


Early Warning System
Belg Synoptic Report

The 1993 Belg Production and
Food Prospect of the Belg
Growing Areas
of
ETHIOPIA



Early Warning & Planning Services
RELIEF & REHABILITATION COMMISSION
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I.

S U M M A R Y

The current year's Belg season has been concluded unfavourably. The poor performance of the season (i.e. late start of the rains, excessive rains causing heavy flooding, prolonged dry spells during parts of the season, hail and pest damage to crops, etc) in most of the major Belg producing areas of the country has caused production shortfalls, ranging from 4 to 100%. Consequently an estimated 331,900 people in the hardest hit areas are already at great risk of food shortage, and their situation, should, therefore, be addressed through immediate relief intervention. The woredas which are of most concern are, Mama Midir, Lalo Midir, and Gera Midir (North Shewa); Ambassel (South Wello); Bugna and Gubalafto (North Wello); Ginir and Mena (Bale); and Kucha, Humbo, Damot Woide, Damot Gale, Konso and Mirab Abaya (North Omo).

It is to be recalled in our monthly Early Warning report of March/April 1993, that the number of people which needed assistance was raised to a new estimate of 5.1 million. The food situation has further deteriorated since then mainly as a result of the poor Belg performance. On the other hand, severe flooding by the Baro, Gilo and Alwero rivers in Gambella during June/July has rendered around 37,100 people seek emergency assistance. There was also similar flooding in April-June in the Ogaden which aggravated the prevailing food shortage problem.

This report attempts to provide the result of the RRC's recent assessment of the likely food situation of the Belg growing areas of the country. The assessment details the performance of this year's small (Belg) season crops and the expected outcome of the harvest, as well as the likely food situation in the Belg producing areas. A brief summary of the findings by Region/Zone is presented.

1. TIGRAI

The impact of Belg production on food availability in this region is limited. The overall performance of both this year's rain and crops in the Belg producing pocket areas of Wajirat, Korem, Endamehoni and Ambalage woredas was satisfactory. On the other hand, harvest failures estimated at 35-51% were expected in Mehoni, Alamata and Chercher Woredas due to irregularities in the amount of rainfall, and significant reduction in the area under Belg. Relief food distribution amounting 3,833 Mt. has to continue for the next five months in these Belg producing woredas to 51,100 people who were also affected by the failure of last year's Meher (main) season.

2. Region 3:

The rainfall and crop condition in the Belg growing in the zones of the region was poor. The problem was much more serious in North Shewa, where rainfall conditions didn't even allow planting to take place in the major Belg dependant woredas of the former Menzina Gishie

Awraja. On the whole, production shortfall is estimated to be at least 50% of normal, but this could go to 100% in the major Belg producing woredas of Menz.

Delayed onset followed by excessive Belg rains after its start was observed in many areas in North and South Wello. Flooding and hailstorm damage to crops was also reported in several pocket areas. The most seriously affected were Ambassel in South Wello and Bugna and Gubalafto woredas in North Wello. Production shortfalls in these woredas ranges from 50-60% of normal. In spite of the poor Belg season in North and South Wello, the volume of Belg production this year is believed to be higher than last year's.

At present some 110,000 people in North Shewa and 67,300 in North and South Wello require relief food aid amounting 13,298 Mt.

3. Oromia Region

Apart from Ginir and Mena woredas of Bale, Merti and Jeju Woredas of Arsi and very few localized areas in West Harerghe, the rainfall situation was favourable for crop growth. As a result, the outcome of the Belg harvest was satisfactory. Unfavourable rainfall situation in some pocket areas of Bale have reportedly lowered this year's Belg production by about 10-15% from normal. As a result of the Belg production shortfall and the effects of the poor harvest in 1992, an estimated 16,700 people in Ginir and Mena woredas

are in need food assistance. On the other hand, the Belg season has been good in East and West Harerghe. Nevertheless, food assistance will have, to continue to those non-Belg producing people who have been affected by the failure of the 1992 Meher rains and those victims of man-made problems, these people need food assistance amounting to 45,315 MT for the next five months.

4. Southern Ethiopia People's Administration

The season's rainfall was erratic throughout the region. Several areas have experienced late start of the season's rains, and in some areas the rains were excessive, causing flooding. Area cultivated for Belg in the eastern lowlands of North Omo was reportedly down by as much as 50% from normal due to shortage of oxen and excessive rain. Pest damage to potato was also wide spread. The harvest shortfall in the most affected woredas of the region is estimated to range between 25 and 50% of normal.

In an area as vulnerable as North Omo, food production calls for concern. In Northern Omo, the current year's poor Belg harvest will put around 118,640 people to seek relief assistance. The assistance required for the next five months is estimated to be 7,118 MT.

SUMMARY OF THE STATUS OF 1993 BELG PRODUCTION

Region	Zone	Belg Growing woredas	Contribution of Belg to annual grain Production		Performance of 1992 and 1993 Belg Harvest		Pop. Needing Food Assistance due to Failure of Belg	
			Zone	Belg pro. Woredas	1992	1993	1992	1993
Tigray	S. Zone	Cherecher, Menoni Alamata, Wajirat, Korem, Enda Menoni & Ambalagae	5-10%	5-25%	An estimated 60-90% loss	35-50% loss in Cherecher, Menoni & Alamata	176,340	- *
Region 3	N. Welio	Wadia Dawint, Delanta Habru, Gubalefto, Kobo, Gidan, Bugna & Mekot	upto 25%	upto 50%	40-90% loss	. 50-68% loss in Bugna & Gubalefto woredas, slight loss in the remaining areas	182,030	16,300 **
	S. Welio	Legambo, Dessie Zuria Kutaber, Mekdeia, Tenta Tehulederie, Ambassel, Wore Jilu, Legenida, Worebabo & Kalu	upto 25%	upto 50%	40-90% loss	. 50-60% loss in Ambassel . 4-30% in remaining woredas	66,860	51,000
	N. Shewa	Gera Midir, Mama Midir, Lalo Midir, Keya Gebre, Gishie Rabei, Meezezo, Ankober, Angoleik & Tena Hagre Mariam, Asagirt Siya Debir, Wavu, Baso & Warana, Jiru, Efratana Jile, Vifat, Kekot & Mafud	15-20%	20-25%	55-100% loss in the former Menzina Gishie Awraja, and 15-30% loss in the remaining areas	. near total failure in the three major Belg growing woredas (50-100% loss)	277,000	110,000 ***
Oromia	Bale	All woredas except Adaba, Kokosa, Dodola, Hensebo & Arena Bulki	40%	40-50%	poor harvest with production shortfall of 25-50%	10-15% loss from normal	131,960	12,000
	Arsi E. Harerghe and W. Harerghe	High-Highland pocket areas	4-7%	NA	poor to very poor	Generally good harvest obtained in all Belg producing areas except in Werti & Jeju woredas of Arsi	-	-

Region	Zone	Belg Growing Woredas	Contribution of Belg to annual grain in the		Performance of 1992 and 1993 Belg Harvest		Pop. Needing Food Assistance due to Failure of Belg	
			Zone	Belg prod. woreda	1992	1993	1992	1993
Southern Ethiopia	N.Omo	All woredas	60-70%	60-70%	regional level harvest loss estimated to be in the order of 40%	harvest was expected to be down by 25-50% from normal in the most seriously affected woredas: Kucha, Humbo, Damot Wayede, Damot Gale & Mirab Abaya	343,650	142,600
	Hadiya, Kambata, Alaba and Temparo	All woredas except Alaba	4-10%	4-10%	favourable harvest obtained	an estimated harvest failure of 50-70% observed	-	-

Remarks:

- * Relief food distribution has to continue to 51,100 people who were affected primarily by the failure of 1992 Meher season.
- ** The failure of the 1992 Belg season covered all woredas of the major Belg producing areas of North Wello, but this year's failure is limited to only two woredas.
- *** The failure of the 1992 Belg season covered all woredas of the former Menzda Gishu Awraja of North Shewa, but this year's failure is limited to only three woredas of the same awraja.

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II. INTRODUCTION

The major Belg producing areas in the country are the high lands of Bale, North and South Wello, North Shewa and Several low and mid-altitude areas in North Omo. Although not significant, Belg crops are grown in the high lands of East and West Harerghe, Arssi, East and West Wellega, Illubabor, Jima, Hadiya and Kembata Zones.

The Belg season normally extends from February to June. It starts and ends early in the northern region, and ends late in July in the south, particularly in Bale. The major Belg crops grown in most parts of the Belg growing areas are barely and wheat. Short maturing varieties of teff in some areas, particularly in North and south Wello, and maize and sorghum in North Omo are also grown during the season.

The contribution of Belg production to the annual grain production of the country is 3-5%. But it is much more important to the annual food supply of the major Belg producing areas of North Shewa, North and South Wello, Bale and North Omo. These areas derive at the minimum half of their yearly food production from Belg. Although not significant, other parts of the Belg producing areas use the season's harvest to carry them through the lean period before the main harvest in December. In addition, good Belg rains also provide favourable conditions for planting of maize and sorghum, two major main (Meher) season crops, and the preparation of land for other Meher crops.

The rains during the Belg season improve water availability and contribute to the generation of grazing for the livestock in the major nomadic areas (Ogaden, Borena, South Omo and Afar).

It should be noted that the impact of this year's Belg rains on food supply in these nomadic areas is not incorporated in this report. A detailed report on the food supply situation and prospect of the pastoral areas will be released following the field assessment which is currently being undertaken.

This report, which is based on the findings of a field assessment carried out in July, attempts to provide information on the progress of the Belg season and the outcome of the season's harvest and its effect on the food supply situation.

III. THE 1993 BELG PRODUCTION BY REGION AND ZONE

1. REGION 1: TIGRAY

1.1 Background

Tigray is predominantly Meher dependant. The importance of Belg crops in this region is not significant. Only lowland areas of Chercher, Mehoni and Alamata, and a few pocket areas of Wajirat, Korem, Edndamehoni and Ambalage woredas of Southern Tigray (former Rayana Azebo in Tigray and Rayana Kobo in North Wello) are Belg producing. Belg production accounts for about 5-10% of the regional annual food production. Major crops grown are barely and teff in mid-altitude areas and sorghum in the lowland areas.

1.2 Rainfall Situation

The onset of this year's Belg rain was 3-4 weeks earlier than normal in almost all woredas, but its cessation was on time. The untimely rains in December 1992 were heavy, creating unfavourable condition for land preparation particularly in Chercher and Alamata. The excessive rains continued into the planting period in Chercher. On the other hand, the amount and distribution of rainfall during the rest of the season was satisfactory and better than that of the last few years in the Belg crop growing areas.

1.3. Crop Output

Untimely and excessive rains coupled with shortage of oxen in the lowland areas of Mehoni, Chercher and Alamata have hampered land preparation. These areas were forced to leave some land unplanted, and where it has been possible to plant crops, the area planted was less by 30% from normal. On the other hand, much more area was cultivated and planted in the mid-altitude areas of the other Belg growing woredas. The performance of Belg crops was also satisfactory in these mid-altitude areas.

Hailstorm and pests like stock borer, shoot fly and rodents, have affected maize and sorghum in Mehoni. Excessive rain during the growth and grain filling stages have also damaged maize and teff in Chercher. Overall reductions in production were estimated at 35% in Mehoni and Alamata and 50% in Chercher. Although there were significant reductions in production in the three woredas this year, performance are, however, far better than last year.

The rainfall was adequate for pasture and water for livestock. The livestock condition was satisfactory and no serious outbreak of disease was reported.

1.4 Impact of the Belg Harvest on Food Supply

Since the contribution of Belg production to the food supply of the region is very limited, the expected Belg harvest will not have significant impact on the food availability in the region as a whole. The food shortage in the region is mainly due to shortfalls in Meher production. Most parts of the Belg producing areas had surplus production last Meher. Only 51,100 people in some pocket areas have been seeking relief assistance this year due to the failure of last year's Meher. Therefore, distribution of relief food amounting 3,833 MT. has to continue for the next five months in the Belg producing areas of Southern Tigray.

2.

REGION 3

North Shewa, and North and South Wello are the only Belg producing zones of Region 3. These are also among the drought prone areas of the country which experience recurrent food shortages. The remaining zones are almost entirely Meher dependent.

Both Belg and Meher production are very important for most parts of the above mentioned zones. If either of the seasons' harvest fails or performs poorly, food availability of the population would be at great risk. Hence, it is important that the two seasons' crop productions wind up fairly well if the crop dependant population is to enjoy a reasonable degree of food security. The performance of the 1993 Belg season by zone is as follows:-

2.1. NORTH SHEWA2.1.1 Background

North Shewa is one of the areas of the country noted for its Belg production. The contribution of Belg crops to the overall crop output in the zone is not so high - an estimated 15-20%. The share is, however, much higher in the major Belg producing woredas of the zone. In Mama Midir, Gera Midir and Mezezo Woredas of the former Menzina Gishie Awraja, and Mafud and Kewot Woredas of the former Yifatena Timuga, an estimated 40-75% of the annual food crop production is derived from Belg.

2.1.2 Rainfall Situation

The unusual rains in December 1992 have been reported by farmers in the zone to have provided adequate soil moisture for preparing land for the 1993 Belg crop. The 1993 Belg rains followed in January across the entire zone, but soon came to a stop. The break continued for about 2-3 months until mid-April. The rainfall received during mid-April to May was unusually intensive resulting in land slides and flooding in several localities of Mafud and Kewot woredas. This caused considerable crop and property damages.

2.1.3 Crop Output/Crop Yield

Area cultivated for Belg was comparable to normal. But, the unusual dry spell during most of February and March did not allow Belg planting in most areas. For this reason no Belg crop has been sown in nearly all Belg growing areas of Mama Midir, Gera Midir, Lalo Midir, Kewat and Mafud. Most of the Belg fields were either left fallow or were later covered with Meher crops. Those pocket areas which somehow managed to plant Belg encountered high yield reduction due to moisture stress at the beginning and excessive rains towards the end of the rainy season. The overall condition of the Belg crops observed on the fields was poor. In Mezezo, for example, where the season's performance was relatively better, yield has been estimated to be reduced by as much as 50% from normal. In addition to the irregularities of the rainfall, the season's production

has been greatly affected by very low application of fertilizers. The cause for the low application of fertilizers was reportedly due to exorbitant prices and lack of credit facilities for such inputs.

2.1.4 Impact of the Belg Harvest On Food Supply

Over the last 2 years Belg growers in Mama Midir, Gera Midir and Lalo Midir have suffered repeated harvest failures causing food shortages. As production is marginal in the above mentioned woredas, any adversity in food production is often cause for considerable concern. Last year's poor Meher harvest has made a little over 100,000 people in the three woredas in need of relief food. This year's Belg harvest has been a near total failure in most Belg growing areas of North Shewa. In Menz, Mama Midir, Lalo Midir and Gera Midir woredas crops have now failed for three seasons in a row. The recent Belg failure in the above mentioned woredas has further aggravated existing food shortages which was caused by the failure of the 1992 Meher crops. According to a recent assessment, most of the areas which have experienced serious Belg crop failures are those which were also hard hit by frost-induced production failures last year. As a result considerable portion of the population in these woredas is seriously affected. The estimated population requiring food assistance in the above areas has now slightly gone up from an

earlier estimate of 104,000 to 110,000. Of these, around 70,300 people are being assisted, most of them through food-for-work programmes. It is strongly felt that the current assistance should be expanded to ensure sufficient coverage of the needy population. The present relief food distribution has to continue at least until the coming Meher harvest.

Outside the three mentioned woredas the poor performance of the Belg is unlikely to have any significant impact on food availability. Nevertheless, the food situation in a few localities of Mezezo woreda, particularly those bordering Mama Midir and Gera Midir, requires close follow-up. On the other hand no information has been received on the progress of the season and the prospect of Belg harvest in the remote woredas of Keya Gebriel and Gishe Rabel (in former Menzena Gishie Awraja) due to problems of inaccessibility. According to informal sources, however, there are indications of food shortages in Gishe Rabel which could be cause for concern.

Table 1: Number of People Affected by Failure of Belg Crops

Woreda	Number of people needing food aid	Food Aid requirement until next Meher harvest (MT.)
Mama Midir	56,000	3,360
Lalo Midir	18,000	1,080
Gera Midir	36,000	2,160
Total.....	110,000	6,600

2.2 NORTH AND SOUTH WELLO

2.2.1 Background

Belg crops are widely grown in North and South Wello. The overall contribution of Belg crops in these zones is not more than 25% of the annual food supply. The share, however, goes up to 50% of the annual total in the major Belg producing woredas of Delanta and Wadla Dawint in North Wello and Legambo, Dessie Zuria, Kutaber, Mekdela and Tenta in South Wello.

Although, not as important as the western high lands, Belg crops are also grown in the mid and lower elevation areas of the two zones. Barley is the major crop grown, followed by wheat and oat. Unlike many of the other regions, short maturing varieties of teff is also planted in the mid and low altitude areas for harvesting during the season. Last year's Belg harvest was poor in many areas of the two zones, making an estimated 274,900 people to be dependant on relief food. On the other hand, although there were crop damages by pests and excessive rain, the overall production of last Meher season in the Belg growing areas was adequate.

2.2.2 Rainfall Situation

The onset of this year's Belg rain was late from two weeks to two months and its amount was far from adequate the critical periods of land preparation

The assistance requirement is estimated at 5,048 MT. On the other hand the food situation of 3,400 people in Legehida needs close monitoring.

Table 2: Number of People Affected by Failure of Belg Crops

Zone	Woreda	Number of people affected	Food Aid Requirement until next Meher Harvest (MT)
North Wello	Bugna	10,300	618
	Gubalafto	6,000	360
	Sub-Total	16,300	978
South Wello	Ambassel	51,000	3,060
	Total	67,300	4,038

and planting in most woredas of North and South Wello. There were, on the other hand, excessive rains coupled with hailstorms in most parts of the two zones during germination and growth stages in some pocket highland areas and during flowering and maturation in others, causing heavy flooding and crop damages. The most severely affected woredas were highland areas of Bugna and Gubalafto in North Wello, Ambassel and Dessie Zuria in South Wello. Some pocket areas of Giden Legehida were also affected by flooding.

2.2.3 Crop Output

Planting in both zones was seriously hampered by the late onset of the Belg rain. It was delayed by about one to one and half months in Meket, Wadla Dawint and Delanta of North Wello and Tenta, Legambo, Legehida, Wereilu and Kutaber Woredas of South Wello. This prolonged the season into the wettest period of the Meher season which in turn depressed expected yields considerably. Areas planted were also much lower than normal in Bugna and Gubalafto woredas of North Wello.

The late onset of the Belg rain was followed by excessive rain, hailstorm and flooding which have damaged crops in a number of pocket areas. The highland areas of Ambassel and Legehida in South Wello and Bugna and Gubalafto in North Wello were seriously affected by heavy rain and flooding.

If the Belg season is said to have been favourable it was only for the livestock. Pasture was sufficient and water was adequate for animal consumption. Livestock condition was reported to be satisfactory. Prevalence of diseases were reported in several woredas, but were with minimal impact. The major diseases were rinderpest, black leg and pasteurellosis.

2.2.4 Impact of the Belg Harvest on Food Supply

The overall production in the high lands of Ambassel in South Wello and Bugna and Gubalafto in North Wello was very poor as compared with last year. The production shortfall is estimated to be 50-60%. On the other hand, although there were production reductions in the remaining areas, this year's production was better than that of last year. The food problem in both zones are likely to be limited to high land areas of Ambassel in South Wello and Bugna and Gubalafto woredas of North Wello. A total of 67,300 people, as a result, would be seeking relief assistance up to December 1993.

3. REGION 4: OROMIA

Oromia is predominantly Meher dependant. Belg crops are also grown in several areas of the region. It is, however, in Bale and the Arbagugu area of Arsi that the Belg crops are important. The impact of the season's production on food availability in other parts of the region is minimal. The details of the performance of this year's Belg by zone are as follows:-

3.1 BALE

3.1.1 Background

Bale is the most important Belg producing zone in the region. Most cropping woredas in Bale are heavily dependent on Belg crops. Belg harvest accounts for at least 50% of the annual grain output. Belg production in Bale cuts across all altitudinal zones unlike other areas where production is mostly limited to the highlands. Barley, wheat and pulses are the major crops for Goro, Ginir, Gololcha, Agarfa, Sinana, Goba, Gassera and Dinsho woredas. Maize and teff are also important Belg crops for lowland areas of Ginir, Gololcha, Mena, Berbere, Guradamole, Meda Welabo, Raitu and Beltu woredas. The crops are normally planted in February/March and harvested between July and August.

3.1.2 Rainfall Situation

In Medawelabo, Berbere, Mena, Gololcha, Raitu, Beltu, Ginir and Goro woredas the onset of this year's Belg rain was late by two to four weeks, and its amount and distribution was erratic. In the above woredas there was scarcity of rain in parts of May and June, causing considerable damage to the crops, while in Golelcha, Gassera, Dinsho, Agarfa Sinana and Goba woredas the April/May rain was reported to be excessive.

3.1.3 Crop Output

The late onset of the Belg rain has slightly hampered planting in Meda Welabo, Berbere, Mena, Gololcha, Raitu, Beltu, Ginir and Goro woredas. Areas planted in these areas were reported to be about 5% less than normal. The dry spell during mid-May/June has also caused crop damage. Although there were localized crop damages mainly due to late onset of the Belg rain and the dry spell during mid-May/June, significant production reduction was not reported. The overall Belg harvest is expected to be down only by 10-15% of normal.

3.1.4 Impact of the Belg harvest on Food Supply

Many of the Belg areas in Bale have experienced reductions in both last year's Meher and Belg productions, causing serious food shortage. A total of 250,000 people had been seeking relief assistance as a result of the Belg failure and some 80,000 in the consecutive Meher season due to poor Meher production. But, this year's Belg harvest in most parts of Bale was expected to be far better than those of the last two production seasons. The anticipated production in several areas should improve the food supply situation in the zone significantly. It is only in Ginir and Mena woredas where food problems are likely to occur. The total number of relief beneficiaries in these woredas is estimated to be 16,700 of which 4,700 in Ginir are returnees from Somalia who have at present no alternative to relief. The relief assistance required is estimated at 1,002 MT.

3.2 Arsi, East Harerghe and West Harerghe

3.2.1 Background

Belg production is very insignificant in Arsi, East Harerghe and West Harerghe zones of Oromia, contributing an estimated 4-7% to the total annual production. Belg production is limited to pocket areas in the highlands with barely as the dominant crop in all the three zones. Sugar beets are also important crops of the season in East and West Harerghe.

"Chat", which generates additional income to farmers, is an important perennial crop in the high and mid-altitude zones of East and West Harerghe.

3.2.2 Rainfall Situation

The onset of the season's rains was a bit late although this had very little impact on Belg agricultural activities. In Merti and Jeju woredas of Arsi a shortage of rainfall has adversely affected agricultural operations and over-all crops performance. The rainfall situation in the other zones was generally favourable.

3.2.3 Crop Output

Untimely and heavy rains during December 1992, late onset of Belg rains coupled with displacement of people due to tribal conflict in 1992 have seriously affected the area planted in Merti and Jeju. Area cultivated has been reported to be 65% lower than normal, resulting in much below normal production.

Belg crops were generally doing well in both East and West Hararghe except for a few pocket areas in West Hararghe where the Belg rains were erratic and inadequate for crop growth. By and large, with the exception of Merti and Jeju, the rainfall in the remaining Belg producing areas was sufficient to support good crop development. Peasants, excluding those displaced by ethnic conflicts and who have not yet been fully rehabilitated, are expected to have made good use of the rainfall condition.

3.2.4 Impact of the Belg Harvest On Food Supply

At the beginning of the year, it was anticipated that 604,190 people in both East and West Harerghe and 91,500 people in Arsi would be in need of relief assistance. This year's improved Belg harvest in East and West Harerghe does not ameliorate existing food shortages in the two zones, since the populations affected by poor Meher harvest last year are non-Belg producing and are mainly people displaced by last year's ethnic conflicts. Therefore, distribution of relief food has to continue for the next five months to those victims of both natural and man-made problems whose total assistance requirement is estimated at 41,741 MT.

4. Region:-Southern Ethiopia People's Administration

The Southern Ethiopia People's Administration is primarily Meher producing, and also dependant on perennial crops such as 'Enset' and coffee. It is only in North Omo, Hadiya and Kembata, Alaba and Timbaro zones that Belg crops are grown. The details of the performance of this year's Belg season by zone are as follows:-

4.1 North Omo

4.1.1 Background

Belg production is important in North Omo, accounting for about 60-70% of the zone's annual production. The dominant Belg crops are barley and wheat in the highland areas, maize and sorghum in the mid and low altitude areas of the zone.

4.1.2 Rainfall Situation

The onset of this year's Belg rain was on time and adequate for land preparation but its cessation was two weeks earlier than normal. The amount and distribution of the rain after its onset was erratic through out the zone. It was adequate and favourable for agricultural activities only during January and April but poor in the planning season, i.e., February and March. Excessive rainfall was reported in May causing severe damages to crops.

4.1.3 Crop Output

Shortages of plough oxen coupled with excessive rain hampered land preparation and planting in the lowland areas of Mirab Abaya, Kucha, Damot Woyde and Humbo woredas. Area cultivated and planted in these woredas were reduced by 50% compared to normal. Maize, the major crop, was reported to have been badly affected by excessive rain during planting and germination, and shortages of rain during flowering and maturation. The problem was serious also in Konso and Damote Gale woredas. Sweet potato, a major staple crop, has also been seriously affected by pests in almost all woredas.

4.1.4 Impact of the Belg Harvest On Food Supply

The damage to crops in Kucha, Humbo, Mirab Abaya, Konso, Damot Gale and lowland areas of Damot Woyde is expected to bring down the overall Belg production by 25-50%. As a result, a total of 142,640 people would need relief assistance amounting to 8,558 MT until the upcoming harvest in December /January. The details are presented as follows:

Table 3: Number of People Affected by Failure of the Belg Crops

Woreda	Number of People Affected	Assistance Requirement Until Meher Harvest (MT)
Kucha	50,000	3,000
Humbo	33,640	2,018
Damot Woyde	17,000	1,020
Damot Gale	6,000	360
Mirab Abaya	12,000	720
Konso	24,000	1,140
Total	142,640	8,558

4.2 Hadiya, Kembata, Alaba and Timbaro

4.2.1 Background

All woredas in the above mentioned two zones, except Alaba, grow Belg crops but the production is, however, confined to a few pocket areas. Belg comprises not more than 10% of the annual food production in the zones. The major Belg crops grown are maize, sweet potato, Irish potato, barley and haricot beans. 'Enset', i.e., *Ensete Ventricosum* is widely grown and serves as one of the most important staple food crops.

4.2.2 Rainfall Situation

The Belg rains which came on time in January and continued until mid-February, allowed adequate land preparation for Belg. From mid-February to late March or early April there was either very little or no rain at all. This was one of the critical periods in the crop cycle, i.e., planting. As a result planting was pushed forward by several weeks, and the area under Belg crops went down significantly.

After a break of nearly two months the rains restarted in April. They were, however, rather excessive causing heavy flooding and severe drainage problems in several localities of both zones during the second half of April and most of May.

4.2.3 Crop Output

Due to the absence of rains during the planting period and the damage of heavy rains towards the end of May, the area under Belg crops was reduced significantly. Only farmers with little or no drainage problem took advantage of the heavy rain towards the end of the season by planting short cycle maize. Most farmers in both zones were forced to forgoe-Belg planting.

In areas of poor drainage the excessive rains caused extensive damages to potatoes and sugar beats. Unusually high incidence of blight on these root crops, associated with the heavy rains, were reported widespread. For example, in Limu, flooding in some 24 Peasant associations destroyed Belg crops after which farmers had to off-set the loss by timely substituting Meher crops after the floods receded. Hailstorm has also brought substantial loss on crops in isolated pockets of Kedida Gamela.

In general, according to the zonal Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) experts, potatoes and haricot beans have suffered a near total damage while Belg maize has already undergone an estimated 50-70% yield reductions.

4.4.4 Impact of The Belg Harvest on Food Supply

As was clearly noted earlier, the Belg season's performance was poor in Hadiya, Kembata, Alaba and Timbaro zones and, therefore, very little is expected from this year's Belg harvest. This, however, is not likely to disturb the food security situation in the zones since the conditions of Belg production to the annual crop output is minimal. Moreover, 'Enset', which serves as one of the major staple foods, is in good shape. This crop would fill much of the food gaps that might occur as result of the Belg failure. Nevertheless, the food supply situation in the zones warrants closer monitoring to detect early enough any significant food distress that may occur.

3.1. PLANNED INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES AND RESPONSIBILITIES - *Ethio*

The Directives For Disaster Prevention and Management spell out roles and responsibilities for many TGE institutions as well as other bodies. Central to the whole system is the National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management, which will set up a National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee (NDPPC) at the national level. The RRC will act as the secretariat to the NDPPC. This institution is supposed to replicate itself at all administrative levels specifically at the regional, zonal and woreda levels.

A National Committee for Early Warning will be established under the Chairmanship of the Commissioner of RRC. It will among others include representatives of the key ministries of Agriculture, Health, State Farms and Coffee and Tea Development. Other key institutions represented are Central Statistics Authority, Ethiopian Mapping Authority, National Meteorological Services and Ethiopian Nutrition Institute. The Head of National Early Warning will also be a member.

At the Regional level, a Regional Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee will be formed and membership determined by the region. Its secretariat will be a Regional Rehabilitation Bureau. Zonal Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committees whose membership shall be determined by the RDPPC will be formed and served by a Zonal Office for Relief and Rehabilitation. The Woreda level structure will be the Woreda Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee served by the Woreda Disaster Relief Cell.

The NDPPC will cause to be prepared a National Relief Plan. Since the RRC is the secretariat to the NDPPC, it is assumed that the bulk of the planning for the national Relief Plan will be done by the RRC. Relief Plans will be made at the regional, zonal and Woreda levels and supervised by respective Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committees. RRC is given the scrutinising and evaluation powers over the regional plans which will be aggregates of plans from the Woreda level which in turn are supervised by the zones. This will be done in consultation with line ministries.

In the Directives, development of the disaster prone areas is linked to disaster preparedness and prevention by specifying that line ministry development programmers shall be evaluated on their contribution to disaster prevention and those showing such concern shall be favored in the budgetary allocation process.

Employment Generation Schemes are identified as a major component of Disaster Preparedness and Prevention works at regional and the levels below it. To facilitate the operation of EGS specifications on wages, provision of tools and amenities, staffing as well as

supervision and dates of commencement and termination of the EGS are provided. Gratuitous relief and supplementary nutrition for the below 6 years is given a secondary role to EGS. Agricultural extension geared to improving disaster prone areas' productivity is seen as a major area of focus. Consequently the contact extensionists and peasants are expected to develop specific Contingency Plans applicable to each local situation to include among others supplementary irrigation, peasant based seed banks, and agronomic practices suitable to moisture stress situations. Livestock will be covered by a local action plan which will seek to preserve the herds especially bullocks, milk cattle and breeding stock. Feed for the essential livestock will be assured by government distribution of fodder, creation of livestock camps and support to fodder production programs and access to public lands.

Health activities during a disaster will be covered by the Ministry of Health increasing its activities in the affected areas and expanding its personnel in such areas by among others rehiring retired personnel. MOH will mount nutrition and health surveillance, conduct mass immunization disinfect of water, provide drugs and basic sanitation.

Food distribution at the community level in during disasters will be through a coupon system cashed at Relief Food Outlets which will be established parallel to EGS operations unless it is gratuitous relief. The RFO can be manned by both TGE officials or NGOs. Food will be delivered to the communities either from the National Food Reserve or other sources.

NGOs role in disasters will be through both funding and implementation. After registering with the RRC, NGOs will develop detailed proposals for approval by the Regional Councils.

Funds for disaster relief will be held in the National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Fund managed by the RRC. It is expected that external funds will be consolidated into this fund. In making such donations donors can target funds to a specific project or a specific area. Regions will be able to draw from it if they submit a Relief Plan which is accepted by the RRC.

It should be noted that the matters discussed above still remain at the policy level For it is only now that a paper is under preparation to test the model implied in the policy documents in actual implementation. It is expected that field activities will start in April 1994 for testing this proposed system in 15 Woredas out of more than 640 Woredas nationally. Among the first activities will be the creation of public awareness about the new structures, creation of the various committees, the establishment of the fund and the clarification of the planning role of the national RRC for all these activities.

FROM HERE IT IS INSTITUTIONAL EVALUATION. EVERYTHING ABOVE IS ESSENTIALLY REVIEW OF POLICY DOCUMENTS

INTRODUCTION

In the subsequent sections the consultants comment on the capacities which exist within selected government institutions for in the long term it is these institutions which will carry the burden of disaster management for the country. The institutions identified in the directives include RRC, line Ministries and sub-national government institutions. Given limitations of available data and time only selected institutions are covered. It was the consultants plans to cover the key identified public institutions but data exigencies limited the coverage.

3.2. EMERGENCY FOOD SECURITY RESERVE (EFSRA)

The capacity to hold and manage emergency food has been recognized by Ethiopia and its donor friends for a long term as central in any disaster management system. For a variety of reasons among which was the need to delink from RRC, the progress towards this has been slow. However last year an autonomous organization was created. Its capacity is yet to be built up. This will depend on how quickly some policy issues get resolved.

3.2.1. LEGAL BASIS AND MANAGEMENT

The EFSRA was established by legal directive on 22/10/92. Its objectives are to maintain a short term reserve of 205,000 tonnes of food and to increase this reserve to 307,000 tonnes in the medium term. It has no legal basis for handling price stabilization matters. It is legally an autonomous organization with its policy making Board, made up of ministers from MOT, MONRDEP, MOF, MEEC, MOPED and MOA, who are also members of the IMC for NDPP. It is chaired by the RRC Commissioner and the secretary is the Manager EFSRA.

An interesting institutional linkage, with other TGE institutions and donors with key responsibilities in disaster management, is through the EFSR Technical Committee which is advisory to the Board on policy and operations of the reserve. The Membership is as follows:

a. EFSRA Manager	Chairman
b. EGTE Manager	Member
c. RRC-EWPS Head	Member
d. MONRDP FMU Head	Member
e. MOPED NRHSD HEAD	Member
f. MOA CPRD Head	Member
g. WFP	Member
h. Two donor representatives	Member
i. EFSRA PPS Head	Secretary

3.2.2. EFSR DECENTRALIZATION AND LINKAGE TO LOCAL DEVELOPMENT

3

It is planned that, over and above the stores in Addis Ababa, the EFSR would have decentralized stores in Makelle, Kombolcha, Nazareth, Sheshemene, and Dire Dawa initially and perhaps develop more centers in keeping with the NDPPS. The bulk of the reserve stock though is currently held at RRC stores in Nazareth and EGTE stores in Addis Ababa. It is argued that the decentralization has been slowed by the lack of major external contributions to the reserve. Still one wonders why the marginal contributions are trucked to Nazareth and Addis Ababa.

Basically the EFSR is externally supported in terms of stocks. Of the 131,789 tonnes handled since 1982 and up to 1993, 50,000 tonnes or 38% have been bought by the Ethiopian Government. An issue then for the long term is to investigate ways for the TGE to finance some part of EFSR's stock building with local purchases which may have the impact of supporting agricultural production. Only 12% of the stocks handled since inception have been locally bought. This is about 15,971 tonnes.

3.2.3. INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT TO EFSR

EFSR has had support in the past from Netherlands, UNDP/FAO, WFP, ODA and SIDA. Currently UNDP/FAO has a US\$ 752,762 project which runs out in January 1994.

Support has been in personnel, equipment and supplies, upgrading of managerial skills and training in storage management and pest control.

3.2.4. PERSONNEL

Table 3.2.4. EFSR Manpower Information, shows the manpower when it was a project within RRC, current manpower under autonomy and future manpower needs as a decentralized system. Several salient points are worth recording. As a project it had only 29 personnel of which 8 (28%) were professional level staff with qualifications related to the functions. On being converted to an autonomous organization manpower increased to 50 and the proportion of professionals is 15 (32%). Although this is reasonable, one wonders why the organization needs the following specializations in its personnel; international finance, geography and language!

The second point relates to location of personnel. 42 (84%) of the 50 personnel in place now are located in Addis Ababa. This is anomalous and limits the capacity of the organization to respond to its mandate for clearly the bulk of its work needs to be at least in the decentralized stores and their sub-national catchments.

The third point is that although the organization claims to operate its warehousing capacity in Addis Ababa, Nazareth, Kombolcha, Makele, Shashemene and Dire Dawa, the only personnel outside Addis Ababa are at Nazareth, a stones throw away. The personnel need decentralizing to at least be within reach of the disaster prone areas and to reduce the cost of transporting stocks to the Addis

and Nazareth stores and then retruckung them back to drought prone areas in the periphery of the country.

The fourth point is the future manpower plans of the organization. It is proposed to increase personnel to 311. No time frame is given but it is notable that this will mean that each person will be responsible for 659 tons of short term socks or about 987 tonnes of mid term stocks! That is not the only problem with the projected staffing up. The Headquarters is supposed to take up 24% of all staff. This situation is made worse by the fact that of all professionals 76% are supposed to stay in Addis Ababa. No professionals are projected for the Makele, Shashemene or Dire Dawa warehouses. Further, if one aggregates the administrative and the clerical and fiscal staff, 45% of all staff will be absorbed. This is a very high ratio of administrative staff.

3.2.5. WAREHOUSING

Of the six listed warehouse locations, only two appear to be operating. They are far from the peripheries of the country which are drought prone. A comprehensive strategy on decentralizing warehousing capacity especially to serve regions is called for. This should include evaluation of the RRC warehouses and a decision whether these will be taken over by the agency or integrated into building local Woreda or Zone warehousing capacity.

The consultants are aware that in the draft documents on the planning of the National Food and Non food Distribution system, NDPM Program Implementation, currently under discussion, it is assumed that there will be four categories of food aid. These are EBSN Food Aid, Regular Food Aid, EFSR Socks And Emergency Food Aid. These sources will merge into one stream to supply the NDPPC. The operator of this food is the RRC acting as the NDPPC secretariat. RRC will warehouse this food before passing it to the distribution warehouses at Regional, Zonal and Lower levels.

Although these proposals are under discussion and are related to the designing the implementation structure of the EBSN to start in 1974, it is clear that there is need to look at secondary and tertiary warehousing systematically. The issue will be how far down the food pipeline the EFSR wants to control warehousing. Second should be a decision whether EFSR or regions should take over the RRC warehousing capacities since RRC is supposed to only coordinate and not implement according to the directive. These issues should be subject of discussion between the TGE, the Regions and the interested donor.

3.2.6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

EFSR is supposed "to maintain a readily available food reserve for use during emergencies to be provided in the form of loans to agencies working in relief and rehabilitation activities until such time as other sources of relief supplies can be mobilized"

according to its proclamation. Currently, it holds little stocks, perhaps only about 60,000 tonnes. In the past it has released 66,747 tonnes for emergencies. It has lent 98,000 tonnes of which 28,120 are still outstanding.

A clear need therefore is to increase its stocks as soon as possible. This is an issue for both TGE and donors to consider. The consultants understand that there are policy conditionalities which have to be fulfilled By TGE before the donors release the bulk of the stocks to the organization.

In the long run, it may be a good idea investigate the possibility of locating more and smaller stores in the regions. This can be facilitated by takeover of the existing RRC local capacities or could be financed jointly with regional governments as a strategy for increasing regional capacities. This will be important especially for the Ogaden.

There is a need identify the sub-national staff to be trained on the technical aspects of grain handling after the decisions are made on first the desirable spread of warehousing and how sub-national governments are to be involved. Presumably for the local based stores the staff will be employed by sub-national governments.

Any future staff deployment must decentralize the personnel and warehousing capacity to the disaster prone regions. Current staffing and location of major stores is not near enough to the drought prone areas. For example Dire Dawa is more than 700 km. from most of the areas of Ogaden.

Policy on grain recycling and local purchases is required.

Since the EFSR is new there is need to increase its organizational capacity by improving office equipment, facilities and management.

4.

4.1. 'RRC NATIONAL

RRC straddles thinking about disaster management because of its history and past role of both coordination and implementation of disaster management efforts. Under decentralization, its role will remain coordinative. It is not clear that although the expected role is coordinative that it is giving up the implementation role as seen in current documents on planning the implementation of the EBSN programme.

4.1.1. PERSONNEL

The RRC has been reorganized to meet its new role of coordination. This is shown in Table 4.1.1. RRC Organizational Structure Before Regionalisation and Table 4.1.2 RRC Organizational Structure After Decentralization. Before decentralization RRC was both an implementing and coordinating organization. The new structure assumes that it will be primarily a coordinating organization. As is shown in Table 4.1.3. Manpower Distribution of RRC at the Head Office Before Decentralization and Table 4.1.3. Planned Staff: Qualifications in the Newly Restructured RRC. It has reduced staff from 3259 to 732 at head quarters.

Issues of concern about the National RRC, from a capacity assessment point of view, are the fit of the old staff to the new organizational demands. Perusal of Table 4.1.4. shows some interesting facts from a specialization point of view. For example, what will be the role of 61 Accountants who presumably were needed for the large operation of the past years. If the number is kept, there will be an accountant for every ten people. It is interesting that there are also 64 management specialists. Again the implication of this is that there will be a management person for every ten people. If on top of the management personnel are added staff whose basic qualifications are in the social sciences; 13 Social scientists, 12 economists and 22 sociologists, one wonders what their future activities will be for there will be a total of 111. There are also some few persons with peculiar qualifications like agro-engineering and plant science who do not seem to fit into the new functions.

The deployment of professional staff in the envisaged departments as shown in Table 4.2. is as follows:

The Commissioners Bureau	10
Audit and Inspection	22
Policy Planning Bureau	5
Aid Coordination and Public Relations	26
Early Warning	60
Legal and Insurance	12
Administration and Finance	65
Relief Transport and Coordinating Center	24

Relief Programmers Evaluation and Monitoring 20

Total

209

The details on the types of staff in each department are shown in Table 4.1.11. Professional Staffing of National RRC by Department.

Capacity is reduced if the staff do not match the roles expected. It seems to the consultants that a real issue is to match qualifications and functions. This is best done by conducting a management audit of the organization and to come up with a strategy of matching the personnel available by retraining or redeployment.

It should also be noted that general service staff form just about 42% of the total headquarters staff.

It is not clear how many of the staff have joined the autonomous Emergency Food Security Reserve Administration and the Transport Operation which is in the process of being privatized. Some staff have been redeployed to Ministries.

4.1.2. Offices, Office Equipment and Operating Budgets

No presentations were made to the consultants about shortages of these facilities overall for in the past the RRC has build up plant and equipment based on government and donor resources. A case is made later for specific support to Early Warning.

The transport fleet is in the process of being privatized. However a core fleet of 250 trucks will be left attached to the Headquarters.

The consultants judgement is that given the pruning in staff, offices, plant and operating budgets should be redeployed and a plan on utilization prepared by RRC before requests are made. This should be an immediate task for RRC management.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The reorganization of the National RRC to serve the decentralized national system is only now being put into effect. RRC should within a year evaluate the performance of the organization and see whether the staff deployed serves the new needs. At that time a management audit should be conducted and a consultant appointed to take the key managers in the RRC into an organizational development seminar whose output should be a long term strategic plan of the RRC.

THE BASE COSTING OF THIS ACTIVITY SHOULD BE SALARIES OF A MANAGEMENT/OD CONSULTANT FOR A PERSON MONTH OF PREPARATION OF THE INTERNAL MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS, TWO PERSON MONTHS OF TRAINING AND TRAINING CENTER COSTS AWAY FROM ADDIS FOR A MONTH, AND TRAINING BOARD AND LODGING FOR 2 CONSULTANTS AND 20 MANAGERS FOR A MONTH, AND TRAINING MATERIALS. TOTAL ESTIMATE US\$ 60,000.

4.2. RRC IN REGIONS

4.2.1. PERSONNEL

In assessing capacity, how past staff get utilized in new structures is important for they can transfer some skills or loose them in the new frameworks. Before decentralization it is estimated that the total RRC staff in headquarters and the field were more than 6,000 people. Of the total about 2,610 were in the branch offices. This is shown in Table 4.1.5. Manpower Distribution in Branch Offices of the RRC According to Academic Level As of November 1992. Table 4.1.6. Branch Office Organogram: Pre-Decentralization illustrates how the branch was to be organized. This was changed to keep up with decentralization. Table 4.1.7 The Proposed Structure of Regional RR Bureaus by the Central Government, shows what is recommended to the regions as an ideal bureau. Table 4.1.8. Positions in the Regional and Zonal Offices, lists the personnel to be made available at those levels. Regional staff are supposed to be 45. Zonal staff are supposed to be 34.

However these idealized planning staffing figures and organizational frameworks are clearly beginning to change as Regions get personnel rejected by other regions because of ethnicity, develop their own needs and organize staff to fit those needs. An example is Region 14 which has evolved its organizational structure. Table 4.1.9 Region 14 Planned Organizational Structure contrasts with the ideal model. As shown in Table 4.1.10. Manpower Distribution of Region 3 According to the Academic Level, the region and the zones already exceed the planned idealized manpower.

No aggregated national data exists to show how the Regions, who are supposed to hire all the necessary Regional, Zonal and Woreda level staff, have staffed their levels. It is not clear that the old staff have been retained at the appropriate levels or they have joined the general movement of staff triggered by the ethnicity of staffing regions.

In Region 3 the consultants were able to get detailed data on the manpower in the region. Before decentralization there were 80 total personnel. After decentralization there were 94. They are deployed as follows: Regional Representative 1, Executive Secretary 1, Early Warning Professional Staff 4, Relief Department 4, Transport Department 18, Logistics Department 9, Public Relations 2, Finance and Budgeting 12, Administration 14, Audit and Inspection 4, Legal and Insurance Services 3, Carpenter 1, Copy typists 8, , Guards and Cleaners 13.

For the North Wollo Zone there were 60 staff before decentralization and in six months they have increased to sixty seven. They are Zonal Representative 1, EWPS 6, Relief Section 6, Logistics and Transport 21, Finance and Budgeting 6 Audit and Inspection #, Administration 13, Secretary 1, Guards and Cleaners 10.

In the Ogaden, Qorrahey (Qabridaharre) Zone, previously there were 25 staff and now there are thirty five, twenty three of whom have secondary education and some experience. Officials claim they need 50 staff to function effectively

Whereas some regions have organized themselves, the consultants are concerned that in the case of the Ogaden as revealed in field work, no structure has been put in place. Decisions about personnel to head the Regional Bureau are trapped in politics to such an extent that there has not been any handing over by the previous three RRC Regional Heads. A related issue is of course the qualification of those being hired at the Regional level. In any case the delay in organizing the Ogaden Bureau, has led to confusion at the Zonal level where in Qorrahey (Qabridaharre) Zone food distribution was stopped by the Zonal Administration based on the conflicts between personnel appointed by the Region and personnel previously working. In Region 5 it is clear that personnel are being appointed without being subjected to the Central Personnel Authority criteria for the CPA office is not functioning and the person holding the post is an agricultural economist who had just arrived at the region and who had not experience in personnel matters.

That there will need to harmonize personnel across the regions is clear for some of the functions like early warning will call for some uniformity in data. According to a briefing in the Prime Ministers Office, there are criteria set to ensure that persons appointed by regions have qualifications which a similar. The same office admits though that there is conflict between this ideal and the ethnic pressures on recruiting ethnics who at times are not as qualified as other personnel from other regions. Probably the strategy should be for the National RRC to agree on a uniform strategy with the Regional Bureau Representatives and to commit some training resources to the regions where the staffing problems seem to have been stuck like the Ogaden. This could be undertaken under TA proposed for Ogaden elsewhere.

4.2.2. OFFICES, EQUIPMENT AND OPERATING BUDGETS

Given the extensive offices and plant created by RRC in the past, it is probable that the regional, and zonal levels will have some modicum of office space in areas of previous operations. In North Wollo Zone there was a good building compared to all other bureaus for the RRC.

In North Wollo Zone there is an RRC office bloc. There are 13 warehouses with approximately 9,000 tonnes capacity. There are five trucks with three of them being functional and an office Land cruiser.

Even in Ogaden, the Regional and Zonal levels visited showed relatively good office facilities compared to equivalent bureaus. They also compared with other offices have vehicles at least to the zonal level. Detailed data was to be compiled and sent on to the consultants but did not reach them before the end of the

consultancy.

Office equipment was also relatively better for the RRC staff than for their colleagues in other bureaus in North Wollo Zone and in the Ogaden, both at Regional and Zonal levels.

RECOMMENDATION

When National RRC sets out its strategic plan, estimated to be in a year, it should evaluate what services it needs from the Sub-national RRCs and develop a training plan for them at that time.

This activity is projected for 1995 and cannot be budgeted now for National RRCs needs will change as the coordinating role is refined over the next year.

4.3. NATIONAL METEOROLOGICAL SERVICES AGENCY

For effective disaster management, the NMSA has a crucial role to play for its basic work is prediction of weather which is a causal agent of most disasters. In interviews with personnel from this agency it was made clear that the agency was not decentralized and there were no plans to decentralize some of the key operations for the professionals stated that the costs would be overwhelming to the state. This comment was made specifically with regard to the satellite weather data collection and processing. It was argued that the cost of collecting this data and the need to have specialized personnel to interpret it demanded centralization. However it was argued that there is need to collect more data in local situations for the agency was not collecting enough of this local data.

With regard to personnel, Table 4.3. 1 Permanent Employees of NMSA, it should be noted that 82% of all employees are centrally located. 100% of all meteorologists are centrally located. The point about centralization is not changed when the contract staff, shown in Table 4.3.2., is analyzed in conjunction with the prior table on permanent staff.

Collecting accurate local weather information is important for many aspects of disaster management as well as agricultural production which is the main bridge between disaster and development. Thus it is the view of the consultants that there should be limited decentralization of the professional meteorologists to the Regions. This is a policy matter for the TEG to consider. If such personnel are posted to the regions, they should be enabled to collect systematic data on weather for its patterns in the country are extremely varied and localized disasters, drought, hail storms, flooding etc can be managed better with more solid data bases. The professionals sent to the regions should be primarily occupied in implementing a detailed weather surveillance system which can be used in disaster management among others.

It is proposed that once these professionals are transferred to the

regions they be included in the Regional Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Committees.

The consultants propose that the TEG and the donor community investigate the possibility of supporting the expansion of weather data collection. TED can be responsible for staff and office costs but donors may wish to commit resources to weather related equipment and processing capacity. An investment of about US\$ 100,000 per region to put basic recording and processing equipment into place in each region. This budget would be used to acquire rain gauges, automatic recording stations and to build up local weather information. The target would be to at least a system in each Woreda

DATA ON POSSIBLE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES TO BE INCLUDED IN FINAL REPORT BY TEAM LEADER FROM PRESENTATIONS MADE THE LAST DAY

4.4. MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE

The consultants did not get any detailed data from the Ministry of Agriculture at the national level on how decentralization has been worked out and on how MOA staff can relate to disaster management. Requests were made not only by team but also UNDP and RRC staff. In field work, particular attention was paid to the field staff for the ministry is an important actor in the link between disaster management and development. The field study areas selected for the consultants before arrival were in Wollo Zone where a Daunt Woreda was in the high plateau and Kobbo was in the low lands.

KOBBO WOREDA

Field investigations established that the Agricultural Bureau of Kobbo Woreda in North Wollo Zone had the following establishment:

1. Post	Status	Qualification	
Experience			
2. Head of Woreda Bureau	Vacant		
3. Deputy H. W. Bureau	1	Diploma	9 years
4. Sub. Matter Special.	18	1 Doctor	3-14 years
		1 Msc.	
		4 Graduates	
		12 Diplomates	
5. Coop. Promotion/Dev.			
Team Leader	Vacant		
6. Das	7	?	2-14 years
7. Administration	15	?	7-21 years
8. Finance	1	Secondary	8 years
9. Planning	Vacant		

Office and storage space was limited for it consisted of 3 rooms and 2 stores at Kobbo, a DA office and a store at the DA center in Kobbo and 3 service cooperative stores at 3 DA centers outside Kobbo town.

The total vehicle complement was one tractor and one motorbike. The office had no telecommunication service of any kind. Other equipment consisted of a refrigerator, a weighing scale and a cultivator. The latter were donations from the Ethio-Italy Project.

In terms of interactions with the regional or the National level those interviewed argued that they were pretty much their own and no regular contacts existed between them and the higher levels.

No budget figures were supplied but the basic salaries were paid by the Finance Bureau of the Woreda presumably from funds supplied by the Central government through the Regional Government. Per diems are supposed to be paid by the Zonal level according to the staff.

Because of lack of traveling budget and telecommunications contact, there is no direct contact with the Regional Agriculture bureau or the MOA in Addis Ababa.

REGION 5

In the Ogaden, as is shown in Table 4.4.1. Kilil 5 MOA Staff, there are ninety staff. Twenty five of them are in the livestock sector and one is in the cooperative sector. SERP operates in the area and data supplied by the Gabredehar Zone Office only lists 20 professionals in the Animal Health section as is shown in Table 4.4.2. Conceivably SERP has many more staff in other zones. We could not establish from the Regional Office whether the pattern for Qabredehar holds across other zones but it appears as if the coverage at the Woreda or Tulo level is also inadequate. In any case SERP is a project and there is need to build up the regular MOA staff.

Discussions in the Region suggest that a target figure of an extra 120 professionals in the livestock sector and 112 in crops and cooperatives would be a desirable target. Again as in most of the other organizations there are too many general purpose staff. Two thirds of the staff in the Ogaden are in this category.

RECOMMENDATION

The consultants propose that for the Ogaden a special programme be funded to 1. Recruit professionals and extensionist into the agriculture sector. 2. To retrain them (in service) in agro-pastoral production systems and community extension methods. 3. Support TA to plan the curricula to include local cropping production systems.

Before this activity is undertaken discussion should be held with SERP on whether their system can take on the task. In any case the target ought to be to produce an extensionist for each Woreda and to retrain them for the specific conditions of the Ogaden.

Assuming TA and support for 2 years as well as training costs it is estimated that this activity will cost about US\$ 500,000.

4.5. MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

The consultants did not get any detailed data from the MONRDEP at the national level on how decentralization has been worked out and on how it plans to staff sub-national levels for it is supposed to take from agriculture some key functions like soil conservation. Since the NDPPS directives see soil conservation work as an important component of EGS clearly this ministry will have to develop capacities for planning at national and sub-national levels so that these activities can be related to disaster management and development.

Requests for information were made not only by team but also UNDP and RRC staff. Consultants were told data was not generated for the ministry is young. A policy issue for the TGE is therefore to sort out how the new ministry is to operate on the ground for its mandate overlaps that assumed in the past by MOA staff of all levels needs to be rationalized for the ministry, as conceived, is an important actor in the link between disaster management and development.

In the Kobbo Woreda of North Wollo Zone, the ministry had a Diplomat with six years experience heading the bureau. There were two Das, with forestry specialization who both had 17 years experience. There were 9 persons in administration, there was no secretary. In terms of facilities there were three rooms in the MOA building. There was no typewriter. There was one table and five chairs. The personnel informed us that they have no regular contacts with either Regional bureau or the ministry in Addis Ababa. They like their colleagues, in the Woreda, have no telecommunications contact with any outside places.

In the Ogaden the consultants did not manage to interview field personnel from this ministry.

No proposals are made for this ministry due to lack of data.

4.6. MINISTRY OF HEALTH

The consultants did not get any detailed data from the MOH at the national level on how decentralization has been worked out and on how MOA staff can relate to disaster management. Requests were made not only by team but also UNDP and RRC staff. In field work, particular attention was paid to the field staff for the ministry is an important actor in the link between disaster management and development. The field study areas selected for the consultants before arrival were in Wollo Zone where a Daunt Woreda was in the high plateau and Kobbo was in the low lands.

In North Wollo Zone, there are 477 staff in the bureau as follows:

Post	No.	Qualification	Experience
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1. Health Officer	1	Bsc.	20 years
2. Medical Doctors	18	MD	10 years
3. Sanitarians	11	Diploma	5 years
4. Pharmacists	5	Bsc	5 years
5. Nurses	47	Diploma	+ 10 years
6. Pharmacy Tech.	13	Diploma	5 years
7. Lab. Tech.	7	Diploma	+ 20 years
8. Jun. Lab. Tech.	2	?	2 years
9. X-Ray Tech.	2	Diploma	5 years
10. Jun. X-Ray Tec.	1	Certificate	2 years
11. Field Surveyor	1	?	2 years
12. Anaesthetist	1	Diploma	1 year
13. J. Anaesth.	1	Certificate	2 years
14. Surgical Nurse	2	Certificate	2 years
15. Midwife	2	Diploma	5 years
16. Health Assist.	200	Certificate	+ 5 years
17. J. H. Assist.	54	Certificate	2 years
18. Ophthalmic Asst.	2	Diploma	5 years
19. J. Med. Eq. Tech.	1	Certificate	5 years
20. Administrators			
Zonal	1	?	?
Woreda	7	?	?
Hospital	1	?	?
21. Drivers	3		
22. Accountants	13		
23. Auditor	1		
24. Purchasers	2		
25. Record Officers	8		
26. Radio Operators	7		
27. Patient Regis.	7		
28. Cleaners	17		
29. Guards	35		
30. Cashiers	13		
31. Stores	6		
32. Others	41		
Total	537		

There is a wide spread of personnel with experience in the zone. There however are anomalies in the distribution of staff with administrators and all purpose general staff also dominating.

In contrast to the staff found at the Zonal level in North Wollo, Table 4.6.1. Region 5: Regional Health Bureau, shows the staff available. There are 10 doctors! The other medical staff do not approach the depth and experience of the staff found in North Wollo Zone. Given the history of facilities in the Ogaden, there also is a problem of location of the professional staff. Table 4.6.2. Shows Qabridehar Hospital Staff. These can be considered the staff of

Qabridehar Zone. 9 of the doctors in the region are in this zones hospital which used to be the Referral Hospital for the Ogaden. The fact that it is not in the regions center at Gode and further that communication to it from many points of the Ogaden are problematic essentially means that the specialized staff and equipment is not utilized. The issue here is utilization of staff by redeployment.

In the Ogaden, it is not just an inadequacy of personnel but also of supporting infrastructure. There are 12 functional vehicles and 13 non-functional. The Regional health Bureau is located in two small rooms and there are three small offices. The office problem is not as acute in Qabredehar Hospital but is acute in Shilabo Woreda where the clinic is just two rooms and the only equipment is 1 stethoscope 1 BP apparatus and a few syringes and of course the ubiquitous refrigerators!

The general TA recommended for Ogaden as a special case should sit and plan with the Health Bureau general staffing to existing zoned Woreda.

Donors working in Ogaden in health should create a coordinating committee to evaluate the provision of facilities , completion of some donor facilities and discuss long term health coverage.

This activity has no budget immediate budget line.

4.7. MINISTRY OF PLANING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The consultants did not get any detailed data from MOPED at the national level on how decentralization has been worked out and on how its staff can relate to disaster management. Requests were made not only by team but also UNDP and RRC staff. In field work, particular attention was paid to the field staff for the ministry is an important actor given the very detailed planning activities especially in the disaster directives. The field study areas selected for the consultants before arrival were in Wollo Zone where a Daunt Woreda was in the high plateau and Kobbo was in the low lands.

In North Wollo Zone the planning bureau has twenty seven staff 10 of which are professionals. 5 are economists, 2 are Agricultural Economists, 2 are Sociologists and one is a Geographer. Three of the staff are trained to the masters level in centrally planned economies. Five of the staff are trained to BA level in Ethiopia. Two of the Diplomates are trained in Ethiopia and one of the diplomates is trained in centrally planned economies.

The bureau did not have any data processing capacity. Since it had limited transport budget, no data collection was undertaken in the communities. It was not involved in any food production or food reserve planning or data gathering on food matters. It had limited facilities for four officers shared one room. The bureau has two

typewriters and one calculator!

In discussion with the staff, it was clear that the familiarity was with central planning activities. If the planning bureaus are requested to help sub-national governments to plan disaster management activities especially planning projects to be implemented by the EGS, there will be need to reorient the bureaus and perhaps retrain the persons involved for the skills they show do not seem to be related to the planning of community based activities which would link disaster management and development.

4.8. COMMUNICATION, TRANSPORTATION AND ENERGY

Some theories of development stress that basic to development is the provision of good road communication and lately telecommunications. If there is no agreement on the primacy of roads and telecommunications in development there is absolutely no debate about their primacy in disaster management. One of the basic realities facing Ethiopia is the poor conditions of the roads, their poor coverage of the drought prone areas and the limited telecommunications capacity in these areas. The salience of these issues did not become clear to the consultants until field work was initiated.

It is clear to the consultants though that of the many factors limiting capacity for disaster management and development poor roads and poor telecommunications are at the top. The two increase operating costs, cost of information and indeed cost of relief and rehabilitation. It may well be that the major way disaster management can be linked to development is to increase, 'and quickly, the road networks especially to smaller concentrations of population as well as creating telecommunications links.

In North Wollo, 4 of the 12 Woredas cannot be reached because there are no roads at all in their areas. When it rains 8 of the 12 Woredas cannot be reached for many streams have no bridges. It is argued that the situation was exacerbated by the war which has just ended. The two major roads cutting across the Region have also led to concentration of development inputs from donors to the proximity of the roads. Those involved in past disasters in this region point out that one of the major limitations to giving relief has been the roads. Currently some NGOs operating in the Zone have let Zonal administration know in no uncertain terms that they would only work in Woredas they can access easily. North Wollo Zone has no airport.

Daunt Woreda in North Wollo Zone is a classic case of the problem of road and telecommunication access. Very little interaction takes place even for the locally based officials for there is are no roads. Even the main road to the Woreda Office is impassable most of the year and then by special vehicles.

In the Ogaden, communication is almost non-existent. The microwave link between the capital and the outside world never works

consistently. It was estimated by the Regional personnel that 90% of the Woredas and zones are unreached by modern telecommunications. There are a few scattered radios, remnants of relics of past projects. The consultants were informed that is one of the issues under negotiation with the few NGOs who are in the region. Of course such facilities are dedicated to a specific institution like an hospital or an RRC depot. For general administration there are scarcely any links.

The state of roads is an impediment not only to disaster management but also to private business operations. The main road in the Region, Jijiga to Gode is just about the all weather road. It is in very poor shape and exacts a high toll on the life of vehicles. This increases costs so much that merchants Qabredehar claim that good double in price. Because of the poor state of roads private transporters refuse to put their own trucks into the region. Thus one has the anomalous situation where there is no local transport capacity while some Ogadenis have trucks in other parts of the country and other countries as was explained to us in Shilabo Woreda.

The consultants consider the improvement of roads such a central issue for disaster management and development of the Ogaden that we recommend this as the first priority in thinking about improving capacity. During field work it was recommended that the Dire Dawa-Jijiga- Gode and the Qabredehar-Waldea-Geladi-Bo- Border roads be upgraded to tarmac to minimize transport costs across the region. These improvements can be tied up to the financing of the infrastructure for the major gas project at Gelub. Discussions on their financing should be taken up with the WB which is involved in the Gelub project and which has proposed the upgrading of the Galub-Shilabo- Qabredehar-Degahabur-Jijiga-Dire Dawa Road in connection with the scheme.

Other roads to be improved to all weather level because they serve major local populations and are important in marketing local produce are: Negelle to Dollo; Kole Bridge to Cherete to El Kere and El Kere to Hargele to Afder to Bare which serves an important cropping area; Gode to Denan to Qabredehar- Shillabo-Mustafa; Shilabo-Mustahir to Farfer etc.

Power supplies are extremely limited in the Ogaden. Gode, the capital, is supplied by two generators with 194 kv rating and 867 kv rating. The later dates from the sixties and the former the eighties. The state farm used to have a respectable generating capacity but it has been run down. Two generators with a rating of 134 kv and 24 kv are on site. The former has been out of commission for years. The later works intermittently. Power supply in the Zonal headquarters is problematic at best for it is usually based on unreliable equipment and diesel supplies.

The consultants recommend that the TGE investigate the feasibility of connecting the major towns of the Ogaden to the national grid to facilitate the growth of other economic activities which form

part of the bridge from disasters to development. For example there are no systematic vehicle maintenance garages because of the unreliability of power in Gode. The better garage has its own generator. Presentations were made to us about the possibility of using the Gelub natural gas for generation of power. Although this may be a good idea from a regional point of view, there is a substantive question whether given the good hydro power resources of the country, natural gas should not be used in the fertilizer and transportation sectors mainly.

If connection to the national grid is to be undertaken, an argument was made to the consultants that it may be cheaper to build the main line from Bale rather than Jijiga for it would serve the population concentrations of the west. Whereas this is near, a case can be made for linking the power line to the development of the gas pipeline and thus taking the Jijiga route.

This issue will be resolved in connection with the major gas project and should be taken up at that level. It has no budget implications UNTIL THE BASIC SUPPLY DECISION IS MADE IN tge.

TELECOMMUNICATION RECOMMENDATION

It is therefore proposed that for purposes of early warning and facilitating administration a plan for telecommunication connections to all zones and woreda be developed. Towards that end TA should be funded for a period of 6 months to produce the plan in conjunction with the relevant authorities. It should integrate the private radio system with public ones so as to reduce costs and increase access for public officials.

ROADS RECOMMENDATION

We recommend immediate appointment of TA to work out a comprehensive road development plan for the region. Such a plan should integrate the need to plan and implement feeder roads into to facilitate local access to trunk roads to be implemented by the local communities under EGS/EBSN.

4.9. FINANCING OF SUB-NATIONAL LEVELS

During Field work consultants sought budget information at sub-national levels to assess whether these levels would be able to undertake the responsibilities assumed in the policy documents. We also intended to use the information as an indicator to the viability of local operations and thus to local capacity to generate some surpluses which can be used locally for disaster management after decentralization.

Systematic budget data was not provided at many levels including national Government. In a briefing at the PM Office it was pointed out that there have been administrative problems with the MOF.

In North Wollo Zone's Kobbo Woreda we were shown the audited accounts for financial year 1992/93. The figures in Ethiopian Bir are as follows:

Bureau	Budget	Petty Cash	Total
Education	1,262,664	15,305	1,277,969
Health	152,056	422,164	574,220
Agriculture	222,099	2,396	224,495
Administration	63,396	73,143	136,539
Finance	74,286	10,462	84,748
Justice	32,568	0	32,568
Lawyers	15,960	0	15,960
Total	1,823,029	523,470	2,346,499

During the same fiscal year the Kobbo Woreda was able to raise revenues of 900,419 EB. 86% of the income came directly from taxes. Revenue was therefore only about 38% of the civil service expenditure. Of course it is much lower if the security forces costs, which are not reflected here are included.

In the Ogaden, the state of administration is such that budget data was not availed to the consultants in form which made sense in analysis. Given that all the staff in the Region have not yet been sanctioned by the center, briefing in the Prime Ministers Office brought out this point, it will be a while before detailed information can be compiled.

According to a briefing by the PM office, budgets have been low generally both for the National Government and the sub-national levels for they were frozen and have been eroded by inflation and increases in operating costs. In North Wollo for example the Zonal Planning and Development Bureau receives from the Region only 6,000 Ethiopian B. per month to cover salaries of 22 staff of which 5 are economists, 2 Agricultural Economists, 2 Sociologists, 1 Geography Diplomat, 1 book keeper, 1 Casual, 2 Guards, 1 Messenger, 3 drivers and 4 Office Clerks. The operating budget given per month in 1993 is 1,500 Ethiopian B. This is supposed to cover Office expenses and transportation. Although the bureau has a vehicle, it cannot go out much for the operating funds are not sufficient to fuel it.

4.10 PROBLEM OF RELATIONS BETWEEN ADMINISTRATION AND TECHNICAL MINISTRIES

In the two Woredas visited in North Wollo Zone and at the Regional Government level in Kilil 5 as well as in the two Woreda visited in Qabredehar Zone it was apparent that there is a pattern of administration dominating some of the joint committees set up to handle technical matters. There were even cases where we found the different level Executive committees making technical decisions. Presentations along these lines were made to us particularly in regard to the future running of the Disaster preparedness

committees. This domination of administration seems to be structural and historical for the Directives point out who is to chair what. It is partly historical for in the past the administrative organs have tended to dominate the sub-national levels. Clearly the RRC staff who will be acting as secretariat at different levels must be aware of this problem and perhaps deal with it on an ad hoc basis.

4.11. CHRONIC PROBLEM OF OFFICES

There is a major shortage of office space and equipment in all drought prone regions. For example in North Wollo 22 staff of the Planning and Development Bureau Staff are in the bureau are crammed into two offices. The office situation is worse at the Woreda level. For example in Daunt Woreda, all the administration staff are housed in five rooms in a mud structure. The clinic staff have three rooms which also double as treatment rooms. The state of offices in this Woreda can be explained by its recent creation in some ways but is generally symptomatic of the general shortage of office space in the rural areas. Even in a Woreda Office like Kobbo, located in a relatively large town, the shortage of office space is apparent as more than 6 people share a small office.

If the office space available in North Wollo are insufficient, conditions in the Ogaden are very bad. To begin with at the Regional level on structure houses the President and staff associated with his office. This is the only modern structure in Gode. The established bureaus are scattered in the town and have inadequate staff. In the Zone visited, Qabridaharre Zone, some of the old established institutions like the Ministry of Health had fair office facilities. The new bureaus had acute office space shortages. Shillabo Woreda (Degmo) had only two small rooms for the Woreda administration. The same situation obtained for Dhooboweyn Woreda.

Insufficient physical facilities limit the work output of staff thereby eroding their capacity. It is a problem which Regional and National government will have to face and perhaps come up with self help solutions for the short run. On the part of donors, in spite of the fact that they argue physical plant is not a priority, it clearly should be in the drought prone areas.

4.12. THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR

During debriefing the issue of assessing the private sector role in capacity building and its capacity was raised. Although this was not originally in the terms of reference, data had been collected in all the places on private warehousing and available trucking capacities in the private sector.

In all the Woreda covered both in North Wollo and in the Ogaden there was no local trucks. The explanation was that the roads were so bad that private truckers, some from the region would not put their trucks on the roads.

Private warehousing was non existent. In the past the state did not encourage it. It is not clear yet that the state is encouraging it now for most of the planing documents on this are still tied up to building state controlled warehouses.

RECOMMENDATIONS

There are essentially two recommendations on these issues are that a major road building process be initiated in the drought prone areas.

The second recommendation is that TGE initiate a special programme of lending to the trucking industry.