and MOE. They worked together to devise an approach to this assessment. Ultimately, the fieldwork and writing up has been done separately, ministry by ministry. There is clearly room for much greater collaboration in the assessment and analysis stages. However, the results will be discussed by all line ministries together with the zonal administration in the ZDPPC. This kind of collaboration and zonal initiative is very positive, and should be built upon.

The recent experience of the newly established WDPPC in Kobo is also encouraging. Set up in August '93, it has focussed immediately on the current drought which is affecting parts of the woreda. Thus, in the WDPPC's second meeting, MOA, MOH, MOE, Ministry of Finance and the woreda administration took the opportunity to exchange information about the severity of the drought. In the third meeting which was scheduled for the end of September, the respective ministries had been requested to come up



with proposals for mitigating the impact of drought. The MONR had a proposal for a food-for-work (FFW) project in one drought affected area; MOA had plans for seed distribution. This illustrates the potential for much greater collaboration between departments than occurred in the past. Previously, each ministry had its own committee, on which other line ministries might sit, but with more limited tradition of information exchange and joint problem-solving.

#### Constraints to EW

1) Many parts of North Wollo are inaccessible by road. Limited communications and transport facilities are the biggest constraint to effective EW. For example, MOA reports that it takes approximately one week for woreda reports to reach them at zonal level, and two to three weeks for more distant woredas. From Woldia to Bahir Dar, the transmission of reports usually takes less than a week. The postal system is relied upon in most cases. For early warning data, this speed of transmission is slow. There is an urgent need for more rapid means of communication. In Kobo woreda, there is an additional communications hazard. One road, which gives access to approximately 7 PAs, has been mined and is regarded as unsafe, except on foot.

2) Geographical coverage is limited. MOH and MOA have the most extensive network of officers, but still do not cover all PAs. This is particularly problematic in Wadla Downt, a new woreda where there are only 27 DAs in an area that used to have 67 (check\*\*).

#### Overall assessment of EW in North Wollo zone

Although EW is in the early stages of being decentralised to regional or zonal levels within Region 3, a reasonable framework is in place in North Wollo which can be built upon to strengthen decentralised EW in the future. It is not dependent on donor or NGO agencies, (unlike Region 5 - see below), but on line ministries at zonal and woreda levels. The MOA is the corner-stone, and is already collecting a lot of information which is relevant to EW in its routine reporting activities. MOH is also collecting relevant data. But neither of these are well linked into a zonal level EWS yet, coordinated by the RRB. There also exists under-utilised potential for EW at zonal and at woreda levels: for example, the MOE could also play a role by providing information about levels of school attendance.

The experience of the ZDPPC in Woldia with its recent crop assessment, and the experience of the Kobo WDPPC represent a positive departure from earlier procedures. They have started to build collaboration between line ministries, especially in information collection and exchange. This begins to show the potential for decentralised EW in the future, although there are many ways in which the EWS can, and should, be strengthened.

#### 7.3.3. Current Status of Early Warning in Region 5

##### Recent disaster experience

There are two main 'disasters' which threaten region 5: drought, which is the most common, and floods. To these two 'natural disasters', a third could be added: population displacement, which may be caused by drought or



flooding, but is more likely to be attributed to man-made causes like civil strife and insecurity. In the last two years, parts of region 5 have experienced all three. There was severe drought in 1991/92; in the first rainy season of 1993 there were exceptionally heavy rains which caused serious flooding in many locations; and throughout, there has been large-scale population displacement as returnees have crossed into the Ogaden from Somalia and from Kenya, and there has been internal displacement caused by drought.

As a result, the relief spotlight has been focussed on region 5 since 1991. Large-scale relief operations have been launched, with deliveries to the Ogaden of up to 5000t of relief food per month. NGOs and international aid agencies have been active in the area. Monitoring and assessment have been stepped up. This particular experience in region 5, because of the the recent crisis, means that its current capacity and experience in disaster management may be different from other lowland pastoralist areas in Ethiopia. However, the underlying institutional capacity is extremely weak, and there are few formal systems for managing disasters which have been set up with a long term perspective.

The capacity for carrying out EW, and the current coverage of EW monitoring is extremely weak, and incomparable with the EW capacity and performance in region 3. The main sources of EW (and monitoring) data are the following:

- 1) EWPS's pastoralist assessment;
- 2) Ad hoc monitoring visits by the Emergency Prevention and Preparedness Group in Ethiopia (EPPG);
- 3) One-off assessments by a Task Force or Committee, set up specially to deal with the current crisis, usually based in Gode;
- 4) Regular, but very patchy, monitoring and reporting by line ministries.

Indeed, there is very little genuine early warning. Often assessments are carried out once the disaster has hit. There is very little regular monitoring on a monthly basis, and geographical coverage is extremely patchy: in large parts of the region there is simply no data collection at all.

#### EW by the RRC: Pastoralist assessment

The most regular and formalised EW component is the EWPS's pastoralist assessment. Yet this takes place only twice a year, and there is no monitoring of food security conditions on a monthly basis in the interim. The assessment covers a wide range of indicators, almost all of which are measured qualitatively. For example, rainfall, water and pasture availability, livestock and crop conditions, unusual migrations, market data and other food supply indicators are all included. There are a number of general references to coping mechanisms in the questionnaire, but apart from market data and unusual migratory patterns there are no specific indicators of local coping strategies. This pastoralist assessment provides an overview of conditions in region 5, and has served as an important source of data in the absence of any other more regular or localised EW information. However, there is tremendous scope for improving EW monitoring in pastoralist areas in the future.

Since regionalisation, the EWPS has continued to carry out the twice-yearly pastoralist assessment. But the team from Addis has faced much greater difficulties in accessing the data within the region. For example, during the most recent assessment, they were dealing with new staff in the line ministries who were not familiar with this kind of EW exercise. There was not yet a firm working relationship between the administration and technical departments which hindered the progress of the assessment team. At the same time, there was a parliamentary conference in session in Gode, attended by all zonal administrations. This meant that the team was unable to carry out its work at sub-regional level. Although the latter problem was related to the transitional period of establishing local government in Region 5 (a process which is still incomplete and unstable), the former problems reveal the inexperience of some heads of regional bureaus with respect to EW and disaster management.

The RRC staff who are based in Region 5 have never been charged with responsibility for EW data collection. They are principally involved in relief distribution, and the RRC organisation in Region 5 is currently in a state of chaos (see section 4 above). Yet the RRC staff is huge. In Kebre-Dehar zone alone there are over 30 RRC staff. At least the zonal representative or assistant representative should be able to carry out some simple, yet regular monitoring, for example of market prices. There is under-utilised capacity in this respect.

#### Contribution of UN agencies

Some of the UN agencies associated with the relief effort have helped to fill the information vacuum over the last couple of years. In particular, EPPG field officers have played a very important role in carrying out one-off assessments, with their advantage of good transportation facilities and direct lines of communication to Addis. The World Food Programme (WFP) has also been able to carry out some monitoring (although mostly of relief food distribution) using its 5 field monitors - based in Kelafo, Kebre-Dehar, Deghaboor, Dollo and Bare. The closing down of EPPG at the end of 1993 could leave a serious gap in regular EW reporting from Region 5 unless urgent measures are taken to improve EW capacity within the region in the meantime.

#### Role of temporary disaster committees

For both the drought relief operation, and the more recent flood disaster, a Task Force and Emergency Committee have been set up in each respective case, in Gode. These have both been action-oriented, with an operational focus to deliver relief to those in need. Both committee structures comprised members of line ministries, representatives of NGOs and UN agencies, and were chaired by the regional administration. For example, the flood Emergency Committee included members from RRC, MSF(B), EPPG, WFP, Southern Ethiopian Rangelands Project (SERP), Ministry of Health (MOH), MOA, Ogaden Welfare Society, and was chaired by regional administration.

In the absence of an RDPPC, or any other similar body which meets on a regular basis, the Task Force and Emergency Committee have both provided an important forum for the exchange of information and some decision-making. To a very limited extent they have served an EW function, although in both



cases the disaster had already taken its toll before preventative action was launched.

The significance of these two temporary institutional structures is that they offer the basis for formalising a permanent RDPPC<sup>1</sup> where EW information can be discussed and exchanged; they have also served to bring together government officials and international aid agency representatives, who have collaborated and pooled resources to carry out one-off needs assessments. This happened in the case of flood damage in Denan earlier this year which resulted in a regional decision to provide relief to flood victims. Likewise, occasional joint assessments were launched during 1992, for example to investigate reports of epidemics, or to monitor conditions in different parts of the region (EPPG, 1992/93).

In the current climate of political change in Gode, no such committee structure exists at the moment. But the potential, and to some extent the experience, is there to establish a permanent RDPPC. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that the NGOs and UN agencies are by far the strongest partners in these committees, and they have usually been providing most of the resources necessary to carry out the assessments. Also, in other lowland regions which are predominantly pastoralist, with poor infrastructure and limited institutional capacity, they have not had the same experience as Ogaden over the last year, in terms of establishing a disaster committee and carrying out collaborative assessment exercises.

At zonal level in Region 5 there has been no such committee structure for dealing with disaster, and inter-sectoral collaboration has been much weaker.

#### Regular monitoring by line ministries

##### 1) Health and nutrition:

MOH is one of the few line ministries which has the bare bones of an information/reporting system. Health clinics are supposed to complete monthly reporting forms, which includes clinical reporting of disease and illness. In the absence of a zonal health bureau, these reports are forwarded to the hospitals. The two health clinics visited in Shelabo and Debreweyn were apparently fulfilling this monthly reporting requirement, sending their completed forms to the hospital in the zonal headquarters of Kebre-Dehar. In the event of an epidemic breaking out, the health clinic staff will send a message to the hospital requesting drugs and assistance, by the quickest possible route. In theory, there is a health reporting system. In practice, there are some very major constraints:

- (i) There are very few health clinics in Region 5. For example, in Kebre-Dehar zone, which is relatively better served, there are only 3 health clinics for ....\*\* woredas: in Shelabo, Debreweyn and Sheckosh. In Shelabo, it was also reported that there used to be community health workers in some rural areas, who could have fulfilled some kind of health monitoring function, but this system is no longer working because there is no budget to support them.

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<sup>1</sup> During the consultants' visit, the regional administration was totally unaware of the NDPPS, and the proposed institutional structures for decentralising disaster management, like the RDPPC and ZDPPC.



(ii) There is no zonal health bureau in Kebre-Dihar to carry out an analysis of the health data, and very limited capacity to analyse, or even store the data, in Gode (staff\*\*). Currently, in Kebre Dehar zone, the hospital responds to reported outbreaks of disease in an ad hoc way, depending on the drugs available at the time. There is little real preparedness.

(iii) Transport and communication constraints mean that it can take days, or even weeks, for reporting forms to reach Gode. The Kebre Dehar hospital reported that it takes about 10 days for information from the clinics to reach them. Reporting from some health clinics is very haphazard.

The MOH does have plans to improve and upgrade its reporting system. It has recently had a proposal approved by World Health Organisation (WHO) to carry out training of 27 staff in health statistics in the region, costing approximately Birr 50,000. This is an important first step, but the limited coverage of MOH clinics, and the very difficult communications will continue seriously to hamper the reporting system.

MOH has no capacity to carry out nutritional surveillance. The only regular nutritional surveillance being carried out over the last couple of years has been done by NGOs in camps of displaced and returnees (for example, by MSF[B] and MSF[H]). SCF(UK) also carried out one-off nutritional surveillance as part of their helicopter survey in 1991 (Holt and Lawrence, 1991\*\*). MOH has initiated discussions with the ENI to carry out a baseline nutritional assessment in Region 5, for which donor funds will be sought. If this is implemented, this could provide very important baseline data for future EW.

## 2. Livestock indicators

SERP is doing some regular monitoring of livestock conditions, particularly on livestock disease. They also do some monitoring of range conditions and water availability. Their method of data collection is through DAs at woreda level, or through zonal officers going into the field from their zonal headquarters<sup>2</sup>.

The DAs operate in close consultation with local community elders. This was explained in Shelabo woreda by the SERP livestock DA. Each tulo is asked to select two elders who are responsible for reporting outbreaks of livestock disease to the DA. This system of reporting is somewhat ad hoc, but it does ensure that the DA (who has no means of transport) is kept informed. Monthly reports are sent to the zonal office in Kebre Dehar.

SERP, as a donor funded project, is relatively better resourced than the line ministries, especially in terms of vehicles and mobility. But the reporting system still faces a number of constraints:

(i) SERP coverage is limited. In Kebre Dehar zone, only three out of ....\*\* woredas are covered: Shelabo, Debreweyn and Warder.

(ii) As with MOH, it can take many days for information to be passed from woreda to zonal or regional offices.

<sup>2</sup> It should be noted that the location of SERP offices does not, however, match the new administrative boundaries.

(iii) Staff in the zonal office of SERP in Kebre Dehar spend little time in the field, partly because of security problems, and they are also restricted by language as few of them speak Somali.

### 3. Market indicators

There is some limited monitoring of markets in Region 5 by different institutions. SERP has a marketing section which is supposed to monitor livestock and grain prices on a weekly basis in four markets: Gode, Kebre-Dehar, Kelafo and Warder. Within some zones like Kebre-Dehar, the zonal officers are also supposed to be monitoring some woreda markets. In practice, market monitoring has been erratic, sometimes because of transport constraints. RRC's office in Gode reported that it tries to monitor prices in four to five different markets, although this is also very erratic, and the data does not reach EWPS in Addis Ababa. (The EWPS market monitoring system only covers Dire Dawa and Jijiga in Region 5. There is no regular monitoring of markets in any pastoralist areas).

Weekly recording of market prices by officials who are based in selected market centres should be one of the easiest EW indicators to monitor. In pastoralist areas, livestock/ cereals terms of trade is a very important indicator, but it is not currently being monitored on a regular basis.

### 4. Rainfall monitoring

There is no (check\*) system for measuring rainfall in the Gode or Kebre-Dehar areas, despite the fact that drought is the most serious threat to the region.

Add Ministry of Education\*\*

### Examples of local people raising the alarm

In the absence of regular EW monitoring by the line ministries in Region 5, there are a number of examples of how local people have raised the alarm and have requested assistance when an emergency or disaster has occurred. MOH staff at all levels, from the clinics to the hospitals, frequently hear about epidemics when local people come into their offices to request assistance. The MOH staff do not have transport facilities to travel out of the centres where they are based. If a disease problem is reported at clinic level in Kebre-Dehar zone, the health assistant will usually send a message to the hospital requesting assistance so that a rapid assessment of the situation can be carried out, and drugs provided. (The Kebre-Dehar hospital has only one functioning vehicle).

This happened in July 1993 in Shelabo woreda where there was an outbreak of measles and malaria. The message was sent to Kebre-Dehar hospital, and the doctors visited the woreda to treat the problem. In Kebre Dehar, which is relatively better served than many other zones in Region 5 with one of the best hospitals in the region, it can take about a week to 10 days for an urgent message to be transmitted to the hospital and for assistance to reach the woreda. As many of the MOH staff are highlanders, and do not speak Somali, this can hinder awareness of conditions outside the settlement where the clinic is located, and hence information flow.

The SERP office in Gode also reports that it receives information and requests for assistance from local community members, for example when there is an outbreak of livestock disease.



In section 5 above, community mechanisms for EW and for discussing emergencies amongst the elders are described. Of course there are very strong community information systems which can be tapped. But one of the critical problems is distance and communication. The recent flood disaster illustrates this point very well. The floods destroyed homes, killed livestock whilst some people perished as well. In one case, it took 25 days for the local people to send a message to Gode requesting assistance, from Keri Jokot in Nogob. In another case in Denan zone, it took 15 days for the elders to reach Gode and to request assistance. This can hardly be described as early warning. In the flood disaster, eventually a Ministry of Defence helicopter was used for assessment and assistance, being the most appropriate means of transport in the circumstances.

#### Overall assessment of EW in Region 5

It can be concluded that there is no real early warning capacity in region 5. In the absence of any form of regional EWS, the RRC's twice-yearly pastoralist assessment is a valuable, albeit limited, source of information. And one-off assessments which have been carried out since the drought and emergency in Ogaden were brought to the attention of government and donor agencies in 1991, have played an important role. The danger is that the capacity to carry out such rapid assessments could quickly disappear as relief agencies begin to withdraw.

MOH and SERP are trying to do some regular monitoring, not specifically for EW, although the indicators they monitor are relevant. But both institutions are facing enormous constraints, even the better-resourced project of SERP. Transport and communication difficulties in the vast territory of Region 5 is the number one problem. Limited geographical coverage is the second.

Any capacity that does exist to analyse and pull together information which is relevant to EW is located in the regional capital of Gode. It is here that attempts to build up EW should be concentrated. But this capacity is currently very dependent on NGOs and UN agencies, although line ministry staff have gained some valuable experience during the recent crises. The priority must be to strengthen the regional bureaux to transfer EW capacity to them. Because of the very weak institutional base in Gode, this is a huge challenge.

In the meantime, the burden for 'early' warning falls on local communities. They have to send their own representatives to inform the authorities of a crisis and to mobilise resources. Recent experience has shown how long this process can take.

#### 7.4. PROPOSED STRATEGY FOR DECENTRALISING THE EWS

##### 7.4.1. Underlying principles

A start has been made to decentralising the RRC's EWPS, mainly through the appointment of regional, and in some cases zonal, EW staff. However, the detailed design of a more decentralised EWS is still in the process of being drawn up. Recommendations about how EW activities can be spread between the different levels of the administrative hierarchy, whilst still



maintaining linkages between them, are proposed. The strategy is based on the following underlying principles:

1) The national EWS and national EW capacity should be retained, for the following reasons:

- a) To ensure some standardisation in the design of the EWS, and in the collection and analysis of data in different zones and regions, although there should be some flexibility to ensure that the EWS is appropriate to local conditions.
- b) To provide 'quality control' on EW data emanating from the regions, by providing some kind of objective assessment.
- c) To make judgements on priorities between the needs of different regions in the case of a disaster, and to allocate resources at national level accordingly.
- d) When necessary, to issue appeals for relief assistance, and to make contact with international donors.

2) As far as possible, the EWS should be based on ongoing systems of monitoring and data collection within relevant line ministries, rather than setting up new or parallel systems of data collection. This requires strong collaboration between the RRC, which has overall responsibility for EW, and line ministries.

3) The basic unit for data collection should be the woreda. The key ministries for providing EW data at woreda level are likely to be MOA, MOH, and MOE. MOA is the cornerstone. EW data collection should be coordinated through the WDPPC. (Whether this can be put into practice straight away, depends on the existing institutional capacity of the line ministries at woreda level. The Region 5 scenario is very different from the Region 3 scenario in this respect - see below).

4) The RRC has, or will eventually have, EW staff at regional and zonal levels, in accordance with the Emergency Directives.

5) For an EWS to be timely and effective, the transmission of data from collectors to analysts must be as speedy as possible, and supported by a good communications network.

6) The current system of relief delivery is often too slow to reach beneficiaries before the 'hungry season' and the rains begin (Buchanan-Smith and Petty, 1992). This is partly related to the timing of decisions to respond to EW. Where possible, the EW/ relief process has to be started earlier to ensure more timely delivery of relief.

Because of the different EW experience, institutional capacity, production systems and food economies in the lowland pastoralist and highland cropping areas, two different sets of recommendations are made. The first is for the highland regions, where the food supply is 'crop-dependent' (using the EWPS's classification), and is based on the mission's findings in North Wollo zone of Region 3. The second set of recommendations is for the pastoralist areas, where the food supply system is 'livestock-dependent', and is based on the mission's findings in Region 5 - especially in Gode and in Kebre-Dehar zone.

#### 7.4.2. EW in 'crop-dependent' highland regions

These recommendations are based on the assumption that there already exists some EW activities at regional and zonal levels, that the RRC has a presence at least at regional level, and that line ministries are represented to woreda level and have some kind of regular reporting systems in place.

##### Information collection

As stated above, data collection will be carried out by line ministries at woreda level. They will be required to fill in EW questionnaires on a monthly basis, mainly using data they are already collecting through their field-based staff. MOA will be the main source of EW information, and has the most extensive network of field-based DAs. The WDPPC will be the forum for information exchange between line ministries within the woreda.

##### Information channels, and data analysis

There are three possible options:

- (i) There are two information flows from woreda level: the first is direct to EWPS in Addis Ababa, and the second is to zonal and eventually regional EW staff.
- (ii) Information flows from woreda level to zonal, to regional and eventually to national level. The information is collated and forwarded by each level in the hierarchy.
- (iii) Information flows from woreda to zonal level, where it is collated and passed on to both regional EW staff and to the EWPS in Addis Ababa simultaneously.

The first option is rejected as being unmanageable: EWPS in Addis would receive information from more than 600 woredas, which presents a huge task of analysis, and it would be very difficult to chase up at woreda level if the information does not come through.

The second option is rejected as being too slow. In many of the most drought-prone regions of Ethiopia communications are very poor, and it could easily take a week or more for information to be transmitted from one level to another.

Therefore, the third option is the preferred one. Information will be passed from woreda to zonal level, where it will be collated and some preliminary analysis will take place. From there, it will be forwarded to regional level, but also direct to EWPS in Addis Ababa, probably with selected data rather than the full range of data available. The EWS at regional level will carry out a full analysis of all the data it receives, and will publish a quarterly (or monthly?\*\*) bulletin. This will be much more detailed than the EW reports at national level. The EWPS reports will be similar to their current system, and they will continue to produce a monthly bulletin. This will give the overall picture, and can draw comparisons between different regions.

#### One-off EW assessments

At regional and zonal? levels, capacity to carry out one-off nutritional assessments and disaster assessments should be built up. Thus, if an emergency is signalled, these teams could be mobilised swiftly to carry out a rapid assessment which provides supplementary EW data. Where relevant, NGOs which are involved in EW activities could be included in these teams.

Thus, the capacity to carry out nutritional assessments and disaster area assessments which currently exists in the EWPS in Addis, would gradually be transferred to the regions. The capacity should not be entirely run down at national level, but as the regional capacity increases, there should be less demands on the national teams.

#### Annual crop assessments

The annual crop assessment would continue to be the key EW activity on which forecasts about the food situation in the coming year are made, and on which recommendations for relief are based. However, the coverage of the assessment should be broadened to look at other determinants of food security as well as crop production. It should also be carried out in two stages (based on the North Wollo experience of 1993).

The first stage would be a preliminary assessment carried out by the zone, in late August/early September. This would be a joint exercise by all relevant line ministries: MOA, MOH, MOE and RRC. They would produce a joint report which would come up with an initial assessment of food security prospects for the coming year, to be cleared through the regional administration. Thus, if a problem is signalled this early, there is plenty of time to start the process of mobilising relief resources and other activities like employment generation schemes.

The second stage would be the final crop assessment, which is a well-established part of current EW procedures. It would continue to be coordinated at national level but would use regional and zonal staff. It would be carried out in about November, and would come up with the final assessment of food security prospects and, if necessary, relief needs. As with the preliminary crop assessment, the scope could be broadened to include other determinants of food security as well as crop production.

#### Other indicators (and who should collect data)

\*To be added...

- rainfall monitoring
- market monitoring
- crop performance
- other socio-economic indicators and coping strategies
- nutritional surveillance
- etc...



7.4.3. Recommendations for putting the decentralised EWS in place, in 'crop-dependent' highland regions

a) Training Requirements

1) Training of EW staff

There is an urgent need for training of EW staff at regional and zonal levels. Short 2-3 day training courses have been run by the RRC for some EW regional representatives within the RRBs. More intensive training courses are now required, to cover:

- a) conceptual issues related to EW, particularly on EW indicators;
- b) training on data collection methodologies;
- c) training in data analysis and report preparation.

Such training courses should be coordinated, and as far as possible, implemented by the EWPS of the RRC. Officials from line ministries who are, or will be, providing information to the EWS should also be part of such training courses, particularly MOA staff. Although most training should be carried out in the regions, there may be a need for some staff to attend longer training courses in food security overseas.

Once the regional and zonal EW staff have been trained, it will be their responsibility to train woreda level staff in data collection and analysis.

Combined with the regional training courses (or as follow-up), EW staff should be trained in rapid rural appraisal/ participatory rural appraisal (RRA/PRA) techniques. Such exercises should be run to identify appropriate EW indicators for different localities, which can be added to the basic design of the EWS. In particular, RRA/PRA should be used to identify local coping strategies which can be monitored as part of the EWS.

2) Training in crop assessments

There is a need to train MOA staff at zonal level in crop assessment techniques, if they are to take responsibility for the preliminary crop assessment. NMSA staff from their agro-meteorological department should also be included in such a training exercise. Discussions are currently underway for CSA training of MOA staff in crop assessment techniques. This may be the best way forward for such a training programme.

3) Specialist training

Capacity needs to be built up at regional (and zonal?\*) levels in nutritional surveillance and disaster assessment. Training of the nutritional assessment and disaster assessment teams at regional level is required.

For each of these training programmes, the most drought-prone regions must be given first priority. Where NGOs are active in the field of EW and have experience in particular regions, they may be able to contribute to the training programmes proposed above, either in an advisory, or in an operational capacity.

#### b) Resource Requirements

##### Regional RRB: requirements for EW section

- Micro-computer for data analysis and word processor for report preparation
- Photocopier
- Fax machine
- (Radio for contact with remote zones and woredas?\*)
- Vehicle

##### Zonal RRB: requirements for EW section

- Photocopier
- Radio for contact with remote woredas
- Vehicle

##### Woreda level: MOA/WDPPC

- Radio, if there is no functioning telephone system.

##### Meteorological equipment

- Meteorological stations (details to be added\*)

#### 7.4.4. EW in 'livestock-dependent' lowland regions

The following recommendations are based on the assumption that there is no, or very limited, EW capacity within government institutions in the regions and zones which are 'livestock-dependent', ie. predominantly pastoralist.

##### Overall approach

Although the basic principle is to use the woreda as the unit of data collection, in regions like Region 5 there is currently inadequate representation of line ministry staff at woreda level for this to be feasible. Where there are staff at woreda level from MOA (or SERP in the case of Region 5), MOH or MOE, they should be charged with data collection which is relevant for EW. Until this manpower capacity is properly established, EW may have to focus on regional and zonal levels, but still drawing on the manpower and existing reporting systems of the line ministries.

As soon as possible the RRC should appoint EW staff within the RRB, at regional and zonal levels. These staff should be charged with responsibility for setting up a regional EWS.

##### Design of the EWS

Initially, the regional EWS should draw upon the experience of the RRC's pastoralist assessment to identify appropriate indicators to monitor. However, there is great scope for refining and improving the basic framework of the twice yearly pastoralist assessment.

It is recommended that some RRA/PRA exercises be carried out to identify the most appropriate indicators which can be monitored on a monthly basis. In addition, there may be a need for some in-depth studies on livelihood strategies and coping mechanisms to inform the design of the EWS.

Meanwhile, it is recommended that the RRC's twice yearly pastoralist assessment should continue until a regional EWS is in place, at which time the necessity of carrying out an assessment from Addis should be reviewed.

The data should be analysed at regional level, and written up in a quarterly bulletin. In times of an emergency or crisis, the production of EW reports could be stepped up to monthly bulletins.

In order to maintain contact with the EWPS in Addis Ababa, it is recommended that a telephone questionnaire be used on a monthly basis.

A programme for setting up a regional EWS in all lowland pastoralist areas simultaneously should be implemented. It is recommended that the RRB EW staff from the different regions should meet on a quarterly basis to exchange experiences, to encourage as much standardisation as possible between different pastoralist areas.

#### Indicators

\*To be added....

- Rainfall
  - Market prices, including terms of trade
  - Diet
  - Population movements and migratory patterns
  - Other socio-economic indicators and coping strategies
  - Health and nutrition indicators
- etc...

#### 7.4.5. Recommendations for putting the decentralised EWS in place, in 'livestock-dependent' lowland regions

##### **a) Technical Assistance and Training Requirements**

In view of the very limited, or nonexistent, EW capacity within pastoralist regions, it is recommended that technical assistance be provided, initially for 2 years, to the regional RRB. The technical assistance should also work closely with EW staff at zonal level.

The aims of the technical assistance would be the following:

- (i) to provide on-the-job training to regional and zonal RRB EW staff;
- (ii) to help design an appropriate EWS for pastoralist and agro-pastoralist areas;
- (iii) to coordinate a training programme for line ministry staff in EW data collection and analysis, eg. in nutritional surveillance for MOH.

##### **b) Research and Studies**

A programme of short studies and RRA/PRA exercises should be implemented, in order to inform the design of the EWS and to ensure appropriate indicators are selected.



c) Resource Requirements

Regional RRB: requirements for EW section

- Micro-computer for data analysis and word processor for report preparation
- Photocopier
- Fax machine
- Radio for contact with zones and woredas
- Generator?\*
- Vehicle

Zonal RRB: requirements for EW section

- Photocopier
- Radio for contact with woredas
- Vehicle

Woreda level: MOA/WDPPC

- Radio

Meteorological equipment

- Meteorological stations (details to be added\*)

7.4.6. Recommendations for assistance to national EWS to support programme of decentralised early warning

- To be added....

8. FROM EARLY WARNING TO RESPONSE

To be added.....

# ABBREVIATIONS

CSA	Central Statistical Authority
DA	Development Agent
DPPC	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee
ENI	Ethiopian Nutrition Institute
EPPG	Emergency Prevention and Preparedness Group in Ethiopia (UN)
EW	early warning
EWPS	Early Warning and Planning Services (RRC)
EWS	early warning system
FFW	food-for-work
MONR	Ministry of Natural Resources
MSF(B)	Médecins Sans Frontières (Belgium)
MSF(H)	Médecins Sans Frontières (Holland)
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOH	Ministry of Health
NDPPS	National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Strategy
NDVI	Normalised Difference Vegetation Index
NGO	non governmental organisation
NMSA	National Meteorological Services Agency
NSP	Nutritional Surveillance Programme
PA	Peasants Association
PRA	participatory rural appraisal
RDPPC	Regional Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee
RRA	rapid rural appraisal
RRB	relief and rehabilitation bureau
RRC	Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
SCF (UK)	Save the Children Fund (UK)
SERP	Southern Ethiopian Rangelands Project
TGE	Transitional Government of Ethiopia
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WDPPC	Woreda Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee
WFP	World Food Programme
ZDPPC	Zonal Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee

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AAPAM

AFRICAN ASSOCIATION FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

REPORT OF THE  
WORKSHOP FOR SENIOR LEVEL POLICY PERSONNEL  
ON OPTIMAL UTILIZATION OF MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS  
ARUSHA, TANZANIA  
AUGUST 17 - 21 1987

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. Background
- II. Introduction  
Participation
- III. Summary of Proceedings
  - Workshop Proceedings
    - Session 1: Presentation of Management Consulting:  
Points Emerging from Discussion
    - Session 2: The State of Management Consulting in Africa  
Points Emerging from Discussion
    - Session 3: Experiences of Users of Management Consultancy  
Points Emerging from Discussion
    - Session 4: Experiences of Suppliers of Consultancy  
Services - Private and Public  
Points Emerging from Discussion
  - Session 5: Syndicate Discussions
    - Issues for all Syndicate Groups
    - Special Issues of Public Users
    - Special Issues for Private Suppliers
    - Special Issues for Public Suppliers
    - Points Emerging from Special Issues of Public Suppliers  
Group A
  - Session 6: Final Plenary Session - Conclusions and Recommendations.
- Appendix 1: List of Participants.
- Appendix 2: Programme of the Workshop.
- Appendix 3: Schedule of Proceedings.
- Appendix 4: List of Presentations and Session Proceedings.
- Appendix 5: Papers Presented.

## I. BACKGROUND:

An Expert Group of AAPAM met at Badagry, Lagos State, Nigeria during February 10-15, 1986 to consider Priority Areas in Public Administration and Management in Africa. The meeting noted that the increasing demands for improvements in management services had led to the establishment of indigenous consultancy firms in many African countries. Most of the consultants, although relatively young in the profession, engage in major assignments which would be of significant consequence to development on the continent. The Expert Group therefore considered that it would be essential to improve the technical competence and capability of these consultants so as to enhance the impact and efficiency of management services. AAPAM was requested to act as a catalyst in initiating an organized and systematic approach to training in the practice of management consulting.

As an initial step to implementing the recommendations of the Expert Group, the AAPAM Secretariat considered that it would be useful to start with a forum to sensitize and provide some knowledge and skills to senior level policy-makers on the optimal use of consultants. A Workshop was therefore proposed to bring together Senior Level Policy-Makers, other users of consultancy services and Suppliers of these services who were members of private or public consulting organizations. The Workshop would be a working forum where participants reviewed past experience and spelled out priorities and an action programme for the future.

## II. INTRODUCTION

The Workshop was officially opened by the Principal Secretary to the President of Tanzania, His Excellency Ambassador Paul M. Rupia. Ambassador Rupia highlighted the economic problems facing Africa which included depressed commodity prices, rising costs of imports, heavy external debt service obligations, restricted access to markets in developed countries, stagnant or declining flow of development assistance and low rates of food production amid rapid population growth. The multiplicity of these factors resulted into severe foreign exchange crises affecting all sectors of the African



economies. Yet, Africa "ended up exporting more foreign exchange than we could import for purposes of food imports, machinery spare parts, as well as consultancy and professional advice".

Ambassador Rupia challenged the Workshop Consultants to realize that, in the final analysis, "the initiative for solving our problems has to come from ourselves, based on our own ideas and resources". However, he pointed out that despite the increasing number of indigenous consultants in Africa, the impact of management consultancy had been minimal in impacting change in - Africa's development processes. Ignorance, on the part of policy-makers, managers and administrators, on the type of consultancy services available locally and outside was both a reflection of the non-optimal utilization of local resources as well as the failure of indigenous consultants to make themselves and their abilities known. Ambassador Rupia concluded by saying that the answer to the problem he had outlined was not to despair but to improve the utilization of local resources "for structural change and development". (The full text of the speech by Ambassador Rupia can be obtained upon request from the AAPAM Secretariat).

In his vote of thanks to Ambassador Rupia, Dr. Ibbo Mandaza, Commissioner of the Public Service Commission in Zimbabwe echoed the significance of the theme already spelled out by the Ambassador. (The full text of the Vote of Thanks by Dr. Mandaza is available and can be obtained from the AAPAM Secretariat).

In his welcoming speech, the Vice-President of AAPAM, Prof. Kwame Adjei, emphasised on the theme of improving the technical competence of African consultants as a priority area in the programme to improve public administration and management. He pointed out some of the constraints facing African consultants as being financial problems, lack of organizational and logistical support, lack of acceptance even by their own institutions and unfair competition from foreign organizations.

The situation, he said, should be seen as a source of encouragement toward the optimal utilization of African consultants, which is a responsibility of all relevant individual professionals, institutions and African policy-makers. (The full text of the statement by the Vice-President of AAPAM can be obtained from the AAPAM Secretariat).

The Workshop was attended by 38 participants from 13 countries comprising of representatives of user organizations, representatives of indigenous public and private consultancy organizations, representatives of international organizations, some resource people and a few observers. The full list of participants is attached to this report - Appendix 1.

III. SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS:

Workshop Proceedings:

The Workshop proceeded into Four Working Sessions as follows:

- 1st Session: Presentations on Management Consulting
- 2nd Session: Presentations on the State of Management Consulting in Africa
- 3rd Session: Experiences of Users of Management Consultants
- 4th Session: Discussions of Experiences by Suppliers of Consultancy Services:
  - (a) Private Suppliers of Consultancy Services
  - (b) Public Consulting Organizations

The Fifth Session of the Workshop was devoted to discussions in three Syndicates by:

- 1. Public Institutions Suppliers of Consultancy Services
- 2. Private Suppliers of Consultancy Services
- 3. Users of Consultancy Services

The aim of the Syndicates was to develop recommendations for an Action Programme by AAPAM and other collaborating institutions on the optimal Utilization of Management Consultants. The recommendations, which were approved by a Plenary Session at the end of the Workshop are presented later in this Report.

Session 1: 2.30 p.m. Monday, 17 August 1987

Presentation on Management Consulting

Chairperson: Mr. M. Aboud

Rapporteur: Prof. G. Mutiso

Presentations:

1. Management Consulting Process: Present Practices and How to Overcome them - by Kwame Adjei
2. Process of Drawing Up Terms of Reference: Present Practices and How the Situation Can Be Improved -  
- James Nti
3. Optimal Utilization of Consultants - What Is, Why Use, Who Uses Management Consultancy - by Iddi Simba

Discussions on Presentations.

The Papers enumerated various elements that are necessary for the improvement of the practice of management consultancy, ranging from personal qualities, training and experience of the individual consultant to institutional responsibilities in facilitating consulting assignments.

Points Emerging from the Discussion

- Many retired Permanent Secretaries or Senior Civil Service Personnel are becoming Consultants, and they too, although experienced, need training in the modern practice of management consulting.
- Consultants must familiarise themselves with the procedures of management and of the key organizations which are their potential clients.
- Competence in presentation, execution, report writing and communication should be emphasized.
- Organization of professional consultants is essential
- A consultant must always work with people in the organization where his services are, or will be, utilized
- To define Terms of Reference, the management should take time to think out the goals and measures of performance and analyse problems and their assumptions
- Terms of Reference should be worked out between the consultant and the client
- Training is needed in writing Terms of Reference
- There is need for a body to regulate the practice of management consulting.



- Training of consultants should be by attachment to existing firms
- Users need to know what consultancy is all about, and so they also need basic training

(Details of the discussions in the Session is available from the Secretariat).

Session 2: 9.00 a.m. - Tuesday 18 August 1987:

Presentations on the State of Management Consultancy in Africa:

Chairperson: Dr. Ibbo Mandaza  
Rapporteur : Mr. M. B. Durodolla

Presentations:

1. The State of Management Consulting in Africa - by Ngure Mwaniki
2. The Status of Indigenous Management Consultancy in Africa -  
by Mesfin Terrefe
3. On the African Development Experts (ADEX) Facilities - by J.M. Duke

Discussions on Presentations

The theme of these presentations was the objective of improving the practice of consultancy in Africa. The points emphasised in this respect were need to:

1. Initiate efforts to bridge the existing gap between capacity and capability
2. Facilitate closing of barriers between Users and Suppliers of consultancy services
3. Provide the learning experience on how to use consultants.

To do this, there must be indications as to how the improvement of capacity can take place in the first place, and then the various roles played by relevant agencies in the process. Despite the concern ECA attaches to these aspects and AAPAM's continual intervention by providing assistance towards raising the capability of African consultants, the problem still persist. There are the inadequacies in the capability and professional expertise and quality of work output by the indigenous consultants themselves on the one hand, and unfavourable attitudes on the part of User agencies and institutions involved on the other.

Along with capacity and capability, the need for a Code of Conduct and the development of professional Ethics for management consultants in Africa was also strongly expressed.

Points Emerging from the Discussions:

In order to bring the main objectives of this Workshop into focus, and to ensure that the essence of the deliberations is not lost in rhetorics, the following strategies and action plans were proposed:

- To assist practitioners and users of consultancy, crucial issues for dialogue between donor agencies, users and consultants should be identified
- AAPAM should articulate the strategies and institutional framework it proposes to adopt in finding solutions to all the problems identified and for achieving the objectives of this Workshop and address questions such as:
  - +\* Through what sources can the local consultants obtain funds and finances for heavy consultancy projects?
  - +\* How can consultancy culture, management consciousness and discipline be instilled in policy-makers and public officers?
- Serious consideration to be given to professionalising management services practice in the public service, and to developing relevant training programmes for the officers so as to retain them long enough to make a realistic impact.
- AAPAM should make efforts to document the status of management consultants in Africa
- There is need for a formal Resolution to legitimise the decisions and conclusions reached at the Workshop, and for all participants to ensure that the resolutions will be followed up.
- All the issues addressed at this Workshop should be referred to ECA for its intervention in giving support and expression to the implementation of the Resolutions
- There is need to have long term strategic planning for both the users and practitioners of management consultancy in Africa
- Sources of resources for training and development of local consultancy experts need to be identified, and a strategy for implementation of a training programme clearly defined. (Details of discussion is available from the Secretariat).

Session 3: 2.30 p.m. Tuesday 18 August 1987

Presentations on Experiences of Users of Management Consultancy

Chairperson: Ms T. Bare

Rapporteur: Mr. G. Tibakweitira

Presentations:

1. Experiences in the Use of Management Consultants in Tanzania  
- by W. H. Shellukindo and S. K. Mtali
2. The Role of Consultants in the Seychelles - by Maryse Roberts
3. Effective Utilization of Consultants: Lesotho's Experience  
- by Jules Letsie
4. Optimal Utilization of Consultants: Swaziland - by S. Ceko

The presentation illustrated the use of consultancy services and the problems experienced. These include:

- Insufficient observation of ethical standards by the consultants
- Breakdown of communication between the consultants and the client organization, leading to adverse relationships
- Unawareness of Users of the availability of indigenous consultancy resources
- Consultants are often not action-oriented
- Insensitivity to local political, social, cultural and ethnic conditions and orientation of the client
- Financial constraints

Points Emerging from the Discussion:

- Care should be taken to ensure that consultants do not initiate projects which unduly divert resources from other projects
- Consultants should exercise diplomacy in dealing with Clients
- Consultants should ensure that they are aware of and present best solutions to the problems
- Regular Symposia for consultants should be organised
- Formation of professional associations of consultants is essential
- Foreign firms should be obliged to work with local consultants
- More opportunities should be deliberately given to local consultants
- Consultants should draw upon research conducted at institutions of higher learning to service the consultancy activity
- Consultant's recommendations should be action-oriented

*Proposal was  
10% local each yr.  
Deputy T. Leader  
from Year 1  
Team Leader by  
Yr. 5  
full local theoretically  
in 10 years.*



- Consultants should endeavour to play a positive role in providing advice relevant to the solution of the issues at hand
- Have adequate consultation between client and consultant
- Adequate control and supervision of consultant essential from the client
- Joint involvements by consultants more realistic than use of counterparts or contact persons
- Late submission of consultancy reports is a major short-coming among management consultants
- Scheduled meeting between client and consultant should be included in Consultancy Service Contracts.

(Details of presentations available from the AAPAM Secretariat).

Session 4: 9.00 a.m. 19 August 1987 - Wednesday:

Presentations on Experiences of Suppliers of Management

Consultancy: Private Consulting Groups

Chairperson: Dr. James Nti

Rapporteur : Mr. D. Kabyemela

Presentations:

1. The Future of African Consulting - by G. Mutiso
2. The Indigenous Consultant's Experience - M. K. Consultants, Tanzania - by Medard Mutungi

Discussions on Presentations

Presentations on Experiences of Suppliers of Management

Consultancy: Public Consulting Groups

Chairperson: Mr. Bernard Mulokozi

Rapporteur : Mr. D. Kabyemela

Presentations:

1. ASCON's Experience in Consulting - by Mike Durodola
2. ESAMI's Experience in Consulting - by Philip Shirma
3. Institute of Development Management, Mzumbi's Experience - G. Tibakweitira
4. Conceptual Approach to Training of Consultants - by J. D. Kimura
5. Experience of a Young Professional - by M. Kabyemela

Discussions on Presentations

The role of the Consultant in filling the gaps in institutions with inadequate supply of skilled managerial staff was discussed. However, the problem of the young indigenous Consultants gaining acceptance by the

Users of consulting services was noted. The suppliers' complaints included undue preference for foreign firms, the requirement for a list of past Clients as references and the susceptibility of consultancy services to budget cut-backs.

Points Emerging from the Discussions:

- Hard data is difficult to come by. Therefore, building of local data banks and information sharing is of essence.
- AAPAM should help in evolving publicity programmes to enhance awareness
- Assignments to indigenous consultants should be awarded on the basis of professional competence rather than emphasising references
- Users should retain consultants even during recessions to provide advice on the fastest way to recover
- It was felt that management consultants should play a leading role in evolving relevant management/organizational theory and practice
- The need for concretizing what is meant by Management and Public Administration and Management Consulting was voiced
- AAPAM should be requested to spearhead production of reference materials for management consultants
- Private consultants, like public servants should be required to sign bonds under the Official Secrets Act, so that they can acquire access to classified government documents, when these are essential in the course of consultancy assignments for government
- Apprenticeship/internship was recommended
- Consultancy should play a major role in the transfer of knowledge and technology
- Consulting should act as 'change agent' and a catalyst in ensuring the required change for effective performance of management practices.
- National management consultants should offer their services outside their countries as ASCON of Nigeria has done in providing consultancy services to Zimbabwe
- There is need to create mutual rapport, understanding and confidence between Suppliers and Users of consultancy services
- There is need for regular platforms for professional management consulting firms and governments. Such platforms should be used to create better understanding and regulate the profession.

SESSION 5: SYNDICATE DISCUSSIONS:

The aim of the Syndicate discussion was to develop recommendations for an action programme by Users and Suppliers, with AAPAM whenever appropriate, acting as a catalysing agent. The following topics were suggested for discussions:-

ISSUES FOR ALL SYNDICATE GROUPS:

1. How do Consultants make themselves known to Users - Advertising: is Advertising Ethical?
2. How can the behaviour and conduct of consultants be regulated?
3. Training of Users and Supplier; Mechanisms for attaining it.
4. How can indigenous management consultants break into the monopoly of consulting Contracts Associates with Aid packages?
5. When is Consultancy not a Management Consultancy?
6. What role should AAPAM play in the Development of Indigenous Management consultancy in Africa
7. What are the conceptions of Suppliers and expectations of Users in respect of effective Reports: How can the gap, if any, be bridged?

SPECIAL ISSUE FOR PUBLIC USERS:

1. How can governments insulate themselves against Rip Offs?
2. How do you give management service muscle?

SPECIAL ISSUES FOR PRIVATE SUPPLIERS:

1. Development and acquisition of Reference materials
2. How do you ensure links and contact between Private Suppliers and Public Suppliers - the issue of Competition and Cooperation
3. Interface between Research and Consultancy?

SPECIAL ISSUES FOR PUBLIC SUPPLIERS:

1. Career Development for Public Consultants (Management Services People)
2. How does Management Audit become institutionalized?
3. How do you ensure links and contact between Private and Public Suppliers - the issue of competition and cooperation?
4. How do you give Management Service Muscle?
5. Interface between Research and Consultancy?

Points Emerging from Discussion on Special Issues for Public Suppliers:

GROUP A:

- Question 1. All African Governments should consider establishing and strategically placing Management Services Divisions to undertake Public Consulting work. Also to have members of Management Services Divisions



assigned in all Ministries/Departments to act as in-house consultants. To develop a scheme of service for management service personnel, clearly spelling out training requirements, experience and salary grading. If this done, this area of activity will be professionalized and insulated from infiltration from other ill-qualified cadres.

Question 2. It was observed that Management Auditing which forms part of Management Services work should be emphasised in the training process as well as in the day to day operations of management consultants in government. Management services Divisions through this process can intervene and take early corrective measures.

Question 3. It was felt that the recommended National Regulatory Bodies do this linkage function and also that the Management Services Division be given regulatory powers to co-ordinate the engagement of private consultants into the Public Sector.

Question 4. Management Services Divisions should be located in a strategic coordinating Ministry in government so that its recommendations can be supported by the image of the office from which they operate. Their scheme of service and professional competence and status should be manifested in the quality of their recommendations. The grading of jobs in this area should allow for the retention of the competent and well trained staff.

Question 5. It is recommended that research findings relevant to management consulting be made available to consultants through libraries to be established by national consultancy regulating bodies.

SESSION 6: FINAL PLENARY SESSION:

Based on the discussions which took place at the plenaries and in syndicate groups, the workshop concluded and recommended as follows:

1. The existing practice of making extensive use of foreign consultants, especially, in strategic and highly sensitive areas, does not square with the doctrine of collective self-reliance.
2. In order to ensure optimum utilization of indigenous management consultants, their actual and potential contributions should be brought to the attention of beneficiaries of consultancy services, i.e. government and private sector organizations.
3. However, while it is necessary to publicize the activities of indigenous consultants (through advertisements in reputable journals, and in brochures), due caution should be exercised to guard against making extravagant claims, undercutting or mis-representing the positions of competitors, and adopting unethical marketing techniques.
4. To enhance the credibility of the management consulting profession, there is an urgent need for the establishment of National Management Consulting Council empowered among other things, to lay down codes of conduct; enforce the codes of conduct; register, accredit and discipline management consulting practitioners and/or firms; monitor and regulate the fees chargeable for certain categories of services; and generally protect the image of management consulting practice.
5. To improve the productivity of organizations, managers in both the public and private sectors need to establish Key Results Areas and performance indicators. They (the managers) therefore require training in performance measurement and performance improvement. They also need to maintain a roster providing up-to-date information on locally available management consulting capacity.

*Council is state  
regulatory.  
Suggest Trade  
Association.*

6. For their own part, the management consultants need to close whatever credibility gap might be perceived by their clients. In particular, the consultants need training in the methodology of process consulting, report-writing, presentation and follow-up project costing and time-tabling use of computers, management auditing and management services.
7. The position of management services units in government could be strengthened in a variety of ways, notably through high-quality consulting work through the recruitment, training and motivation of first-class personnel and through high-level political backing as well as the location of a management services units in a strategic resource-controlling arm of government.
8. In embarking on projects involving external technical/financial assistance, the recipient countries should ensure that the Memorandum of Understanding signed with the donors explicitly spell out the role of indigenous consultants in the execution of the project.
9. In pursuit of the objective of self-reliance as incorporated in the Lagos Plan of Action, the Final Act of Lagos and the recent African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery, AAPAM should enter into discussions with the ECA and the OAU with a view to bringing senior policy-makers and indigenous consultants together and mapping out the contributions of indigenous consultants to Africa's economic recovery and development efforts.
10. AAPAM should further liaise with African governments with a view to encouraging them to initiate or activate policies aimed at enhancing the status of management consulting in general, and of indigenous management consultants, in particular.
11. Pending the establishment of a regional body performing general, clearing-house functions in the area of management consultancy, AAPAM should coordinate arrangements pertaining to research, training publications, information and reference material on management



consulting and continue to promote training and exchange of experiences among indigenous African consultants. In this regard, a task force consisting of AAPAM representatives of governments and representatives of the Consulting Community should be set up to work on implementation of this recommendation.

12. Donor agencies selection criteria to be improved and their claim to improve the situation should be practical.

The Workshop was formally closed at 10.30 p.m. on 20 August 1987 by the Vice-President of AAPAM, Professor Kwame Adjei.

Appendix 1.

AFRICAN ASSOCIATION FOR PUBLIC  
ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

WORKSHOP FOR SENIOR LEVEL POLICY PERSONNEL ON  
OPTIMAL UTILIZATION OF CONSULTANTS  
Arusha, Tanzania 17 - 21 August, 1987

I. PARTICIPANTS

- |    |                         |   |  |
|----|-------------------------|---|--|
| 1. | Mr. M. Aboud            | - | Controller and Auditor-General<br>P. O. Box 9080<br>Dar Es Salaam<br>Tanzania.   |
| 2. | Mr. J. O. O. Akinyemi   | - | Secretary for Establishment (MSD)<br>Office of the Head of the<br>Civil Service of the Federation<br>New Secretariat, Phase II<br>Ikoyi, Lagos<br>Nigeria. |
| 3. | Mr. Mike Durodola       | - | Director of Consultancy and<br>Extension Services,<br>Administrative Staff of Nigeria<br>P. O. Box 1004<br>Badagry, Nigeria.                               |
| 4. | Dr. Lawrence S. Bestman | - | Director-General<br>Civil Service Agency<br>P. O. Box 9019<br>Monrovia, Liberia.   |
| 5. | Mr. Mesfin Terrefe      | - | Director<br>Mesfin Consultants Ltd.<br>P. O. Box 3374<br>Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  |
| 6. | Prof. J. Mawuse Dake    | - | Executive Director<br>African Development Experts<br>P. O. Box 9227<br>Accra, Ghana.   |
| 7. | Mr. J. D. Kimura        | - | Principal<br>Kenya Institute of Administration<br>Lower Kabete<br>Nairobi, Kenya.  |

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17. Mr. G. Tibakweitira - Principal  
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## II. RESOURCE PERSONS

1. Prof. K. Adjei - Institute of Public Administration  
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- 5 -

6. Prof. Ken Edwards - Principal  
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IV. SECRETARIAT

1. Prof. G. Mutahaba - Secretary-General  
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2. Mr. H. S. Nkumbi - Personnel Policy Division  
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Appendix 2.

AFRICAN ASSOCIATION FOR PUBLIC  
ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
WORKSHOP FOR SENIOR LEVEL POLICY PERSONNEL ON  
OPTIMAL UTILIZATION OF CONSULTANTS  
HOSTED BY  
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF  
TANZANIA  
  
P R O G R A M M E

ARUSHA, TANZANIA, 17 - 21 AUGUST, 1987

SUNDAY, 16 AUGUST, 1987:

- Arrival of participants
- Registration
- Meeting of Executive Committee, 5.30 p.m.

MONDAY, 17 AUGUST, 1987:

10.00 A.M.: Official Opening

- Introductory Remarks by Hosts
- Statement by AAPAM President
- Opening Speech by Mr. P. Rupia  
Principal Secretary to the President,  
Secretary to the Cabinet and Head of the  
Civil Service, Government of the United  
Republic of Tanzania.

11.00 A.M.: - Group Photograph

11.30 A.M.: - Refreshments



2.30 P.M.

TUESDAY 18, 1987:

9.00 A.M.

11:00 A.M.

11.30 A.M.

1.00 P.M.

2.30 P.M.

4.00 P.M.

4.30 P.M.

- Introductory Remarks on Programme
- By Secretary-General
- Programme Consultant
- : Participants Introductions
- : Presentation of Programme and Adoption of Same.
- : LUNCH
- : 1st Session
- \* Presentations on Management Consulting:
- Prof. Kwame Adjei
- Dr. James Nti
- Mr. Iddi Simba
- Representative of ICIPE, Lubjuana, Yugoslavia
- \* Discussions on Presentations
- \* Cocktail Reception
- : 2nd Session
- \* Presentations on the State of Management Consulting in Africa
- Mr. N. Mwaniki
- Mr. M. Terefe
- Prof. J. M. Dake
- \* Tea Break
- \* Discussion on State of Management Consulting
- \* Lunch Break
- : 3rd Session
- \* Experience of Users of Management Consultants
- Mr. William Shellukindo
- Mr. Ndikwe
- Ms. Bare
- Mr. Bereng and others.
- \* Tea Break
- \* Discussions on View by Users.

WEDNESDAY, 19 AUGUST, 1987:

- 9.00 A.M. - 4th Session
- \* Experience by Suppliers of Consultancy Services:
  - Private Consultancy Groups:
  - Prof. Mutiso
  - Mr. Mutungi
  - Mr. Obaso and others.
- 11.00 A.M. \* Tea Break
- 11.30 A.M. \* Discussions on Experience by Private Suppliers of Consulting Services.
- 1.00 P.M. \* Lunch
- 2.30 P.M. \* Free Afternoon
- \* Optional Tour of Arusha National Park

THURSDAY, 20 AUGUST, 1987:

- 9.00 A.M. - 5th Session
- \* Experience by Suppliers of Consultancy Services:
  - Public Consulting Organizations
  - \* Mr. M. Dur dola
  - \* Dr. Mbise
  - \* Mr. Tibakweitira
  - \* Mr. Kimura
  - \* Mr. Kagwe.
- 11.00 A.M. - Tea Break
- 11-30 A.M. - Discussions on Experience by Public Consulting Groups
- 1.00 P.M. - Lunch
- 2.30 P.M. - Syndicate Discussions (Groups to be Communicated)
- 8.30 P.M. - Dinner by AAPAM

FRIDAY, 21 AUGUST, 1987:

- 8.30 A.M. - Final Session
- \* Reports by Syndicate Groups and  
Discussions on Recommendations
- 10.30 A.M. - Tea Break
- 11.00 A.M. - Adoption of Reports
- 12.30 P.M. - Closing Ceremonies
- 1.00 P.M. - Lunch

SATURDAY, 22 AUGUST, 1987:

- \* DEPARTURE



Appendix 3.

AFRICAN ASSOCIATION FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION  
AND MANAGEMENT (AAPAM)

WORKSHOP FOR SENIOR LEVEL POLICY PERSONNEL  
ON OPTIMAL UTILIZATION OF MANAGEMENT CONSULT-  
TANTS, ARUSHA, TANZANIA 17- 21 AUGUST, 1987.

Workshop Chairpersons and Rapporteurs

1st Session: 2.30 p.m. Monday 17 August 1987

Presentation on Management Consulting

Chairperson: Dr. Ibbo Mandaza

Rapporteur: Prof. G. Mutiso.

2nd Session: 9.00 a.m. Tuesday 18th August 1987

Presentations on the State of Management  
Consulting in Africa

Chairperson: Mr. M. Aboud

Rapporteur: Mr. N. B. Durodolla

3rd Session: 2.30 p.m. Tuesday 18th August 1987

Experience of Users of Management Consultants

Chairperson: Ms. T. R. Bare

Rapporteur: Mr. G. Tibakweitira

4th Session: 9.00 a.m. Wednesday 19th August 1987

Experience by Suppliers of Consultancy  
Services: Private Consultancy Groups

Chairperson: Dr. James Nti

Rapporteur: Mr. D. Kabyemera

5th Session: 9.00 a.m. Thursday 20th August 1987

Experience by Suppliers of Consultancy Services:  
Public Consultancy Organizations

Chairperson: Mr. B. Mulokozi

Rapporteur: Mr. J. D. Kimura

Final Session: 8.30 a.m. Friday 21st August 1987

Reports by Syndicate Groups and Discussions  
on Recommendations

Chairperson: Prof. K. Adjei

Rapporteur: Dr. Talala Mbise.

Appendix 4.

List of Presentation and Session Proceedings - (available  
from the AAPAM Secretariat)

- A. Opening Speech by the Principal Secretary to the President,  
Ambassador Paul M. Rupia
- B. Vote of Thanks by Dr. Ibbo Mandaza
- C. Statement by Vice-President of AAPAM
- D. Presentation of Management Consulting: Session 1
- E. The State of Management Consulting in Africa: Session 2
- F. Experiences of Users of Management Consultancy: Session 3
- G. Experiences by Suppliers of Consultancy Services - Public  
Consultancy Groups: Session 4.



Appendix 5:

Papers Presented (available upon request from AAPAM Secretariat).

A. Papers by Resource Persons

- A.1 The Status of Management Consultancy in Africa - by Mesfin Terrefe
- A.2 The State of Management Consulting in Africa - by N. Mwaniki
- A.3 Management Consulting Process: Present Practices and How to Improve them - by Kwame Adjei
- A.4 Process of Drawing Up Terms of Reference: Present Practices and How the Situation Can be Improved - by James Nti
- A.5 Optimal Utilization of Consultants - What is, Why use, Who Uses Management Consultancy - by Iddi Simba
- A.6 Experiences in the Use of Management Consultants in Tanzania - by William Shellukindo and Samuel Mtali

B. Papers Presented by Participants at the Workshop

- B.1 The role of Consultants - by Maryse Roberts (Mrs.) Department of Planning and External Relations, Seychelles
- B.2 The role of Consultants in Community Development and Women's Affairs in Zimbabwe - T. Bare, Permanent Secretary Ministry of Community Development and Women's Affairs-Harare
- B.3 Issues in the Utilization of Consultants in Kenya's Public Sector - by P. M. Ndikwe, Management Services Division, Directorate of Personnel Management, Nairobi
- B.4 Effective Utilization of Consultants, Lesotho's Experience - by Jules J. Letsie, Ministry of Public Service, Maseru
- B.5 Optimal Utilization of Consultants: Swaziland - by Sandile B. Ceko, Director of Management Services Division
- B.6 The Indigenous Consultant's Experience - by M. Mutungi
- B.7 ESAMI Consultancy Services: Past Experiences and Future Prospects - by Talala B. Mbise
- B.8 Consultancy at the Institute of Development Management (IDM) Mzumbe - by G. Tibakweitira
- B.9 Experience as a Supplier of Consultancy Services - by J. O. O. Akinyemi, Office of the Head of Civil Service, Lagos
- B.10 The Problems of a Beginning Indigenous Consultancy Firm: The Case of a Kenya Consultancy - by Managing Director, Profession Training Consultants, Nairobi
- B.11 Management Consulting: The Experiences of a Young Professional - by Dominico M. Kabyemera, Tanzania.
- B.12 Conceptual Approach to Training of Consultants by J. D. Kimura, Kenya Institute of Administration, Nairobi
- B.13 The Future of African Consulting - By Prof. G.C.M. Mutiso, Mutiso Consultants Ltd., Nairobi.

from water management and environmental policies, legislation and Governmental organizational structure.

(c) Specific tasks

- (i) Teamleader/Hydrologist. would be responsible for collating the study and coordinating the work of other team members and for all aspects of the assessment not assigned to the other team-members, in particular the hydrology of the well-field systems, including the hydrological balance of the study area.
- (ii) The Ecologist. would be responsible for the overall assessment of the project's impact on the ecology of the study area and for describing all aspects of the environment in the area and environmental changes to be expected; and assess and describe measures needed to protect the coastal environment and riverine ecology.
- (iii) The Resource Economist. will deal with all economical aspects relevant for the assessment, in particular assessing project impacts and any proposed environmental remedial measures in terms of environmental costs and benefits. The project's impact on tourism should be included.
- (iv) The Institution Specialist. will review relevant legislative and policy issues and assess whether these provide adequate environmental protection or identify measures for those purposes and the necessary changes, if required. Institutions affected or involved will be reviewed as to their capacity of supporting the environmental assessment's recommendations.

Data Sources

30. An initial list of reports to consult would be:

Feasibility study on water supply augmentation project of Mombasa Coastal area-hinterland. Final Report. Ministry of Water Development. 1981.

World Bank project documents on the Mombasa and Coastal region water supply.

National Water Master Plan. MOWD. 1990.

Environmental profiles and other data in the files of the National Environmental secretariat, Nairobi, Kenya.

Relevant reports in the Ministry of Water and in the National Water Conservation and Pipeline Corporation, Nairobi and Mombasa, Kenya

Reports in the library of the Kenya Wildlife Service. Nairobi.

Materials in libraries of United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (UCN), and Wildlife Conservation International, all in Nairobi.

Reports in the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment, and in the Ministry of Tourism, Nairobi.



